Leaving a hundred dollar bill under a rock on the sidewalk, maybe? You'll never gain any benefit from it. Who knows, it might go to some drug addict. Or, someone really down on their luck who needed just that amount to make rent or cover this month's bills might pick it up instead. You'll never know. — Outlander

No. You served your agency or desire to act.

That would, technically be selfless, no? — Outlander

No. They may had gains or motives other than altruism.

No. You served your agency or desire to act. — Copernicus

What if I was drunk/high/on drugs/delirious from lack of sleep/in an emotional frenzy and had no such agency? At least, not my own as one is generally only considered to have otherwise.

They may had gains or motives other than altruism. — Copernicus

Here we go with more presumptions. That overused word "may" that means nothing in absolute discussion.

What if I was drunk/high/on drugs/delirious from lack of sleep/in an emotional frenzy and had no such agency? — Outlander

You are not of sound mind. Everything you do that is not done voluntarily (under influence or coercion) doesn't count as [voluntary] action.

If you have the liberty to choose, then it's voluntary. But if, let's say, I hypnotize or control you with magic, then not.

I've already discussed something similar here.

Here we go with more presumptions. That overused word "may" that means nothing in absolute discussion. — Outlander

Okay. They MUST have had other gains or motives.

You are not of sound mind. Everything you do that is not a voluntary act (under influence or coercion) doesn't count as [voluntary] action. — Copernicus

Is a person not of sound mind no longer a person? Who decides whose mind is sound and whose isn't? You? Society? Was such a formation of such standards a selfish act? How do you know? If it was a selfish act, perhaps their motives are less than representative of reality and conform to personal biases. Who are you to judge? Is this not selfish and so to be avoided, but most importantly invalidated?

Careful now. Lest one paint oneself into a corner one cannot so easily talk their way out of.

Who decides whose mind is sound and whose isn't? — Outlander

This is a chokepoint I've been stuck for a long while in multiple cases. I guess if I can crack this formula, I can solve multiple paradoxes at once.

Check out the hyperlink to see how this is something I have yet to solve.

Is a person not of sound mind no longer a person? — Outlander

If you have the liberty to choose, then it's voluntary. But if, let's say, I hypnotize or control you with magic, then not. — Copernicus

According to who? And certainly, it can at least be imagined as such. One can say many things about the Neoplatonists, or say the Sufi poets, but that they lacked imagination is not one of them.

According to me. My apologies, but when I was referring to the “communitarian” I was referring to an advocate of the modern philosophical movement. I was assuming you were one of them given your writing as of late.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/

In general, when there is an appeal to ancient framings or norms, the idea is that they are better, not that they are merely old (although to be sure, some folks do tend towards tradition for tradition sake, just as some see innovation as an end in itself).

I couldn’t see how such a framing could be better. There doesn’t appear to be much of a good life for the individual wherever Aristotelian traditions were particularly popular. In any case, communitarians often commit the fallacy of selecting a philosopher and assigning his opinions as the spirit of the age, as if everyone today has read Rawls and were all good liberals now. I’ll try not to make the same mistake.

If every action originates from the actor’s internal state, then no act can be wholly “selfless.” Even apparent self-sacrifice — the soldier dying for his country, the mother starving for her child, the philanthropist donating wealth — finds its roots in personal satisfaction, emotional fulfillment, or existential meaning — Copernicus

I don’t deny that we are motivated to achieve k personal satisfaction, emotional fulfillment and meaning. The question is , what is the connection between such reinforcers and our attempts to make sense of our world?


The psychological model you’re deriving both your concept of desire and self from is a bit moldy, dating back to Hobbes and updated by folks like Dawkins. More recent approaches within the cognitive neurosciences argue that there there is no ‘self’ to be found within mental processes as a little controlling homunculus, except as an abstraction. What we call the self is continually transforming its nature, meaning and purposes from day to day. It is more accurate to say that metal processes consist of self-organizing schematic patterns which ‘strive’ to maintain their dynamic consistency in the face of constantly changing conditions. Mental processes are designed to make sense of their world, and the best way to do this is to be able to anticipate events as effectively as possible, as far out into the future as possible.

The aim of this process of self-consistency is to assimilate as much of the world as possible into itself. This means that the ‘self’ doesn’t differentiate itself from others on the basis of a boundary defined by its skin, but by the limits of its ability to assimilatively make sense of others. It is possible for me to relate more intimately to a loved one than to myself when I am confused with regard to my own motives and thoughts. When I perform an active of ‘selfless’ altruism or generosity, it is made possible by my ability to expand the boundaries of my self, thereby achieving a more powerful self-integration by figuring out how to incorporate what I may have previously experienced as alien, threatening and unassimilable in the other. In other words, my most far reaching goals of ‘selfish’ desire are directly aligned with , and can only be achieved by, understanding others in ways that allow me to optimally anticipate their behavior.

