We do and it ought to be evident. I think the simplicity of an act of free will can get obfuscated by big questions pertaining to who we are, regrets, life and death decisions and the like. But that's inflating the trivial and putting in a host of complications that obscure the phenomenon.

So, there is a clear and massive difference between raising your leg and a doctor tapping your knee with a hammer, and then the leg going up as a reflex.

One we control easily, the other we can't control - it just happens.

If that distinction is taken to be true as it should, because it's so trivial, then you can begin amping up this example to other cases (but not all).

Turning a right instead of left is the difference between living a normal life or being a paraplegic for the rest of it as another car slams into yours.

Going to that trip may be the difference between a relaxing vacation or getting a promotion at work. And you can expand this in all ways. I can continue writing, or I can stop. I can't do both at the same time, that much is evident.

But yeah, that you can do something because it is in your power and that you do something because you can't control it, is the difference between free will and necessity.

This hasn't been solved because the nature of decision making, control, and cause-and-effect is not straightforward at all, the "yes, there is free will" position tries to oversimplify various processes at work when we do things and make decisions.

It seems to always be the case that when I state my opinion that free will is incoherent, the response is always, essentially, how dare you. No-one ever seems to respond with a coherent definition, or give a description of how it could function in a hypothetical universe. — Mijin

I appreciate this and I apologise if my comment may have been a little curt. I may have been projecting a bit since exasperation sometimes is my own attitude when I see people appearing unwilling or unable to unpack their presuppositions about the nature of the persons or selves that allegedly have or lack "free will." (and it's often within such conceptions of the self that much of the philosophical meat is concealed.)

I don't think, in general, philosophical discussions should start with providing rigorous definitions, though. That's because the meanings and connotations of the terms that figure in any purported definition often are equally as contentious as the concept we attempt to define. So, it's often better not to reinvent the wheel and rather gesture towards the conceptual clarifications and framings of the problems as they've already been in the process of being articulated (in the literature or in discussions already under way) and start with that (e.g. point out considerations that have been ignored or shared presuppositions between other participants that one finds questionable).

But anyway, to respond to your points, I have given examples of formulations, like "could have chosen differently", and explained why I think they're meaningless. So I did do the thing you're suggesting.

If you know of better definitions, let's hear them, I'm here for it. In the meantime, yes my opinion is that it's incoherent, not just because all the formulations I have heard have been, but because I've heard all of the most popular ones.

A appreciate that as well and I tend to agree as regards the purported meaning of "could have done otherwise" (sometimes analysed in the context of the PAP principle—"principle of alternative possibilities, " after Harry Frankfurt, in the literature.) But surely, you must grand that ordinary uses of the phrase, like "I didn't stop by the corner store to buy milk after work (and hence couldn't have chosen differently) because it was closed" are meaningful? I think beginning with ordinary uses, properly contextualized, often already goes a long way towards dispelling common philosophical confusions.

We have will free from the laws of physics. Countless things exist that would not exist if particles and the things comprised of particles interacted only in accordance with the laws of physics. Nothing that exists violates the laws of physics, but many things cannot be explained by those laws. Therefore, something else is at work.

Here is a reconstructivist approach to free will: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17057739

I appreciate this and I apologise if my comment may have been a little curt — Pierre-Normand

Thanks and reading back my own post, I will say the same. My posts are often more acerbic / confrontational really than they need to be and I appreciate you cooling the temperature.

But surely, you must grand that ordinary uses of the phrase, like "I didn't stop by the corner store to buy milk after work (and hence couldn't have chosen differently) because it was closed" are meaningful? — Pierre-Normand

I do agree that that description is meaningful.

I'll try to clarify my position.

I believe that we make choices, but those choices are the product of our knowledge and predilections.
If you could rewind time to the moment I made the biggest mistake of my life, and you "rewind" my memories back to that state, then I'll do the same thing for the same reasons.

Some might balk at calling this "choice" then, but I think this is the *only* thing we can mean by choice. What's a choice that *isn't* the product of knowledge and predilection, what would that even mean?

