Well, if the good is being qua desirable (what is truly most fulfilling of desire) in what way is it ever "better" to choose the worse over the good?

Why is it morally obligatory to choose the better over the worse?

Why choose the better over the worse? Why choose good over evil? These seem extremely obvious to me, so I am not sure how to answer. Those who deny morality tend to say that nothing is good or evil, not that it makes sense to choose evil as evil. Even Milton's Satan has to say "evil be thou my good," because "evil be evil to me that I might choose you anyway" makes no sense. So, what is the definition of "morally obligatory" here?

Of course they don't. That's why they aren't moral injunctions. Whereas "You ought to help the poor" is. Is there a reason why "ought" can't have both moral and non-moral uses? Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that "we still don't use the word 'ought' exclusively in this way"? For why should we? -- surely the deontological ethicists weren't recommending that. — J

So, helping the poor isn't truly desirable or a path to happiness? Then why do it?

Kant's response relies on sheer formalism to answer this question. I suppose what is "desirable" is "the good will willing itself," but because of his epistemic presuppositions Kant is only able to establish this by sheer definition. Indeed, other people and their freedom as moral agents cannot be known according to Kant, but are mere "postulates of practical reason" needed to justify practical reason's definitional drive towards universalization.

I will just repeat what I've said before here:

The problem here is that Kant makes "moral goodness" a wholly sui generis (and wholly formal) good that is isolated from all other goods (e.g., the good "good food," or a "good baseball player," or even the good of being in love, etc.). I do not think it is too strong to say this is a sort of castration of the Good as classically conceived. We go from a source of endless fecundity and plentitude, which is present in all being, both reality and appearances, to a sheer formalism. The good that we have access to is no longer generative. It is essentially cut off from how the world is. No matter how the world is, all "rational entities" will share the same sterile goal, none able the affect the other's aims.

More to the point, this makes being "moral" unrelated to "having a good life" except accidently. But if being "moral" doesn't make us or others happy, what good is it? Why should we care about contradicting our "rational nature" when rationality itself seems only accidentally related to desire? Although Kant comes to many laudable conclusions, I think there is something perverse in the idea that "what is most choice-worthy" is a "good will" that is its own object and law giver. It makes desire collapse into a solipsistic black hole. The creature must never look outside itself for the "moral." There is no Eros drawing us on. The Other is irrelevant. Only the Same matters; the entire goal of ethical life ends up being an effort to universalize an isolated, autonomous will so that it becomes self-similar ("law-like") in its willing. Is this not a picture of the incurvatus in se with a halo of moral conclusions disguising it?

It's also arguably the height of hubris to think that "how to become a good person" is something that requires no contact with being or others, but only isolated reason. The entire edifice hangs on the idea that practical reason can never be corrupted (an assumption that seems phenomenologically suspect). This is a move that pretends to flow from epistemic humility, but which absolutizes the self above all others. Yet, given the epistemological constraints, this only makes sense. Kant might be said to be doing the best possible with the conditions he has set for himself.

I mean, what is the point of Kantian ethics if you don't agree with his epistemology? Kant himself seems to allow that it must be developed only because of the extreme epistemic limits he has set on himself.

This seems like a long and convoluted way to explain something that can be better explained in a much more direct way. We believe killing is wrong because we care about others. We care about others because we see them as like ourselves, which allows us to relate to them, learn from them, expand the boundaries of our sense of self. It’s not a question of what we can ‘get out of them’ for some narrowly conceived selfish purpose, but that they become a part of our own sense of self. — Joshs

This makes sense, but I don’t think it contradicts what @panwei has written. I think it makes sense too say, or at least consider, that the fact we care about each other is something that has evolutionary roots.

I agree with the thrust of your post, and I personally share the sentiment quoted above. But . . . suppose I don't? Suppose I don't see others as like myself, and am not interested in relating to them or expanding my sense of self. Are you arguing that I ought to? — J

I saw @Joshs response to this. Here are my thoughts. It’s not that humans have to or ought to see others as similar to themselves, it’s that they tend to and are capable of seeing them that way.

