I remember Chomsky saying something like, if W stays away from science, then science will have to return the favor.
— Paine
Well, one sharp put-down deserves another. But the map of academia is contested - what map isn't, particularly when it comes to border territory, where both sides have relevant expertise? We need both sides to recognize where territory is contested, not pretend that everything can be decisively settled. — Ludwig V

Yes, I think Wittgenstein (as well as Husserl, Heidegger and others employing phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches) would respond that it is only by keeping a distance from and bracketing the facts of science that one can see the sense of those facts differently. The fact that science has stayed away from the kind of philosophical clarification that Witt’s work represents is the reason for what Evan Thompson calls its ‘blind spot’ concerning its relation to the Lifeworld that generates it and makes it intelligible.

I agree that the different directions in academia do not seem to be gravitating towards a center.

I don't think Wittgenstein would have objected to Linguistics as Chomsky pursues it. I wonder if Wittgenstein talked about that somewhere.


Mention of Thompson reminds me of the interest in "forms of life" amongst "cybernetic" epistemologists.
Here is a passage from G Bateson that touches upon the Blue Book:

I have the use of the information that that which I see, the images, or that which I feel as pain, the prick of a pin, or the ache of a tired muscle—for these, too, are images created in their respective modes—that all this is neither objective truth nor is it all hallucination. There is a combining or marriage between an objectivity that is passive to the outside world and a creative subjectivity, neither pure solipsism nor its opposite.

Consider for a moment the phrase, the opposite of solipsism. In solipsism, you are ultimately isolated and alone, isolated by the premise "I make it all up." But at the other extreme, the opposite of solipsism, you would cease to exist, becoming nothing but a metaphoric feather blown by the winds of external "reality." (But in that region there are no metaphors!) Somewhere between these two is a region where you are partly blown by the winds of reality and partly an artist creating a composite out of the inner and outer events. — Gregory Bateson, afterword to John Brockman

@Ludwig V

…what sticks out for me is when Wittgenstein complained that Socrates was being too complacent in his job of midwifery in the Theaetetus. Let's make finding out if an idea is alive harder.... — Paine

First instance of man-listening. I just couldn’t with the off-the-wall examples. I mean I know it’s hard to create a situation that matches the logic of the desire of the skeptic, but another’s pain in my body? And what’s “me” and “A.N.”? I can’t tell if it had to be genius or the guy’s imagination was wack.

On a serious note, I think Witt is coming to conclusions, making judgments, and even casting dispersions all over his work. I think people get confused about Witt not claiming “theories” (bad choice of words on his part), which I believe is because a) he is not responding in “answer” to the skeptic’s problematizing; and b) it just relates to the method, in that “what we mean when we say…” is only relevant if it is something we all accept. If we can’t accept the premise of what the logical difference is between an accident and mistake, we won’t see what Austin is trying to tell us about intentional acts.

And as far as bringing philosophy to a close, I don’t think philosophy is relegated to just responding to radical skepticism. And now we can investigate assumptions and connotations, and we learn what the commitments and ramifications are of what we do, and whether we are messing it up by putting ourselves in the middle of it. Sounds like solid thinking when something comes up we aren’t sure how to deal with—when “right” or “ought” are up for grabs.

First instance of man-listening. — Antony Nickles

Are you referring to Socrates or Wittgenstein? I am familiar with the phrase "man-splaining" but don't know how to hear "man-listening."

I don’t think philosophy is relegated to just responding to radical skepticism. — Antony Nickles

Neither do I. But I am not the one claiming that such is the primary goal of this or any other writing from Wittgenstein. Your map has no place for the arguments against Russel and Frege. They seem more like the adversaries to Wittgenstein's language game model than frightened skeptics asking for what will never be given.

Your reading is clearly a response to reading Cavell and Austin. Translating everything that is said by Wittgenstein into those terms is a reduction of the original text into another. For me on the outside, it sounds like a private language.

I don't think Wittgenstein would have objected to Linguistics as Chomsky pursues it. I wonder if Wittgenstein talked about that somewhere. — Paine

Perhaps not. Sadly Chomsky was just three years too late. He didn't develop the theory of transformational grammar until 1955.

I have the use of the information that that which I see, the images, or that which I feel as pain, the prick of a pin, or the ache of a tired muscle — Gregory Bateson, afterword to John Brockman

The argument that there is a difference between what our senses tell us and how the world "really" is is not wrong; it is grossly over-stated and reduces itself to absurdity, imo. From the differences that we can detect, we should conclude that some of the information is good. If all the information was bad, we could never detect the fact.

