Ideological Evil

ToothyMaw

I assert that the commonly portrayed image of ideologically driven evil is somewhat specious; I do not think that, say, jihadism is the greatest evil on earth - although it is very significant - but rather that those types of ideologies that tend towards manifesting in positions of power and causing mass suffering are indeed the most salient evils because of that suffering and certain inherent qualities they possess. Many consequentialists seem to maintain that intent matters in moral considerations of good or evil at least as a way of predicting or analyzing outcomes, and I will continue with reasoning along these lines.

To begin, I propose a stratification of ideologies in terms of their structures and will provide examples of these categories:

Tier (1) ideologies are those that “spontaneously” radicalize individuals. This is through media not originating from, not legitimized by, and that do not sustain concentrations of political power as much. A good example of this is the arising of IS and their subsequent violent rampages and insurgencies, which, according to various iterations of IS, were attempts, at least in part, to fight social injustice and marginalization (which is, of course, ridiculous, but no one ever thinks they are the bad guys, and this claim helped them recruit many fighters). Their propaganda efforts in general are excellent examples of the kind of media I'm referring to.

Tier (2) ideologies are those that occupy nexuses of power, openly legitimate that occupation, and manifest in governmental power structures. They tend towards sustaining concentrations of political power. Think ideologies like Zionism, neoconservatism, fascism, etc. The example of Zionism, in its modern-day form, is relatively straightforward: many Israeli Jews believe they are justified in stealing land in the West Bank. They likely would not have these beliefs if not for the decisions made by politicians and powerful people that resulted in the decision to create a Jewish ethnostate. The very existence of this state, and the propaganda it puts out, encourages the attempted vindication of Zionism through governmental channels.

One might argue that Tier (1) ideologies inevitably, or are likely to, morph into something resembling a Tier (2) ideology as they gain adherents and power. After all, IS is intent on ushering in a Caliphate or whatever. I think this is true, but we will be considering the likelihood of ideologies attaining power as part of this analysis.

Given we define the evil an ideology is capable of causing as being a function of both the intent of its adherents and the consequences of their actions, and we demarcate tier (1) ideologies from tier (2) on the basis of the definitions provided above, the evil of ideologies in either tier is thus determined (at least in part) by:

(1) The level of intent to cause destruction and suffering propagated by an ideology.
(2) The actual suffering and destruction reliably caused by adherents of an ideology.

(1) clearly affects (2), and perhaps vice versa, but it is a little harder to pull these two things apart and see the exact relationship than to just consider (2) to be a function of (1), which is how I'm going to treat it.

My question is this: if Tier (2) ideologies do not propagate as much bad intent, but they result in larger numbers of deaths, more suffering, etc., then can we actually say that certain Tier (1) ideologies are more evil than Tier (2) ideologies even given that if a certain Tier (1) would result in more suffering and death if it enjoyed as much power as other ideologies that do tend more often to manifest in positions of power? Given that Tier (2) ideologies can actually result in more suffering because they reliably manifest in power structures, and not just because of the efficacy of the associated propaganda of a given government and its content, it seems to me we must accept that Tier (2) ideologies are usually inherently more destructive according to a consequentialist criterion. That is to say that the capability of being more likely to manifest in power structures, nexuses of power, etc. is fundamental, and this capability affects the consequences of the actions of adherents of a given ideology - which is the bottom line. So, we could add the criteria that evil is also (conditionally) determined by an additional factor inherent to Tier (2) ideologies if we frame this input purely in terms of one-way, predicted consequences much like how (2) is a function of (1):

(1.5) The tendency towards originating from, legitimizing, and sustaining concentrations of political power.

I say that (1.5) conditionally determines evil because an ideology could also be a source of good depending upon the ideology and context. If one wants to maintain consequentialism while also condemning certain ideological actors as being a significant, or perhaps the most significant, evil based upon their intent, one might need to consider this critique.

Also: please don't fixate on the examples too much. I just used what was convenient and would allow for something concise. IS and Zionism don't need to be what is actually discussed, and I'm not even totally sure how they would measure up against each other in terms of bad consequences.

Outlander

I feel it worth mentioning that people generally consider "intent" to be a prerequisite for an act to be "evil."

Going to visit an isolated or uncontacted people because you want to give them money, yet end up introducing a modern bacteria that 99% of people are immune from that ends up reducing their population to a few dozen, and had no idea, probably wasn't evil, or at very least wasn't "as evil" as if you wanted to visit them to steal from them, or otherwise were fully aware of biology and had such intentions in mind, and ended up doing the same.

Reason I mention such, is it seems your flagship example of religion hinges on not only the idea that a god exists or does not exist, but whether or not the people who perform actions or inaction under the ideological mindset of such genuinely believe a god exists or not. Theoretically speaking, if they were right, and we were all wrong, they would be preventing us from eternal damnation (or whatever) and therefore, despite acts of violence that would normally be considered evil, are actually the greatest good one could ever perform. Theoretically speaking, of course.

In short, imagine an isolated, ultra-religious family believing their 6-year-old child is the devil incarnate and so they drown him to "save the world" or what have you. They'll sleep soundly at night, and never perform any other act of violence again. Take real actual examples of history. Botched exorcisms for example. Giving people the benefit of the doubt (things were much, much different back then, superstition wasn't the exclusive domain of fools and the mentally unwell as it is often considered today) that they actually believed they were doing the right thing and preventing evil, one should clearly be able to draw a line between unfortunate, misguided deeds and intentional misdeeds.

