Therefore there is no reason to assume an interaction problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly, you're in denial ...
. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism#Arguments_against_dualism

... the validity of the intuition of Idealism — Pantagruel

I.e. folk psychology (akin to superstition). Smells of a fallacious appeal to popularity / tradition, 'gruel – there are no 'immaterialsis' in foxholes. :mask:

Descartes wasn't an idealist as far as I'm aware. Idealism is monistic so the interaction problem does not arise.

Clearly, you're in denial ... — 180 Proof

Yes, I deny it because I understand the philosophy well. And, I know that Plato solved the so-called interaction problem more than two thousand years ago with the introduction of "the good", which Aristotle developed as "final cause".

In modern days, "the interaction problem" is brought up as a hoax. Defending this supposed problem, as a problem, requires supporting determinism, denial of free will, and denial of the capacity of choice. And that's simply hypocrisy.

How does the concept of 'the good' solve the interaction problem?

In modern days, "the interaction problem" is brought up as a hoax. — Metaphysician Undercover

:lol:

Idealism is monistic ... — bert1

Tell that to neo/Kantians ... :roll:

:up:

Not exactly what I said. I noted that the self-evidence of material intuition can't exceed that of self-evidence simpliciter, which is to say thought. It isn't an ontological claim, but an epistemological framework for making an ontological claim.To assert anything about reality —material or otherwise— is already to presuppose the structure of intelligibility in which that claim appears. That structure is thought. — Pantagruel

Materiality is evident in embodiment and in the body's interactions with other bodies. The conceptualization of materiality is derivative in being an expression of pre-linguistic experience. You say "to assert anything about reality" but any and all assertions are secondary to, and dependent upon, experience.

We are animals. To say that all experience is first and foremost linguistically mediated would be to claim that non-linguistic animals don't experience anything, which would be absurd. Thought, at least linguistically mediated thought cannot constitute the primordial "structure of intelligibility" or else animals could not find their Umwelts intelligible. Our primary experience, shared with animals, is as material entities in a material world, subject to all the physical constraints and opportunities that world imposes and affords.

And yes, linguistically mediated self-reflection is a kind of culmination of self-awareness, which doesn't exclude or preclude other kinds, whose existence doesn't contradict the characterization. — Pantagruel

The point is that linguistically mediated self-reflection and what seems self-evident to that reflection should not be 'sublimed' away from its primordial sources in embodied material life, because to do creates the illusion of an immaterial dimensionless point of consciousness, and all the misleading conclusions that follow from that kind of thinking.

Your phenomenological inventory doesn't actually contradict the premise, which doesn't require us to be constantly reflective, only capable of reflectivity...among other things. — Pantagruel

Our metaphysical conclusions should be derived from, and not stray away from, the whole of the pre-reflective experience that linguistically mediated reflectivity is parasitic upon. Otherwise we land in a "hall of mirrors".

:up: :up:

Our metaphysical conclusions should be derived from, and not stray away from, the whole of the pre-reflective experience that linguistically mediated reflectivity is parasitic upon. Otherwise we land in a "hall of mirrors". — Janus

:100:

To say that all experience is first and foremost linguistically mediated would be to claim that non-linguistic animals don't experience anything, which would be absurd. — Janus

Yes, you've already said that and I never did make that claim, as I clarified. I'm glad we agree.

:ok:

How does the concept of 'the good' solve the interaction problem? — bert1

"The good" is the way that Plato brings ideas from being understood as inert and passive, into being understood as playing an active role in causation. Aristotle described it as final cause, and we understand it as intention and free will.

Following Plato's criticism of Pythagorean idealism and the theory of participation, the dominant metaphysics no longer understood ideas as eternal, unchanging, inactive objects. Instead, ideas were understood as causally active in a changing world, full of intentional beings. In Aristotle's hylomorphism, form is actual and matter is passive. Therefore there is no interaction problem.

The interaction problem reemerges in modern times, when people return to ancient Pythagorean idealism, commonly called Platonism because Plato is the one who exposed the principles, in his criticism of it.

Our metaphysical conclusions should be derived from, and not stray away from, the whole of the pre-reflective experience that linguistically mediated reflectivity is parasitic upon. Otherwise we land in a "hall of mirrors".