This makes sense, but I don’t think it contradicts what panwei has written. I think it makes sense too say, or at least consider, that the fact we care about each other is something that has evolutionary roots. — T Clark

It can have evolutionary roots in two ways . One way is that it is a gimmick, an arbitrary genetic contrivance whose value is indirect; that it is adaptive for the survival of the species. The second way is that the intrinsic dynamics of caring and social involvement function according the same same principles as evolutionary processes; not as an arbitrary gimmick that just so happens to further survival but
as what Piaget described as the fundamental organizing principle of life , the reciprocal relation between assimilation and accommodation in evolving living systems from a weaker to stronger structure. This limited the arbitrary gimmick aspect, as though we would stop caring about each other if evolution found a better way.
Another way to put it is that relevance and mattering are not inventions of evolution, but its basis.

The above is an explanation I made after completing the institutional argument to respond to Hume's dilemma. — panwei

What is the institutional argument?

In what sense did you complete it?

Translations provided by deepseek. — panwei

Which translations?

Traditional political philosophy often grounds its normative foundations in transcendent moral laws or abstract social contracts. — panwei

Is this your own observation?

However, the "must" argued for in this theory — panwei

Which theory? (Your OP's title?)

[For Kant,] No matter how the world is, all "rational entities" will share the same sterile goal, none able the affect the other's aims. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Cf:

MacIntyre at first responded to Anscombe's call to provide an adequate account of human flourishing by developing a theory of virtue that rejected what he called "Aristotle's metaphysical biology." MacIntyre soon came to see, however, that he was wrong, and this on two levels. First, although there is much in Aristotle's biology that is outmoded, MacIntyre came to see that any adequate account of human virtue must be based on some account of our animality: human virtues are the virtues of a specific type of animal, and our theories of virtue must take this animality into account. Secondly, an adequate portrait of human flourishing must recognize that there are principles within us that are ordered toward this flourishing as toward their proper end. There is a dynamic given-ness to nature that we are called to discover and to respect, on the cognitive level and on the level of the spiritual desires of the will and our passions. Indeed, MacIntyre will affirm that the incoherence of contemporary culture is largely a result of its rejection of this causality. As MacIntyre explains in the prologue of the third edition to After Virtue, his subsequent reading of Aquinas had lead him to deepen his understanding of this aspect of human nature. And this is a quote from MacIntyre, "I had now learned from Aquinas that my attempt to provide an account of the human good purely in social terms—in terms of practices, traditions, and the narrative unity of human lives—was bound to be inadequate until I had provided it with a metaphysical grounding."

MacIntyre was nonetheless still committed to giving a non-rationalistic account of how we come to know these metaphysical principles and live according to them. Thus, he adds, "It is only because human beings have an end toward which they are directed by reason of their specific nature that practices, traditions, and the like are able to function as they do." What MacIntyre means here is that it is precisely because we are metaphysically ordered to flourishing on the level of the principles of intellect and will that A) communities of virtue that promote this flourishing are possible, and that B) barbarous communities that are ignorant of the true nature of human flourishing can also arise. Because this orientation exists on the level of principle, we can wrongly apply these principles and teach others to do so as well. Thus, like Nietzsche, MacIntyre offers a genealogy of the Enlightenment's failure. Unlike Nietzsche, who only discerns a path for the solitary hero, MacIntyre sees that nature offers another path—like Ms. Anscombe—a path for communities of virtue that, by promoting practices within a narrative of human fulfillment developed from within a tradition of inquiry, offer hope for an increasingly dark world. — Fr. Michael Sherwin, OP, Christian Virtue in America's Nietzschean Wasteland: Thomistic Reflections, 29:05

It’s not that humans have to or ought to see others as similar to themselves, it’s that they tend to and are capable of seeing them that way. — T Clark

Oh, I definitely agree about the tendency and the capacity. It's just that, if I happen to be one of those lacking that tendency or capacity, we've pulled all the ethical teeth out of the argument if you can't say to me, "But here's why you ought to" (or perhaps, "Here's why you should at least behave as if you did"). Otherwise, ethical injunctions only apply to those who have the proper tendencies and capacities. But it's the very ones who don't that we'd most like to persuade, if we can.