Say your child really wanted to go to summer camp by the lake, and you know he or she cannot swim, yet didn't have that item of knowledge in your mind at the time, and you permit him or her to go, and they drown, resulting in your entire family disliking you, calling for your arrest, and basically putting you on par with the likes of a murderer. Or more simply, falling asleep while your kid is swimming in your backyard pool and the same fate befalls him or her. Are you evil? Did you perform an evil act? Well, did you?

ToothyMaw

I feel it worth mentioning that people generally consider "intent" to be a prerequisite for an act to be "evil." — Outlander

Yes, I agree, thus I included that even many consequentialists have use of the concept of intentions even when all that fundamentally matters is consequence.

Reason I mention such, is it seems your flagship example of religion hinges on not only the idea that a god exists or does not exist, but whether or not the people who perform actions or inaction under the ideological mindset of such genuinely believe a god exists or not. Theoretically speaking, if they were right, and we were all wrong, they would be preventing us from eternal damnation (or whatever) and therefore, despite acts of violence that would normally be considered evil, are actually the greatest good one could ever perform. Theoretically speaking, of course. — Outlander

I don't know what "flagship" example you are referring to exactly (Zionism?), but yes, the issue of divine command is a quagmire for anyone making any meta-ethical claims at all that don't rule it out. However, I could make up any God I want and act according to their supposed divine wisdom, but that doesn't mean other people can't be concerned with the real world; religious claims don't necessarily disprove human-based ethics.

In short, imagine an isolated, ultra-religious family believing their 6-year-old child is the devil incarnate and so they drown him to "save the world" or what have you. They'll sleep soundly at night, and never perform any other act of violence again. Take real actual examples of history. Botched exorcisms for example. Giving people the benefit of the doubt (things were much, much different back then, superstition wasn't the exclusive domain of fools and the mentally unwell as it is often considered today) that they actually believed they were doing the right thing and preventing evil, one should clearly be able to draw a line between unfortunate, misguided deeds and intentional misdeeds. — Outlander

I'm just talking about instances in which bad intent lines up with bad actions as analyzed from a broadly consequentialist view. I acknowledge that misguided actions are not as clearly evil as intentional ones, and that the two can be considered separately. If I have an ethic, as applied with the critique in the OP, that says there is a difference along the lines you provide for two different actions, then I don't see a problem.

Say your child really wanted to go to summer camp by the lake, and you know he or she cannot swim, yet didn't have that item of knowledge in your mind at the time, and you permit him or her to go, and they drown, resulting in your entire family disliking you, calling for your arrest, and basically putting you on par with the likes of a murderer. Or more simply, falling asleep while your kid is swimming in your backyard pool and the same fate befalls him or her. Are you evil? Did you perform an evil act? Well, did you? — Outlander

I'm not entirely sure how this relates to the OP. Could you explain it to me? I might be being obtuse.

ToothyMaw

your flagship example of religion — Outlander

Oh, I see. You are referring to how I used religious examples for both tiers of ideology. It doesn't have to be that way; that these people believe in their ideologies because of God is not that relevant to the OP.

edit: also, Zionism can be secular

ToothyMaw

↪Outlander

I just want to be clear: Judaism is not equivalent to Zionism. Zionism is substantially secular and makes normative claims that are not necessarily tied to any religion.

ProtagoranSocratist

All ideologies are intent on gaining political power unless they just exist in their "armchair activism" form, in other words, they are just a collection of talking points until they get ambitions.

I personally agree with your first assumption, that "ideological evil" is superficial (or as you put it, "somewhat specious"). Ideologies do not exist outside of the historical framework where they are created, the ideologies by themselves are inert artifacts, not necessarily doing harm to anyone or behaving in a violent manner...because I would assume that your judgements about "evil" are mostly concerned with both the ambitions and actual completions of some sort of violence?

So by this set of assumptions I'm laying out, you can be a Nazi or Jihadist, but both are just ideas until groups of people start putting plans together to achieve the ends of Nazism or Jihadism.

I think your tiers are bunk: various ideologies influence "the nexi of power", none are inherently more or less powerful. Just using islamic fundamentalism as an example (a broader term for the ideology that motivates jihadies), there are already muslim governments, examples being saudi arabia, oman, and Iran. I'd bet you there are people who associate with jihadist movements in or closely associated with those governments, the connection between jihadist militancy and iran being fairly obvious, yet also not something the Iranian government, Hezbollah, or Hamas would speak openly about. However, it would be impossible to have a government dedicated purely to one ideology, without associating with some of the others.

L'éléphant

If we are judging "evil" by the size of suffering, then we ourselves are misguided.

The means to an end is what we judge as morally reprehensible or morally good regardless of whether they are committed through the concentrated, legitimate power, or a boorish accumulation of blind adherents.

Astorre

↪ToothyMaw

This probably won’t surprise you, but reading your post reminded me of a personal experience.

Some time ago, while browsing job postings, I stumbled upon one from a well-known local blogger who teaches business skills and “personal development.” The blogger needed a philosopher. Among the requirements were things like “ability to create meaning” and “ability to construct a methodology.”

