Accordingly, from the view point of philosophy, rather than asking, ‘Is a concept of Free Will valid’ would it not be more productive to ask, ‘Is a concept of Moral Autonomy valid’? — Robert Lockhart

Moral nihilists can believe in free will, so I don't think that this new question works.

Can't see how - from the perspective of philosophy as distinct from neural science that is - an enquiry into the possibility of free will unrelated to to the question of moral autonomy (albeit the possibility of such moral autonomy were to be considered within a context of moraly relative values) could have any meaning. Amoral autonomy, in itself, would have no consequences relevant to the discipline of philosophy. So, other than as it relates to the possibility of moral autonomy, what could be the purpose from the perspective of philosophy of any enquiry into the possibility of free will?

Because the issue of free will is concerned about causal responsibility, not necessarily moral responsibility. As a simple example, one can be a Cartesian dualist who believes that one's mind is the first cause of one's behaviour but also be a moral nihilist who does not believe that there are any moral facts.

First it must be decided that there are real choices made by the mind and directed by will, and then it must be decided to what extent real choices are constrained and influenced. The issue of our choices in a subjective morality context just one branch if the general question.

If we have real choices (none of this illusion stuff) then we can readily observe that we have constraints and influences on what is termed moral actions - no greater or less than any other action we can take.

The point of the OP seems to be that in order for there to be moral responsibility there must be moral autonomy, and in order for there to be moral autonomy there must be free will. The fact that this chain of entailment does not work in reverse: that if there is free will there must be moral autonomy and hence moral responsibility would seem to be irrelevant to that point.

The assumption made in my op – which I had assumed was inimical to dispute – is that any enquiry from the perspective of philosophy regarding the possibility of free will would in principle be concerned exclusively with considering the validity of a concept of moral autonomy, any consideration of a concept of amoral autonomy being at most tangential to the problem of moral autonomy and then only if the speculative assumption were to be made that a capacity of moral autonomy would necessarily be derivative of a capacity of amoral autonomy – i.e. that if it were to be proven that I possessed a capacity of irreducible autonomy regarding, for ex, my decision to bake pasta tonight then that such a capacity of amoral autonomy would necessarily imply on my part a capacity of moral autonomy. However since in the absence of a rigorous argument to demonstrate such a contingent relationship it would be illogical to presume it and, given then that it can indeed be accepted that the sole object of a philosophical enquiry concerning free will would be to consider the question of moral autonomy then, on that basis, I submitted that a less reducible form of the ‘Free Will’ question from the perspective of philosophy along the lines of, ‘Is a concept of moral autonomy valid?’ would be more appropriate.

given then that it can indeed be accepted that the sole object of a philosophical enquiry concerning free will would be to consider the question of moral autonomy — Robert Lockhart

That's the part I dispute. A moral nihilist would reject moral autonomy, given that they reject moral facts, but can accept that we have free will. As @Janus said, moral autonomy may depend on free will, but it isn't entailed by free will. They are distinct things.

Read Bergson. His inquiry into free will (choices) is entirely independent of morality and for him fundamental.

Rich: Not yet having read ‘Bergson’, could you indicate for me what he considers should properly be the purpose, from the perspective of philosophy, of an enquiry regarding the possibility of free will given that, from what you say of his position, he apparently dismisses the relevance of a concept of moral autonomy towards the problem even in the context of there existing moral values which are relative in nature? Assuming he would accept that the question of autonomy regarding amoral choice would, in itself, have relevance essentially for the discipline of neural science only, as opposed to philosophy, I’m wondering then what type of capacity of choice relevant to philosophy he considers to be at issue in the free will debate? - If a capacity of free will is not envisaged to consist in a state of moral autonomy then in what state, other than in a capacity of amoral autonomy, which presumably we can agree has in itself no ramifications relevant to the discipline of philosophy, could it be envisaged to consist?

Not yet having read ‘Bergson’, could you indicate for me what he considers should properly be the purpose, from the perspective of philosophy, of an enquiry regarding the possibility of free will given that, from what you say of his position — Robert Lockhart

Bergson was solely interested in understanding the fundamental nature of life and how such an understanding may affect the way one lives a life. He basically embraces creativity over a fated materialistic/deterministic view of life. His most famous book that earned him a Nobel prize was Creative Evolution.

“That's the part I dispute. A moral nihilist would reject moral autonomy, given that they reject moral facts, but can accept that we have free will. As @Janus said, moral autonomy may depend on free will, but it isn't entailed by free will. They are distinct things.” Michael.

The theory I am basing my views on considers the free will question as it is posed from the perspective of philosophy to be a sub set of the problem of moral knowledge:

The principle advanced is that moral autonomy should properly be regarded as being neither dependent on or entailed by a state of free will but as in itself consisting in a de facto state of free will. This theory for example considers the idea of ‘choosing’ to assent to either a moral or immoral act to amount to a logical contradiction in terms in that it regards immoral behaviour to be determined and moral behaviour to be inevitable in any individual, both types of behaviour following irresistibly from the level of the given individuals moral knowledge. The concept of irreducible personal moral autonomy is reconciled with determinism through attributing a causal roll to personal experience, from which the state of moral knowledge and therefore autonomy is regarded as being ultimately descendent. However as moral knowledge is regarded by this theory as being a conscious faculty on the part of any individual, and in this respect fundamentally distinct from the unconscious nature of determinism, so the moral nature of the behaviour thus descended, though such descent is considered by the theory as being inevitable, nonetheless is regarded on the basis that it be ‘knowingly’ elected as being simultaneously autonomous. In this way then the theory suggests a means of reconciling the concepts of determinism and free will.

