Therefore there is no reason to assume an interaction problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly, you're in denial ...
. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism#Arguments_against_dualism

... the validity of the intuition of Idealism — Pantagruel

I.e. folk psychology (akin to superstition). Smells of a fallacious appeal to popularity / tradition, 'gruel – there are no 'immaterialsis' in foxholes. :mask:

Descartes wasn't an idealist as far as I'm aware. Idealism is monistic so the interaction problem does not arise.

Clearly, you're in denial ... — 180 Proof

Yes, I deny it because I understand the philosophy well. And, I know that Plato solved the so-called interaction problem more than two thousand years ago with the introduction of "the good", which Aristotle developed as "final cause".

In modern days, "the interaction problem" is brought up as a hoax. Defending this supposed problem, as a problem, requires supporting determinism, denial of free will, and denial of the capacity of choice. And that's simply hypocrisy.

How does the concept of 'the good' solve the interaction problem?

In modern days, "the interaction problem" is brought up as a hoax. — Metaphysician Undercover

:lol:

Idealism is monistic ... — bert1

Tell that to neo/Kantians ... :roll:

:up:

Not exactly what I said. I noted that the self-evidence of material intuition can't exceed that of self-evidence simpliciter, which is to say thought. It isn't an ontological claim, but an epistemological framework for making an ontological claim.To assert anything about reality —material or otherwise— is already to presuppose the structure of intelligibility in which that claim appears. That structure is thought. — Pantagruel

Materiality is evident in embodiment and in the body's interactions with other bodies. The conceptualization of materiality is derivative in being an expression of pre-linguistic experience. You say "to assert anything about reality" but any and all assertions are secondary to, and dependent upon, experience.

We are animals. To say that all experience is first and foremost linguistically mediated would be to claim that non-linguistic animals don't experience anything, which would be absurd. Thought, at least linguistically mediated thought cannot constitute the primordial "structure of intelligibility" or else animals could not find their Umwelts intelligible. Our primary experience, shared with animals, is as material entities in a material world, subject to all the physical constraints and opportunities that world imposes and affords.

And yes, linguistically mediated self-reflection is a kind of culmination of self-awareness, which doesn't exclude or preclude other kinds, whose existence doesn't contradict the characterization. — Pantagruel

The point is that linguistically mediated self-reflection and what seems self-evident to that reflection should not be 'sublimed' away from its primordial sources in embodied material life, because to do creates the illusion of an immaterial dimensionless point of consciousness, and all the misleading conclusions that follow from that kind of thinking.

Your phenomenological inventory doesn't actually contradict the premise, which doesn't require us to be constantly reflective, only capable of reflectivity...among other things. — Pantagruel

Our metaphysical conclusions should be derived from, and not stray away from, the whole of the pre-reflective experience that linguistically mediated reflectivity is parasitic upon. Otherwise we land in a "hall of mirrors".

:up: :up:

Our metaphysical conclusions should be derived from, and not stray away from, the whole of the pre-reflective experience that linguistically mediated reflectivity is parasitic upon. Otherwise we land in a "hall of mirrors". — Janus

:100:

To say that all experience is first and foremost linguistically mediated would be to claim that non-linguistic animals don't experience anything, which would be absurd. — Janus

Yes, you've already said that and I never did make that claim, as I clarified. I'm glad we agree.

:ok:

How does the concept of 'the good' solve the interaction problem? — bert1

"The good" is the way that Plato brings ideas from being understood as inert and passive, into being understood as playing an active role in causation. Aristotle described it as final cause, and we understand it as intention and free will.

Following Plato's criticism of Pythagorean idealism and the theory of participation, the dominant metaphysics no longer understood ideas as eternal, unchanging, inactive objects. Instead, ideas were understood as causally active in a changing world, full of intentional beings. In Aristotle's hylomorphism, form is actual and matter is passive. Therefore there is no interaction problem.

The interaction problem reemerges in modern times, when people return to ancient Pythagorean idealism, commonly called Platonism because Plato is the one who exposed the principles, in his criticism of it.

Our metaphysical conclusions should be derived from, and not stray away from, the whole of the pre-reflective experience that linguistically mediated reflectivity is parasitic upon. Otherwise we land in a "hall of mirrors".

But we always were in a hall of mirrors, to deny that doesn’t remove the philosophical dilemma.

external things of nature which exist for consciousness...constitute the external material for the embodiment of the will....But the purposive action of this will is to realise its concept, Liberty, in these externally-objective aspects, making the latter a world moulded by the former....
Section II. Mind Objective, § 483,4

The intuition of mind is at least as certain and at least as real as that of matter. There is no counter to that argument that is not parasitic on the premise (since it would be an "argument", hence itself a mental product). Naive materialism is a joke without a punchline.

Thank you, that's interesting. I can see that on this metaphysic, ideas interact with matter. But this isn't necessarily substance dualism, on which view there is more than one substance, each of which have nothing in common with the others. The non-dualist will say that if ideas and matter interact, they must have something in common, and therefore are not wholly other, and therefore not two totally distinct substances. I have no idea if Plato, Aristotle or any other platonists were, in fact, full-on substance dualists. In my experience, people who say they are dualist generally turn out not to be this kind of full-on two-distinct-substances-with-nothing-in-common type of dualist. I remember Galen Strawson arguing at length that even Descartes was not actually a substance dualist, but a property dualist of some kind (iirc).