It struck me because about ten years ago I watched this person, listened to him, and genuinely believed what he was saying. Only later did I realize how deliberately those messages were crafted and how strongly they shaped people’s thinking.

How does this relate to your topic? Your distinction between levels of ideology made me think that many ideologies are not merely spontaneous or “organic.” They are often created, refined, and maintained by people who are quite skilled in philosophy, communication, and narrative-building. Concepts like good and evil become tools in that process — instruments used by those who design and legitimize the ideology.

So your framework resonates with my experience: what looks like a natural emergence of beliefs often turns out to be the product of intentional work by experts who know how to shape collective meaning.

ProtagoranSocratist

Some time ago, while browsing job postings, I stumbled upon one from a well-known local blogger who teaches business skills and “personal development.” The blogger needed a philosopher. Among the requirements were things like “ability to create meaning” and “ability to construct a methodology.”

It struck me because about ten years ago I watched this person, listened to him, and genuinely believed what he was saying. Only later did I realize how deliberately those messages were crafted and how strongly they shaped people’s thinking. — Astorre

Adolf Hitler himself did this; history has it that he practiced his messages and act as an authoritative speaker/politicians for years before he was able to seize power. In his earlier years of doing this, some people saw him looking overly awkward and strained in his mannerisms.

These examples show that ideologies themselves are tools used to benefit certain individuals or groups, and i guess the more interesting and harder to answer question is to what extent their advocates "believe the ideology". Do Islamic extremist leaders really think they are putting forth the will of God, or is it just a way to produce a short-sighted adrenaline rush?

Astorre

Do Islamic extremist leaders really think they are putting forth the will of God, or is it just a way to produce a short-sighted adrenaline rush? — ProtagoranSocratist

My understanding is different. It's neither adrenaline nor pure religion; it's both, plus ten other factors. It's a multifactorial phenomenon that can be grasped within the context of multiple layers.

I'll give you a philosophical example. Imagine you're observing a shopper in a supermarket filling a large basket with groceries. Your task is to determine what they're planning to cook. Now the question is: did they buy olives for solyanka (a soup made with olives) or did they simply want to eat them?

Any discussion of these topics is speculative, a priori. What can we do about all this? My answer to this question is to find our own subjectivity, outside of any ideology. How can this be achieved? By exactly the same method that ideologies operate: if they use the individual as a tool, then why can't the individual use ideology as their own tool?

AmadeusD

Theoretically speaking, if they were right, and we were all wrong, they would be preventing us from eternal damnation (or whatever) and therefore, despite acts of violence that would normally be considered evil, are actually the greatest good one could ever perform. Theoretically speaking, of course. — Outlander

This is, imo, such an important point that almost all comers to moral discussions (in modernity, and outside of 'centrist' thinkers) miss entirely, which prevents civil discussion: If you are Catholic, your desire to put your child through conversion therapy is patently loving.
The result being (almost invariably, and almost always intense) harm is a side-effect of you being a bozo, not you being evil (assuming you're wrong, obviously). No one wants to give people their flowers in this sense, because no one wants to see their own beliefs as contingent.
That's one of the reasons my moral position on ever applies to me (other than discussions about my opinions on other things). Other people's motivations are, for hte overwhelmingly large part, good but misguided.

So by this set of assumptions I'm laying out, you can be a Nazi or Jihadist, but both are just ideas until groups of people start putting plans together to achieve the ends of Nazism or Jihadism — ProtagoranSocratist

I'm unsure this quite captures the relevant issue, although I already buy into the premise so this is a little "for fun": If you're a Nazi or committed Jihadist, your thoughts are Evil. Its almost a side-effect whether something harmful plays out in the 'real world' but that's where everyone else finds out, and has something to discuss. But that intention (say, to ethnically cleanse Germany of Jews and Romanis) can, itself, be considered Evil under some framework. I do agree its 'just an idea'. But ideas are where actions come from, so it's not like they vary independently in this context.

(1) clearly affects (2), and perhaps vice versa, but it is a little harder to pull these two things apart and see the exact relationship than to just consider (2) to be a function of (1), which is how I'm going to treat it. — ToothyMaw

I think its more interesting (and important, in my view) to ascertain where 1. fails but 2. obtains. That seems more regular, and more pernicious.

BLM could be used as an example, but I can't bring myself to wade into that as a discussion topic - but it should be clear where I'm going simply mentioning it. Repatriation is often a similar thing, or the reformation of religions.

ProtagoranSocratist

I do agree its 'just an idea'. But ideas are where actions come from, so it's not like they vary independently in this context. — AmadeusD

Yeah, but what i was getting at was that it's important to investigate where "true evil" begins and ends. I don't think it can possibly come from the thoughts and ideas themselves, as a philosophically minded person can use them to learn and make rational decisions.

For example, lets say for a minute we consider whether genocide can ever become a real solution to a problem...one quickly runs into several issues right away if they remain skeptical...like, are Jews really a source of political power? Do they work against against other groups to enslave them? And for the jihadist, to what extent do liberal western temptations cause sin and disharmony? It's actually a pretty big debate in modern muslim communities to talk about which kinds of transgressions of doctrine merit violent punishment. The nazis and jihadists are the same in the sense that they see "evil" as a justification for what others see as horrendous and truly evil.

