entailment are 'logical rules', which could only be said to 'cause'(scarequotes intentional) someone to infer certain conclusions, if they know and follow the rules. — creativesoul

Sure. "Knowing the rules" is a background condition, just like "all things being equal at room temperature and normal gravity etc." is a background condition for many statements of physical causation. My questions was/is, Given that the mind in question does know the rules, do they actually have a choice about following them? (This is similar to the perennial question in epistemology about whether I can choose what to believe, given a set of facts.) (And yes, the links with JTB issues are obvious as well.)

I'd like to understand this thought better. I think you're saying that I can have a belief without also having a propositional expression or equivalent of that belief? Thus, a non-linguistic animal can form a belief about, say, pain and fire, without entertaining any propositions about it?

If I've got that right, I don't think it's tangential at all. It raises the extremely interesting question of what to do with beliefs, in the taxonomy of Worlds 2 and 3. If we're going to use causal language, as I'm suggesting we might do, what causes a bear to believe that fire will cause pain, and how does that belief in turn cause whatever mental process results in the bear's steering clear of smoke? Is all this happening in the world of psychological events, local to the bear, and explainable in terms of brain processes? Or is there a shadow, so to speak, of propositional content, such that the bear might be said to conclude that smoke is to be avoided?

I think we can get some insight by consulting our own mental behavior when beliefs arise, but I'll stop here.

entailment are 'logical rules', which could only be said to 'cause'(scarequotes intentional) someone to infer certain conclusions, if they know and follow the rules.
— creativesoul

Sure. "Knowing the rules" is a background condition, just like "all things being equal at room temperature and normal gravity etc." is a background condition for many statements of physical causation. My questions was/is, Given that the mind in question does know the rules, do they actually have a choice about following them? — J

My own objections to Gettier's Case I and II, as well as the cottage industry cases, serve as prima facie evidence that one can know the rules and not follow them.

Did I have a choice in the matter? I don't think so.

↪creativesoul I'd like to understand this thought better. I think you're saying that I can have a belief without also having a propositional expression or equivalent of that belief? Thus, a non-linguistic animal can form a belief about, say, pain and fire, without entertaining any propositions about it? — J

The summary above points towards the general thrust. Not all belief is propositional in content.

If I've got that right, I don't think it's tangential at all. It raises the extremely interesting question of what to do with beliefs, in the taxonomy of Worlds 2 and 3. If we're going to use causal language, as I'm suggesting we might do, what causes a bear to believe that fire will cause pain, and how does that belief in turn cause whatever mental process results in the bear's steering clear of smoke? Is all this happening in the world of psychological events, local to the bear, and explainable in terms of brain processes? Or is there a shadow, so to speak, of propositional content, such that the bear might be said to conclude that smoke is to be avoided?

I think we can get some insight by consulting our own mental behavior when beliefs arise, but I'll stop here. — J

There's a lot packed up in there. The taxonomy of beliefs is an interesting subject matter, to me, all by itself. I reject the idea that language less animals' belief(s) have propositional content.

Feeling pain after touching fire causes an animal to infer/conclude that touching fire caused the pain, which in turn forms the belief that touching fire causes pain. That belief will then affect thoughts and effect behaviors, causing the animal to avoid fire.

I reject the idea that language-less animals' belief(s) have propositional content. — creativesoul

I agree. I chose the expression "shadow of propositional content" to try to express something closer to what's going on.

Feeling pain after touching fire causes an animal to infer/conclude that touching fire caused the pain — creativesoul

But if we agree that this does not occur in the space of propositions, then what do you mean by "infer" or "conclude"? What is a nonlinguistic conclusion?

That's the problem I want to home in on. If it's only a matter of one neuron-firing pattern causing another, then we shouldn't call it inference or conclusion at all.

Feeling pain after touching fire causes an animal to infer/conclude that touching fire caused the pain
— creativesoul

But if we agree that this does not occur in the space of propositions, then what do you mean by "infer" or "conclude"? What is a nonlinguistic conclusion?

That's the problem I want to home in on. — J

A non-linguistic inference/conclusion is one that is arrived at via a language less creature. In this example, the creature recognizes/attributes causality; recognizes and/or attributes a causal relationship between their own behaviour and the subsequent pain.