I am not thereby using them as means for my own ends. Rather, their ends and mine are the same. My self-expansion is not fundamentally designed to come at their expense. This only happens when such attempts break down, and I cannot find a way to incorporate their strange way of being within my familiar schemes of understanding. The classical notion of selfishness as a competition among egos, whereby what fulfills my desires has no direct bearing on what fulfills yours, does not contradict what I’ve said here. Rather, the concept of the fortress self reflects the limits most people encounter in their ability to make sense of other’s thinking in ways that allow us to see ourselves in them. In sum self and other is not defined by spatially separated bodies. The non-self only appears when and where an aspect our our world presents a challenge to our ability to assimilate it , and we are not equipped to rethink our interpretation of it.

I don't see where I got it wrong.

If you have arrived at a definition that collapses the distinction, you've not arrived at a new profound truth (i.e. that there is personal benefit in kindness to others so such kindness is selfush), but instead you've just mis-defined a term. — Hanover

That collapse is what I tried to illustrate earlier in the discussion.

It is not as if the collapse gives us a better way to understand narcissism, lack of self-awareness, or solipsism, as a form of isolation.

What do you think of my definition for the term?

If Copernicus every ends up in a authority position on the Pequod, hopefully he facilitates mutiny for the sake of preservation of the group over tolerating the self-destructive madness of Ahab. Though the white whale was a bit of a black swan for the crew, and the lack of information along a hierarchy is as much the cause of failure of mutiny. Any whale potentially could sink a ship but what are the odds.

And Copernicus by chance could be cast as an Ahab, if psychopathic traits prevail.

Ahab was no more or less selfish than anyone else on that fictional ship according to the OP's generalization. Though he was ignoring economic/moral duty to pursue a personal desire/vendetta.

To be less selfish is to extend yourself into having someone else's perspective, so as to make a decision that benefits the greater self (the group) sometimes at the cost of the little self (you). The greater self may be selfish too but it's coordinated actions override and guide the little selves for mutual benefit.

The self can imagine itself to be like another, to have its point of view. If it shares a body with other selves, many may breath from the same lungs and coordinate to use the same appendages for the sake of living a good life. So together they are all selfish, insofar as they must use up and destroy or exploit other selves, for the sake of living.

I didn't read the book. What's the story/context?

To be less selfish — Nils Loc

Refinement of selfishness.

I didn't read the book. What's the story/context? — Copernicus

For my purposes you don't need to read Moby Dick but just contemplate when a crew shares a body (function/vessel) and coordinates action for mutual survival. You could just as well think of astronauts on a space station, who have to maintain a breathable atmosphere.

Refinement of selfishness. — Corpernicus

I think an issue is the connotative baggage of the word "selfish". It's doing a kind of associative/propagandist work we can't properly articulate. Like the generalization we've all a propensity for violence. It doesn't say much.

Rather we want to know, relatively, who is problematically violent and who is problematically selfish with regard to whatever the mutual goal is.

Rather we want to know, relatively, who is problematically violent and who is problematically selfish with regard to whatever the mutual goal is. — Nils Loc

Sounds more like statecraft than philosophy to me.

The definition excludes a difference that does not replace why the difference has been used up to now. General terms lose their value when they apply equally to all particulars without a way to make distinctions amongst those particulars. "All men have flesh" is not to say, "Flesh is all that men are." As a matter of contrast, the use of the terms self/selfless is similar to other contraries which provide a way to distinguish what is experienced through a range of differences. That was my first point:

The problem with your bubble is that the generality of the explanation renders any particular instance useless for inquiry. Distinctions without a difference. — Paine

The reference to La Rochefoucauld is to point out that none of his Maxims do anything without the distinction. Your definition erases his observations. Thus, my second point:

It is a problem with your dichotomy. You enlist La Rochefoucauld for your purposes but are unable to replace his model with equal perspicuity. — Paine

Hanover underlined the paucity of this generality as a way of describing our world. I jumped on the wagon by noting your definition does not give us any leverage understanding actual experiences:

It is not as if the collapse gives us a better way to understand narcissism, lack of self-awareness, or solipsism, as a form of isolation. — Paine

When Copernicus changed his standpoint from that of Ptolemy, he was looking at the same heavenly bodies. Your definition says they are the same but there is no corresponding discovery proffered.

Perhaps you would benefit from a reading of some of the literature on intentionality. Anscombe, maybe.

"Jack turned on the light" is neither selfish nor unselfish.

What makes it selfish or unselfish is the intent with which Jack turned the light on. And that is a description of the act, not the act. Jack turned on the light to see what was going on - done for himself. Jack turned on the light so that Jill could see what was going on - done for Jill..

Point being, you seem to be in need of a broader theory of action in order to understand what is going on here.

Other parties (their gain or loss or neutral outcome) are never my driving force for action. — Copernicus

Your use of "my" in that sentence makes your statement irrelevant. If you change it to "the," you'd be wrong. If you argue that an act is selfish if it is performed out of a desire to be a good person, you would also be wrong. "Selfless" does not mean the person receives no benefit from the act. Words are defined by usage, not by literally putting the words "self" and "less" together and then claiming it must mean an act where the person performing it receives no benefit whatsover.

the definition is purely wrong, then, and those neologists need to be hanged.

Jack turned on the light to see what was going on - done for himself. — Banno

Self-interest.