To truly confront anti-semitism and other forms of bigotry, one needs to start from the point of view that having bad or prejudicial thoughts is not evil, and the beliefs/tenants are not to be feared lest we want to fuck up our thought process. Perhaps true evil just reflects a failure to be skeptical rather than the specific ambitions, ideas, or actions of ideologues...

Leontiskos

Other people's motivations are, for hte overwhelmingly large part, good but misguided.

...

If you're a Nazi or committed Jihadist, your thoughts are Evil. Its almost a side-effect whether something harmful plays out in the 'real world' but that's where everyone else finds out, and has something to discuss. But that intention (say, to ethnically cleanse Germany of Jews and Romanis) can, itself, be considered Evil under some framework. — AmadeusD

So would you say that some things are not merely misguided but truly evil, and that thoughts can be one of those things? ...The trick here is that I believe you see yourself as a moral subjectivist, and therefore in these discussions you often end up talking about what other people think rather than what you yourself think.

No one wants to give people their flowers in this sense, because no one wants to see their own beliefs as contingent. — AmadeusD

Yes, but I think the deeper issue is the embrace of moral non-naturalism beginning in the modern period. For the moral non-naturalist moral reasoning can be nothing more than taboo-based reasoning (

↪classic example

). On that view true philosophical arguments for moral positions are impossible, and when the philosophical intelligentsia hold to such a view unthinking prejudice and taboo is inevitable, especially among the common people.

So your own quandary with "moral subjectivism" (my word) is very similar to the broader quandary of society. We might say that the general view agrees with you in saying that moral positions are not rational or arguable, but many people nevertheless wish for their moral position to "win out," and this leads to all sorts of behavior that is different from rational argument. It leads to the question, "How do I get what I want without relying upon rational argumentation?"

---

To truly confront anti-semitism and other forms of bigotry, one needs to start from the point of view that having bad or prejudicial thoughts is not evil, and the beliefs/tenants are not to be feared lest we want to fuck up our thought process. — ProtagoranSocratist

I think there is something right about what you say here. It relates a bit to my thread, "Beyond the Pale," which is about when (if ever) it is permissible to dismiss someone, failing to rationally engage their position.

In the first place we have two options if we want to say that dangerous beliefs should be rationally engaged. We could either say that the beliefs themselves are not evil and therefore can be rationally engaged. Or we could say that the beliefs are evil but nevertheless should still be rationally engaged and treated with respect during that rational engagement. At the end of the day we will need to say what we mean by 'evil'.

Yeah, but what i was getting at was that it's important to investigate where "true evil" begins and ends. I don't think it can possibly come from the thoughts and ideas themselves, as a philosophically minded person can use them to learn and make rational decisions. — ProtagoranSocratist

There are two unconnecting arguments here. @AmadeusD's argument:

1. What is in the effect is in the cause
2. Some actions are evil
3. Actions are caused by thoughts
4. Therefore, some thoughts are evil

And your argument:

1. That which can be used to learn and make rational decisions is not evil
2. All thoughts can be used to learn and make rational decisions
3. Therefore, no thoughts are evil

Tom Storm

↪ToothyMaw

Not sure if this is relevant, but I've often held that the notion of evil depends heavily on perspective and motivated reasoning. Many years ago, I met a couple of old former Nazis. They told me how, in their view, the world had been taken over by great evil, and how those “forces of evil” had destroyed Hitler’s beneficial plan to transform humanity into a great force for good. “One day our time will come again,” one of them concluded, followed by a sermon about how truth and goodness will always win out over evil (and other heavily derived Christian notions).

Clearly, most of those who think they are serving reason or truth, God or science believe they are doing good, no matter how harmful their actions may be in practice. Which reminds me that the most dangerous people in the world are probably those who think they have reason and destiny on their side.

Outlander

Which reminds me that the most dangerous people in the world are probably those who think they have reason and destiny on their side. — Tom Storm

Is it really that simple, though? The partially-disrobed homeless dude on the corner believes he has reason and destiny on his side. So, respectfully, it's far more complex and substantial than that one requirement of self-confidence or self-delusion.

It takes two to tango. Human nature resulted in every crime against humanity. The front men or perpetrators, merely pawns of fate and catalysts of the darkness that churns within every man.

Why are libraries full of lifetimes of wisdom and virtue empty yet arenas of combat and near-death cheap entertainment full at any given moment? Ask yourself that. And you'll find out something about yourself you did not wish to know.

Tom Storm

Is it really that simple, though? The partially-disrobed homeless dude on the corner believes he has reason and destiny on his side. So, respectfully, it's far more complex and substantial than that one requirement of self-confidence or self-delusion. — Outlander

No. I am not arguing that delusion is an issue. I said reason and destiny. Not madness and destiny.

By the way, Hitler was a homeless dude (in your words) in Vienna for some years and used to rant in public spaces, much to the embarrassment of others (Ian Kershaw's great book Hubris). Amongst other things, it was his reasoning that eventually made him attractive to others.