On my view, thought and/or belief cannot be reduced in/to purely physical terms or mental terms. That is because thought and belief consist in part of both and are thus not properly accounted for by either a purely physical or a purely 'mental'(non-physical) framework.

A non-linguistic inference/conclusion is one that is arrived at via a language less creature. — creativesoul

Well, yes, it would be. But I'm trying to puzzle out whether that's a category mistake. You may well be onto something, but help me understand: What is a conclusion that is not put into words? Do you mean a behavior? Probably not, so it must be some mental event that is the equivalent of a conclusion we would express in language. Can you say more about what that would be, phenomenologically? Taking the bear's point of view, so to speak. :smile:

On my view, thought and/or belief cannot be reduced in/to purely physical terms or mental terms. That is because thought and belief consist in part of both and are thus not properly accounted for by either a purely physical or a purely 'mental'(non-physical) framework. — creativesoul

So you wouldn't allow that there could be a "thought" in the World 3 sense. All propositions must appear as items in the physical world? Interesting.

What is a conclusion that is not put into words? — J

In this example, the creature recognizes/attributes causality; recognizes and/or attributes a causal relationship between their own behaviour and the subsequent pain. — creativesoul

Can you say more about what that would be, phenomenologically? — J

I reject phenomenology.

Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Where there has never been language, there could have never been propositions. I'm not sure if I rightly understand what the W3 sense is.

Given the direction of our discussion, it's worth saying that the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is incapable of taking proper account of language less thought and belief, particularly in terms of the content thereof.

I reject phenomenology. — creativesoul

OK.

Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Where there has never been language, there could have never been propositions. I'm not sure if I rightly understand what the W3 sense is. — creativesoul

Popper agrees that all W3 objects, such as propositions, are human-made. The reason he puts them in a separate "world" (and of course that is metaphorical) is that propositions have the peculiar property of being true or false (for example) regardless of whether anyone asserts them -- at least, that's the usual construal, though Kimhi and Rödl are both raising questions about that. So in that sense they don't seem to depend on being instantiated in particular minds.

the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is incapable of taking proper account of language less thought and belief, particularly in terms of the content thereof. — creativesoul

Say more about that? Do you mean, the dichotomy is too rigid?

The theory laden nature of these discussions you mentioned as necessary in the OP is showing up here.

What does an unarticulated proposition consist of?

the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is incapable of taking proper account of language less thought and belief, particularly in terms of the content thereof.
— creativesoul

Say more about that? Do you mean, the dichotomy is too rigid? — J

Sort of. The content of a language less creature's thought and belief can include/consist of stuff that is existentially dependent upon language.

Right, that's the question.

OK, but I still wish I understood what the "stuff" was.

...propositions have the peculiar property of being true or false (for example) regardless of whether anyone asserts them... — J

What does an unarticulated proposition consist of? — creativesoul

Right, that's the question. — J

I would ask that question to anyone claiming that there is such thing as an unarticulated proposition. By my lights, it exposes an emaciated ontological framework.

If propositions are existentially dependent upon language use(being proposed), and language use is existentially dependent upon shared meaning, then it only follows that propositions are existentially dependent upon shared meaning. If the capability of being true/false requires saying something meaningful about the world(which is usually held by such positions), and saying something meaningful about the world is language use, then it only follows that in order for a proposition to be capable of being true or false, they must say something meaningful about the world via language use.

There is no such thing as an unarticulated proposition.

the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is incapable of taking proper account of language less thought and belief, particularly in terms of the content thereof.
— creativesoul

Say more about that? Do you mean, the dichotomy is too rigid?
— J

Sort of. The content of a language less creature's thought and belief can include/consist of stuff that is existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

OK, but I still wish I understood what the "stuff" was. — J

A cat can think/believe that a mouse is on the mat. The content of the cat's thought/belief includes the mouse(which is not existentially dependent upon language) and the mat(which is). Both are elemental constituents of the cat's thought/belief. The cat is a language less animal capable of forming thought/belief consisting of elemental constituents that are themselves existentially dependent upon language.

