:rofl: Maybe so. But, then, the site could be asolutioninsearchofaproblem.com

How Does a Thought Cause Another Thought? — Patterner

It's precisely what counts as a thought that is insuffienctly described for me to have much of an oppinion about it.

Take "7+5". In what ways is that even thught? If I read "7+5" and think "12" then I might just cover this with a stimulus-response model without ever invoking the concept of "a thought".

Another problem: 5+7=12 is usually just memorised, so what happens is that we're completing a culturual template. In a manner of speaking, we're completing a default thought: filling a gap we automically perceive. So "5+7" might be an incomplete thought where we automatically fill the gap in the proper way.

This is not mainly describing what actually happens. For example, "5+7" = thought 1 and "12" = thought 2 might require a different theoretical model of thought than "5 + 7 = 12" is a common and context-evoking cultural template, so that "5 + 7" is auto-completed to make a recurring thought happen once again.

Take "432 + 493 = 925". If you were to see "432 + 493" and you recognise this as addition. You may solve, or you may shrug and walk away. These are two responses: do any of those involve thought? Is shrugging and walking away less of a thought than mumbling "Who cares?" and walking away, because the latter includes language and the former doesn't? Is the recognition of addition already thought, given that it's implied but not expressed in either reactions? How many thoughts are involved in solving the addition?

For example, I just went back to front: 3+2, put down 5, 9+3, put down 2, carry over 1, 4+4+1, put down 9. I could have been quicker if I'd just used 432 + 500 = 932; 932 - 7 = 925. I realised that too late. Is me automatically choosing my habitual mode a thought? To me this type of choice has a lot in common with completing 7+5; both happen almost without thinking.

What's different here is the output. If the output is language we tend to name it "a thought". I'm reminded of the line "A sentence is a complete thought". In creative writing circles this is usually used to stigmatise run-on sentences, or advocate for many short sentences over one long sentence. This has always struck me as silly. My intuition is to decouple thought and language, but if I do that what remains to look at. What kind of concrete entities remain as hints that you are thinking?

If "thought" is the process and "a thought" is a usefully demarcated stretch of that but that demarcation does not necessarily co-incide with the demarcation of the words what is there to go into the model. I'm not saying that words shouldn't be in the model, just that we should be careful not to use words and sentences as stand-in for thoughts.

This is me just rambling, really. To cut it short: I'm not convinced that "7+5" illiciting the response "12" is usefully modelled as one thought causing another (though I'm also not convinced that it doesn't). Maybe you just see "7 + 5" and think "7 + 5 = 12": maybe it's a visual stimulus triggering your mental copy of culturally template. But then for the reflected light on your retina to transform into a visual stimulus is thought necessary? And if so, how much of it? And if thought happens is there anything you could usefully demarcate into "a thought"?

I'm still trying to figure out what the topic is. — Dawnstorm

so far, this discussion looks to me like a solution in search of a problem. — SophistiCat

I just want to note that I understand these comments. For me, they point to two things: First, the difficulty of adapting our concepts of causality on the one hand, and the mental on the other, to even frame a sensible question. And second, as we've already noticed, the disconcerting way in which a perfectly simple (!) query -- Can a thought cause another thought? -- quickly expands into large theoretical questions, most of which we have at best tentative answer to.

Nevertheless, I'm going to try to post a reformulation of my initial OP question, in light of the very interesting discussion that's ensued. Hopefully later today.

Do we need to analyze thoughts in terms of causation? — SophistiCat

To this, I'd say no, we don't. I'm quite open to other hypotheses about the "relations," "affinities," "influences," "associations," et al. among thoughts. The only line I'd draw in the sand would be: We mustn't talk as if we already understand this issue, or as if there is no issue.

The only line I'd draw in the sand would be: We mustn't talk as if we already understand this issue, or as if there is no issue. — J

Well now that's two lines in the sand. Is it two different thoughts? Or is it one compound thought?

Yes, I'm joking.
:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

Another problem: 5+7=12 is usually just memorised, — Dawnstorm

You think? I intentionally looked for an example that I didn't think is memorized. I don't know that people memorize addition the way we do the Times Tables. It's also more involved than counting by 2s. And not as thoughtlessly easy as adding 1 or 2 to any number.

Well, even if it's not the best example, I'm sure we can find one that is net memorized, but is easy enough that the majority of people would add it up sticky and reading, rather than shrug and walk away.

Take "7+5". In what ways is that even thught? If I read "7+5" and think "12" then I might just cover this with a stimulus-response model without ever invoking the concept of "a thought". — Dawnstorm

I haven't thought about this before, but I'm inclined to disagree. I don't see how something we are thinking short isn't, but definition, a thought. And even if we're talking about counting by 2s, which most beyond whatever age can do easily, without any sort of calculating, do we not have to think to do it?