In a universe is magic, souls and indeterminacy, how do the fairy folk decide between coffee or tea?

Do we really have free will? Unfortunately, a question that can never be answered.

Suppose someone makes the decision to turn left rather than turn right. On the one hand their decision may have been determined by forces outside their control. On the other hand they may have made the decision regardless of forces outside their control using their personal free will. The insurmountable problem remains that it is impossible for anyone to know, either the person themselves or an outside observer, whether that decision had been determined or freely made. And if that is the case, that it is impossible to know whether a person's decisions are determined or freely made, the existence or not of free will remain a topic with no possibility of resolution.

If Determinism is the case, the decision has been determined prior to the moment of action, and if free will is the case, the decision is made at the moment of action. We can see a cue approaching a snooker ball, and it makes sense that the moving cue causes the snooker ball to move, But the snooker ball does not move because the cue is approaching the snooker ball, it moves because of the moment of contact between cue and snooker ball. For both free will and determinism, it is within an instantaneous moment in time that the future is determined.

As we can never know what is happening within the mind at an instant in time, knowing a physical state of affairs at an instant in time gives us no information as to how that physical system will change with time. Knowing what is tells us nothing about what will be, whether this is about the mind or a physical state of affairs. And if we cannot know what will be, it logically follows that we are also unable to know the cause of what will be, meaning that we are unable to know whether the cause of what will be has been free will or prior determination.

Because of this problem with our fundamental inability to know what is happening within a moment in time, we have a fundamental inability to know whether an action is that of free will or prior determination. Free will is a problem beyond any conceivable solution.

I believe that we make choices, but those choices are the product of our knowledge and predilections.
If you could rewind time to the moment I made the biggest mistake of my life, and you "rewind" my memories back to that state, then I'll do the same thing for the same reasons.

Some might balk at calling this "choice" then, but I think this is the *only* thing we can mean by choice. What's a choice that *isn't* the product of knowledge and predilection, what would that even mean?

In a universe is magic, souls and indeterminacy, how do the fairy folk decide between coffee or tea? — Mijin

The idea that free will requires this sort of "rewind" possibility and that if we reset the whole universe to that moment (including your brain and memories) you could have chosen otherwise is what I've called "rollback incompatibilism" in a paper I wrote a few years ago. I think it's false, but it does seem to be a shared presupposition between libertarians who insist it's required and possible and hard determinists who insist it's required and impossible.

One problem with the "rewind" way of thinking is that it encourages us to look at ourselves from a kind of God's-eye, external standpoint, as if what mattered for free will were whether a particular event in the causal chain could have gone differently, holding everything else fixed. Both those who look backward for freedom conditions (as in Galen Strawson's "you didn't make yourself" Basic Argument) and those who look forward to the good consequences of holding people responsible (as in Derk Pereboom's deterrence/incitement account that views ascriptions of personal responsibility to be justified on merely instrumental grounds) tend to treat actions just as causal links in that empirical chain.

On my view, such moves sideline what is distinctive about practical reason. Our practices of holding ourselves and others responsible (blame, resentment, gratitude, guilt, pride, but also simple second-person demands like "How could you do that?") are not merely external levers we pull to shape behaviour from the outside. They are also things that we ourselves can recognize as warranted or unwarranted.

When I acknowledge that someone's blame is fitting, or feel shame or regret where I should, I'm not just being moved into acting better in the future (though I may be). I'm recognizing that, in this case, I was or wasn't properly responsive to the demands of reason. When I say that I could have done better, I don't mean that I lacked the general ability and opportunity to do better. What rather accounts for my not having done better is my failure (which I am responsible for) to have been suitably sensitive to the reasons I had to do better. I am responsible for my failure to actualize an ability that I had. "Could have done otherwise," in such contexts, signifies the presence of the general practical reasoning ability even in cases where it isn't being properly exercised.

