The sensation of flying is pleasurable. So go jump off a cliff.
Falling is exhilarating, but landing is unpleasant.
Therefore, bungee jumping.

Philosophy is rather stupid about feelings. Life cannot be reduced to the calculus of pain and pleasure or any one dimension of positive and negative, even after allowing that consequences are complex. Consider chronic negative states for example: — ennui, anxiety, depression, hyper-vigilance, stress.
What may alleviate ennui, might well increase stress or anxiety.

Call no man happy until he is dead.

Solon, according to Herodotus.

Because a life worth living makes a story worth telling, and unmitigated good is no story at all; it needs the relief of a crucifixion.

It is uncontroversial that pleasure can lead to pain, and happiness to misery. And vice versa. It is worth getting tired and sore gathering food and fuel for the winter. And there is joy in overcoming fear or pain in some achievement; indeed it is some such difficulty that makes it an achievement in the first place.



Or consider satisfaction or contentment - the condition of not seeking either pleasure or to avoid pain. This might be a happy state to be in sometimes, but supposing it could be prolonged, would lead to an empty, apathetic life.

And all this without mention of the complexities of social interaction - the happiness of my friends and neighbours is essential to my own happiness, and when things go wrong with you, it hurts me too.

There is a metaphysical distinction, sometimes made, between aesthetics and ethics. The principal difference is that "the good" of ethics is always sought for the sake of a higher end, a further good. Therefore there is always a reason why it is deemed as good. "It is good because...". On the other hand, the pleasure of aesthetics is sought for the sake of itself, there is no further end. This is known as "beauty", and there is no rational answer as to why it is good or pleasant.

Aristotle insisted that we must put an end to the good of ethics, or else we'd have an infinite regress. A is good for the sake of B, which is needed to bring about C, which is required for D, and onward ad infinitum. Without the end, there would be no grounding for "good" in general. The theological position inserts "God" as the ultimate end, as a sort of grounding. Aristotle proposed "happiness" as the ultimate end, that which is sought for the sake of itself.

But happiness may easily be conflated with pleasure and beauty, and this results in a unification of ethics and aesthetics. Then "the good" of ethics is supported by the pleasure of aesthetics, and everything which is deemed "good" is done so because it supports that further end, pleasure, which is desired for the sake of itself.

What are the bad pleasures according to Plato? — javi2541997

Plato demonstrated that pleasure is not properly opposed to pain. If these two are opposed, then the desire for pleasure, which is a lack of pleasure in one's present condition, would necessarily be an existence of pain. This implies that pain is a requirement for pleasure, as necessarily prior to it. So he had some argumentative tricks (which I can't recall off hand), to show that there must be a type of pleasure which is independent from, therefore not properly opposed to pain. He assigned the highest good to this type of pleasure, because it does not require pain for its attainment.

If we take this as our guide, the highest good is that pleasure which is not at all opposed to pain, then the lowest good (most bad) would be the type of pleasure which is most readily opposed to pain.

It is uncontroversial that pleasure can lead to pain, and happiness to misery. — unenlightened

I agree with this. But I was looking for a practical or objective example. Your comment seems to be on the path of Plato's view, where pleasure depends on each individual and is subjective. I think the important fact is that Plato stated that there were "bad pleasures" in plural. Thus, a collection of actions or desires which are bad and conflict with the supposedly intrinsically good of pleasure.

There is a metaphysical distinction, sometimes made, between aesthetics and ethics. The principal difference is that "the good" of ethics is always sought for the sake of a higher end, a further good. Therefore there is always a reason why it is deemed as good. "It is good because...". On the other hand, the pleasure of aesthetics is sought for the sake of itself, there is no further end. This is known as "beauty", and there is no rational answer as to why it is good or pleasant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. What do you think, MU? Is pleasure related to ethics or aesthetics?

Plato demonstrated that pleasure is not properly opposed to pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, exactly. I get this from Plato. But I think it is a bit subjective when he debates about good, bad, pain and pleasure. It seems that pleasure and pain need to be experienced by the subject, and then they conclude if something is bad or good. For example, smoking. In my humble opinion, I think smoking is a bad pleasure (following Plato's points) but completely objective because it is scientifically demonstrated that smoking kills and causes cancer. Therefore, smoking is a bad objective pleasure that does not depend on subjectiveness.