My brain is clogged with too many sedimented layers of philosophy which have explicitly dismantled the entire framework on which the is-ought distinction is built. — Joshs

Are you telling me that you read the wrong books? I think Iv'e mentioned that previously. :wink:

But the account you gave, , aligns well enough with my own, with the addition that points out, if one is not giving consideration to others, one is not doing ethics. says much the same thing.

Psychological approaches like enactivism assume that we always already find ourselves thrown into action, so the ‘ought’ of motive doesn’t have to posited as a separate mechanism from the ‘is’ of being in the world. — Joshs

I'm not sure how the conclusion follows from the premise here, but despite that I think I agree with the sentiment. Isn't his the familiar existentialist claim, that we don't first exist as neutral observers, but that our very existence is saturated with normatively? And even then, the question of what to do remains; and the answer is not found in what is the case, but what we would do about it. This is not a rejection of the is/ought barrier, so much as a expression of it in phenomenological terms.

Hume's division isn't logical, it's metaphysical and epistemic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Your are invited to read Gillian Russell's new book, and the article being discussed in my most recent thread, that sets out in detail various barriers to entailment including the is/ought barrier, using a first order logic an model theory. I'm still digesting the argument there, but your claim is not self-evident.

I wasn't much able to follow the rest of your post. You noted that we do regularly invoke "ought" statements such as "you ought try the chicken", but seem to think these mitigate against the is ought barrier rather than demonstrate it. There's a play on the word "fact", which in this context can variously refer to what is the case, or to only "is" statements. It appears that you think that n "ought" statement cannot be true, which is a vies some quite prominent philosophers have adopted, but which is sorely tested by the obvious validity of the syllogism you set out. And we've elsewhere discussed and I think rejected the view that Hume's account of induction "precludes ever knowing such facts". points out two other issues with the approach you seem to be adopting, that "better than" already presume judgement, and that "ought " may be used instrumentally or categorically.

So to this:

It’s hard to imagine a circumstance in which the utterance ‘the coffee should be chosen because the coffee should be chosen’ would be useful, — Joshs

Quite true of instrumental choices, where it makes sense to give look for further explanation; but what about "you ought to treat others fairly because you ought treat others fairly"? One might imagine Kant saying such a thing, with the force that this is were we make a start, that this is our foundation.



In any case we mentioned here might find agreement in pointing out that it is by no means evident that we ought do what we have supposedly evolved to do. Evolution does not answer, indeed hardly even addresses, the questions of ethics.

Russell's paper is interesting but she is actually only speaking obliquely to Hume's position (actually, the choice of title is a little puzzling in that respect; maybe the term "Hume's law" is used differently in some areas of philosophy for what she is talking about, but it isn't Hume's original position). It's true that, from the epistemic direction, the Guillotine is justified as a sort of a special case of the more general attack on induction, but Hume's objection would also prohibit moves from the "universal" to the "particular" wherever "values" are concerned. I did find that a little strange actually, Russell is speaking more to Hume's justification for the "law" than the "law" itself.

Hume's claim is more expansive though. Because morality is just sentiment, it can never justified by reason alone, full stop. Reason is also wholly inert in terms of action, so even if normative claims did work in this way, they could never drive behavior. Those claims are what set up the Guillotine. What Hume is objecting to has nothing to do with form, it has to do semantics, what kinds of facts there are, and how language refers to them.

Russell gets at the epistemic side: we cannot know universal value claims. But actually, Hume goes further. There can simply be no such thing as a descriptive fact about value, so of course one cannot derive "ought" from "is" even leaving aside the gap from particular to universal. His position can be described as ontologically eliminativist in this respect. It isn't a sort of skepticism on this issue; because of his psychology, such facts are impossible. He is pretty explicit about this in the Treatise BTW, he compares "vice and virtue" (values) to secondary qualities (which in his context are wholly subjective and do not exist in the world objectively at all).

A great many philosophers since have rejected the fact/values distinction and this has nothing to do with logic per se. If you want a close analogy, consider logical interpretations by emotivists.