But we always were in a hall of mirrors, to deny that doesn’t remove the philosophical dilemma.

external things of nature which exist for consciousness...constitute the external material for the embodiment of the will....But the purposive action of this will is to realise its concept, Liberty, in these externally-objective aspects, making the latter a world moulded by the former....
Section II. Mind Objective, § 483,4

The intuition of mind is at least as certain and at least as real as that of matter. There is no counter to that argument that is not parasitic on the premise (since it would be an "argument", hence itself a mental product). Naive materialism is a joke without a punchline.

Thank you, that's interesting. I can see that on this metaphysic, ideas interact with matter. But this isn't necessarily substance dualism, on which view there is more than one substance, each of which have nothing in common with the others. The non-dualist will say that if ideas and matter interact, they must have something in common, and therefore are not wholly other, and therefore not two totally distinct substances. I have no idea if Plato, Aristotle or any other platonists were, in fact, full-on substance dualists. In my experience, people who say they are dualist generally turn out not to be this kind of full-on two-distinct-substances-with-nothing-in-common type of dualist. I remember Galen Strawson arguing at length that even Descartes was not actually a substance dualist, but a property dualist of some kind (iirc).

I think what you are describing is the strawman representation of dualism, designed by monists to make dualism look incoherent. You define the two substances as "having nothing in common", and from this strawman definition, which begs the question for the monist, it is impossible that the two substances could interact. Then substance dualism is deemed as incoherent.

But look closely, both are called "substance" therefore they already have something in common, the same name. So "having nothing in common" is already ruled out, from the beginning, as a false representation. Then, to look deeper we would need to inquire what it means to be substantial, "substance". We might determine that this is to be actual. And under the Aristotelian tradition "form" is what is actual. Then we can distinguish two types of form (actuality), that which is united to matter, and that which is separate or independent. In this way we have substance dualism, one type of substance contains matter, the other does not. But there is nothing to indicate that the two types of substance, united with matter and not united with matter, both being actual, cannot interact.

I kind of agree with this. Although substance dualism really is incoherent, but that doesn't matter because there are no substance dualists. You may well be right that less radical dualists (i.e. all dualists) are accused of substance dualism to make their views look implausible. You make the case yourself for the incoherence of substance dualism and its rarity in philosophy:

So "having nothing in common" is already ruled out, from the beginning, as a false representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here:

In this way we have substance dualism, one type of substance contains matter, the other does not. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are using 'substance' in a different way from, say, Spinoza.

Although substance dualism really is incoherent, but that doesn't matter because there are no substance dualists. — bert1

I'm substance dualist, by the principles i just explained. Substance dualism is only made to appear incoherent through the strawman representation.

I think you are using 'substance' in a different way from, say, Spinoza. — bert1

I don't know, "substance" is an Aristotelian term, and he distinguishes primary substance and secondary substance, laying the ground work for a coherent substance dualism.

Yeah, fair enough. There are different usages. Looking at Stanford, yours might actually be the more mainstream. However as we have approached this topic via Descartes, his usage is the one in use in this thread, and is the subject of the interaction problem. Here is a bit from the Stanford article on Descartes definition:

Elsewhere, however, Descartes says that a substance is something “capable of existing independently”; “that can exist by itself”; or “which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence” (AT 7: 44, 226, VIII A 24). Descartes contrasts substances, so defined, with modes, qualities and attributes, which can depend for their existence on substances.

In these locations, Descartes affirms an independence criterion of substancehood. This idea may be implicit in Aristotle’s Categories and is gestured at by Al Farabi, but Descartes appears to be the first influential philosopher who explicitly defines substances as those things that are capable of existing by themselves. Descartes adds that only God truly qualifies as a substance so defined, because nothing else could exist without God, a view that would be reaffirmed with greater emphasis by Descartes’ most influential follower, Spinoza. However, Descartes recognises two kinds of “created substance” – things that can exist without anything else, leaving aside God: material body, which is defined by extension, and mental substance, which is defined by thought, which, in this context, is more or less equivalent to consciousness. — SEP

Elsewhere, however, Descartes says that a substance is something “capable of existing independently”; “that can exist by itself”; or “which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence” — SEP

I think that's somewhat consistent with what I said, depending on how one would understand "independently". If things can exist independently of each other, yet still interact, then there is no interaction problem. But if interaction denies independence, then there is an interaction problem. So for example, consider an artefact created in the past. Is that artefact currently independent from its creator or is it dependent on the creator?