If we take this as our guide, the highest good is that pleasure which is not at all opposed to pain, then the lowest good (most bad) would be the type of pleasure which is most readily opposed to pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't disagree with this, but I consider it a bit ambiguous. What are the boundaries of pain and good? There are people who enjoy sadomasochism. Is this sexual practice objectively good or bad even though it clearly implies pain?

Interesting. What do you think, MU? Is pleasure related to ethics or aesthetics? — javi2541997

Pleasure is definitely related to aesthetics. The question is how these two are related to ethics. The two extremes would be, one, that they are completely separate and unrelated, and the other that ethics is completely determined by pleasure and aesthetics. I would think that reality is somewhere in between.

Yes, exactly. I get this from Plato. But I think it is a bit subjective when he debates about good, bad, pain and pleasure. It seems that pleasure and pain need to be experienced by the subject, and then they conclude if something is bad or good. For example, smoking. In my humble opinion, I think smoking is a bad pleasure (following Plato's points) but completely objective because it is scientifically demonstrated that smoking kills and causes cancer. Therefore, smoking is a bad objective pleasure that does not depend on subjectiveness. — javi2541997

I think you need to consider that goods, as that which is desired, need to weighted and prioritized relative to each other. This is because they often conflict, so we commonly need to exclude one for the pursuit of another. This is why Plato compared an immediate pleasure to a distant one.

Sometimes we need to resist an immediate pleasure for a distant one if the distant one is more highly prized and the immediate one conflicts. This is difficult, because being immediate it appears bigger and better than it truly is. But we need to understand that the distant one is actually better, so we need to resist the immediate one which conflicts.

I think that this might be the case in your example of smoking. Smoking is an immediate pleasure, but reason informs us that it conflicts with the long term, less immediate desires. Since the long term is more highly prioritized, we need to resist from smoking for the sake of the other. Then smoking is a "bad pleasure" because it conflicts with the other which is more highly sought after.

I can't disagree with this, but I consider it a bit ambiguous. What are the boundaries of pain and good? There are people who enjoy sadomasochism. Is this sexual practice objectively good or bad even though it clearly implies pain? — javi2541997

I don't quite understand what you are asking here. Plato was looking for a type of pleasure which was unrelated to pain, which would be determined as "good". Incorporating pain and pleasure together within the same activity, as is the case in sadomasochism is a move in the opposite direction. We're supposed to be looking for a pleasure which is unrelated to pain, not one which is more closely related to pain.

Pleasure is definitely related to aesthetics. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wanted to express this, but I wasn't very clear, I guess. :wink:

The question is how these two are related to ethics. The two extremes would be, one, that they are completely separate and unrelated, and the other that ethics is completely determined by pleasure and aesthetics. I would think that reality is somewhere in between. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is true that it is better to choose the most eclectic choice and put pleasure between ethics and aesthetics. Perhaps the key to this distinction is more related to what we understand as "good" rather than how we experience pleasure. On this point, Plato (if I am not wrong) argued that everyone has to when he is doing good when something is good. I mean, it is subjective. There is not an objective approach to pleasure, apparently.

Smoking is an immediate pleasure, but reason informs us that it conflicts with the long term, less immediate desires. Since the long term is more highly prioritized, we need to resist from smoking for the sake of the other. Then smoking is a "bad pleasure" because it conflicts with the other which is more highly sought after. — Metaphysician Undercover

Understood! Thanks for this clear and informative explanation, MU. :up:

I don't quite understand what you are asking here. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd try to express myself better.

Since Plato argued that pleasure is unrelated to pain and this determined the "good", what do "pleasure" and "pain" mean? Do you think that their understanding of these concepts depends on each of us because it is a purely subjective experience? What I may consider as "painful", you could feel otherwise, and vice versa. So, when I read that paragraph by Plato, I thought in the first place that pleasure, good and pain are "universals" and they do not have objective existence. They are dependent upon how we experience them. But is there the possibility that pain and pleasure exist in an objective perspective?

What I consider a good pleasure, such as listening to opera, may be insufferable to you. According to this, pleasure seems to be a purely subjective concept. — javi2541997

Not necessarily. Opera is not itself pleasure, it is something that brings pleasure to you. If it is insufferable to me, it brings me no pleasure. The stimulus is not the response. Different stimuli may be needed to bring about the same pleasurable response in each of us.