It's just that, if I happen to be one of those lacking that tendency or capacity, we've pulled all the ethical teeth out of the argument if you can't say to me, "But here's why you ought to" (or perhaps, "Here's why you should at least behave as if you did"). — J

That’s what social rules, laws, the police, and public shaming are for—social control. As I intimated in a previous post on this thread, ethics and morality, to the extent they are useful ideas, deal with what comes from within, not what is imposed from without.

t can have evolutionary roots in two ways . One way is that it is a gimmick, an arbitrary genetic contrivance whose value is indirect; that it is adaptive for the survival of the species. The second way is that the intrinsic dynamics of caring and social involvement function according the same same principles as evolutionary processes; not as an arbitrary gimmick that just so happens to further survival — Joshs

I’m not sure I understand the distinction you’ve made and I’m not qualified to specify any particular evolutionary mechanism. Humans and other animals have instincts—modes of behavior that are hereditary. I don’t know whether it’s appropriate to designate the kinds of behavior we’re talking about as instincts or whether they represent a more complex mental process. Maybe that’s what Piaget was talking about.

I am a skeptic about evolutionary psychology— the attribution of particular behaviors to specific evolutionary pathways or genes.

I'm glad you found the paper interesting. So we agree there is (or perhaps may be) a logical basis for the is/ought distinction?

The other point of contention is your "Hume's psychology... precludes knowing virtually any facts at all", which is far too strong. Experience grounds our knowledge.

is there some more substantive point on which we disagree?

This treatment allows causal knowledge of the world to be separated from the agent's subjective preferences. — sime

Sure. But both of those separated things are how things are. Causal knowledge of the world is in the state it's in, and the agent's subjective preferences are in the state they're in.

How is describing these or any other states of affairs supposed to determine how they ought to be?

I don't quite understand this. Are you saying that, for those without the inclination or capacities for respecting social norms, there is no argument that can be made that what they're doing is wrong? Not necessarily an argument that would convince them, but a general argument showing that there is an ethical sense in which they ought to behave differently?

if the good is being qua desirable (what is truly most fulfilling of desire) . . . — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not sure I get this. Can you expand?

Why choose the better over the worse? Why choose good over evil? These seem extremely obvious to me, so I am not sure how to answer. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I sympathize. Explaining what seems obvious to you, to someone for whom it isn't obvious at all, is difficult. I won't press you. I'll just say that, from my viewpoint, there are many possible reasons for choosing the better over the worse, only some of which are ethical reasons. And for what it's worth, the question "Why choose good over evil?" seems to me to be a different question entirely.

So we agree there is (or perhaps may be) a logical basis for the is/ought distinction? — Banno

No, I agree with the many critics who say that the division is wholly metaphysical. Maybe it can be justified, but it would have to be justified on metaphysical terms. However, what Russell is talking about is a real limitation of deduction. I am not totally sure why she is calling it "Hume's Law" though since it's a slightly different issue. My suspicion is that maybe people use the name for the issue she is talking about too, a sort of semantic drift in the literature maybe, sort of like how "Aristotelian essences" in many articles in analytic philosophy have very little to do with Aristotle's metaphysics. IDK though.

Hume's issue isn't just that we cannot go from "particular" to "universal" facts about values, but that there simply are no such facts, because value statements can never be purely descriptive since they relate to purely subjective sentiment. It's a very early-modern sort of division.

The other point of contention is your "Hume's psychology... precludes knowing virtually any facts at all", which is far too strong. Experience grounds our knowledge. — Banno

I agree that it's too strong. That's the problem with Hume! I mean, he basically says as much too. He says you'd go insane if you took his conclusions to heart. Bertrand Russell said something similar, basically "Hume demolishes the line between sanity and insanity" or something to that effect.

, there are many possible reasons for choosing the better over the worse, — J

Such as? If one had "good reasons" for choosing "the worse" over the "better" it seems to me that, by definition, we must think that "the worse" is in fact, in an important respect, better than "the better." Else why choose it?

No doubt, I might choose the "worse character" in playing a video game against a child, because I want the competition to be more fair, etc. But in those cases, I am choosing the "worse" because it is truly better as respects the ends that I believe to be themselves better. So, in this example, winning the game is not better than having a more equal competition.