There is a combining or marriage between an objectivity that is passive to the outside world and a creative subjectivity, neither pure solipsism nor its opposite. — Gregory Bateson, afterword to John Brockman

I think the word he is looking for is interaction. A pure solipsist would be like someone floating in space. But pure objectivity would be like being fossilized into rock. Either way, you suffocate in seconds. Wittgenstein was right to favour the rough ground.

I can’t tell if it had to be genius or the guy’s imagination was wack. — Antony Nickles

Some of the argument lacks his usual elegance. It's not surprising that it didn't make it to the PI. But he was trying hard to cover all the angles. If nothing else, it shows how hard that is.
I think, however, that the approach that argues that what the sceptic/solipsist/whoever wants to say cannot be said sometimes comes over as denying even the space to state a view.

If we can’t accept the premise of what the logical difference is between an accident and mistake, we won’t see what Austin is trying to tell us about intentional acts. — Antony Nickles

Austin makes it look so easy, doesn't he? That's why he is not just a good philosopher, but a master, even though he makes jewels and not monuments. But I think it is dangerous to take widespread agreement about logical differences for granted - it leads to complacency and dogmatism. I recommend C.L, Dodgson's "What the Tortoise said to Achilles" as a corrective.

Sounds like solid thinking when something comes up we aren’t sure how to deal with—when “right” or “ought” are up for grabs. — Antony Nickles

Yes. It can be hard to cope with the bewilderment.

The fact that science has stayed away from the kind of philosophical clarification that Witt’s work represents is the reason for what Evan Thompson calls its ‘blind spot’ concerning its relation to the Lifeworld that generates it and makes it intelligible. — Joshs

Yes. The problem no-one likes to talk about - the moment that we have to face the ouroboros. The existence of the blind spot in the eye is a splendid source of metaphors. So let's remember that it is not a flaw - it is the inevitable consequence of sending information to the brain for processing.

To be clear, Bateson falls on the "psychology" side of what Wittgenstein is considering. And so does Chomsky. I don't mean to imply that their ideas are adequate responses to what Wittgenstein is trying to do.

To be clear, Bateson falls on the "psychology" side of what Wittgenstein is considering. And so does Chomsky. I don't mean to imply that their ideas are adequate responses to what Wittgenstein is trying to do. — Paine

No, I wasn't going there. There's nothing wrong with having different approaches around the same subject/object. I would need to do quite a lot more work before I could begin to really understand how all these projects relate to each other.

That is and will be a lot of work for all or any who attempt it.

I am trying to understand how Wittgenstein thought of his work as outside of the other projects. Not so much a solving of a puzzle but looking at how the pieces of it are laid out.

From that point of view, Bateson wants to establish a generality that Wittgenstein wants to interrogate.

↪Ludwig V
To be clear, Bateson falls on the "psychology" side of what Wittgenstein is considering. And so does Chomsky. I don't mean to imply that their ideas are adequate responses to what Wittgenstein is trying to do. — Paine

George Lakoff’s embodied alternative to Chomsky’s innatism comes a bit closer to Wittgenstein.

@Paine

the study of the logic of our language and the study of how people actually use their language are different practices. — Ludwig V

I get that there is a difference between what Witt is doing and (cognitive) linguistics or the scientific study of our ability to communicate. I take his idea to be that learning language involves learning our shared judgments (lives), so the sense and meaning of language, its logic, is wrapped up in our practices. But yes, there is the confusion of turning this into a scientific/sociological enterprise, which I think comes from what Witt points out is the desire for an “answer”.

There's no problem about that. The meaning of "must" is specified by the context. — Ludwig V

Yes, but the logic of ordinary criteria provides a context-based sense of what is appropriate, etc., where the skeptic’s “must” is dictated beforehand by imposing the criteria of certainty.

Is there anything obviously wrong with the answer [to why the skeptic wants certainty] that we want/need to resolve the cognitive dissonance? — Ludwig V

Well I think there is more to learn from the skeptic in the PI than just a resolution. We know how they do it now in the Blue Book, but the question of why, I would think, calls for further investigation.

Are you referring to Socrates or Wittgenstein? I am familiar with the phrase "man-splaining" but don't know how to hear "man-listening." — Paine

Just that Socrates doesn’t hear anything as important unless it meets his criteria. Obviously a poor joke.