The two substances I proposed are material forms and immaterial forms. By the nature of contingency, and the cosmological argument, the idealist might conclude that in an absolute sense, all material substance is 'dependent' on immaterial substance. That is, the material came into being from the immaterial, exemplified by "God". The immaterial is understood as the ultimate source of the material. However, we might still say that material things have a sort of 'independence', as the artefact is independent from its creator. That's an ambiguity between the absolute sense of "dependent", and the relative sense of "independent".

If we insist on rigorous, strict definitions, then we might be inclined to reject this ambiguity. And since material forms are dependent on immaterial forms, the idealist would be inclined to reject the substantial existence of material forms, in a way like that described by Berkeley. That the forms we observe in the world around us are actually composed of "matter" is just an illusion produced because our senses are prone to deceiving use in the way explained by Plato. Then the world can be understood to exist solely of "forms", and the idea that there is matter within these forms is just a conceptual aid, created for the purpose of assisting us in understanding how the world appears to us through sensation.

So the interaction problem is created by those who insist on the use of "matter", and the claim that material things could have independent existence. This is completely inconsistent with scientific observations because matter is a principle used to describe what is passive, inactive, what does not change as time passes, and we observe that everything is active and changing.

... and we [material sentients in/directly] observe that everything [materiality ~ "swirling atoms"] is active and changing. — Metaphysician Undercover

:victory: :smirk:

. and we [material sentients in/directly] observe that everything [materiality ~ "swirling atoms"] is active and changing — Metaphysician Undercover

That's an unjustified and unwarranted qualification of my statement. "Material" is purely conceptual, and no observations of active change support the assumption that anything is composed of material.

This talk of idealism vs. materialism pops up all the time, but it is rarely defined. Or if it is, the definitions seem to me to be unsatisfactory.

Roughly speaking:

Idealism: everything is a product of mind.

Materialism: everything is made of physical stuff.

What is this supposed clash? Is the mind not coming out of a brain? Is the brain not a mental construction based on sense data?

So what prevents one from being incompatible with the other? That matter can't think? That's factually false and is relying on old (but justified at the time) Cartesian intuitions.

Or alternatively that mind is above matter? What does this even mean? I find no meaning in this assertion. The problem that can be posed is the problem of the world, either it exists absent us or it does not. That is a legitimate question, because it can be meaningfully debated.

Another question that can be meaningfully debated is how much of the world is a construction of the mind. But the alleged rift or incompatibility between idealism and materialism is merely verbal.

What is this supposed clash? Is the mind not coming out of a brain? Is the brain not a mental construction based on sense data? — Manuel

My criticism here is that If materialism is true, then the brain is not merely a "mental construction" even if our models of it, and perhaps even our perceptions of it, are mental constructions (idealism) or brain generated models (materialism).

According to materialism, there would be some mind-independent functional structures which appear to us as brains, and what we experience as thoughts are on the level of the physical brain, neuronal processes.

On the other hand according to idealism, the brain is merely one among all the other ideas which are taken by materialists to be mind-independently real functional structures, but are really, through and through, mental constructions..

The issue between the two is one of metaphysical fundamentality, and if the idea of metaphysical fundamentality is a coherent one, then the incompatibility between the two views is not merely verbal.

The idealists collapse epistemology and ontology, claiming there is no substantive distinction between the two, while the materialists maintain a substantive distinction.

The other point is that when you say that the problem which can be meaningfully posed is the "problem of the world"―the question regarding how much of the world is a construction of the mind (or a brain generated model) just is the salient question the answer to which precisely distinguishes idealism from materialism.

My criticism here is that If materialism is true, then the brain is not merely a "mental construction" even if our models of it, and perhaps even our perceptions of it, are mental constructions (idealism) or brain generated models (materialism). — Janus

It may be more than merely a mental construction, but it is at least a mental construction, or we would have no way to perceive or model it. I presume you know Russell's quote on this topic, and he was not an idealist. But what he says is factual as far as I can see.