What is and isn't pleasurable is subjective. But is pleasure itself subjective? On the one hand, pleasure, like other feelings, is a private sensation which can be experienced only by the one who feels it. On the other hand, pleasure universally attracts us to that which is pleasurable. Pleasure is a manifestation, made to a mind, of the body's instinct to do this thing, to seek this or that out. It is the carrot to pain's whip, and both work together to steer all the sentient animals. And so pleasure is an objective feature of the biology of everything with a mind.

Not necessarily. Opera is not itself pleasure, it is something that brings pleasure to you. If it is insufferable to me, it brings me no pleasure. The stimulus is not the response. Different stimuli may be needed to bring about the same pleasurable response in each of us. — hypericin

Therefore, you agree with the points of Epicurus and other philosophers who stated that pleasure is subjective. Since something (like opera, for instance) may be considered pleasure/non-pleasure at the same time by different perceivers, then music is dependent upon subjectiveness. The complexity is in the concepts. Plato doesn't use 'insufferable' or 'non-pleasant'. He states that pleasure could be good or bad, and each of us should know where we are in one or the other. But here we find another issue: if opera is insufferable to you. Does this mean that opera (or music) is bad?

And furthermore, are there insufferable experiences which are good? An appointment with the dentist, perhaps?

And so pleasure is an objective feature of the biology of everything with a mind. — hypericin

What do you mean by this? That pleasure is objectively existent from a biological perspective? It is intriguing. I can't disagree with this, but the debate arises when we distinguish between bad and good pleasures. Don't you think?

Since Plato argued that pleasure is unrelated to pain and this determined the "good", what do "pleasure" and "pain" mean? — javi2541997

Let me clarify what I believe that Plato did. He did not argue that pleasure is unrelated to pain, some pleasures very much seem to be related to pains. But I think he demonstrated that since pleasures come in different types, if there is a type which is not related to pain, that type could be related to good. What I believe he explicitly argued was that as long as we understand pleasure as the opposite of pain, then it is impossible that pleasure can be equated with good.

As to what "pleasure" and "pain" mean, we'd have to look somewhere else. I suppose the common tendency at Plato's time, was to oppose the two in meaning. That allows us to avoid the effort required to define them. We understand pleasure as the opposite of pain, and pain as the opposite of pleasure.

Do you think that their understanding of these concepts depends on each of us because it is a purely subjective experience? What I may consider as "painful", you could feel otherwise, and vice versa. So, when I read that paragraph by Plato, I thought in the first place that pleasure, good and pain are "universals" and they do not have objective existence. They are dependent upon how we experience them. But is there the possibility that pain and pleasure exist in an objective perspective? — javi2541997

I see all three, pleasure, pain, and good, as subjective at this point. Pleasure and pain are definitely subjective because when I feel pleasure or pain you do not necessarily feel what I feel. There may be a type of pleasure though, which when a person feels it, it is subjective, felt only by that person, but it is good for everyone. Then that good could be objective. This, I believe is the pleasure we get from being morally good. Like the pleasure from being a philanthropist for example, the specific pleasure is felt only by that person, and is subjective, but the good is related to all.

Let me clarify what I believe that Plato did. He did not argue that pleasure is unrelated to pain, some pleasures very much seem to be related to pains. But I think he demonstrated that since pleasures come in different types, if there is a type which is not related to pain, that type could be related to good. What I believe he explicitly argued was that as long as we understand pleasure as the opposite of pain, then it is impossible that pleasure can be equated with good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. What surprises me the most is that just one phrase of Plato in his book caused an intriguing discussion here. It is astonishing what Plato contributed to philosophy.

I can't disagree with you, and I think we have a common agreement that Plato argued that pleasure came from different ways. It is important to highlight this: are they not in like manner compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures?

I don't know if bad pleasure is related to pain. Perhaps it is, as you explained to me with the above reasons. However, in that quote, Plato clearly refutes the idea that pleasure has a natural significance as the "good," a view held by most utilitarians and other philosophers. I believe that Plato wanted to argue that sometimes a pleasure can be bad too, but it is upon us how we distinguish when a pleasure is good from when it is bad.

Perhaps, the point seems to be what the meanings of 'good', 'bad', 'pain', etc. are when we experience pleasure. Without any doubt, it is a subjective experience. But as I said to @hypericin, such experiences can conflict with other aspects: If I dislike opera and I feel this is insufferable, does this mean that music is bad (or even painful) in my context?