Your map has no place for the arguments against Russel and Frege. — Paine

True, there is more going on than just looking at how the interlocutor (the skeptic) imagines their claims, and thus why they are making them, but I would argue that it is the primary thrust of the investigation, starting here in the Blue Book, but of course we all have different things that catch our eye/interests. As far as Cavell and Austin, I tried to limit it to just cross-over instances of the same method, but I imagine my studies leaked into understanding this text.

I think, however, that the approach that argues that what the sceptic/solipsist/whoever wants to say cannot be said sometimes comes over as denying even the space to state a view. — Ludwig V

True, true. His method is to make the most sense of what they say even if that entails imagining a whole new world to do it.

But I think it is dangerous to take widespread agreement about logical differences for granted - it leads to complacency and dogmatism. — Ludwig V

Ah but allowing for the possibility of, even assuming, the agreement, is to necessarily allow for the outlier cases/possibility of aversion to conforming to society, even in every instance.

But yes, there is the confusion of turning this into a scientific/sociological enterprise, which I think comes from what Witt points out is the desire for an “answer”. — Antony Nickles

I think we should look to the question to see whether the empirical projects are framed by the same question(s) as Wittgenstein's.

Yes, but the logic of ordinary criteria provides a context-based sense of what is appropriate, etc., where the skeptic’s “must” is dictated beforehand by imposing the criteria of certainty. — Antony Nickles

I would go a step further and argue that the sceptic's certainty is muddled and/or makes the sceptical conclusion inevitable - i.e. begs that apparent question. The mere logical possibility that the sun won't rise tomorrow is confused with the actuality that it will. Roughly.

Just that Socrates doesn’t hear anything as important unless it meets his criteria. — Antony Nickles

Yes,, he does have a restricted range. But his interlocutors seem to accept his criteria and, in the end, own themselves not to know what they thought they knew.

As far as Cavell and Austin, I tried to limit it to just cross-over instances of the same method, but I imagine my studies leaked into understanding this text. — Antony Nickles

There something a bit odd about the mutual silence between Wittgenstein and the Oxford people. There must have been some sort of communication or awareness. Anscombe alone ensures that.

True, true. His method is to make the most sense of what they say even if that entails imagining a whole new world to do it. — Antony Nickles

Yes. The principle of charitable interpretation. Our first reaction to apparent nonsense is to look for an interpretation that makes sense. Quite different from what we usually find in philosophical debate. Yet Wittgenstein seems to have made up his mind - there's no hint of oscillation about his critical stance.

Ah but allowing for the possibility of, even assuming, the agreement, is to necessarily allow for the outlier cases/possibility of aversion to conforming to society, even in every instance. — Antony Nickles

True - especially when we start using words - stretching the normal rules - in non-standard contexts and limiting cases.

There something a bit odd about the mutual silence between Wittgenstein and the Oxford people. There must have been some sort of communication or awareness. — Ludwig V

Well now we’re just agreeing too much for this to be fun. But to this, I did read that Austin and Wittgenstein bristled at the mention of the other, taking some minor distinction and making it seem like a big deal, which is ironic that apparent ego trumped their mutual, vast ability to imagine the position of another, and a bit sad as Wittgenstein always thought no one would understand him.

Is there are reason why we haven't mentioned Ryle?

True, there is more going on than just looking at how the interlocutor (the skeptic) imagines their claims, and thus why they are making them, but I would argue that it is the primary thrust of the investigation, starting here in the Blue Book, but of course we all have different things that catch our eye/interests. — Antony Nickles

So far, you have not made that argument but taken for granted that it is true. You have provided a description of the text as meaning to say X but the singular purpose you assign it is not an argument for it over against any countervailing view.

If your thesis is correct, it would mean that all the apparent concern with other topics are rhetorical ploys put in place to distract the reader. The introduction of "language games" is not the challenge it seems to be given to his contemporaries but is really just a diagnosis of a particular set of personal problems.

Just that Socrates doesn’t hear anything as important unless it meets his criteria. Obviously a poor joke. — Antony Nickles

Are you saying that Wittgenstein was not bringing in that reference as an important background to think about generality?

You have provided a description of the text as meaning to say X but the singular purpose you assign it is not an argument for it over against any countervailing view. — Paine

Well if I haven’t provided the evidence in the text (or examples) for what I read in it, then I haven’t been doing my job, but I tried to make that my priority (though, as I look back at it, there are a few transposed terms and perspectives from PI). And, as I say, there may be parts of the text that are of separate interest. I actually did even mention other readings that I would either count as too surface—too literal in a sense—(to have it about identifying color or equating pain*) or entire misinterpretations, that would take him to be providing an “answer” to the skeptic’s “problem” (for example, forms of life as justification**).