Take "432 + 493 = 925". If you were to see "432 + 493" and you recognise this as addition. You may solve, or you may shrug and walk away. These are two responses: do any of those involve thought? Is shrugging and walking away less of a thought than mumbling "Who cares?" and walking away, because the latter includes language and the former doesn't? — Dawnstorm

Either is a decision. Which sounds like a thought to me.

Is the recognition of addition already thought, given that it's implied but not expressed in either reactions? — Dawnstorm

I don't see how it's possible that it's not thought. Photons can hit our retinas without us really seeing it. We don't notice everything in our visual field, and wr sometimes don't notice things dead center in our visual field. But if you notice it enough to decide you are not going to do the math, you're thinking about it.

And if thought happens is there anything you could usefully demarcate into "a thought"? — Dawnstorm

It seems like running to me. Running happens. It's a process. And you go for a run. Thought happens. It's a process. And you have a thought.

(Although it might be better to use the word thinking for the process. Sometimes we do strange things with words. "Lowe's delivered the fencing yesterday.")


It's a difficult thing sometimes. Can a voluntary action become so habitual that there is literally no thinking involved any longer?

I do not believe driving, or walking through a crowded store, on "auto-pilot" is done without thought. We certainly relegate such things to the background. Sometimes so much so that we have accidents. And, not dwelling on any moment, nothing makes it into our long-term memory. But I have to believe there is some thought involved.

You think? — Patterner

I think or at least thought so. I'm, of course, uncertain, even more so now that you brought it into question. The thing is, when I read 5 + 7 in your post I didn't think 12. I knew you what you were going for, and that was enough for the purpose of this thread, which is very mentally demanding.

Now what's going on my mind here? I really did think that 5+7 is mostly memorised (of course not always for everyone). That's definitely true. So what was my thought process here? What's clear is that, even though I was prompted to "retrieve 12" and I knew I was prompted such, I didn't bother to retrieve twelve. Given my memorisation bias, I didn't bother to retrieve a synonym. "7 + 5" and "12" are labels for the same thought, so there was no need.

If that really is what happened, then we would have one concept beneath and two labels on top, and maybe three thoughts in total (one of which I didn't find necessary to activate). If this is not what happened, then it's possible that I misinterpret what's going on between thoughts and language inside my head. An my testimony on the topic would be at best unreliable.

The type of social study I gravitated towards while in University (sciology) relied a lot on self-report. So there's that.

I intentionally looked for an example that I didn't think is memorized. I don't know that people memorize addition the way we do the Times Tables.

I don't mean delibertaly sitting down and memorising tables. 12 is a low enough number so that if you've done a lot of addition by hand (as I have; when I was a kid in the 70ies even pocket calculators were expensive; these days everyone has smart phone) then you'll remember 5+7 as 12 simply by repetition. I assumed that's normal. Not something I now think I should assume.

It's also more involved than counting by 2s. And not as thoughtlessly easy as adding 1 or 2 to any number.

Not for me. 5+7 and 12 are literally synonymous in my mind. No extra steps needed. No need to retrieve 12, when I already have 5+7. Interestingly, I just went through other digit-pairs that end up at 12, and it seems I take slightly longer even with 11+1. It seems 5+7 is special for me somehow. Huh. Not what I expected.

Well, even if it's not the best example, I'm sure we can find one that is net memorized, but is easy enough that the majority of people would add it up sticky and reading, rather than shrug and walk away.

I agree.

I haven't thought about this before, but I'm inclined to disagree. I don't see how something we are thinking short isn't, but definition, a thought. And even if we're talking about counting by 2s, which most beyond whatever age can do easily, without any sort of calculating, do we not have to think to do it? — Patterner

I think you misunderstand my position. "Thought" is what's going on in when we're thinking. The process; the stream of consciousness (or part of it, whatever we're willing to count as thinking). "A thought" is unit that occurs with that process. It's perfectly possible to be thinking, but there's no good way to break what's going on apart to isolate "a single unit that makes up a thought".

So, if two thoughts are part of the same stream of consciousness, then if you zoom in one thought might cause another, but if you zoom out they're both part of a bigger thought. And it's easy to skip zoom levels without noticing. So, maybe we suspect thought 1 causes thought 2, when thought 1 is really just the beginning stage of thought 2. We've not been clear enough what happens on what level. But to be clear about that we need a sane model (and I have none).

I'm suggesting we need a model of what type of thoughts can reasonable compared to each other on a level that's relevant to causation. I'm sorry for being so convoluted, but that's just how I... think.

I don't see how it's possible that it's not thought. Photons can hit our retinas without us really seeing it. We don't notice everything in our visual field, and wr sometimes don't notice things dead center in our visual field. But if you notice it enough to decide you are not going to do the math, you're thinking about it. — Patterner

Again, this was meant to be a terminological enquiry. Above it was "thought" vs. "a thought". Here it is about the place of thought within a cognitive framework. Is all cognition "thought" or is it a specialised form of cognition distinct from other terms, such as "memory", "recognition". Maybe some people would like to use "thought" only for "reasoning"?