Pleasure and pain are definitely subjective because when I feel pleasure or pain you do not necessarily feel what I feel. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, absolutely.

There may be a type of pleasure though, which when a person feels it, it is subjective, felt only by that person, but it is good for everyone. Then that good could be objective. This, I believe is the pleasure we get from being morally good. Like the pleasure from being a philanthropist for example, the specific pleasure is felt only by that person, and is subjective, but the good is related to all. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is well-noted the examples of objective good, but what about objective bad? This is the issue. Remember that Plato scolded us for not admitting that there are bad pleasures too. :razz:

Therefore, you agree with the points of Epicurus and other philosophers who stated that pleasure is subjective. Since something (like opera, for instance) may be considered pleasure/non-pleasure at the same time by different perceivers, then music is dependent upon subjectiveness. — javi2541997

I think your wording threw me a bit. What brings one pleasure is subjective. Opera may be considered pleasurable or unpleasurable. I think most will agree with this, today. I tried to answer the slightly odd question, "Is pleasure [itself] subjective?", anyway.

And furthermore, are there insufferable experiences which are good? An appointment with the dentist, perhaps? — javi2541997

I fully agree that pleasure/pain and good/bad are independent axes. Whether good/bad is used in the advantageous sense, or the moral sense.

Where good/bad means advantageous/disadvantageous:

Good Pleasure:Success, hiking, social bonding
Bad Pleasure: Cigarettes, overeating, compulsive browsing/video games/etc
Good Pain: Dentists, surgery, workouts, study
Bad Pain: Illness, injury, depression

(TPF can occupy each of these!)

Where good/bad means moral/immoral:

Good Pleasure:Helping, reconciliation, activism, child rearing
Bad Pleasure: Sadism, exploitation, bullying, destruction
Good Pain: Self sacrifice, activism, child rearing
Bad Pain: Bitter arguing, war

I agree with you, hypericin.

Sorry for my wording. It is true that I don't tend to express myself clearly. Of course you did a wonderful job trying to answer my questions. I appreciate your contribution to my thread, mate. :pray:

Nonetheless, I have some questions that I would like to share and debate with you:

What are the bad pleasures according to Plato? Does this really depend on each of us and how we understand Hedonism?

Are there objective pleasures? Can these be drawn from the boundaries of good and bad? — javi2541997

To me too this is a very complex topic. I’ll add to what has so far been mentioned in the thread that happiness (our bet fit modern-day term for eudemonia) and pleasure, thought best intwined, are not identical: e.g., the great happiness of a marathon runner finishing the marathon while in excruciating pain. Nor is suffering (an opposite of eudemonia) and pain identical. I don’t yet know of a more clear cut example than the following, so please excuse the sullenness of it all: some women who are raped (always against their consent, and with a great deal of traumatic suffering incurred) can experience physiological pleasure from their penetrated genitals (such that this physiological pleasure only further traumatizes the raped women and increases her suffering). Then there is masochism, wherein consensually incurred pain is juxtaposed with heightened happiness. All these, again, being complex enough topics on their own.

But I’m writing because I take it you are in part asking for clear cut cases of “bad/unethical pleasures” that might align to being "objectively bad" ... such that not engaging in such pleasures might then be objectively good. Here are three examples that I presume most will readily acknowledge:

• The pleasures (and likely momentary happiness) of a mass-murderer in murdering others are bad/unethical pleasures.
• The pleasures (and likely momentary happiness) of a rapist in raping others are bad/unethical pleasures.
• The pleasures (and likely momentary happiness) of an extreme bigot in successfully depriving others of the dignity to their own life, and this strictly on account of these others being significantly different rather than due to these others being unethical, are bad/unethical pleasures.

Given Plato’s views of the Good—which could well be argued equivalent to perfected, complete/absolute eudemonia and, hence, to perfected happiness (one reference to this effect), this rather than being in any way associated to “perfected pleasure”—all bad pleasures (and instances of bad momentary happiness) are, in ultimate terms, bad precisely because they deviate one from proximity to the Good, i.e. perfected happiness. To not here mention their affect upon others as well. And this “deviation” can at times be far more egregious than in other cases, this as per the three examples just presented.

I have not read the thread yet but ...

