Yes we have free, but will complicates the issue.

Perhaps the answer is, we do in some things, and we don't in others. As to which concepts or aspects of existence, being, and behavior belong to which category, that's not something any man would know.

Yes we have free, but will complicates the issue. — Punshhh

Please, exactly what issue will be rendered complicated by one exercising free will?

Perhaps the answer is, we do in some things, and we don't in others. As to which concepts or aspects of existence, being, and behavior belong to which category, that's not something any man would know. — Outlander

So, you disagree with the aspects of existence, being and behaviour that I proposed - the aspect of increasing wealth? I propose that the increase in wealth is indeed an aspect of our existence, our being and our behaviour - it is an aspect that is indeed known to any and all man.

So, you disagree with the aspects of existence, being and behaviour that I proposed - the aspect of increasing wealth? I propose that the increase in wealth is indeed an aspect of our existence, our being and our behaviour - it is an aspect that is indeed known to any and all man — Pieter R van Wyk

Not particularly, no. We're largely self-serving beings after all, sure. Otherwise, it's not likely we'd be here.

Another way of framing the topic, rather properly underscoring the dynamic, is to say it is technically possible in theory, but not applicable due to the nature of human manifestation. We don't have control of whether or not we are born healthy, enfeebled, prone to anger, really laid back, smart, dumb, poor memory, great memory, poor sight, great sight, etc. Neither do we have any control over the events and information that we go through or are exposed to, particularly at a young age. All these things contribute to the type of person, or rather what type and state of mind we will have or end up having. These things also define not only what our perceived "hand" that has been dealt in life is but also what we perceive as not only the best options and possible actions or outcomes but the only ones at that.

We are free to move about and navigate the maze that is our life, sure, but it remains a maze that has been created, or at least influenced, by just about every single person living or dead. Every person on Earth has shaped and continues to shape this maze for us, every single person except ourselves.

My position remains that the concept of free will is incoherent. Let me be clear: I'm not agreeing with the position "there is no free will", I am saying that that position is "not even wrong" because it's meaningless.

A reasoned choice is the product of reasoning: the product of (knowledge of) past events and individual predilections: both of which can be traced to causes outside of the self.

Determinism is a red herring here, because IME no one can give an account of how free will would work and make sense even in a non deterministic universe.

My position remains that the concept of free will is incoherent. Let me be clear: I'm not agreeing with the position "there is no free will", I am saying that that position is "not even wrong" because it's meaningless.

A reasoned choice is the product of reasoning: the product of (knowledge of) past events and individual predilections: both of which can be traced to causes outside of the self.

Determinism is a red herring here, because IME no one can give an account of how free will would work and make sense even in a non deterministic universe. — Mijin

If some people's notion of free will is incoherent, one option is to advocate for dispensing with the notion altogether. Another one is the seek to capture the right but inchoate ideas that animate it. The idea of free will clearly is conceptually related to the idea of determinism, on one side, and to the idea of personal responsibility, on the other side. Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett have argued over which one of those two attitudes—eliminativist or revisionist, roughly—is warranted. Sam Harris has complained that although some compatibilist conceptions of free will may be more plausible (although he also thinks it's still incoherent), arguing that people are reasonable to believe that they have free will on that ground is cheating because he thinks the idea of compatibilist free will is, at best a trivial notion, and it doesn't match the unreasonable idea that ordinary people really entertain when they think about free will. This is the point of their (Harris and Dennett's) debate about "Madagascar". The core of the disagreement seems to be whether straightening up the popular and intuitive concept of free will amounts to a minor revision (which I think it does, like Dennett,) or to a wholesale replacement (like Harris thinks it does).

Dennett, also shows, I believe, why Harris's eliminativist position isn't tenable and may be motivated by his own misconceptions about free will, which he tends to project onto others. (The charge can be levied against some professional philosopher too, like Galen Strawson). That's because even Harris clearly sees the tight connection between the concept of free will, as confused as some people's conceptions of it may be, and the concepts of personal and moral responsibility. So, relinquishing the concept altogether, rather than straightening it up or disentangling it from misleading connotations, yields a denial that people are personally and/or morally responsible for what it is that they have done, which is a bullet that Harris is happy to bite, although he tends forgets that he has done so whenever the topic veers away from the philosophical context.

A reasoned choice is the product of reasoning: the product of (knowledge of) past events and individual predilections: both of which can be traced to causes outside of the self. — Mijin

Is this why you think that the concept of free will is incoherent? Why?

If some people's notion of free will is incoherent, one option is to advocate for dispensing with the notion altogether. Another one is the seek to capture the right but inchoate ideas that animate it. The idea of free will clearly is conceptually related to the idea of determinism, on one side, and to the idea of personal responsibility, on the other side. Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett have argued over which one of those two attitudes—eliminativist or revisionist, roughly—is warranted. — Pierre-Normand

True, but I think it's a bit misguided, or maybe gets us off on the wrong foot. (I mean their descriptions, not that you are misguided)
For example, Sam Harris, Stephen Law, Alex O' Conner etc will say that they don't believe that there is free will -- tacitly agreeing that "free will" has been well-defined as something which could potentially exist in some reality.

But their reasons for thinking it free will not exist are more fundamental than just talking about Determinism. They talk about where the will comes from, and that random events could not be called free will.

Therefore I think they would struggle to describe any universe that would have this concept. And, furthermore, the scrutiny should then be placed on the concept itself; basically questioning the premise that I just mentioned -- that free will is a meaningful concept that could exist.

It’s quite simple, in my understanding, and is discovered in the answer to the question “who or what controls my actions?”

In other words, it’s a matter of sourcehood and identity. If something other than me controls my actions, then I do not have free will. If I control my actions, then I have free will.

In the debate so far, determinists and those who otherwise deny free will have never found any other source of the control of our actions, and the identity of that outside controller remains a mystery to them. And until that occurs, one ought to side with the existence of free will.

Is this why you think that the concept of free will is incoherent? Why? — SophistiCat

Apologies -- I've repeated my position on this so many times, on so many forums that I can forget the need to explain myself on a different site.

1. The concept usually gets framed first around Determinism. The reasoning is that, if the universe is Deterministic I might think I chose coffee or tea, but actually that choice was predictable from the big bang. I only had the illusion of choice.
Fine.

2. Then, when it's pointed out that the universe may well not be determinstic, thanks to quantum indeterminancy, this is usually handwaved away. How can randomness be called choice?

3. But to me, (1) and (2) combined leave a bad smell. In (1) it seemed that the issue was with our decisions being predictable, being integrated in the causal chain of events. When the suggestion (2) arrives that this may not be the case, apparently it's still insufficient to have free will.
So, to me, at this point we should be asking What exactly do we mean by free will, and is it something which could even potentially exist?

4. And basically I've never heard a satisfactory answer to (3). No-one can seem to breakdown how a "true" free will decision would be made, or what it even really means.
The popular "Could have chosen differently" is quite a woolly definition. Every reasoned action I've made in my life I did for reasons, that I could have told you at the time. And some of those reasons were more important to me than others. When we talk about "could have chosen differently" what do we mean in this picture -- that I could have been aware of different things, or would value different things more highly? But these things can also be traced to events / properties external to me.