What makes a reason good is not the prior causes that led me to appreciate it, but its place in that normative space: how it bears on what I am committed to, on what counts as doing justice to the situation. So insofar as what makes me act (in the relevant, intelligible sense) is my recognition of the goodness of those reasons, prior causes are not what explain my acting as I do, even though they of course enable it. That is where I'd locate freedom and responsibility, rather than in the possibility of getting a different outcome on a cosmic rewind scenario.

We either have free will or we don’t. If we have free will, then we cannot reason not to have free will. If we don’t have free will, then we cannot reason to have free will. If we have free will and choose how to increase a company’s wealth, then we can also choose not to increase the company’s wealth at all.

Kant in the CPR argues his thesis (A444) that there is one causality in accordance with the laws of nature and another causality of transcendental freedom.

He argues that not all causality can be in accordance with the laws of nature. As for each physical state there must be a prior physical state causing it. It would follow that there cannot have been a beginning, which is in contradiction with our understanding.

But as we experience a unity of experience from past to present, there must be a causality within our transcendental freedom, meaning that this causality must be separate from the causality that is in accordance with the laws of nature.

However, by the same argument, for each physical state there must be a physical state following it. It would follow that there will not be an end, which is not in contradiction with our understanding.

If we are able to understand a world with no end, we should be able to understand a world with no beginning. We may live in a world of infinite time. This overcomes his thesis that not all causality can be in accordance with the laws of nature.

If Kant’s argument that not all causality can be in accordance with the laws of nature is negated, this removes the necessity of a transcendental freedom separate to the laws of nature.This takes us back to all causality being within the laws of nature.

If "free will" just means that we make some choices without being forced by something external to ourselves, then indeed we have free will.

If "free will" means that our will operates independently of the laws of nature (wholly or partly), then it's impossible to know that.

The idea that free will requires this sort of "rewind" possibility and that if we reset the whole universe to that moment (including your brain and memories) you could have chosen otherwise is what I've called "rollback incompatibilism" in a paper I wrote a few years ago. I think it's false, but it does seem to be a shared presupposition between libertarians who insist it's required and possible and hard determinists who insist it's required and impossible. — Pierre-Normand

I would go further than just calling it false, I think it's nonsensical. Rewind time and things are either going to be the same, or different for things like quantum indeterminancy (which we don't consider to be a reasoned choice). If there's a third way that could make sense, no-one seems to know what it is.

And this rewind possibility is the standard framing. I've watched or taken part in countless online and in-person debates where the whole premise was this (false) dichotomy of "Determinism vs free will" and usually a subtext of "Could we have chosen differently?"

When I acknowledge that someone's blame is fitting, or feel shame or regret where I should, I'm not just being moved into acting better in the future (though I may be). I'm recognizing that, in this case, I was or wasn't properly responsive to the demands of reason. When I say that I could have done better, I don't mean that I lacked the general ability and opportunity to do better. — Pierre-Normand

I think there's room for a lot of nuance on the concept of blame, but broadly I disagree.

I doubt that blame makes sense from a god's eye view, that is, with perfect knowledge. And I think this whether or not my decisions are predictable.

But I'll start with the nuances.

Firstly, as a practical matter, we have to hold people accountable for their actions. Both because we don't have perfect knowledge (and in terms of predicting actions, we likely never will) and we're limited in what we could do anyway. So it's necessary to praise and encourage the good, and condemn the bad, as part of just having a society.

(I would still say though that justice systems should be primarily based on rehabilitation, deterrence and public protection and not punishment. Because the notion of punishing evil is vulnerable to us finding genes, or neuropathologies highly correlated with violence say.)

Secondly, in terms of what you're saying about not living up to our potential, I get why it feels like that: I look at many dumb things I've done in my life that way. But it's usually the result of having greater knowledge and awareness now, often due to seeing the results of past dumb behaviours.

There's a strong correlation between impulsive behaviours and youth -- does that mean young people aren't their true self? Someone who died at 25 was never their true self?

But anyway, in general, I don't think blame works in the abstract. If God asks me why I did X, I can always give an explanation and it was down to what I understood at the time, and just the way I was wired (e.g. disliking pain, being attracted to women etc). All things God is at least as culpable as me for.