But I will grant you that I would be a better thinker if I could more easily put myself in the shoes of others, a la Witt himself, or Mill ( though he makes “On Liberty” three times longer than it needs to be fighting windmills). Actually, if Witt were just convincing us of something, it would be 20 pages, but he is trying to investigate to get to the bottom of “why” the skeptic looks at the situation as they do.

With the response here (“it would mean that all the apparent concern with other topics are rhetorical ploys put in place to distract the reader”*), I don’t mean to suppress discussion of color, pain, etc. in themselves, e.g., how feelings (the brain) actually do work. Witt even grants the line of inquiry into the “casual connections” of the brain. “Supposing we tried to construct a mind-model as a result of psychological investigations, a model which, as we should say, would explain the action of the mind…. We may find that such a mind-model would have to be very complicated and intricate in order to explain the observed mental activities….” (p.6)

But he does say that “the method of their solution is that of natural science” and that “this aspect of the mind does not interest us” which is related to one of two aspects of this lecture that I think is the hardest to wrap our heads around. This is just before saying that “For what struck us as being queer about thought and thinking was not at all that it had curious effects which we were not yet able to explain (causally). Our problem, in other words, was not a scientific one; but a muddle felt as a problem.” (Emphasis in original). I will try to address this problematizing in a summary, as it is tied to the projection of an object onto understanding thought, etc.

*And I do think the examples are important in actually showing how thinking, understanding, meaning, experiencing, “seeing”, are logical (not internal) practices, which I do see as more traditional philosophical topics, though, again, he gets into these with more breadth in the PI.

Also, as soon as I started talking about fear and desire (of the skeptic), that seemed to ruffle some feathers. As much as I do think that is relevant and evidenced here, it is more a matter of the PI, so I tried to back off that discussion as that is three steps deeper in this text (past where he ends at “conviction”). I would offer though that the resistance to seeing the skeptic as more than intellectual—that “want” is more than logical here—is to want (desire) reasons to just be of a certain type (only a certain “logic”), and to rule everything else out as “psychological”, which traditionally is termed “belief” or “irrational” (“emotional”), or, as you put it, “personal problems”, as if all of us do not have the skeptic within us. But that could, and it appears should, be an entirely different discussion.

Are you saying that Wittgenstein was not bringing in that reference as an important background to think about generality? — Paine

No, sorry to trivialize that. It does seem important, and interesting.

The introduction of "language games" is not the challenge it seems to be given to his contemporaries but is really just a diagnosis of a particular set of personal problems. — Paine

**I take it that ‘language games’ is just a way of referring to the imagined examples that he creates, but I don’t think they are just “rhetorical” though (there is a point). And, as I say above, ‘forms of life’ is just a way of pointing to our practices—which he more specifically terms ‘concepts’, like pointing, or following rules, etc.—but the reasons being their varied logic, and so about judgment, criteria and our interests in them reflected in our language (though I see this as one of my premature impositions of the PI here). And, yes, it’s just taken up by others as a challenge because they misinterpret it as a proposed solution to (or dissolution of) the skeptic’s problem (re: foundation, justification), which comes from applying the method of science to philosophy (p.6). I would suggest though, again, that the first part is more appropriately a separate topic of a discussion of the PI.

Witt even grants the line of inquiry into the “casual connections” of the brain. “Supposing we tried to construct a mind-model as a result of psychological investigations, a model which, as we should say, would explain the action of the mind…. We may find that such a mind-model would have to be very complicated and intricate in order to explain the observed mental activities….” (p.6)

But he does say that “the method of their solution is that of natural science” and that “this aspect of the mind does not interest us” which is related to one of two aspects of this lecture that I think is the hardest to wrap our heads around. This is just before saying that “For what struck us as being queer about thought and thinking was not at all that it had curious effects which we were not yet able to explain (causally). Our problem, in other words, was not a scientific one; but a muddle felt as a problem — Antony Nickles

My reading of this is the following: Witt isnt simply allowing for a peaceful division of labor, where science does its empirical work and philosophy diagnoses conceptual confusion. Instead, he’s diagnosing the impulse to construct “mind-models” as a grammatical temptation. Our very desire to “explain” thought as if it were a causal process is already the problem. Is this your interpretation too?