A cat can think/believe that a mouse is on the mat . . . . [these are] elemental constituents of the cat's thought/belief. . . The cat is a language less animal capable of forming thought/belief that consists of elemental constituents — creativesoul

But you're just re-asserting all this. I'm asking why you believe it's true, and what such thoughts or beliefs consist of, if not words? Does the cat perhaps think in images? Can she believe using images? I'm not trying to be difficult, or imply that there are no good answers to my questions, but we need a lot more clarity on what's being proposed. What is the "stuff" that allows this account to go forward?

There is no such thing as unarticulated proposition. — creativesoul

But at this very moment (or so goes the usual story) there are propositions about all sorts of things, which are either true or false, yet unarticulated. Your objections are very much in line with Rödl's concerns. He's a tough read, but Self-Consciousness and Objectivity has a lot to recommend it. There was also a long thread jumping off from his re-evaluation of what a proposition is; I believe it's the thread called "p and 'I think p'".

But at this very moment (or so goes the usual story) there are propositions about all sorts of things, which are either true or false, yet unarticulated. — J

Yup. I'm aware of this dogma. So much the worse for convention. In what sensible way can an unarticulated proposition be said to exist?

What does a proposition consist of?

What does an unarticulated proposition consist of?

But you're just re-asserting all this. I'm asking why you believe it's true, and what such thoughts or beliefs consist of, if not words? Does the cat perhaps think in images? Can she believe using images? I'm not trying to be difficult, or imply that there are no good answers to my questions, but we need a lot more clarity on what's being proposed. What is the "stuff" that allows this account to go forward? — J

Interesting reply given the context.

What are you wanting to know? :brow:

Are you looking for an ontological basis or terminological framework upon which to build an 'updated' conception/understanding of thought/belief... human thought/belief notwithstanding?

All thought and belief reduce to correlations drawn between different things.

Your objections are very much in line with Rödl's concerns. He's a tough read, but Self-Consciousness and Objectivity has a lot to recommend it. There was also a long thread jumping off from his re-evaluation of what a proposition is; I believe it's the thread called "p and 'I think p'". — J

Yeah. I read that thread, and followed it fairly closely. It was an interesting thread.

What are you wanting to know? — creativesoul

As above:

what [do] such thoughts or beliefs consist of, if not words? Does the cat perhaps think in images? Can she believe using images? — J

All thought and belief reduce to correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

But what is a correlation? In what mental process does it happen? If animals can do it, then a correlation doesn't use words. What correlates with what? -- again, perhaps you're thinking of images and sensations. OK, is holding two images in some relation the same thing as having a belief about them?

It sounds to me, if I can say this without giving offense, that you've grown used to your own views in this area (and that happens to us all, of course) and you may not realize how un-obvious they are without further explanation. It's a topic that interests me, and I'm genuinely curious to see if we can put together a picture of how non-linguistic creatures may or may not engage in a rudimentary form of reasoning. But you have re-interrogate each of the terms you're using and try to say exactly what they mean. Perhaps start with "non-linguistic belief"? That's the one I find most puzzling.

It sounds to me, if I can say this without giving offense, that you've grown used to your own views in this area (and that happens to us all, of course) and you may not realize how un-obvious they are without further explanation. — J

No offense taken. No worries. I'm very well aware of how unorthodox my views are. I've been working out the kinks for nearly two decades. Further explanation is to be expected. I welcome shouldering any burden they may require. I welcome germane questions about my claims, and any inevitable logical consequences thereof. However, I'm not shouldering any burdens borne of words and claims I've not made.

I'm also quite short on time nowadays. The only reason I've been on here as frequently as I have the past few days was due to being in a state of recovery time limiting my own physical abilities.

It's a topic that interests me, and I'm genuinely curious to see if we can put together a picture of how non-linguistic creatures may or may not engage in a rudimentary form of reasoning.

You, me, and so many more. There's a ton of work necessary to reach that goal. "Thesis worthy" doesn't even begin to appropriately describe the endeavor.

First of all, I do not talk in terms of "non-linguistic belief" for reasons already explained.

But you have re-interrogate each of the terms you're using and try to say exactly what they mean. Perhaps start with "non-linguistic belief"? That's the one I find most puzzling.

I have no burden regarding that terminological use. You first invoked it. I rejected it.

A correlation is a relationship and/or association that is attributed/recognized/inferred/drawn between different things by a creature so capable. In our example, the creature touching the fire associated/correlated their own behaviour(touching the fire) with/to the subsequent pain, hence attributing/recognizing a causal relationship between the behaviour and pain.

Perhaps start with "non-linguistic belief"? That's the one I find most puzzling.

I have no burden regarding that terminological use. You first invoked it. I rejected it. — creativesoul

But you said:

I reject the idea that language less animals' belief(s) have propositional content. — creativesoul

So if a language-less animal has a belief -- moreover, a belief without propositional content -- isn't it by definition a non-linguistic belief? I'm confused.

Perhaps start with "non-linguistic belief"? That's the one I find most puzzling.

I have no burden regarding that terminological use. You first invoked it. I rejected it.
— creativesoul

But you said:

I reject the idea that language less animals' belief(s) have propositional content.
— creativesoul

So if a language-less animal has a belief -- moreover, a belief without propositional content -- isn't it by definition a non-linguistic belief? I'm confused. — J

The confusion is understandable. The position I argue for/from is quite unusual/unconventional in some ways and includes subtle details that are crucial for understanding.

To the question: What counts as "by definition" depends upon taxonomy/terminological framework. As we both know, this particular subject matter, is extremely nuanced(theory laden).

If there is such a thing as language less thought and/or belief, and evolutionary theory is given a modicum of credence/applicability here, then it only follows that we're attempting to set out/discover/understand that which existed in its entirety(in some form or another) prior to our accounting practices. Thus, our definitions thereof are quite capable of being wrong, particularly regarding the elemental constituents therein/thereof.

On my view, if a language less creature has a thought and/or belief, then that thought and/or belief is - by definition - language less belief, i.e. the thought and/or belief of a language less creature. One aspect of such belief is that they cannot include language use as part of their content. That is one of the defining features. In other words, and circling back to what I've been setting out, language less belief are correlations drawn between different things, but language use is never one of the things(or "stuff") the creature draws correlations between.

However, and this is the subtlety, because language less belief can include(consist of) some things that are existentially dependent upon language(like mats, tables, cars, etc.) and all things that are existentially dependent upon language could sensibly/rightly be called "linguistic" things, the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is found sorely lacking in its ability to further draw and maintain the distinction between the belief of language users and the belief of language less creatures, particularly when it comes to the content of those.

When we call language less belief "nonlinguistic belief", and then we take further account of the content therein, we will inevitably arrive at the incoherent conclusion that nonlinguistic belief has linguistic content. That serves as ground to reject the dichotomy as a means to draw and maintain the distinction between language users' and language less creatures' thought and/or belief.

That's about as plain as I'm able to put it. Hope that helps.

First of all, I do not talk in terms of "non-linguistic belief" for reasons already explained. — creativesoul

To be fair, the above words are mine, and they're misleading at best, and downright false at worst. I have now explained it, so. My apologies for what's directly above. Brief mentions are not explanations.

Hope that helps. — creativesoul

Yes, a bit clearer. One thing first, though: Is the reason that "some things are existentially dependent upon language (like mats, tables, cars, etc.)" because those objects are human artifacts? Or could you just as well have included trees or sunlight? If it's the human-made aspect that makes the difference, how would a language-less animal know about it or be aware of it? In any case, I'm a little puzzled about why a mat, e.g., would depend on language for its existence. If I make an object but don't give it a name, does it exist in some lesser way? Probably I'm just not seeing what you're getting at.

the above words are mine, and they're misleading at best, and downright false at worst. — creativesoul

I appreciate your willingness to re-examine and self-correct. A good model for all of us.

Yes, a bit clearer. One thing first, though: Is the reason that "some things are existentially dependent upon language (like mats, tables, cars, etc.)" because those objects are human artifacts? — J

Probably, unless there are human artifacts which are somehow not existentially dependent upon language. It's the existential dependency upon language that matters.

If it's the human-made aspect that makes the difference, how would a language-less animal know about it or be aware of it? — J

They wouldn't, but the language less creatures' awareness(or lack thereof) regarding what their own belief consists of is irrelevant.

I'm a little puzzled about why a mat, e.g., would depend on language for its existence. — J

I suppose I'm claiming that the technology involved in textiles is impossible without shared meaning. I haven't tried to prove it, but I'm okay with that. There may be arguments for it, if need be. I don't see the need, because there's no good reason to doubt it, and I cannot imagine a sound argument against the idea. Of course, I may be mistaken and given that none of us are capable of knowingly believing a falsehood or knowingly holding false belief, it would take another to point it out, should there be a mistake with claiming that textile technology is existentially dependent upon language and mats are existentially dependent upon textile technology.

This notion of existential dependency is not to be confused/conflated with subsistence. It's better understood as initial emergence requirements.

If I make an object but don't give it a name, does it exist in some lesser way? Probably I'm just not seeing what you're getting at. — J

It's not whether or not the candidate under consideration has been named that matters. We name things that are not existentially dependent upon language, and some unnamed things are existentially dependent language.

I was making the case for rejecting the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy as a means for taking account of thought and belief. And now I've just went through a process I tried to avoid earlier by mentioning the rejection. It's a bit disheartening that you say what you said at the end.

Sigh.

Edited to remove a comment that harmed the quality of the discussion.

This notion of existential dependency is not to be confused/conflated with subsistence. It's better understood as initial emergence requirements. — creativesoul

OK, this seems important. I hadn't seen the distinction you want to make between subsistence and what you're calling existential dependency.

textile technology is existentially dependent upon language and mats are existentially dependent upon textile technology. — creativesoul

So the idea is that some objects can't come into existence without a language-using community. That makes sense.

The challenge here would be: But natural objects also "come into existence" as a result of language use. For this challenge to bear weight, I think we have to deny the familiar skepticism which says that every single thing out there is somehow created by our identifications of it. No; there are natural kinds, and it seems silly to maintain that sunlight, for instance, is an arbitrary designation that humans make. But nonetheless, a significant amount of what we designate by language is artificial and/or arbitrary, and "created" by us in the sense that we choose what counts as an "object" or a "thing" or an "event." (This is not "subsistence creation," to observe your distinction. We don't somehow bring into being the raw materials of our physical world.) Is a sand dune a natural object? Yes and no. The human intention to see it as a dune -- because we have uses for which the term "sand dune" is needed -- can't be ignored.

Now does any of this matter for your schema? I'll go back to your initial reply:

language less belief can include (consist of) some things that are existentially dependent upon language (like mats, tables, cars, etc.) and all things that are existentially dependent upon language could sensibly/rightly be called 'linguistic' things — creativesoul

Does it matter if we include some non-artifactual objects in the list of things that are existentially dependent upon language? I don't think so. We can add sand dunes and the like without changing your schema.

Now, let's say we do reject the dichotomy between linguistic and non-linguistic things, on the grounds that it is "lacking in its ability to further draw and maintain the distinction between the belief of language users and the belief of language less creatures."

That's the point I want to return to. How does the question of whether a belief concerns a) something that is existentially dependent on language, or b) something that is not so dependent, affect whether a non-linguistic animal can be said to have linguistic beliefs or not? Do you simply mean that we ought to extend the normal meaning of "linguistic belief" so that it can also mean "A belief about something that is existentially dependent on language"?

It's a bit disheartening that you say what you said at the end. — creativesoul

Sorry, but don't be disheartened. Philosophical ideas always need repeated unpacking, in my experience.

So the idea is that some objects can't come into existence without a language-using community. That makes sense.

The challenge here would be: But natural objects also "come into existence" as a result of language use. — J

Since it's about language again (my pet topic) I'll poke my head in again. Might even have more time going forth, who knows? In any case:

When language comes up in here, we're mostly talking about "naming objects". But that's a rather small aspect of language. Naming is something that pets understand (if you've ever called your pet and it responded regularly, you'll know.) Naming is just the most basic operation.

I'd argue that, if the results aren't doctored, Alex the Grey Parrot understood simple syntax, and definiately morphology (when coining new words, such as "cork nut" for almond).

What we haven't so far demonstrated in any animal studies (as far as I'm aware of) is complex syntactic operations, such as embedding smaller structures in larger structures (see these parentesis I keep making)?

Some thought, I do think, relies on language, as language supplies a retrievable label that stands in for a sub routine. If there isn't a word for something, we can still talk about it but it takes longer. If there's a word for it, we just say one word, but mean the same thing (wasting less time). And that process is iterative. "Hm, what do we call this reverse track ball? Kinda looks like a mouse, doesn't it?". There's grammatical crossreference that's quite common: the verb to marry, its participle form "married" ending up ambiguous between verbal and adjectival usage (an ambiguity striking in the analysis of passive voice...)

What I'm ending up with in the current conversation is the question of what even is a "language-less creature"? With respect to thought language is some kind of mental activity. And it seems clear to me that there isn't a clear-cut distinction between humans and other animals to be found. At some point we arrive at complexity we don't see in other creatures, sure. But the basics seem to cut across species.

Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic, but they might be about things that couldn't exist if we didn't trick our limided attention spans with shortcuts, and then embed those shortcuts in thoughts that again get short-cutted, until we've got a thought-habit no longer reliant on the original thought process. In other words, we can switch on the light without knowing how to fix the circuits in the wall should they break.

Here the difference between animals and humans seems to break down: it's not so much about being "language-less". It's about not being an expert in the origin and nature of the generative concept. I'd argue it's more about result-based perception vs. process-based perception.

With the cat-mouse-mat example as construed by a human observer, I would argue that a human has a more process-centred approach to the mat than the cat (we know where to get one; we know more vaguely how it's made, etc.). There's a difference in the relevance-structure of the human observer and the cat when it comes to the mat. So:

A cat can think/believe that a mouse is on the mat. The content of the cat's thought/belief includes the mouse(which is not existentially dependent upon language) and the mat(which is). — creativesoul

To what degree does the "mat" feature? There are other questions: to what degree is the "mouse" a mouse? Is there a sequence of: movement over there; focus attention; prey; plan: pounce. Now? Now? Now? Now!

As the referential piece of reality the human and the cat my have, under a theory of comparison, similar believes: compatible ones. Their tied together in a situation: both the human and the cat might like for the cat to catch the mouse. But there are differences, too: the human mightn't want mouse droppings on the mat (it might be harder to clean up than on the floor, depending on the texture of the mat), whereas the cat won't care. And so on. What's important here is that the overlap between worldviews seems stronger when it comes to "mouse", then when it comes to "mat". Or not. Maybe the mat is the place where it's not cold in winter, so there's a sense of "territory" in the situational background that the human lacks specifically for the mat, as it's relevant for the entirety of the house?

As the above paragraphs show, I think that humans and cats have comparable "thoughts". Language isn't irrelevant, but it's not where I would draw the line (given relevance to thought).

I'd say result-based concepts are thing we interact with, but are largely ignorant about and thus don't think of as processes. The light-switch is a thing I use. I have limited process-awareness of it, compared to the electrician who fixes the circuit when the switch doesn't work. The light switch is a thing that works or doesn't. I'd say that's pretty much the relationship between the cat and the mat (except that it might serve less of a function in the current activity).

I see language as an activity, much like switching on the light (but much more complex). It's related to thought, because usually when we utter a sentence we mean something by it. It is possible, though, to utter a sentence in a language we don't understand, maybe focusing on the aspect of getting the pronunciation right. It's hard to get foreign pronunciations right because of acquired speech habits. That is: language itself isn't only a possible tool for thought, it also always a target of thought (we monitor for mistakes, for example).

So the putative difference between a langauge-having and a language-less creature is mostly that a language-less creature cannot and does not have to think about language. But puzzling out what the difference between language-accompanied and language-less thought is seems at the core of this thread.

It occurred to me, while reading the current discussion, that it might be relevant that I grew up bilingually. I grew up in Austria, with my mum being Austrian and my dad being Croatian (which would have been "Yugoslavian" when I was a kid). I'd almost exclusively talk German, even when spoken to in Croation by my dad. Maybe that's why I never associated words and thoughts quite as closely as others, and in turn why I also don't think language is quite as important a creature feature during species distinction. Maybe? (Just an aside.)