It seems like running to me. Running happens. It's a process. And you go for a run. Thought happens. It's a process. And you have a thought. — Patterner

Yes, that's my intuition, too, until that last sentence. Here I'd deiverge, maybe like this: "...It's a process. And you have a thought/thoughts." The slash is supposed to represent a modal "or" - depending on how you count what different grammatical structures apply. I wish English would mark this in its number system: singular, plural, either. I'd have used the third form here.

I do not believe driving, or walking through a crowded store, on "auto-pilot" is done without thought. We certainly relegate such things to the background. Sometimes so much so that we have accidents. And, not dwelling on any moment, nothing makes it into our long-term memory. But I have to believe there is some thought involved. — Patterner

Yes, that's my intuition, too, but it makes for a really broad term. The trade off is that - suddenly - thought is everything and nothing that goes on in the mind. With a definition so broad the question "can a thought cause another thought," becomes a trivial yes, but it's no longer an interesting question on it's own. It's a doorway to host of different questions.

Finally, thought in the context of cause and effect needs certain traits amenable to cause. What are they? If we review the thread we've had "causation = physical" and "entailment = logical", and then pair that up with Popper's 3 worlds. Causation would then inhabit world 1, and entailment would inhabit world 3, but thought would inhabit world 2 (as it's centre of operation, but it has tendrils in both world 1 and 3). If causation language is biased towards world 1, then how should we model thought, if we want to focus on world 2. Does that seem like a fair description of the confusion this thread is in (or is just me overthinking things again...)

If causation language is biased towards world 1, then how should we model thought, if we want to focus on world 2. Does that seem like a fair description of the confusion this thread is in (or is just me overthinking things again...) — Dawnstorm

I want to hear @Patterner's response, but I'll just jump in to say that I do think it's a fair description of the confusion -- or at any rate the uncertainty -- with which I began, and which prompted me to start the thread in the first place. I don't know that anyone's responses has made it any worse, or that there would have been a clearer path to follow. I'm still working on my own restatement of the OP question. . .

I only have a cell phone. I know it misspells things all the time, and I proofread a lot. It's very frustrating to read your response, and see mistakes I didn't catch.

"I don't see how something we are thinking short isn't, but definition, a thought."
might be better as
"I don't see how something we are thinking about isn't, by definition, a thought."

Anyway, I'll be back.

Do we need to analyze thoughts in terms of causation? — SophistiCat


To this, I'd say no, we don't. I'm quite open to other hypotheses about the "relations," "affinities," "influences," "associations," et al. among thoughts. The only line I'd draw in the sand would be: We mustn't talk as if we already understand this issue, or as if there is no issue. — J

To clarify, my question was not rhetorical. Where I was going with this is that causal analysis is a choice that we make, and so is the form that it takes. We shouldn't presuppose that causation is there, and we just need to elucidate it, or if it turns out that causation is absent, then we are in trouble (epiphenomenalism!)

That said, we need a proper motivation to look for causation. The place to start would probably be the field of psychology (less so philosophy of mind, for that is where idle and wrongheaded questions often originate...) Does mental-to-mental causation figure in psychology - as distinct from reason or explanation (informally, those words are often used interchangeably)?

As for the type of causation, perhaps inferential causation would be more promising in this context, since it is quite loose (being a spiritual descendant of Humean regularity theory) and does not rely on any physicalist ontology, such as energy.

It's not causation. It's memory retrieval. — L'éléphant

Could you expand on this? I have Thought A and then retrieve a memory so as to have Thought B? Why that particular memory? — J

Because of the operation of the mind -- thoughts are modes of thinking. If a thought can cause you another thought, are you not removing the mind from the equation?
A thought cannot cause another thought in the way that "causation" is used in philosophy.
You seem to think that a thought that can cause another thought is a starting point of an idea. If you think of an idea then another idea comes up, this thought that you said was caused by the first thought does not enjoy a particular hierarchy in the way actual causation happens. The mind is in control. It is also selective. A thought comes as a presentation from your mind. If further information is lacking or forgetfulness ensues, then another idea will come up.

Causation is physical. — L'éléphant

We can stipulate that, certainly. Do you think there's an argument for why it must be the case, or does it represent a kind of bedrock commitment to how to understand the concept? — J

Because causation is an observed phenomenon. That's why it is the case that it is physical.

It's not causation. It's memory retrieval. — L'éléphant

It seems to me retrieving a memory is a big way one thought causes another. Any kind of association is a memory. The fact that bananas are yellow is stored in my memory. So seeing something yellow might make me think of bananas. There was a ridiculous, hilarious show with Space Ghost as a talkshow host. One time he just blurted out that bananas have potassium, when it was only a tangent to the conversation. So thinking of bananas might make me think of Space Ghost.