Not sure I get this. Can you expand? — J

Well, that's the classical definition of goodness, and it might take some unpacking. Goodness isn't something over and above a thing, just as there isn't a thing and its truth as something distinct, over and above it. Being "transcedentals," goodness and truth are conceptual, not real distinctions (but of course, "objective"). They are being as considered from a particular aspect, as intelligible/knowable (truth), or as desirable (goodness).

An easy way to see how this takes shape in ethics is to consider that pre-modern ethics (in the East too from what I can tell) is primarily concerned with reality versus appearances, and the higher versus the lower. We want what is truly most desirable, not what merely appears most desirable. We know we can be wrong about what is most desirable, and this leads to regret and bad consequences. Ethics is about discovering the best way to live/act, i.e., what is truly desirable. In this context, to knowingly choose the worse over the better is essentially to act contrary to reason and desire.

Of course, a difficulty here is that subjectivism has sort of crept into our definitions. "Desirable" becomes just "whatever is currently desired." However, Etymonline tells me that the word entered the English language in the 14th century, then meaning: "worthy to be desired, fit to excite a wish to possess." That's the better way of taking it here.

Your observation resonates with a statement by Mao Zedong: "Modesty makes one progress, whereas conceit makes one lag behind."
I grasp the essence of your argument. However, I contend that there is no necessary connection between success and the complacency you describe. ​​The key reason the phenomenon you identified emerges is that the inherent logic of the institution does not inevitably lead to progressive development.​​ Conversely, the institutional conclusions I have derived from first principles of action theory, such as the fundamental purpose, explicitly incorporate mechanisms to ensure sustained robustness.
For instance, at the administrative level, a rigorously demonstrated conclusion mandates that officials can only advance by achieving administrative results superior to those of their competitors. This merit-based mechanism for promotion is perpetual.
As for preventing the erosion of normative perception among the general public, the solution lies in legal education—specifically, in普及 the constitutional reasoning process. In practice, if a constitution can be founded upon arguments as rigorous as mathematical proofs, then a secondary school student could comprehend its entire logical framework with minimal effort. This understanding would instill the certain knowledge that the constitution rests upon an unshakable foundation.

In my argument, I begin by postulating five axioms of action, one of which is the Axiom of Purpose. This axiom explains the root of behavioral motivation. It consists of two parts. The first part posits the existence of a fundamental purpose underlying human action. This axiom is derived from a commonsense observation: human behavior is an expression of biological adaptation (this is a descriptive statement of fact). This observation indicates a directional relationship between all human actions and adaptation. I term this directional relationship a "teleological relation," from which the Axiom of Purpose is derived. This axiom, which can be formulated in several compatible ways, aims to show that human behavior is, at the level of biological mechanism, configured to achieve a fundamental purpose. It is a factual postulate, not an "ought."
However, it is indeed this fundamental purpose that serves as the key premise for deriving various conclusions about what "must" be done.

The requirements imposed by an individual's specific purposes on their specific actions do not constitute the behavioral norms for the entire society. The norms for society as a whole are constructed upon the fundamental purpose shared by all individuals. The conclusions derived from this fundamental purpose do not mandate that any specific individual must make the utility-maximizing choice regarding a particular, concrete goal. Within the framework I have argued for, utility-maximizing choices are only relevant at the level of public objectives, and the magnitude of this utility is defined relative to competitors.

This theory does not require you, as an individual, to care about your own flourishing. The conclusions it derives exist as social norms, whose codified form is established as the constitution—the sole source of legal authority. By subsuming specific behaviors under these conclusions, we arrive at the complete legal system. You may not care about your own flourishing, but you must abide by the law.
Regarding your example involving a 13-year-old girl, I hold a specific view on the legal status of minors. The prerequisite for expecting Person A to obey the law is ensuring that A knows what the law is. However, humans are not born with this knowledge. Therefore, prior to enforcement, there must be a process for A to learn the content of the law (i.e., legal education). If we artificially set a final age limit for this process, we thereby artificially create the category of "minors." In other words, a stipulated age serves as a deadline by which individuals are obligated to understand the fundamental logic of the legislation. Once past this age, they are presumed to have this understanding and henceforth bear independent legal responsibility for violations. The case you mentioned can be explained by the fact that the individual had not yet fully comprehended her rights and obligations pertaining to the relevant actions.