Why are libraries full of lifetimes of wisdom and virtue empty yet arenas of combat and near-death cheap entertainment full at any given moment? Ask yourself that. And you'll find out something about yourself you did not wish to know. — Outlander

It's best not to presume what others here know or don't know about themselves on a forum. My local library is massively busy, and I am not sure what you mean by an 'arena of conflict'. But the idea that people prefer circuses to intellectual pursuits is perfectly reasonable and conventional notion. How does this relate to my point?"

Outlander

No. I am not arguing that delusion is an issue. I said reason and destiny. Not madness and destiny. — Tom Storm

You also said "those who think" they have reason and destiny on their side. Which is precisely who I was referring to when I referenced "self-confidence" (or possibly self-delusion). Essentially, we all think we're unique, in some ways. That we have purpose and our actions are justified by our beliefs. No? Is this not the breeding grounds for the inevitable state of mind you describe?

It's best not to presume what others here know or don't know about themselves on a forum. — Tom Storm

That's correct. However I give people the respect and benefit of the doubt to assume they post honestly and are describing their worldview and sentiments to the best of their ability. Analyses in line with generally-accepted psychology and proven patterns of human behavior is just one step above mere presumption. Meaning, if someone expresses a sentiment of how "all roads are two lanes", this would lead an observer to conclude said individual is ignorant of the existence of freeways. Maybe they're not. But if one is expressing their view of the world and how they see it honestly and to the best of their ability, it's a fair ~~presumption~~ analysis.

That said, I'm not sure what your point is. — Tom Storm

Just that it takes two to tango. People, especially desperate people, can be led to believe anything. If people were more educated, or yes, perhaps just intrinsically better than how they are, those leaders who ended up committing crimes against humanity and other human rights abuses (who were not born into cemented power and so had to become such from the ground up, of course) never would have been anything more but unknown figures. The average person likes things that are not conducive to enlightened societies (primal pleasures, violence, and conflict) more than things that are (highly cultured entertainment, operas, plays, higher learning, and such). It's not that these preferences are the mark of an evil majority, it's just that the former is "easier to understand" and therefore one who peddles the former is more likely to be taken seriously and elevated to power or social worth than one who truly believes in the latter.

In a sentence: it's not that a person who "thinks they have (whatever it may be) on their side" that's dangerous, it's the fact that the majority is easily convinced of anything so long as you push the right buttons. As far as believing in one's self (having "reason" or "destiny" on "one's side"), sure, hard work tends to pay off. Dedication tends to result in, well, results. "Confidence is key", I suppose? Is this some sort of revelation? Come to think of it, I'm not sure what your point is, really. :razz:

And that's quite alright. :grin: We both, in our own complementing ways, made this discussion just a bit more broad and insightful than it was previously, just a bit more "worth one's perusal" to those who will read and participate in it after us, I'd say. Bravo, to the both of us.

Tom Storm

↪Outlander

I can see why you went in this direction, but that wasn’t exactly what I intended. What I was really trying to say, albeit unclearly, is that reason is often used as a post hoc justification for how people feel. When other factors like destiny, religion, or politics are added, it can become dangerous. But what I really wanted to highlight is that the Nazis reasoned their actions were in the world’s best interests; they believed they were the good guys.

Sir2u

Ideologies in themselves cannot be evil. They are nothing more than a point of view. The actions that occur in the implementation of these ideologies can be classified as evil. Therefore the evil can only be used to classify those that participate in the implementation,not the ideologies themselves.
Everyone behaves according to some ideology or influence, whether it is an ancient book, common law, their own ideas, common sense or a Superman comic.
The intentions of a person involved in the implementation of any ideology is usually, from their point of view, are for the good of humanity according to their beliefs. Taking this into account, terrorists would not be classified as evil. The results of their actions would be ridding their world of the evil as defined by their ideology.
Consequentialism says that only the ramifications of the actions are judged. If the methods used in the implementation of any ideology are then to be taken into account to define it as evil, we would then be able say with a certain amount of surety that terrorists are evil.

Tom Storm

↪Sir2u

So how do you understand an ideology that says a certain race or group of people must be wiped out for the good of the world? Is this merely a point of view? Does it only become evil when the ideology is put into practice?

ProtagoranSocratist

There are two unconnecting arguments here. — Leontiskos

Un-connecting? Not sure what you mean; they still appear to be related subject matter, but the arguments are different...maybe they are just contrary opinions.

AmadeusD

↪ProtagoranSocratist

I genuinely cannot quite understand what you're trying to say here. I don't mean that to be disparaging - it's probably me.

It seems you're saying there is nothing that can be called evil. Given that actions are guided by motivations, it seems wrong in law and in concept to call an act evil which does not carry a malicious intention. I can't really see how we could reject that the ideas/thoughts/motivations are evil but maintain that the acts are. Partially because of some of hte other stuff i said, that it looks like I'll be going on for Leon just now..

So would you say that some things are not merely misguided but truly evil — Leontiskos

For me, personally, I find "evil" pretty empty. In terms of how personally arrange my moral judgments, yes. But I don't think this means much at all. It's just hte convenient semantic way I work out how I feel about things (or more properly, whether I should feel that/some way or not). An action which is aesthetically/prima facie disgustingly malicious and inhumane, let's say, whicih accurate reflects the actor's intention and ..i don't know.. world view? Could be considered evil to me. That's a practical notion, though, so I think I may not be saying what you're asking for unfortunately lol.