Because of the operation of the mind -- thoughts are modes of thinking. If a thought can cause you another thought, are you not removing the mind from the equation? — L'éléphant

Maybe that is the mind. I've asked elsewhere - What is the mind when there is no thinking taking place?



Regarding causation in general… A famous example of correlation not being causation is watching a train station for a day, and noticing that every time a bunch of people gather at it, a train shows up.

One thought following another is not correlation. it is causation. Think of paparazzi. Your next thought might be that Lady Di was killed because they were trying to outrun the paparazzi. It might be pizza, because both words start with p, have zz, and have at least one a and i. Who knows how many other things the word causes people to think? But none of those thoughts were about to be thought anyway. They wouldn't have been thought (well, there are coincidences) if you hadn't been thinking about paparazzi. And paparazzi obviously did not become a thought in anticipation of Lady Di or pizza.

obviously, there are times when one thought was not caused by a previous thought. One example is you might be in the middle of thinking anything, and then you see or hear or smell something, and it entirely changes your thoughts.

A famous example of correlation not being causation is watching a train station for a day, and noticing that every time a bunch of people gather at it, a train shows up. — Patterner

They're most definitely causing the trains to show up. The proof of that if that if those people would stop showing up, the trains would eventually also stop showing up :wink:

And, in reverse, all the muddle-making issues about physical cause show up when we try to understand mental causation! — J

Maybe the issue is classifying causation as "physical" or "mental" rather than simply "procedural"?

Take "7+5". In what ways is that even thught? If I read "7+5" and think "12" then I might just cover this with a stimulus-response model without ever invoking the concept of "a thought".

Another problem: 5+7=12 is usually just memorised, so what happens is that we're completing a culturual template. In a manner of speaking, we're completing a default thought: filling a gap we automically perceive. So "5+7" might be an incomplete thought where we automatically fill the gap in the proper way. — Dawnstorm

This is the way it is for you now, but what about when you were in grade school learning arithmetic? Are you saying that we only think when we are learning something new and when it becomes reflexive it is no longer a thought?

It seems to me that consciousness has out-sourced it's thinking to other (sub/un-conscious parts of the brain) once something has been learned sufficiently enough where conscious thought is no longer needed. Does this mean that thinking is no longer involved, or that thinking was simply relegated to another part of the brain that does not require updated information from the senses?

So what was my thought process here? What's clear is that, even though I was prompted to "retrieve 12" and I knew I was prompted such, I didn't bother to retrieve twelve. — Dawnstorm

You knew you were being prompted to retrieve 12, so chose not to, all without thinking of 12? aren't you thinking of 12 when you realized it's what was being prompted? Isn't the best you could do choosing to stop thinking about 12?

I think you misunderstand my position. "Thought" is what's going on in when we're thinking. The process; the stream of consciousness (or part of it, whatever we're willing to count as thinking). "A thought" is unit that occurs with that process. It's perfectly possible to be thinking, but there's no good way to break what's going on apart to isolate "a single unit that makes up a thought". — Dawnstorm

Yes, I was misunderstanding. However, I think I disagree. In what way can we not break apart what's going on and isolate a single thought? Driving into work this morning I see a lot of leaves on the ground. It's autumn. I think New Yorkers as a rule like autumn. Pumpkins and squash and apples are big this time of year. All the apple orchards have apple cider and cider donuts this time of year, and there's usually fudge also. One orchard has a cupcake festival every year, which is as wonderful thing as you can imagine. Autumn also reminds me of a particular Monty Python moment with the leaves falling off the tree, seen here:
https://youtu.be/O7rU2l9WiYo?si=r0N021_livZ8fVd2

Allof these things can be seen as separate images/moments/thoughts, can't they?

I'm suggesting we need a model of what type of thoughts can reasonable compared to each other on a level that's relevant to causation. I'm sorry for being so convoluted, but that's just how I... think. — Dawnstorm

Sure, we should be able to come up with ideas for models along these lines. Any suggestions? I can't say I'm entirely clear on what you have in mind.

Finally, thought in the context of cause and effect needs certain traits amenable to cause. What are they? — Dawnstorm

Difficult to answer, since, as I've said, we don't even know what charge, which is fairly important for physical causation, is. If mental causation is a significantly different thing, it's going to be even more mysterious, since we don't have centuries of systematic study of it.


My apologies to you and . I don't know anything at all about Popper. I only heard his name for the first time recently, in another thread, and haven't been able to make head or tail out of what you two are saying about his Worlds.