Jack turned on the light so that Jill could see what was going on - done for Jill.. — Banno

Intent to assist others — agency — serving his own will and limbs to turn on the switch. He did it to both save himself from subconsciously feeling bad for not assisting, and serve himself his agency to act.

without a way to make distinctions — Paine

Perhaps because there's in none.

Intent to assist others — agency — serving his own will and limbs to turn on the switch. He did it to both save himself from subconsciously feeling bad for not assisting, and serve himself his agency to act. — Copernicus

Not necessarily. It could just be an unconscious habit at this point, not unlike putting the toilet seat down after use or putting the cap back on a bottle after a sip.

What defies explanation is how you assume every person on Earth both alive and who ever did live once, and who ever will live just automatically has to have a mind that works the way yours does, exactly as it does. This is just not realistic, at all.

It could just be an unconscious habit at this point, not unlike putting the toilet seat down after use or putting the cap back on a bottle after a sip. — Outlander

Your brain adapting to a pattern for your future convenience — self-interest.

What defies explanation is how you assume every person on Earth both alive and who ever did live once, and who ever will live just automatically has to have a mind that works the way yours does, exactly as it does. This is just not realistic, at all. — Outlander

Just like I don't measure everything in the universe but know that (a+b)²=a²+2ab+b².

Your brain adapting to a pattern for your future convenience — self-interest. — Copernicus

But how can that be agency, if unconscious or otherwise a non-consciously formed arrangement the human mind forms automatically with no say or input from the "self" or conscious mind?

Is that not an example of a truly "intent-less" act? Like nail-biting or some other nervous habit? Sure, you can realize "whoa, wait a minute I'm biting my nails" and stop at your leisure, but it was still initiated without a conscious agent behind it.

Agency requires awareness and intent, whereas the prevailing understanding of the human mind is that the unconscious can never be made conscious. So riddle me that.

Just like I don't measure everything in the universe but know that (a+b)²=a²+2ab+b². — Copernicus

That still doesn't comport or explain an intrinsic, large part of your theory, which seems to suggest every other person's brain on Earth who lives, ever lived, or ever will live, somehow must respond and behave the exact way yours does.

But how can that be agency, if unconscious or otherwise a non-consciously formed arrangement the human mind forms automatically with no say or input from the "self" or conscious mind? — Outlander

You are pressing the switch in your sound, awaken mind.

Is that not an example of a truly "intent-less" act? Like nail-biting or some other nervous habit? Sure, you can realize "whoa, wait a minute I'm biting my nails" and stop at your leisure, but it was still initiated without a conscious agent behind it. — Outlander

Reflexive actions are done biologically for your own good. They're self-serving.

Agency requires awareness and intent, whereas the prevailing understanding of the human mind is that the unconscious can never be made conscious. So riddle me that. — Outlander

Your entirety is your self. Whether mind (agency) or body (reaction).

That still doesn't comport or explain an intrinsic, large part of your theory, which seems to suggest every other person's brain on Earth who lives, ever lived, or ever will live, somehow must respond and behave the exact way yours does. — Outlander

Natural law, not personal experience.

You are pressing the switch in your sound, awaken mind. — Copernicus

Hm. I'm sure the person is aware of it, but the arising tendency or intent to, in some cases, might be reflex of habit, thus never once being a thought that enters the "thoughtsphere" or "conscious mind." That's what an unconscious reflex or habit means.

Reflexive actions are done biologically for your own good. They're self-serving. — Copernicus

I'm sure many if not most have benefit, but now the person is completely removed from the equation thus eliminating all possibility of such sort of acts being either "selfish" or "selfless" since their is no agency. It never once crossed or entered the persons mind until said action long already occurred.

Anxiety or nervousness that makes one stand out and otherwise miss out of social opportunities doesn't seem "for [one's] own good." To name one example. Same with stuttering. And a few other non-willed actions that are generally lumped under "nervous tendencies."

Your entirety is your self. Whether mind (agency) or body (reaction). — Copernicus

Again, selfishness requires intent, which requires agency. Otherwise we're just talking about cellular responses, not unlike photosynthesis. Was that your intent?

Natural law, not personal experience. — Copernicus

So, what is your point then? What is the point of the OP? That organisms, no matter how simple (one-celled amoeba) or complex (human beings) perform actions that generally offer benefit to said organism in just about any and all scenarios? That's common knowledge; a solution in search of a problem.

I mean, what's next. An OP about how fire is bad if touched by most organisms?

You missed so much.

persons mind — Outlander

Mind isn't the whole of the person. Body can't be sidelined. Agency requires both (not necessarily in synergy; can be done independently).

Anxiety or nervousness that makes one stand out and otherwise miss out of social opportunities doesn't seem "for [one's] own good." — Outlander

It is. It reduces the stress and helps you relax.

stuttering — Outlander

Your bodily functions (whatever causes stutter) execute full agency (even if against your mind, i.e., your willingness to talk smoothly).

selfishness requires intent — Outlander

Why? Intent is mental. Function is physical. Both constitute the self.

OP about how fire is bad if touched by most organisms? — Outlander

That's a fact supported by everyone, unlike my OP, which is still being debated.

such as?