The reason I used the example of "thou shalt not kill" is that I have logically derived this conclusion from the fundamental purpose (and I could have used other examples as well). Since this derived conclusion aligns with a moral duty we intuitively recognize, I used this example to demonstrate that the alignment is not a mere coincidence.

1、"My framework, derived from the axioms of action, yields conclusions pertaining to only four domains, which correspond to the four constituent elements of a state. While the norms derived from these four domains indeed provide a framework that undergirds all aspects of our social life, their normative force is not expressed as mandating specific goals and actions such as donating to a sperm bank. The justified conclusions themselves inherently include the principle that 'Agent A possesses behavioral autonomy.'"

2、"The conclusions derived from the axioms of action are not predictions, but conclusions of logical necessity. To illustrate: If A, then B. A is the case. Therefore, B. Within the framework of the given axioms, B is an inescapable and certain conclusion."

it ought to rain

"The 'ought' you mentioned, as in 'it ought to rain,' is a prediction. In contrast, the 'must' in a normative conclusion is a requirement for action—a behavioral standard that everyone ought to abide by."

As for preventing the erosion of normative perception among the general public, the solution lies in legal education—specifically, in普及 the constitutional reasoning process. — panwei

No, I was talking about something slightly different. If "ought" is derived from "necessary," and the idea of ​​"necessary" changes over time, does what is "ought" also change? Or should "ought" be enshrined in the constitution and predetermined? Then how will evolution occur?

"I, too, initially believed that institutions required constant updating to keep pace with the times. However, after rigorously deriving the relevant conclusions, I came to understand that at the constitutional level, these justified institutions are eternally valid and do not require modernization. The validity of these conclusions depends solely on the soundness of the axioms themselves and the absence of logical errors in the derivation process.
"What requires adaptation to the times is specific legislation. For example, the justified conclusion that 'one must not defraud others of their property' is eternally valid. Before the advent of the internet, there was no such thing as online fraud. Therefore, after its emergence, it became necessary to codify it within specific laws."

"When our aim is to establish behavioral requirements that are obligatory for everyone, we cannot reason from the diverse purposes of individuals. The reasoning must proceed from the fundamental purpose common to all. From this common fundamental purpose, one cannot derive dictates about how an individual must choose among their personal, differentiated goals. Individuals are solely responsible for their own choices, but these personal choices do not constitute the behavioral norms for society as a whole."

"Conclusions deduced from non-contradictory premises possess uniqueness; therefore, the fundamental 'standard' is immutable. The example you cited—'we killed them, and it is justified'—is indeed a violation of the justified conclusion that 'thou shalt not kill.' However, the act of 'killing' carried out during law enforcement is permitted because both injunctions (the prohibition of murder and the permission for capital punishment) can be justified under the same higher-order conclusion. They are derived from the principle of 'distribution according to efficacy.' The act of murder imposes a negative efficacy on society, and thus the perpetrator must receive a negative benefit—punishment—of which the death penalty is one form."

Okay, so let's say you enshrine the right to work in the constitution. Robots appear and replace humans in every field. The state can no longer guarantee the right to work. Do we change the constitution or get rid of the robots?

Right, but the opponent of teleological reasoning will claim that they have no reason to adopt the fundamental purpose/telos that you identify. They will say, "I agree that I ought to eat food if my purpose is survival, but I don't grant that my purpose need be survival. I could choose to die instead of survive if I want."

This theory does not require you, as an individual, to choose survival. I also postulate an axiom of cognition, which consists of three parts, one of which states that 'human cognition can be erroneous.' This axiom can be used to explain phenomena that appear to deviate from the fundamental purpose.
The reason I assert that people ought to abide by these normative conclusions derived from the fundamental purpose is that these conclusions coincide with the moral duties we universally recognize. I maintain that this coincidence is not accidental. When we establish a constitution in this manner, the constitution rests on a solid foundation. You are free to choose death, but you are not free to break the law. Choosing death may be a tendency formed by your personal, differentiated purposes and potentially erroneous cognition, but it is not a social norm that can be derived from the fundamental purpose common to all.