They're most definitely causing the trains to show up. The proof of that if that if those people would stop showing up, the trains would eventually also stop showing up :wink: — Pierre-Normand

True enough. But the idea is that the gathering of people at that time and place is not the cause of the train's arrival. If nobody showed up when they needed to to catch the train, the train still would have shown up. It wasn't even the purchase of those particular tickets that caused the train to show up. Tickets for that particular day of the week and time would have to stop for some time before they stopped having three train stop there. At which point, no number of people gathering there would cause the train to stop.

At which point, no number of people gathering there would cause the train to stop. — Patterner

Got that, I was joking, but also kind of highlighting the contrastive character of causal explanation. Claims that event A caused event B always are ambiguous if one doesn't specify (or relies on shared assumptions) regarding what counts relevantly as event A happening: is it its happening in general, its happening once, its happening in some particular way, etc.

Yes, I suspected that was your thinking.

I don't know anything at all about Popper. I only heard his name for the first time recently, in another thread, and haven't been able to make head or tail out of what you two are saying about his Worlds. — Patterner

Sorry, perhaps we should have elaborated more. Fortunately it's a pretty easy concept to grasp.

He proposes a novel form of pluralistic realism, a “Three Worlds” ontology, which, while accommodating both the world of physical states and processes (world 1) and the mental world of psychological processes (world 2), represents knowledge in its objective sense as belonging to world 3, a third, objectively real ontological category. That world is the world

'of the products of the human mind, such as languages; tales and stories and religious myths; scientific conjectures or theories, and mathematical constructions; songs and symphonies; paintings and sculptures.]' (1980: 144)

In short, world 3 is the world of human cultural artifacts, which are products of world 2 mental processes, usually instantiated in the physical world 1 environment. — SEP article on Popper

This schema, which at first glance seems a bit rough and simplistic, proves surprisingly useful as a way to at least get a foothold in these ontological distinctions.

So, for thoughts, we have a World 2 event -- a "psychological process" -- and, often, a World 3 event as well -- language, math, often expressed as propositions and entailments.

True enough. But the idea is that the gathering of people at that time and place is not the cause of the train's arrival. If nobody showed up when they needed to to catch the train, the train still would have shown up. It wasn't even the purchase of those particular tickets that caused the train to show up. Tickets for that particular day of the week and time would have to stop for some time before they stopped having three train stop there. At which point, no number of people gathering there would cause the train to stop. — Patterner

Got that, I was joking, but also kind of highlighting the contrastive character of causal explanation. Claims that event A caused event B always are ambiguous if one doesn't specify (or relies on shared assumptions) regarding what counts relevantly as event A happening: is it its happening in general, its happening once, its happening in some particular way, etc. — Pierre-Normand

It could also simply be that we are wrong about the causes. Train stations are built where there are towns, or close to interesting locations that humans might want to visit. It's not necessarily about where humans are, but where they might want to go. A locomotive company might make a bad investment building tracks to somewhere people are not interested in going, or are no longer interested in going.

As such, our ideas, dreams and predictions play a causal role in the world.

Are you saying that we only think when we are learning something new and when it becomes reflexive it is no longer a thought? — Harry Hindu

I'm saying that's one way to look at it. It's not actually my preferred way, but I think in a context of causation a more narrow concept of what constitutes "a thought" may be more useful than my intuitive model that is broader.

It seems to me that consciousness has out-sourced it's thinking to other (sub/un-conscious parts of the brain) once something has been learned sufficiently enough where conscious thought is no longer needed. Does this mean that thinking is no longer involved, or that thinking was simply relegated to another part of the brain that does not require updated information from the senses? — Harry Hindu

As I replied to Patterner, I'm not concerned with "thought"; I'm concerned with how to isolate "a thought" from the process of thinking such one can say that "thing" is caused. And I need to be concerned with this because I'm denying that thought corresponds either with words or propositions. The problem is that have no clear alternative.

If I engage with other people on this topic, I can't just assume we mean the same concepts just because we use the same words. I'll go into examples when replying to Patterner.

You knew you were being prompted to retrieve 12, so chose not to, all without thinking of 12? aren't you thinking of 12 when you realized it's what was being prompted? Isn't the best you could do choosing to stop thinking about 12? — Patterner

To be precise, at no point did I retrieve the word "12". That is a fact, if my memory is reliable, which it might not be. The choice would have been subconcsious, if it's a choice at all, and not just me being busy with other things. One of my interpretations, is that - on account of me having made a strong connection between "5+7" and "12" - thinking of "5+7" already is thinking of "12". Me recognising your intention is me foregrounding your intention and thus actualising the connection between "5+7" and "12" was not neccessary. This is not a fact. This is me guessing what went on my in mind.

Part of that is - again - the connection between thought and language. Thinking "5+7=12" has many aspects to it. One is the idea of an equation. "5+7" and "12" are literally synonymous on account of what an equation means. So I can recognise addition as an equation, and can see 5+7 (and through reading actualise it in the moment) and then not actualise "12", the sign, as it refers to the same concept of the compound sign of "5+7". They have the same meaning in the value sense, but different meanings in what they represent within a mathematical operation. Since this thread, though, isn't about maths, I think I felt no need to actualise "12" because my mind/brain was busy with the topic of the thread.