Of course, such a theory is predicated on the idea that there exists an objective morality and so any solution to the Free Will problem accordingly is considered to be contingent on first successfully arguing for a concept of objective moral values and then describing the putative state of moral autonomy which could in principle be attained to.

If you attempt to predicate Free Will upon Morality you only create new problems which in experience simply do not exist.

Free will is no more and no less than the ability of the mind to choose a direction of action couple with the capability to exert will to attempt to effect such action. Beyond this it is open season including what the mind may consider moral, immoral, or no moral.

Rich: The philisophical problem of whether moral values are subjective/culturaly relative in nature or whether such types of values are ultimately ojective is of course a subject of perennial debate. The theory I am alluding to maintains that the latter situation is the case together with the principle that not only does moral autonomy itself comprise the state of free will but that free will comprises the state of moral autonomy - i.e that the two concepts map on to one another.

Yes, I understand your goal, but I think that creating contingency between these two ideas creates all kinds of complications without any added value, other than achieving a specific goal of giving morality ontological basis by virtue of its mapping to Free Will. I'm not big on goal seeking philosophy.

Rich. Well, having engaged in a constructive discussion at the end of which our ideas remain stubbornly incompatible, our only remaining option would seem to be to avail ourselves of the platitude of ‘agreeing to disagree’! - All I would add finally regarding the theory of morality I have been alluding to is that its’ most fundamental proposition is that it is impossible for an individual to wilfully assent to an act he ‘morally knows’ to be wrong and further, that it considers that the possibility of any putative state of ‘Free Will’ which could be regarded as meaningful in philosophical terms must be contingent on the validity of the concept of such a type of objective knowledge.

OK. Enjoy your exploration into the issue.

I read the opening statement, and I can't understand what is going on.

I think it's because there are too many assumptions the author takes for granted as common knowledge, whereas opinions are myriads that oppose what the author feels is "given".

One sense I get (it's not spelled out) is that the OP believes that morality always presents as a choice, and without making a choice one can't be moral. In my opinion that is so not true. Moral actions are always self-sacrificial (to varying degrees of self-harm), but involve no analytic brain work, and they are automatic.

Now, this, I can't even touch:

i.e. whether a concept of moral autonomy could be valid. In the absence of a rigorous logical argument to demonstrate otherwise, the frequently made assumption that the capacity of amoral autonomy and capacity of moral autonomy must necessarily be related is just that – an assumption which may in reality be invalid, and it is logically indefensible to include an unspoken assumption within the framework of a question — Robert Lockhart

HOW must something and its opposite be related? What is the "frequently made assumption" you speak of, Robert Lockhart? Okay, amoral and moral decisions are related, but HOW? These concepts the author ought not to have neglected to describe if not to define.

It is logically indefensible to include an unspoken assumption within the framework of a question -- I am sorry, what is this? If something is not said, of course it can't be attacked. Assumptions are not a matter for defense -- a premise is. Not all assumptions are premisses.

Robert Lockhart, OP, your presentation of a topic is insufficiently worded to make much sense.

szardosszemagad: My OP was an attempt to define more precisely what the aim from the perspective of philosophy of an enquiry concerning the possibility of free will should properly be.

It could of course be stated that the obvious aim of such an enquiry would be to enable it to be decided whether any individual could be capable of irreducible self determination regarding the election of personal behaviour in cases where circumstance made available to them alternative choices regarding such. However such general types of dilemma could be distinguished into those categories of behavioural choice involving connotations which are moral in nature – ex whether to steal - and those involving connotations being solely amoral – like what colour to paint my apartment. My OP commenced with the assumption that the aim in principle of any enquiry from the perspective of philosophy concerning the possibility of behavioural self determination should exclusively be to determine the possibility of such self determination with regard to the former category of choice, together with the view that the question of self determination regarding the latter category should in principle be considered a problem relevant only to the discipline of neural science. Accordingly, I suggested that the ‘free will question’ from the perspective of philosophy might more accurately be posed along the lines of, ‘Is a concept of moral autonomy meaningful?’.

Of course it could be advanced that a capacity of self determination regarding amoral choice, were it to be demonstrated, might then imply such a capacity regarding moral choice. However in the absence of a description of any specific mechanism which might in practice permit amoral autonomy, together with a rigorous argument to demonstrate the necessity of such a contingent relationship with moral autonomy - which capacity additionaly would presumably involve the separate element of moral knowledge - the question, ‘Is a concept of Free Will meaningful?’, would in itself by virtue of its’ generic nature seem in my opinion to be insufficiently accurate and to be unjustifiably assuming this contingent relationship referred to.

Indeed, given the absence of a justification for presuming that there must exist some form of contingent relationship between the putative capacities of moral and amoral autonomy, the possibility in principle must then be accepted that a demonstration in practice of the impossibility of the commonly discredited notion of amoral autonomy could nonetheless be reconciled with the idea that human beings might yet be capable of possessing a capacity of autonomy regarding behaviour involving morally relevant factors.