On that view true philosophical arguments for moral positions are impossible, and when the philosophical intelligentsia hold to such a view unthinking prejudice and taboo is inevitable, especially among the common people. — Leontiskos

To some degree, i think this. I don't see any possible coherent basis for moral thinking which isn't entirely relative. The best call I've heard from anyone is mass agreement. But we know that mass agreement is essentially culture-bound. Carlo Alvaro wrote an absolutely horrible paper outlining the basic premises of current moral realism and its.... as if a first year student was tasked with defending an illogical position. But that's just my take. I think the Law does well-enough when it comes to moral regulation. Its often wrong, and it can't please everyone, but its better than everyone doing what they think is right, imo.

many people nevertheless wish for their moral position to "win out," and this leads to all sorts of behavior that is different from rational argument. It leads to the question, "How do I get what I want without relying upon rational argumentation?" — Leontiskos

Yes, definitely. I think this is one of the unsolvable problems of modern, pluralistic society. I, at least, remain humble in my moral positions and don't pretend that they need apply to anyone else. I will try to enforce mine where i am not obviously violating rights (which are a legal institution) but otherwise I don't feel 'right' trying to convince people to my point of view (although, there is the obvious caveat that if it has to do with others violating rights, I'm likely to say something. Boot licking? Not imo).

You may be right about the disconnect between those arguments.

ProtagoranSocratist

It seems you're saying there is nothing that can be called evil. Given that actions are guided by motivations, it seems wrong in law and in concept to call an act evil which does not carry a malicious intention. I can't really see how we could reject that the ideas/thoughts/motivations are evil but maintain that the acts are. Partially because of some of hte other stuff i said, that it looks like I'll be going on for Leon just now.. — AmadeusD

close, but what i'm trying to say is not quite as dogmatic. There very well may be evil -- there are certainly things that are horrible or very bad. It doesn't take much effort to find these things, especially in human activity and behavior. Ideas themselves hardly fit the bill for being the absolute worst, because clearly people say and think a lot of things just as an emotional reaction, and emotional reactions are too pure for such heavy-handed blame and moralization implied when calling something "evil" in my opinion.

However, I personally choose not to describe things as evil, because it's very emotive, and it's a common concept used by very dishonest (or maybe just stupid/delusional) people. That doesn't mean i think anyone who believes in evil has less intelligence than me, but I personally don't feel I benefit from describing anyone or what they do as such.

For example...you could say Donald Trump is evil, some people say that he is, some people compare him to adolf hitler...but i prefer "extremely dishonest" and "xenophobic" because these are more descriptive. Some people call Caligula (one of the early Roman emperors) and John Wane Gacy evil, but I prefer "sadistic" and "psychopathic" because those are also more descriptive of these individuals.

Leontiskos

For me, personally, I find "evil" pretty empty. In terms of how personally arrange my moral judgments, yes. But I don't think this means much at all. It's just hte convenient semantic way I work out how I feel about things (or more properly, whether I should feel that/some way or not). An action which is aesthetically/prima facie disgustingly malicious and inhumane, let's say, whicih accurate reflects the actor's intention and ..i don't know.. world view? Could be considered evil to me. That's a practical notion, though, so I think I may not be saying what you're asking for unfortunately lol. — AmadeusD

Okay, and is there a particular ethical system you hold to in this? Am I correct in recalling that you are an Emotivist?

Yes, definitely. I think this is one of the unsolvable problems of modern, pluralistic society. I, at least, remain humble in my moral positions and don't pretend that they need apply to anyone else. — AmadeusD

Okay, but let's probe your claim that you don't pretend that your moral positions need to apply to anyone else:

I will try to enforce mine where i am not obviously violating rights (which are a legal institution) — AmadeusD

So you will try to enforce your moral positions, as long as you are not violating civil rights? Wouldn't enforcing your moral positions involve applying your moral positions to other people?

It's been awhile since I read it, but C. S. Lewis' argument against moral relativism in Mere Christianity is quite good. He points up the way that people who claim not to impose any morality on others are very often doing just that.

ProtagoranSocratist

It's been awhile since I read it, but C. S. Lewis' argument against moral relativism in Mere Christianity is quite good. — Leontiskos

Seems appealing to me, as my personal grudge with moral relativism is how even though it makes moral judgments relative to a situation instead of abstract absolutes (categorical imperatives...), it's still boiling decisions down to "right and wrong", which is still simplistic.

Leontiskos

There very well may be evil -- there are certainly things that are horrible or very bad. It doesn't take much effort to find these things, especially in human activity and behavior. Ideas themselves hardly fit the bill for being the absolute worst, because clearly people say and think a lot of things just as an emotional reaction, and emotional reactions are too pure for such heavy-handed blame and moralization implied when calling something "evil" in my opinion. — ProtagoranSocratist

So would you say that "evil" means "the absolute worst," and one must be careful about calling something "the absolute worst" given the way that emotion often misleads us? Nevertheless, you do think there are things which are bad, and knowably so?

For my part, I think that's fine. The older understanding of "evil" is not as extreme as "the absolute worst" (and 'bad' has a curiously recent etymology). Still, the common English meaning does differentiate bad and evil in something like the way you indicate.