This is plausible to me because the topic of this thread is highly complex; not having time for associations that would otherwise trigger seems plausible. That doesn't mean it's true, but it's the best I have.

I can't say I'm entirely clear on what you have in mind. — Patterner

All I really have in mind is vague ideas and a question. That is to say, I'm not entirely clear on what I have mind either. I'm not ready to make a model yet. Currently I'm waiting for "@J's" post.

As for the three worlds: it's basically physical world, experience, and abstraction. I'm sure I use it differently than Popper did. But the basic distinction is useful when it comes up. I'm not sure I'd ever have brought it up myself.

Google’s ever-helpful chat-program – presumably reflecting some kind of cyberworld consensus – would like to straighten this out for us:

“Causation involves a physical connection between events, while entailment is a relationship between propositions.” — J

Thus is the incredibly opaque nature of a thought having any bearing on "physical reality".

Thoughts give rise to eachother in terms of their topical content, like with your example of thinking about ann. This reminded you of her upcoming birthday.

However, i would argue this whole process is fully dependent on emotional content. Thoughts that carry less emotion are less likely to have any importance to you, and continue any newtonian chain reaction.

So here is a restatement of the issues in the OP, as influenced and I hope clarified by the subsequent discussion.

1) I began by saying that the question of “thought-to-thought” causation should be understood in the context of psychologism vs. logicism. I still think this is a possible approach, but most of the discussion focused on the Popperian vocabulary of World 2 and World 3 objects/processes, so I’ll stick with that.

2) The OP assumes an overly binary version of how we have to understand what a thought is. This was partly for purposes of simplification and tractability, but also partly because I hadn’t deeply considered some of the points about “streams of thought” and non-verbal thoughts that subsequently arose. I proposed that when we have the ordinary mental experience of first thinking “I wonder how Ann is doing” and then “It’s her birthday soon; I must get her a present,” we must choose between seeing these thoughts as either psychological events in my mind, or as propositions that could find expression – and possibly necessitation of some sort – in anyone’s mind. And this is fair enough, but it suggests that “thought” must come equipped with certain properties it may not have, especially linguistic expression. The problems that @Dawnstorm and others raised about this are exigent.

3) So what does the question “Can a thought cause another thought?” really ask? I now believe it’s a question about a certain kind of thought, namely a thought that has been expressed linguistically and is thus a candidate for being described in propositional, World 3 terms. But not all thoughts are like this. If we ask, “But what caused the original thought about Ann?” we are giving proper importance to this point – what “caused” (if this is even appropriate) the original thought may have been completely non-verbal, but nonetheless a thought if we allow “thought” to cover many more mind-events than the OP suggested was possible. And I’m inclined to think we should.

4) Now there’s the danger that the discussion will swerve into a terminological dispute. Let’s avoid that. I don’t much care about deriving a precise definition of what a thought is, or what are the correct ways of using the term “thought.” I’m happy to narrow my questions about mental-to-mental causation to a certain type of thought; call it a J-thought. Such a thought is one that can be given a description in either World 2 or World 3 terms – thus, it is likely linguistic, or at least a linguistic thought would be the type-specimen of a J-thought. So my initial question is now: “Can one J-thought cause another, and if so, is this by virtue of a World 2 relationship, a World 3 relationship, or some combination?” And lurking behind this question is another, broader one, which has also been raised repeatedly here: If causation isn’t a very good model of what happens when we think J-thoughts, then can we come up with a better description, something more contentful than merely “association” or “affinity”?

Happy to forge on, or of course we can let it go at this point.

So my initial question is now: “Can one J-thought cause another — J

One thought can cause another. It happens all the time.

and if so, is this by virtue of a World 2 relationship, a World 3 relationship, or some combination?” — J

I won't be able to help you with this. I just don't get the idea well enough. Or maybe the point of it. We'll see if I catch on as you guys discuss.

If causation isn’t a very good model of what happens when we think J-thoughts, then can we come up with a better description, something more contentful than merely “association” or “affinity”? — J

I think causation is a good model, and I think it's because of associations.

As I replied to Patterner, I'm not concerned with "thought"; I'm concerned with how to isolate "a thought" from the process of thinking such one can say that "thing" is caused. And I need to be concerned with this because I'm denying that thought corresponds either with words or propositions. The problem is that have no clear alternative.

If I engage with other people on this topic, I can't just assume we mean the same concepts just because we use the same words. I'll go into examples when replying to Patterner. — Dawnstorm

I don't see how one isolates a thought from the process of thinking. It would be like trying to isolate the stomach from digestion, and I don't see how that would get us any closer to how thoughts are caused.