What are the bad pleasures according to Plato? — javi2541997

I don't know about Plato's mumbo-jumbo, but Epicurus thinks "bad pleasures" are ones which cause or increase pain (or fear (i.e. suffering)) because they are either unnecessary (e.g. luxuries, excesses) or unnatural (e.g. wealth, power, fame) in contrast to good pleasures which reduce pain (or fear (i.e. suffering)) and are simple but necessary (e.g. food, shelter, play, friendship, community). I think tranquility, not the "pleasure" (i.e. euphoria) of hedonists like the Cyrenaics, is the Epicurean (or disutilitarian) goal. :flower:

I don't know about Plato, but Epicurus thinks "bad pleasures" are ones which cause or increase pain because they are either unncessary (e.g. luxuries, excesses) or unnatural (e.g. wealth, power, fame) in contrast to good pleasures which reduce pain and are simple but necessary (e.g. food, shelter, play, friendship, community). — 180 Proof

Don't know if you happened to read my post, but, pulled out from it: Going by Epicurus's thoughts as just outlined by you, running marathons would then be bad, this because they result in increased unnecessary pain. As does weightlifting, and a good number of other human activities often deemed to be eudemonia-increasing. The altruism to running into a house on fire and thereby risking grave unnecessary pain (to not even get into the risk of mutilation and death) so as to rescue another's life would then be bad and hence unethical?

None of your examples are the ones I gave: luxuries, excesses, wealth, power or fame (all of which cause fear of pain of losing them somehow) and therefore not "bad pleasures" per se, or "pleasures" at all.

Thanks for your reply and contribution, javra. It is a complex topic, indeed.

Perhaps you are right in approaching this topic from an ethical perspective. I wasn't seeing pleasure or unpleasantness as related to ethical/unethical actions. Rather, I thought it was more focused on aesthetics, but it is obvious that this philosophical matter cannot be understood by only my own perspective, I guess. The problem is that the question asked by Plato is ambiguous, and it is open to many different interpretations. He just stated: Or are not they in like manner compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures?

In the first glimpse, Plato simply refuted the position of some Epicurean and other philosophers that pleasure is the good and only the good. I already understood, thanks to your explanation and MU and hypercin, that pleasure is subjective. Thus, pain, good, bad, ethical, unethical, etc., are dependent on the subjectiveness of the perceiver. However, this can be tricky, as you also noted in your examples above. Smoking, raping, and murdering are objectively bad, in my humble opinion. Yet there are people out there who see smoking and murdering as pleasant. Then, what is happening here? Isn't it possible to abstract the notions of good and bad at all?

On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that Plato's point is located in his work The Republic. Therefore, it is likely that his ideas focus on ethics (as you mentioned), and the bad pleasures may refer to those associated with unethical actions or those that negatively impact the majority of people rather than contributing to the common good.

But how is that possible? I thought Epicurus only conceived pleasure as good, so perhaps he never thought of bad pleasures at all.

The links I shared are nice to read. Kelley Ross says:

From the eponymous Greek Hedonists, the doctrine was continued by Epicurus and survives in the significant modern school of Utilitarianism, with agreement that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. — Kelley Ross.

Going by Epicurus's thoughts as just outlined by you, running marathons would then be bad, this because they result in increased unnecessary pain. As does weightlifting, and a good number of other human activities often deemed to be eudemonia-increasing. The altruism to running into a house on fire and thereby risking grave unnecessary pain (to not even get into the risk of mutilation and death) so as to rescue another's life would then be bad and hence unethical? — javra

That's not quite right.

Something that's difficult to understand with ancient ethics is we have a tendency to want to classify an act as good or bad, but these ancient ethics don't address the goodness and badness of acts in the way modern moral philosophy often does. For Epicurus:

No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but some pleasures are only obtainable at the cost of excessive troubles. — Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus' Principle doctrines

to respond to your example of training for a marathon. (so it'd depend upon how much anxiety a person is burdened with in training for the marathon -- if they are tranquil and accepting of the pain then no evil is found in training and running a marathon)

For saving someone in a burning building: were you to do it because of anxiety that you would not be perceived as altruistic (even if just by yourself or before God) then that'd be bad, but if you were to do it because you have a natural kinship towards other human beings and no fear of death then ataraxia is still achieved.

That is, just as there aren't good/bad acts for Epicurus in particular there are no heroic acts one must strive towards. None of us are Odysseus and Homer is a storyteller more than a doctor: surely it's good that someone else was spared pain, and surely it's good to care for our fellow man, because this is what it means to live a good life.

