Kant wrote his massive tome to show this is wrong.
— Jamal

Yes, I agree. — Corvus

It is confusing to have you acknowledge that Kant argued against your argument immediately after you claim that he supported it.

A quandary.

LOL.

From what I've seen the main argument in the last two pages has been that Banno thinks if there are things we don't currently know, then Antirealism can't hold.

Well... *sigh*. That is.. not reasonable.

There are plenty of things we may never come into contact with. That doesn't make them unknowable. Unknown and unknowable are simply not the same.

Now, I presume I've missed something major. But I don't see it anywhere. Someone want to help me out there?

From what I've seen the main argument in the last two pages has been that Banno thinks if there are things we don't currently know, then Antirealism can't hold. — AmadeusD

It is difficult to follow your argument since you base it upon an interpretation of what an interlocuter has said rather than engage in the debate proffered.

Well... *sigh*. That is.. not reasonable. — AmadeusD

There are many ways to show how the argument is not reasonable, I provided one. The argument requires a very narrow perspective to work. It works for Banno because he adopts that narrow perspective and refuses to talk to anyone who will not take it. It's like saying the argument requires these assumptions, and if you do not accept these assumptions, I will not discuss it with you. What's the point?

With a simple smattering of charity you could just have offered that they are maybe trying to say that phenomenon is all we have via sensibility?

@Corvus I think that is all that is being said?

This didn't help. LOL

If this isn’t the case, then there must be other things that are not seen, even by an anti-realist. Because there might be more than one anti-realist. — Punshhh

Well, yes. But can an anti-realist know that there is more than one anti-realist? I think not, and that's why I think that the only consistent form of idealism is solipsism.

...... antirealism, which is the epistemic position that if something is true, then it is knowable. — Banno

That seems entirely reasonable. I guess the problems must be in the fine print.

There cannot be any unknown truths if every truth is knowable. — Banno

But what is the force of "cannot"? Does it mean that we don't have the technology? Or does it mean that we have to develop a new approach (elliptical orbits instead of circular ones?

If we are to hold that we do not know everything, then there are things we cannot know. — Banno

Well, I can see that perhaps we cannot know all truths. But it does not follow that there are any truths that we cannot know.

If we do not know everything, then antirealism is not an option. — Banno

I think the distinctions between known unknowns and unkowns. lt seems to me that the former are not incompatible with anti-realism (or some forms of it). I may not know the tenth place in the expansion of pi (5), but I know that there's a method for finding it. But it also seems to me that the latter are. However, I don't see that anything prevents us from discovering at least some of them and developing new concepts in the process.

That doesn't seem to me to be addressing Fitch, ..... — Banno

Perhaps not. I don't really think I'm capable of demonstrating that it is wrong. On the contrary, I think it is right, provided the context is right. IEP - Dynamic Epistemic Logic has a helpful summary of the argument:-

From ∃p (p ∧ ¬Kp) follows the truth of its instance (p ∧ ¬Kp) → ◊ K(p ∧ ¬Kp), and from that and p ∧ ¬Kp follows ◊ K(p ∧ ¬Kp). Whatever the interpretation of ◊, it results in having to evaluate K(p ∧ ¬Kp). But this is inconsistent for knowledge and belief.

It is clearly true that I cannot know that p (is true) and that I do not know that p. In general, if the person who knows (K) is the same as the person who asserts the starting-point, it is self-contradictory (Moore's paradox). But it is not contradictory if the person asserting the starting-point is different from the person who knows. There's no problem about me asserting (knowing) that p is true and someone else does not know it. I'm not sure what impact, if any, this has on realism/anti-realism.

From what I've seen the main argument in the last two pages has been that Banno thinks if there are things we don't currently know, then Antirealism can't hold. — AmadeusD

I agree with you that it is not obvious that known unknowns threaten antirealism. But unknown unknowns do. The catch is that we don't, and can't, know what they are. We only know that there are such things because we have encountered some of them before.

I'm not sure if it is relevant but @Banno doesn't assert merely that there are things that we don't currently know.

It (sc. Fitch's paradox) begins with Up(p⊃◇Kp), which is not temporally dependent. — Banno

. l agree, though, that a move from "knowable" to "known" does seem to require tenses.

I think that is all that is being said? — I like sushi

My reality is strictly constructed with my perception, sensation and imagination and belief. What I don't sense and perceive, I rely on my imagination and belief. There is no objectivity in there. Even my own perception and sensation can sometimes mislead me. There is no 100% guarantee that my perception and sensations are infallibly true. And what is more, what I perceive and sense is perhaps not even 0.0000000000001 percent of the world. How could I pretend to claim to know what the world is?

Now this is not a solipsism like some have been misled on the point. It is the critical nature of our perception, mind and reality under the philosophical analysis.

I think that is all that is being said? — I like sushi

Some say Kant was a phenomenologist, quite understandably so.