Would you agree that conclusions are caused by reasons? Have you ever reached a conclusion without a reason? Would that still qualify as reasoning (thinking)?

In what sense are we using "cause" and "effect"? It seems obvious that similar causes lead to similar effects, so why wouldn't it be that some thought leads to similar thoughts. You can tell because part of the thought is shared with the other. In what way is a baseball causing a window to break different than 2+ 2 causing 4? 2+2 isn't necessarily equal to 4. 2+2 is an act of adding two groups of two. 4 is one group of four and what you get AFTER adding two groups of two. Essentially addition and subtraction are moving the goalposts of the boundaries of what we are talking about. Are we talking about two groups of two, or one group of four?

It seems more important to lay out what we mean by "cause" so even understand how it happens in the physical realm to understand how it might apply to the mental. If we admit that the mind and the world are connected causally - that the physical realm can cause changes in the mental realm (try stubbing your toe) and vice versa (think about all the holiday decorations you see at your local mall during the holiday season), then it seems to me there is no distinction between physical and mental causes, and that making this distinction (dualism) could be part of the problem.

To be precise, at no point did I retrieve the word "12". That is a fact, if my memory is reliable, which it might not be. The choice would have been subconcsious, if it's a choice at all, and not just me being busy with other things. One of my interpretations, is that - on account of me having made a strong connection between "5+7" and "12" - thinking of "5+7" already is thinking of "12". Me recognising your intention is me foregrounding your intention and thus actualising the connection between "5+7" and "12" was not neccessary. This is not a fact. This is me guessing what went on my in mind. — Dawnstorm

This doesn't make any sense. How did you know that there is a relationship between the scribbles "5+7" and the scribble "12", or even what that relationship is? WHY does 5+7=12? These are just scribbles on the screen in which the relationship is not obvious with a simply observation. You have to already have learned what the relationship is. Your recognition that 5+7 and 12 mean the same thing is an effect of your prior experiences. If you had never seen those scribbles before your thoughts about them would be different.

I don't see how one isolates a thought from the process of thinking. It would be like trying to isolate the stomach from digestion, and I don't see how that would get us any closer to how thoughts are caused. — Harry Hindu

I don't know about being able to isolate a thought from the process of thinking, but we can clearly talk about different thoughts in isolation. I can think of my door that needs work too keep thme cold out. I don't know what to do, so I need to find a carpenter. I really like the music of The Carpenters, and Karen had an amazing voice. Karen does because, even though she was recovering from anorexia, it had already causes damage to her heart.

We can talk about many separate thoughts in all that.
-My door letting in the cold
-carpenters
-The Carpenters
-Karen's death
-anorexia

Would you agree that conclusions are caused by reasons? Have you ever reached a conclusion without a reason? Would that still qualify as reasoning (thinking)? — Harry Hindu

I would agree that conclusions are caused by reasons. I think reasoning is one way a thought can cause another.

But I don't think all thoughts caused by another are the result of reasoning. Sometimes it's just an association, which means memory.

And not all thoughts are caused by other thoughts. For example, sensory input often causes thoughts.

It seems more important to lay out what we mean by "cause" so even understand how it happens in the physical realm to understand how it might apply to the mental. — Harry Hindu

My definition might be something like:
Thought B was caused by Thought A if B would not have come into existence at the time it did had A not existed first.

As for how it works, I'm thinking of this:
B came into existence because of an association work A (meaning A triggered a memory); because it was the conclusion of a line of reasoning that lead from A to B; (other "mental mechanisms"?).

I don't know about being able to isolate a thought from the process of thinking, but we can clearly talk about different thoughts in isolation. I can think of my door that needs work too keep thme cold out. I don't know what to do, so I need to find a carpenter. I really like the music of The Carpenters, and Karen had an amazing voice. Karen does because, even though she was recovering from anorexia, it had already causes damage to her heart.

We can talk about many separate thoughts in all that.
-My door letting in the cold
-carpenters
-The Carpenters
-Karen's death
-anorexia — Patterner

But did they really occur in isolation? What do you mean by isolated? It seems to me that the isolation is a mental projection onto the thinking process just as we project our categorical boundaries onto other natural processes. And each thought shares a property with the thought before it.

But I don't think all thoughts caused by another are the result of reasoning. Sometimes it's just an association, which means memory. — Patterner

We can agree that thinking and recalling are both mental processes and causally related (why would you recall something if not to think about it).

And not all thoughts are caused by other thoughts. For example, sensory input often causes thoughts. — Patterner

Yes. And thoughts can be the cause of things that are not thoughts.

My definition might be something like:
Thought B was caused by Thought A if B would not have come into existence at the time it did had A not existed first.