But whether a particular act in a circumstance is good or evil -- as if there were some consequentialist calculus that tells us the right action to take as an individual at a given moment -- just isn't what the ethic is driving at, and is more contextual than asking after whether a particular act just is good or bad because of some rule.

You might then want to change your written position, namely this:

"bad pleasures" are ones which cause or increase pain because they are either unncessary (e.g. luxuries, excesses) or unnatural (e.g. wealth, power, fame) — 180 Proof

So its not "unnecessary or unnatural" but something else ...

As to wealth, power, and fame being "unnatural", one can readily find them in the animal kingdom, such as among great apes, with chimpanzee politics readily consisting of power (over other) and fame (repute) as that then leads to greater personal wealth (such as in territory and mating rights).

https://fourphilosophies.com/epicureanism-vs-hedonism/ (re: aponia, ataraxia)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suffering-focused_ethics (re: disutilitarianism)

That's not quite right. — Moliere

I haven't read Epicurus (who, after all, was a relative ascetic) since college, and yes, many of these issues can be argued back and forth in terms of intents and meanings.

But my post was in direct relation to how Epicureanism was outlined by @180 Proof. And with that description I yet disagree.

But my post was in direct relation to how Epicureanism was outlined by 180 Proof. And with that description I yet disagree. — javra

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1024189

I already understood, thanks to your explanation and MU and hypercin, that pleasure is subjective. — javi2541997

In many a way, yes, but, in addressing Plato, the question instead becomes one of whether eudemonia too is subjective ... or, else, if there is such a thing as objective eudemonia. It is on the latter which Platonic notions of ethics hinges (this as per the SEP reference previously given).

Not a proper reply. Or should I point you to links regarding what Epicurus in fact stated? Time is a commodity.

But my post was in direct relation to how Epicureanism was outlined by 180 Proof. And with that description I yet disagree. — javra

I thought his summation good enough, basically -- in a rough and dirty way, sure that's what the bad pleasures are, and the good pleasure is ataraxia and aponia, like the link he linked says.

I'd disagree with that link in marking a distinction between Epicureanism and Hedonism -- but I understand the distinction he's drawing (I'd just call them two types of hedonism)


Also, your post gave me an in to laying out a bit on Epicureanism -- I had been thinking about what to say yours was just the first comment that finally sparked words.

I thought his summation good enough, basically -- in a rough and dirty way, sure that's what the bad pleasures are, and the good pleasure is ataraxia and aponia, like the link he linked says. — Moliere

OK, I don't though. For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was. For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom.

Maybe this is all differences of opinion. So be it then.

:up:

Yes, indeed. Happiness/unhappiness may also be related to pleasure. It is another good approach. However, I think this is a clear example of subjectivity. Eudemonia is dependent on how/what we feel. As you stated, eudaimonia is hardly objective.

As you stated, eudaimonia is hardly objective. — javi2541997

I can respect your views but, to be clear: To me, eudemonia is very much objective. The pleasures of chain smoking till you die to this world as just one relatively easy to understand example of pleasure's subjectivity vs. eudemonia's objectivity.

As you stated, eudaimonia is hardly objective. — javi2541997

I don't recall stating that. In fact, I believe eudaimonia (i.e. flourishing) is objective — acquiring adaptive habits (virtues) and unlearning maladaptive habits (vices) — e.g. the Capability approach of M. Nussbaum & A. Sen.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability_approach

OK, I don't though. For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was. — javra

I want to mark a distinction here: @180 Proof's description of the good/bad pleasures is accurate to Epicureanism is what I mean -- as in, descriptively, this is what Epicurus says are the good/bad pleasures in a rough-and-ready way.

With your examples what I'm saying is that the Epicurean ethic can handle them. So with:

For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom.

And your example of the marathon runner, and your example of the altruistic firefighter.

It's not that all marathon runners, firefighters, or lovers are bad. It's the ones who run marathons for glory, heroes that save people for praise, and lovers that possess their object of love that the Epicurean philosophy is aiming at.

So it's not that marathons are bad -- it's the character of the person who is running marathons in order to achieve immortality that's causing themself to be miserable.

Maybe this is all differences of opinion. So be it then.

Oh, of course it does in some way, though we can still offer reasons and such for the opinions and attempt to pursue what's good, or at least enjoy reflecting for awhile.