ProtagoranSocratist

So would you say that "evil" means "the absolute worst," and one must be careful about calling something "the absolute worst" given the way that emotion often misleads us? — Leontiskos

Mostly, but i don't equate evil and "absolute worst" in how i understand the terms. "evil" almost 100% of the time in modern english indicates some extreme moral wrong. For example, rarely does anyone say something like "that couger attacked the man on the hiking trail, that couger is evil!" because we all seem to assume that a couger cannot make moral decisions of right and wrong, but people use "evil" all the time to describe serial killers, politicians, and business men. While I don't like the term evil, I would have absolutely no problem with saying "Hitler, John Wayne Gacy, and Caligula acted in some of the absolute worst ways imaginable", but the thing i don't like about calling them evil is that we assume they could have acted in a different way with better morals, which is something I disagree with.

(and 'bad' has a curiously recent etymology). Still, the common English meaning does differentiate bad and evil in something like the way you indicate. — Leontiskos

huh, that's really quite interesting and i bookmarked the website...who knew that "bad" was derived exclusively from a work used to insult homosexuals and less-masculine men?! It's not surprising, but to me the word is more abstract and less loaded than that...

i guess in modern english, "evil" has it's moral and satanic overtones since the medieval era was more thoroughly christian in europe...but that etymology example you showed me illuminates how little i know...

Sir2u

So how do you understand an ideology that says a certain race or group of people must be wiped out for the good of the world? — Tom Storm

If it is not your ideology, then you will probable never understand it. But it has been practiced since the beginning of human history. The only difference is that thousands of years ago small groups of humanoids killed off other small groups to make sure that their resources were not taken by them. Now it is by the thousands.

Is this merely a point of view? — Tom Storm

What else could it be, if they thought that by killing others that they could survive then that was their point of view. It might help to think about the other group having the same point of view.

Does it only become evil when the ideology is put into practice? — Tom Storm

Evil is a moral judgment of something that is believed by one group or another to be bad for them. Judgment of good or bad can only be made about actions, not thoughts, because they are the only things that can be proven through physical evidence. Even if I tell you what I am thinking, you still have no proof that it is true.

AmadeusD

close, but what i'm trying to say is not quite as dogmatic. There very well may be evil -- there are certainly things that are horrible or very bad. It doesn't take much effort to find these things, especially in human activity and behavior. Ideas themselves hardly fit the bill for being the absolute worst, because clearly people say and think a lot of things just as an emotional reaction, and emotional reactions are too pure for such heavy-handed blame and moralization implied when calling something "evil" in my opinion. — ProtagoranSocratist

Right, okay, that makes more sense, thanks.

I personally find the "if but for" type of reasoning helpful here. "If but for the belief that negroes are inferior to whites, the defendant would not have carried out X, resulting in the wrongful death of a"

I think this applies to almost all actions that could be considered evil. The problem, as I see it, is that some wont fit

Action 1 = ostensibly evil (appearance of a hate crime, for instance)
Motivation 1 = ostensibly non-evil: true self defence, in an awkward circumstance
NOT EVIL
Action 2 = ostensibly evil (appearance of a hate crime, for instance)
Motivation 1 = ostensibly evil (actual hate crime, by admission)
EVIL
Action 3 = ostensibly evil (illegally refusing service to a Black person)
Motivation 3 = ostensibly non-evil (the Black person in question was ornery, unruly, couth and threatening but in some nuanced way not obvious on the face of it)
NOT EVIL
Action 4 = ostensibly non-evil (refusing service to an apparently obtuse/unruly/threatening Black person)
Motivation 4 = ostensibly evil (by admission: hates Blacks and so refused service at hte first possible chance of justifying it).
EVIL

The wrong-maker appears to be the thoughts. However:

I personally choose not to describe things as evil, because it's very emotive, and it's a common concept used by very dishonest (or maybe just stupid/delusional) people. — ProtagoranSocratist

Absolutely. I think its essentially empty, because it can only mean whatever the person using it describes when asked. We have difference descriptions, i'd say (all of us, not you and I). Not because I thikn people are dumb for using it. I do think dumb people use it wrongly, as you say, though.

i prefer "extremely dishonest" and "xenophobic" because these are more descriptive. Some people call Caligula (one of the early Roman emperors) and John Wane Gacy evil, but I prefer "sadistic" and "psychopathic" because those are also more descriptive of these individuals. — ProtagoranSocratist

Hmmm. I appreciate that this may be the best we can do as people - but those descriptions certainly wont hit home for many. I, for one, while agreeing with dishonest, can't see it in the "extreme" category. Neither do I see him as xenophobic - so, there's the descriptive thing I mentioned above.

Okay, and is there a particular ethical system you hold to in this? Am I correct in recalling that you are an Emotivist? — Leontiskos

More-or-less correct, yes. I imagine there's edges to it, as there are with almost all claims to a moral system, that don't quite fit into a description of same, but yeah overall. Hence this being a system of figuring out what I (or what to, depending on whether action is required) feel about X, Y or Z.

So you will try to enforce your moral positions, as long as you are not violating civil rights? Wouldn't enforcing your moral positions involve applying your moral positions to other people? — Leontiskos

No, not at all. If people resist my attempts to 'enforce' my moral take *on that specific thing that I have deemed action is required in response to* then that's fine, and I can't say they're 'wrong'. Just that they are counter to what I think is best. I don't think my wanting to take the action I feel is 'right' goes against accepting that it is subjective and i can't justify getting anyone else to agree with me (although, when they do, it's good. That might be harder to explain). My reasoning is what I am trying to get other people to assent to in those situations. If they do not, my moral position becomes irrelevant. UNless there's a "The Sky is yellow" type of thing going on, my reasoning is unlikely to move anyone expressing a moral belief. Which is fine. But I suggest those "sky is yellow" cases are covered by rights violations.

It's been awhile since I read it, but C. S. Lewis' argument against moral relativism in Mere Christianity is quite good. He points up the way that people who claim not to impose any morality on others are very often doing just that. — Leontiskos

I cannot imagine this mattering to our discussion. Imposition is quite, explicitly different to carrying on ones life as they see morally fit. Charlie Kirk would be an example of someone imposing their moral beliefs on others (and I still see no problem with that, personally.. Which is part and parcel of my not imposing my beliefs on others). That i personally would want to see X happen or not happen, and carry on my life under those beliefs doesn't seem to me to run into any obstacles insofar as claiming I don't impose on others.

Maybe there just needs to be a concession/caveat that carrying on ones life will implicitly, "accidentally" impose ones morals on those around them. I can accept that. But i active attempt not to do this, where ever there is no clear legal rights violation. Even some situations where there is, I don't feel that simply believing A or B is a better response gives me any truck in trying to get other people to do so.

huh, that's really quite interesting and i bookmarked the website...who knew that "bad" was derived exclusively from a work used to insult homosexuals and less-masculine men?! It's not surprising, but to me the word is more abstract and less loaded than that... — ProtagoranSocratist

There are several possibly origins of the term. Thiis is one of three that seem to ahve serious thought behind them. The other two make far, far more sense:

Old English baedan = "to defile" roughly
Proto-Germanic bada = "difficulty, trouble/damage" roughly.

The first seems to be the original of the suggestion Leon's given. I would probably hold off on concluding one or the other.

ProtagoranSocratist

Old English baedan = "to defile" roughly
Proto-Germanic bada = "difficulty, trouble/damage" roughly. — AmadeusD

Okay, thanks for researching that more carefully than i did...

Leontiskos

I personally find the "if but for" type of reasoning helpful here. "If but for the belief that negroes are inferior to whites, the defendant would not have carried out X, resulting in the wrongful death of a" — AmadeusD

The question is how to justify this claim:

The wrong-maker appears to be the thoughts. — AmadeusD

This is because but-for causation casts a wide net. We would not want to conclude that knives are evil from the claim, "But for the knife, he would not have murdered." Nevertheless, what I think your argument does demonstrate is that thoughts constitute an important causal aspect of acts.

More-or-less correct, yes. I imagine there's edges to it, as there are with almost all claims to a moral system, that don't quite fit into a description of same, but yeah overall. — AmadeusD

Okay.

No, not at all. If people resist my attempts to 'enforce' my moral take *on that specific thing that I have deemed action is required in response to* then that's fine, and I can't say they're 'wrong'. Just that they are counter to what I think is best. I don't think my wanting to take the action I feel is 'right' goes against accepting that it is subjective and i can't justify getting anyone else to agree with me (although, when they do, it's good. That might be harder to explain). My reasoning is what I am trying to get other people to assent to in those situations. — AmadeusD

Focusing on the bolded, I would ask 1) why is it good when you convince someone to agree with you, and 2) why would you try to get other people to assent to your reasoning if moral issues are not susceptible to rational assent?

That i personally would want to see X happen or not happen, and carry on my life under those beliefs doesn't seem to me to run into any obstacles insofar as claiming I don't impose on others.

Maybe there just needs to be a concession/caveat that carrying on ones life will implicitly, "accidentally" impose ones morals on those around them. I can accept that. But i active attempt not to do this, where ever there is no clear legal rights violation. Even some situations where there is, I don't feel that simply believing A or B is a better response gives me any truck in trying to get other people to do so. — AmadeusD

Okay good, and you state your position clearly and cogently.

I will just stick with the question I've already asked rather than complicating it further. If you don't think moral positions are susceptible to rational inquiry, then I don't understand why you would try to rationally persuade another person to adopt your own moral position.

---

Mostly, but i don't equate evil and "absolute worst" in how i understand the terms. "evil" almost 100% of the time in modern english indicates some extreme moral wrong. For example, rarely does anyone say something like "that couger attacked the man on the hiking trail, that couger is evil!" because we all seem to assume that a couger cannot make moral decisions of right and wrong, but people use "evil" all the time to describe serial killers, politicians, and business men. While I don't like the term evil, I would have absolutely no problem with saying "Hitler, John Wayne Gacy, and Caligula acted in some of the absolute worst ways imaginable", but the thing i don't like about calling them evil is that we assume they could have acted in a different way with better morals, which is something I disagree with. — ProtagoranSocratist

Okay, so it sounds like part of what you are saying here is that someone's act can only be evil if they were able to do otherwise than they did in fact do. You don't believe Hitler could have acted otherwise, therefore you wouldn't call him evil.

Ideological Evil

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