As for how it works, I'm thinking of this:
B came into existence because of an association work A (meaning A triggered a memory); because it was the conclusion of a line of reasoning that lead from A to B; (other "mental mechanisms"?). — Patterner

B came into existence because of an association work A (meaning A triggered a memory); because it was the conclusion of a line of reasoning that lead from A to B; (other "mental mechanisms"?). — Patterner

Yes, the effect always seems to retain some property of the cause.

But did they really occur in isolation? What do you mean by isolated? It seems to me that the isolation is a mental projection onto the thinking process just as we project our categorical boundaries onto other natural processes. And each thought shares a property with the thought before it. — Harry Hindu

I don't really know what you had in mind with the word "isolation". But, unless we say we have only one thought per day, spanning the entirety of the time we're awake and thinking, then, whatever it means, we isolate thoughts all the time. I just ate a salad. You don't need, and surely don't want, to hear all the thoughts surrounding it. My wife gave it to me. She got it last night at a late meeting for her job. Her boss had these meeting every month. He always gets food. but my wife only eats one meal a day, and it is keto, so she never eats at these meetings. For some reason, that bothers her boss. He always wants her to eat, and actually you could say he pressures her to eat. don't know why he feels so strongly about it. Anyway, it's usually pizza or something, and she's not gonna eat it under any circumstances. But last night he got her this nice chef salad, and asked her how that was. She said she would eat it today. She gave it to me instead. My father absolutely loves chef salads. He always says, "That was good! It had everything!" it cracks all of us up. we can go to any restaurant, with the most amazing food in it, and he's darned likely to ask if they have a chef salad.:rofl:

I just ate a salad.

First, I have to appologise. I'll likely not be writing much in the weeks to follow. We're transitioning from one piece of software to another and it's so different that apparently data export and re-import isn't possible. So we're currently working with two pieces of software, while also transferring data by hand... and I'm very bad at multitasking. I'll be mentally exhausted most of the time. I am now.

I don't see how one isolates a thought from the process of thinking. It would be like trying to isolate the stomach from digestion, and I don't see how that would get us any closer to how thoughts are caused. — Harry Hindu

That wasn't well-phrased by me. If "a thought" causes another "thought" (countable: one thought, two thoughts...) and it's all "thought" an ongoing process, then we need to divvy up the stream of thought into distinct pieces each of which is "a thought".

Since I came into this thread saying that "sentences" aren't clear expressions of thoughts and thus "I wonder how Ann is doing," isn't a 1:1 expression of thought, it's up to me to say what a thought is and how it's related to its sentence. I tried in this thread, but... it's hard.

I'm not trying to say "thinking over here" and "thoughts over there"; I'm asking something like how many thoughts are there in a given stream of consciousness and do we have a reliable method to tell where one thought ends and a new one begins. This is not a question of "what is going on?"; this is a question of which tools are best for looking at what's going. The theory that leads to a theoretical definition that we can then operationalise so we can look at what's really going on.

Would you agree that conclusions are caused by reasons? Have you ever reached a conclusion without a reason? Would that still qualify as reasoning (thinking)? — Harry Hindu

I don't know how to approach this question. We might call a particular stretch of thought "a conclusion", but it might just be a subconscious decision which in turn caused us to look for ex-post rationilastions. In other words, I think that sometimes (and if I'm pessimistic, most of the time) we think of our causes the wrong way round.

Why do I think this? Am I right? How would I tell the difference? (I actually second-guess myself like that all the time.)

In what way is a baseball causing a window to break different than 2+ 2 causing 4? 2+2 isn't necessarily equal to 4. — Harry Hindu

That's part of the point of the thread, if I'm not mistaken. I don't know, but it's an interesting question. (I think there's a difference.)

It seems more important to lay out what we mean by "cause" so even understand how it happens in the physical realm to understand how it might apply to the mental. — Harry Hindu

That's part of the opening post, too. I focused on "thought" out of personal necessity: it's the thing that's the most unclear to me, so if I can't figure that particular topic out I have little to contribute.

This doesn't make any sense. — Harry Hindu

Yeah, we don't seem to be on the same page. Maybe not even in the same book.

You have to already have learned what the relationship is. Your recognition that 5+7 and 12 mean the same thing is an effect of your prior experiences. If you had never seen those scribbles before your thoughts about them would be different. — Harry Hindu

Obviously. I'm not sure what to make of this whole paragraph. We're talking past each other.

Since I came into this thread saying that "sentences" aren't clear expressions of thoughts — Dawnstorm

Ted Chiang wrote a short story called Understand, in which a man becomes super intelligent. Not really intelligent. Super intelligent. He says this:

I’m designing a new language. I’ve reached the limits of conventional languages, and now they frustrate my attempts to progress further. They lack the power to express concepts that I need, and even in their own domain, they’re imprecise and unwieldy. They’re hardly fit for speech, let alone thought. — Ted Chiang

I haven't read many of Ted Chiang's short stoies, but I've liked what I read so far. If I were to write this story, the narrator would fail.

:rofl: