The danger you and I both recognize comes not from the story Bitbol tells here, but from the further story which physicalists try to tell, in which heat is "really" or "actually" or "reduced to" its objectively measurable components. — J

Of course! Neither you or @Patterner are the kinds of reductive materialists that Bitbol (and Chalmers) have in their sights - but plenty are, and that is who he's addressing.

In Consciousness Explained, I described a method, heterophenomenology, which was explicitly designed to be 'the neutral path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological principles of science. — Daniel Dennett, The Fantasy of First-Person Science

That is the polar opposite of Bitbol's phenomenology and Chalmers' naturalistic dualism. So they're not (and I'm not) 'attacking straw man arguments' - physicalists really do say that. It's important to get clear on the fault lines between the tectonic plates, so to speak. Which, from what you're saying, I'm not sure that you're seeing. (Incidentally I'm drafting a Medium essay "Intro to Bitbol" which I hope might be useful as he has an enormous amount of material online.)

physicalists really do say that. — Wayfarer

They certainly do.

It's important to get clear on the fault lines between the tectonic plates, so to speak. Which, from what you're saying, I'm not sure that you're seeing. — Wayfarer

I think I see some of them, but always happy to learn more. Appreciate all the thought you've given this.

I agree that the feeling of warmth is an example of a conscious experience. We also agree, I suppose, that being conscious as such is a conscious experience -- sounds awkward, but how else could we put it? I certainly experience being conscious, and so do you. So I'm hypothesizing that, as with warmth, there's a compatible story to be told about the "outside" of our conscious experience. — J

Can you explain what you mean by "experience being conscious"? we come at consciousness from different directions. I'm happy to explore your idea, but not necessarily sure what it is.

Can you explain what you mean by "experience being conscious"? we come at consciousness from different directions. I'm happy to explore your idea, but not necessarily sure what it is. — Patterner

Fair enough. We'd have to start by agreeing on what can be an object of experience. As you know, many philosophers believe that con* can never be an object for itself, that it is properly a transcendental ego of some sort. To "experience consciousness," for these philosophers, would be like saying that the eye can see itself.

I don't find that persuasive, but let's say we agreed that it was a good description. In that case, we need a different term -- not "experience" or "be conscious of" or "be aware of" -- for what happens when con reflects on itself. Whatever term we decide to use, that's what I'd be referring to when I spoke about experiencing being conscious.

Or, we can allow, as I do, that self-con or the awareness of one's con is an experience on par with any other mental event. In that case, when I talk about the experience of being conscious, I mean the experience I have when I merely look at my looking (doing meditation is an excellent way to get there). It's separate from any content, whether perceptual or internal.

But I don't think we even need anything this esoteric to answer the question, "Do you experience con?" We can just reply, "Is experiencing con the same or different from being conscious?" If it's the same, then we all agree that we have that experience. If it's different, then we return to the Sartrean exegesis I began with. But in neither case is the phenomenon -- call it what you will, "experience" or not -- in doubt.

*consciousness. I'm tired of typing that word incorrectly!

As far as I can tell, consciousness (=experiencing being conscious) entails the set of sensory sensations, thoughts and feelings one has in the present, where "the present" is a short period of time, not an instant of time.

These are all intertwined. Sensations and feelings can induce thoughts, and thoughts can induce feelings. It is the feelings aspect that the hard part, of the "hard problem". Most aspects of consciousness seem amenable to programming in software. Feelings are not amenable to this. IMO, feelings are the one aspect of consciousness that is inconsistent with what we know about the physical world. That doesn't mean it's necessarily inconsistent with naturalism - it could just mean that there are aspects of the natural world that are not understood and may be inscrutable.

*consciousness. I'm tired of typing that word incorrectly! — J

:rofl:

Fair enough. We'd have to start by agreeing on what can be an object of experience. As you know, many philosophers believe that con* can never be an object for itself, that it is properly a transcendental ego of some sort. To "experience consciousness," for these philosophers, would be like saying that the eye can see itself.

I don't find that persuasive — J

I do agree with this, as it happens. I think everything is an object of experience. But I don't think the experience is an object that, itself, can be experienced. I don't think the problem is that an eye cannot see itself. I think the problem is that vision cannot see itself.

I think what is normally called human consciousness is the consciousness - the subjective experience - of being a human. We have mechanisms for mental abilities, and we experience them as, among other things, self-awareness. We are aware of our thoughts and feelings.

A bacterium experiences greater or lesser warmth, just as we do. But it doesn't think about it, or comment on it.



I very much agree regarding what you say about feelings. I agree with most of what you say. But I don't agree that "Most aspects of consciousness seem amenable to programming in software." I think only mental abilities can be programmed, like sensory input, responses to sensory input, storage of sensory input and responses, referencing the stored data... I don't think subjective experience of all that is programmable. we can program feedback loops, but we can't program those feedback loops being aware of themselves.

I think everything is an object of experience. But I don't think the experience is an object that, itself, can be experienced. . . . A bacterium experiences greater or lesser warmth, just as we do. But it doesn't think about it, or comment on it. — Patterner

This gets at the gnarly, self-reflexive quality of the con* problem. Can my experiencing of, say, warmth also itself be an object of experience? Rather than give my answer, I'd toss it back and ask, What do your observations of your own mentality in this regard tell you? How does it seem? -- let's start there.

As for the bacterium, yes, it has no self-con, no self-awareness. Once again, this raises the question of how "experiencing experience" may relate to human con. I'm not saying we're the only animals who can do this -- I'm sure many others are to some degree self-aware -- but it characterizes so much of our sense of what it means to be conscious, of "what it's like to be a human." And let's not forget that the practice of meditation can show us the opposite: what it means to experience non-experience, if I can put it that way. Or at least it may do; some doubt this.

*consciousness

Can my experiencing of, say, warmth also itself be an object of experience? — J

I think so. A bacterium experiences warmth, and that's maybe all there is to say. I experience warmth. But I have mental abilities the bacterium does not, which I experience as self-awareness. So I'm aware that I'm experiencing warmth, unlike the bacterium.

Is this an infinite situation? I experience the knowledge that I'm experiencing warmth. And I experience the knowledge of the knowledge that I'm experiencing warmth. And…

Yes, I also think I can have a self-aware experience, without running into the "eye seeing itself" problem. What I experience, in such a case, is not a "pure" experience without an object, but rather "what it's like to experience X" (warmth, in this example). In my phenomenological world, there is a difference. Being warm is certainly an experience, but not the same one as "experiencing warmth."

The threat of the infinite regress is hollow, I'm pretty sure: How many iterations can a mind really retain?

Is this an infinite situation? I experience the knowledge that I'm experiencing warmth. And I experience the knowledge of the knowledge that I'm experiencing warmth. And… — Patterner

No, I'd say that's just empty playing with words.

Or that. :rofl:

Yes, I also think I can have a self-aware experience, without running into the "eye seeing itself" problem. — J

I really don't see that problem, either. We are made up of many information processing systems. Some, are shared with many species, right down to single-celled bacteria and archaea. Even if our sensory input from light is much more precise and complex than theirs, they also subjectively experience it. (When it comes to light perception, plants leave us in the dust in some ways.) But we have mental abilities that nothing but us has. Our self-awareness is our subjective experience of some of those abilities.

My thinking is that, what we are conscious of is not what consciousness is. Consciousness is not self-awareness. So it's not a case of consciousness viewing itself. I think we have a subjective experience of the warmth. And we also have the subjective experience of feedback loops that are much more complex than single-celled (and many multi-celled) creatures.

Sorry for the disorganized structure of this post. I'm exhausted and this is the best I can get out right now before collapsing in bed.

Pretty good for a sleep-deprived philosopher! :smile:

what we are conscious of is not what consciousness is. — Patterner

This is unproblematic until we consider what I've been calling the experience of being conscious. I agree that con is not self-awareness, but when we are self-aware, we are having a conscious experience of . . .. what, exactly? Is it multiplying terms too far to discriminate between "con" and "being conscious"? Sorry, I'm wide awake, and I already feel like I'm drifting into a Husserlian dreamworld, where terms and loops proliferate!

Maybe it helps to refer once again to meditative states, in which it's possible to experience a very simple, seemingly objectless state of awareness. Am I "viewing con itself" in such a state? What's especially interesting is that the literature of meditation claims that the ego, the (possible) source of conscious awareness, is largely absent in such states. Should we conclude that "I" am not doing anything at that moment, so the whole loop question can never get started?

but when we are self-aware, we are having a conscious experience of . . .. what, exactly? — J

Feedback loops in our brain. Mental feedback loops, as opposed to loops that are involved with, for example, homeostasis.

I always go back to Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam in Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged From Chaos:

A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind.

Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
•​A sensor that responds to its environment
•​A doer that acts upon its environment — Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam

It is difficult to think of the simplest molecule minds ("All the thinking elements in molecule minds consist of individually identifiable molecules."), such as those of archaea or bacteria, as minds that are thinking. But it must surely be the first step on the evolutionary road. Thinking and mental processes are physical events. We are conscious of - we subjectively experience - these events. These events are not consciousness. That's what I mean by "what we are conscious of is not what consciousness is."

Is it multiplying terms too far to discriminate between "con" and "being conscious"? — J

From my standpoint, that's like discriminating between "mass" and "being massive".

Maybe it helps to refer once again to meditative states, in which it's possible to experience a very simple, seemingly objectless state of awareness. Am I "viewing con itself" in such a state? What's especially interesting is that the literature of meditation claims that the ego, the (possible) source of conscious awareness, is largely absent in such states. Should we conclude that "I" am not doing anything at that moment, so the whole loop question can never get started? — J

I can't speak from experience. But everything I've read makes it sound to me that the meditator is (how to say it?) not engaging in thinking/mental processes. Thinking might be an automatic response to sensory input and other thoughts. But if they are doing what is claimed, that automatic response can be prevented. Maybe "suppressed". Perhaps better to say "not engaged in", because that sounds more passive. In essence, as far as consciousness goes, the meditator subjectively experiences only the sensory input, much as other species that do not have or mental abilities.

I always go back to Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam in Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged From Chaos:
A mind is a physical system — Patterner

That's an immediate red flag for me. According to their definition, a thermostat is a mind. From a review:

Despite the splashy blurb, Journey of the Mind is essentially a pancomputational, complexity-theoretic evolutionary narrative. It treats mind as something that emerges when matter organizes into systems capable of learning, in the broadest, most information-theoretic sense.

Think of it as:

Daniel Dennett + Integrated Information + Complexity Theory + Evolutionary Just-So Storytelling,
but written for a general audience with lots of nice pictures.

They argue that:

A mind is any system that takes in information, updates internal structure, and generates adaptive behaviour.

Minds scale: archaeal → amoebic → worm → reptile → bird → mammal → human → societal “supermind.”

Consciousness = a sufficiently complex, recursively self-modelling prediction engine.

It’s an attempt to unify everything from basic chemotaxis to human language under one computational umbrella.

Me, I don't think it qualifies as philosophy. It's pop science.

According to their definition, a thermostat is a mind. — Wayfarer

In what way does thermostat's outputs influence the welfare of its body?

True - it's function is not directed at itself but as part of a larger system. Nevertheless, it does meet their definition: it senses (temperature) and does (turn on or off). But it's allopoeitic rather than autopoeitic, in enactivist terms.

Maybe it helps to refer once again to meditative states, in which it's possible to experience a very simple, seemingly objectless state of awareness. Am I "viewing con itself" in such a state? What's especially interesting is that the literature of meditation claims that the ego, the (possible) source of conscious awareness, is largely absent in such states. Should we conclude that "I" am not doing anything at that moment, so the whole loop question can never get started? — J

Very insightful question! 'Non cogito ergo non sum'. I tried diligently to practice Buddhist meditation for years, but one of the early understandings I had was, so long as you're aware of yourself meditating, then you're obviously not in that kind of 'contentless consciousness' state, as you're still aware of 'I am doing this'. Getting to that kind of complete cessation of self-consciousness always eluded me. In yoga terminology, such states are called 'nirvikalpa', meaning 'nir' (no) 'vikalpa' (thought forms). But in my experience realising such states is very rare in practice. That's why genuine yogis and real spiritual adepts are often reclusive and keep away from society. It's the opposite of our over-stimulated high-tech culture.

True - it's function is not directed at itself but as part of a larger system. Nevertheless, it does meet their definition: it senses (temperature) and does (turn on or off). — Wayfarer

They say influencing the welfare of its body is crucial.

As an example, consider a song. The song 'exists' when it is played. Its script isn't its 'identity' but, rather, what we might call its form, its template.

However, we can't even say that the song is something entirely different from its script as the script is something essential to the song. — boundless

You're talking about the identity of a performance of a song, vs the identity of the script of the song. Both have pragmatic identities, and they're obviously not in 1-1 correspondence. I could argue that like anything else, neither has a rational identity.

In a similar way, something like my DNA is essential to me but, at the same time, it can't 'capture' my whole being.

If DNA was your identity, then identical twins would be the same person. That doesn't work. Consider a bacterium. When it splits, which is the original? That's where our notion of pragmatic identity fails and one must us a different one. It gets closer to the notion of rational identity.

The calculator is (pragmatically) an individual — noAxioms
Yes, I agree with that. But I disagree that it has the sufficient degree of autonomy to make its pragmatic distinction from its environment as a real distinction.

Autonomy has little to do with it. It just plain doesn't care, and pragmatic identity only exists relative to an entity that finds pragmatic utility in assigning such an identity. Physics itself seem to have no notion of identity and is of no use is resolving such quandaries.

Sort of. I see it more like that consciousness comes into discrete degrees and that there is some kind of potency of the higer degrees into the lower degrees. — boundless

But degrees implies a discreet jump in evolution. Thing X has one level of cosciousness, but it's offspring (one of them at least) has a whole new level of it, a significant jump so to speak. That seems not to be how evolution work, hence my skepticism on the discreetness of it all.

Well, up until the 20th century it was common to think that the purpose of science was at least to give a faithful description of 'how things are/behave'.

Well, you mix 'are' and 'behave' there like they mean the same thing. They don't. The former is metaphysics. The latter is not. Science tends to presume some metaphysics for clarity, but in the end it can quite get along without any of it.


Speaking of identity, it is kind of hard to follow @Wafarer's identity given the somewhat regular change of avatar. @Banno (and 180) also does this with similar rate of regularity. You guys don't realize how much stances and personalities I associate with the avatar more than the name. It's like my wife coming home, same person I always knew, but after having swapped to a totally new unrecognizable body. My avatar has been unaltered since the PF days.

I guess you could say that any such inquiry is, by definition, not a scientific one, but that seems awfully inflexible. — J

If it's not a physical science, then, according to physicalism, how could it be a science? It must by definition be metaphysics. — Wayfarer

Right. Physicalism only gets to say what is and is not physical science. — Patterner

All wrong! Much of the back and forth between all of you is dickering about what is included under the heading of science and what is not. All this is irrelevant. Physicalism does not asset which activities one might label as 'scientific inquiry' vs. not. It makes not claim about the what can be known or not. In the case of consciousness, it's on the way to being explained, but it doesn't need to be in order for it to be the case.

Yes, physicalism is a metaphysical stance precisely because, like anything inferred, it cannot be proven. But it's a stance that has proven wildly successful since science began to assume it as their primary methodology, contrasting with what has become known as the dark ages when science worked under a different methodology.

Yes. That's why physicalism is untenable. — J

This was in reply to Wafarer's post just above. It seems an incredibly fallacious statement to suggest that either physicalism being untenable for making a requirement about what is designated as 'science' (it doesn't) or physicalism being untenable because it is metaphysics. Nonsense. It's alternative is also metaphysics.

Everyone knew what "heat" meant long before chemistry. — J

There you go. An example of subjectivity being science before the thermometer came into play.

But I think — Patterner

Of course it's natural. The question is, it is something separate or does it supervene on what isn't consciousness? To assert otherwise, a demonstration would be nice.

So, two questions: 1) Why is an objective description of subjective experience necessary to explain subjective experience? — J

Wrong question. I was thinking more along the lines of "Why is an objective description of subjective experience necessary for said subjective experience to supervene on the physical?".
I am up front that an objective description is never going to happen. It simply isn't a requirement. The strong claim is that it doesn't (cannot) so supervene, in which case the explanation needs to be 'why necessarily not?'. Plenty argue for 'why not', but the 'necessarily' part is always left out, which reduces simply to incredulity.

Perhaps most important, we learned a good lesson from those in the past who thought living things were animated by a special vital force. — Patterner

Good example, but the lesson is clearly not learned. Something being alive or not is still a matter of opinion and definition, with yes, no clear definition that beats asking a 6-year old. Nevertheless, Wayfarer aside, vitalism is pretty much discredited.

So what's not being tested that in principle might be testable then? — noAxioms
Whether a given entity is conscious. — J

But that's not a test since it is a matter of opinion and definition, and the definition is especially a matter of opinion. Asking for a yes/no consciousness detector presumes 1) that consciousness is a binary thing (on or off, nothing being 'more conscious' than another), and 2) is kind of like asking for a meter for attractiveness. Thing X (a piece of artwork say) is attractive or isn't. Not a matter of opinion at all.

Oh right. A thing cannot be attractive unless it is alive. Don't forget that part.

Our nerves detect the kinetic energy of the air. — Patterner

That's incredibly glossed over, but you give far better detail in another post.

We can detect electrical signals caused by the contact, follow them to the spinal cord, and to the brain, where x, y, and z happen.

Why is it suddenly just 'x,y,z'? Why not follow those x's and such, all the way to the decision to adjust the thermostat. OK, maybe you don't know what x, y, and z are, in which case you're hardly in a position to make assertions about what they can and cannot do.

Nowhere in any of that is there a hint of our subjective experience of heat. — Patterner

Yea, because you glossed over it with "x, y, and z happen" and then, far worse, make assumptions about them.

The Hard Problem is that nothing about the first suggests the second.

But it does if you start to work out the x,y,z. You just refuse to label it that, instead calling it correlation or some such.

Fair enough. We'd have to start by agreeing on what can be an object of experience. — J

Opinion, so any attempt at agreement is likely to involve injecting one's conclusions into the definition. So no, you don't start there, you end there.

A bacterium experiences greater or lesser warmth, just as we do. — Patterner

Most aspects of consciousness seem amenable to programming in software. Feelings are not amenable to this. — Relativist

Is this an assertion or is there evidence of this? I mean, something totally alien to you is probably not going to feel human feelings. Despite the assertion above, I seriously doubt bacteria experience warmth the way we do. I'm not even sure if it's been show that they react to more/less favorable temperatures.

In what way does thermostat's outputs influence the welfare of its body? — Patterner

That's a better question. If the reaction influences the entity's own 'welfare' (a loaded term since it isn't clear what is assessing this welfare), that's closer to being conscious than a simple cause-effect mechanism such as seems to occur with a thermostat.
Also, many (the majority?) of my reactions are not necessarily for my welfare. Take the decision to write this long post, or to pick up a piece of litter.

Nowhere in any of that is there a hint of our subjective experience of heat.
— Patterner
Yea, because you glossed over it with "x, y, and z happen" and then, far worse, make assumptions about them.

The Hard Problem is that nothing about the first suggests the second.
But it does if you start to work out the x,y,z. You just refuse to label it that, instead calling it correlation or some such. — noAxioms

Awesome!! I am very excited!! By all means, please proceed!!

Btw, I didn't gloss over. I just didn't write out 50,000 physical events. But now you can say which of them convert physical events to subjective experience.

Most aspects of consciousness seem amenable to programming in software. Feelings are not amenable to this.
— Relativist
Is this an assertion or is there evidence of this? I mean, something totally alien to you is probably not going to feel human feelings. Despite the assertion above, I seriously doubt bacteria experience warmth the way we do. I'm not even sure if it's been show that they react to more/less favorable temperatures. — noAxioms

My point was: 1) that most aspects of consciousness can be described algorithmically- this is what materialist philosophers of mind do. There isn't evidence that this directly maps to neurological function, but it defeats the claims that materialism can't possibly be true. 2) on the other hand, feelings cannot be created via algorithm.

To your point: perhaps other life form have different feelings, or perhaps they have some of the same feelings, but the cognitive context is vastly differen

I don't think subjective experience of all that is programmable. we can program feedback loops, but we can't program those feedback loops being aware of themselves. — Patterner

We could program an "executive function" that integrates sensory input, memories that these trigger, and other memories, that induce thoughts and directs activity. Is there more to awareness?