According to materialism, there would be some mind-independent functional structures which appear to us as brains, and what we experience as thoughts are on the level of the physical brain, neuronal processes — Janus

Who ascribes these functions? We do. What does a brain do? It produces consciousness, but it does many things which are unrelated to consciousness which are equally important. Why privilege consciousness over many of the other things brains do?

On the other hand according to idealism, the brain is merely one among all the other ideas which are taken by materialists to be mind-independently real functional structures, but are really, through and through, mental constructions.. — Janus

You have mentioned structures several times. I can understand epistemic structural realism in physics, but above that, say in biology and so on, I don't quite follow what you are saying.

At least you are framing something which can be discussed that materialism means mind independent structure and that idealism denies that. That's a big improvement over usual conversations on these topics.

Is the brain not a mental construction based on sense data? — Manuel

Yes, it is; no material object, no sense data, comes with a name already imposed on it.

Idealism is that by which the imposition of names is possible; materialism is that which is presupposed by idealism as that empirical domain of objects to which the names belong.
—————-

But the alleged rift or incompatibility between idealism and materialism is merely verbal. — Manuel

Agreed; it is merely another instance of the principle of complementarity, in that, for whatever cognition is possible its negation is given immediately. Idiosyncrasy of the intellectual beast.

The idealists collapse epistemology and ontology [what is known is equivalent to what there is], claiming there is no substantive distinction between the two, while the materialists maintain a substantive distinction [what is known is a fraction of, or exhausted by, what there is]. — Janus

:up: :up:

Yeah, I agree with that framing - it is quite sensible and ought to be factual- but it apparently sounds contentious for some reason. Some people get uncomfortable with the idea of mental construction, as if objectivity is thereby rendered suspect or inexistant.

The issue that arises here, then, is whether there is an external world or not. I don't know of any idealist - save for one, an obscure British philosopher - who denies the existence of the world. But I don't understand Hegel, nor am I compelled to read him.

….whether there is an external world or not. — Manuel

Ehhhhh….I would be far less generous: it’s pathologically stupid to deny the existence of that external thing, the forceful contact of which is sufficient cause for a displaced appearance, subsequently cognized as a farging bloody lip!!! (Sigh)

Obscure. Historically, British philosophers were empiricists, or at least pseudo-Kantian dualists. Who did you have in mind?

Long time ago, I was urged to check out “The Phenomenology of Spirit”, but, given my philosophical persuasions, the conjoined conceptions in that title bespoke inevitable conflict. So I never did. Not to mention the serious trash-talkin’ ol’ Arthur laid on him and “those ridiculous Hegelians” in general. You know….that ubiquitous cognitive prejudice we all suffer to some degree of another.

Sometimes it comes down to taste and aesthetics. I tried reading Derrida a couple of times and kept lapsing into a coma. I have no idea if I disagree with him or not.

Ehhhhh….I would be far less generous: it’s pathologically stupid to deny the existence of that external thing, the forceful contact of which is sufficient cause for a displaced appearance, subsequently cognized as a farging bloody lip!!! (Sigh) — Mww

I agree, it is stupid. But the discussion here is framed as if "idealism" and "materialism" - whatever they are - are somehow opposites. As in if we allow that ideas construct the world then matter does not exist. Or alternatively, if matter exists then ideas are these obscure mystical things. Back in Descartes time views like that made sense - there was a clear intelligible difference between res extensa and res cogitans.

We don't have that distinction along those lines anymore. Descartes was being scientific, to argue along his lines today is to force a distinction that does not look clear at all.

Obscure. Historically, British philosophers were empiricists, or at least pseudo-Kantian dualists. Who did you have in mind? — Mww

I've been reading the English Platonists. Known back then but forgotten today. The one I had in mind was Arthur Collier - who did deny the external world in his Clavis Universalis. Extremely unconvincing if you ask me, just repeated denials.

. Not to mention the serious trash-talkin’ ol’ Arthur laid on him and “those ridiculous Hegelians” in general. You know….that ubiquitous cognitive prejudice we all suffer to some degree of another. — Mww

Absolutely. I like Raymond Tallis' quip here, "Hegel is above my cognitive paygrade." He may have some interesting ideas somewhere, but that explicit and conscious verbosity and obscurity is repellent to me.

And yes ol' Arthur's roasting is sublime.