And therefore you know everything that is true.

Righto.

That these truths may be known at some other time is not particularly interesting. — Ludwig V

The argument is not tensed. It is not based on "Not known now, but could be known later."

It begins with Up(p⊃◇Kp), which is not temporally dependent. It is modal. the supposition is the antirealist one that if something is true, it is possible to know it is true. The direct conclusion is that there is no p such that p is true and not known. This follows without reference to any time or duration. There cannot be any unknown truths if every truth is knowable.

If we are to hold that we do not know everything, then there are things we cannot know.

If we do not know everything, then antirealism is not an option.

What this shows is that being true and being known are not the same.

That this is resisted hereabouts is a bit sad.

"True" is a judgement. Judgements are only made by intelligent minds in the process called "knowing". Therefore all truths are known. — Metaphysician Undercover

“True” isn’t the judgement; it is the relative quality of the judgement;
Judgements are, but not necessarily only, made by rational intellects in the process of understanding;
All truths are known, but not because of either of those.

The necessary condition of empirical truth as such, in general, is the accordance with a cognition with its object, cognition itself being the relation of conceptions to each other in a logical proposition, re: a judgement, or, the relation of judgements to each other, re: a syllogism. It is impossible not to know whether the relation of conceptions or of judgements accord with each other, for in either there is contradiction with experience if they do not. It is not given by that knowledge the cause of such discord, only that there resides no truth in it.


It is not that all true things are known, insofar as the sum of all possible cognitions is incomplete, some of which may be true respecting their objects, but that the criterion of any truth is known, for which the sum of possible cognitions is irrelevant.

Anti-realists don't have to explain how there are unstated statements.

That's not the issue.

That's not the issue. — Banno

Oh. :grin:

The necessary condition of empirical truth as such, in general, is the accordance with a cognition with its object, cognition itself being the relation of conceptions to each other in a logical proposition, re: a judgement, or, the relation of judgements to each other, re: a syllogism. It is impossible not to know whether the relation of conceptions or of judgements accord with each other, for in either there is contradiction with experience if they do not. It is not given by that knowledge the cause of such discord, only that there resides no truth in it. — Mww

But isn't it the case that whether or not there is "accordance" is itself a judgement? You say that truth is "accordance" but isn't accordance a judgement? That "the cat is on the mat" is in accordance with reality, is a judgement. If you don't think that accordance is a judgement, then maybe you could explain how it could be anything other than a judgement?

It is not that all true things are known, insofar as the sum of all possible cognitions is incomplete, some of which may be true respecting their objects, but that the criterion of any truth is known, for which the sum of possible cognitions is irrelevant. — Mww

If there is such a thing as "the criterion of any truth", doesn't this imply that truth is a judgement as to whether the specific criterion is fulfilled?

Yes, we give with one hand and take back with the other. Berkeley is a spectacular example. He says nothing can exist unperceived and that he does not deny the existence of "any one thing" that common sense believes in. (He reconciles the two by pointing out that God always perceives everything.)

Yes, that is the only way around it, we are part of God and God sees everything. Therefore there isn’t anything that isn’t seen.
If this isn’t the case, then there must be other things that are not seen, even by an anti-realist. Because there might be more than one anti-realist.

Nope, afaik the quantum vacuum is the ground state of nature.

Cool.

There's another term I would like to avoid.
— Ludwig V
Which one? "Proposition"? — J

Yes. "Sentence" and "statement" are just about acceptable. "Thought" and "judgement" are also very dubious.

"The argument is not tensed. It is not based on "Not known now, but could be known later." — Banno

That wasn't my summary of the argument. I think it may be based on the point that the manifestation of a disposition or capacity is an event, therefore not tenseless.

It begins with Up(p⊃◇Kp), which is not temporally dependent. It is modal.[/quote]
You won't be surprised that I don't know modal logic. But I had the impression that if it is possible to know that p, it is also possible to not know that p. So (forgive me that I can't do the formula properly,) the formula should read "For all p (if p is true then it is possible to know that p and possible not to know that p). I doubt that the conclusion would follow from that.

The direct conclusion is that there is no p such that p is true and not known. ... There cannot be any unknown truths if every truth is knowable. — Banno

That sounds like "If it is possible that it is raining, it is raining." More generally "possible" does not imply "actual".

If we are to hold that we do not know everything, then there are things we cannot know. If we do not know everything, then antirealism is not an option. — Banno

I don't see any problem about holding that we do not know everything.
Probability. A toss of a coin. It may land heads or tails and must land one or the other and we know that. We know the probabilities of each outcome, but we do not know which it will be.
Most questions identify things that are not known to the questioner. Many of them have answers in the sense that somebody knows the answer. But sometimes research is necessary. It's not really a problem.
I have more difficulty with the idea that there are things that we cannot know. In some cases, it is just a question of technology. Discovering the speed of light may be an example. Seeing what's on the far side of the moon is another.
But I do have a problem with the idea that there are things that we cannot know in some way that is not just a technological issue. Ex hypothesi, if we knew of some such thing, it would be something we knew.

….isn't it the case that…. — Metaphysician Undercover

No.

….doesn't this imply that…. — Metaphysician Undercover

No.

You asked, I answered. You could have just said thanks.

I’ll end with this: an invitation to the dreaded Cartesian theater in your critique of my perspective. It is self-defeating, systemic nonsense, to conflate the thing with a necessary condition for it.

You asked, I answered. You could have just said thanks.

I’ll end with this: an invitation to the dreaded Cartesian theater in your critique of my perspective. It is self-defeating, systemic nonsense, to conflate the thing with a necessary condition for it. — Mww

I didn't see anything to thank you for. But since you seem to be inviting me to critique your perspective, I will.

The substance of your reply, I see as based on incorrect assumptions which make your perspective impossible to understand.
That is the following:

It is impossible not to know whether the relation of conceptions or of judgements accord with each other, for in either there is contradiction with experience if they do not. It is not given by that knowledge the cause of such discord, only that there resides no truth in it. — Mww

It's fundamentally wrong, to say that it's impossible not to know whether a relation is a relation of accordance. More often than not, we do not know that. That is because whether or not it is a relation of accordance requires a judgement of that nature.

And, the proposed problem of "contradiction with experience" does not support that basic premise, because this phrase makes no sense. What could "contradiction with experience" even mean? What is experienced must be put into words, before anything can contradict this. So that would not be contradiction with experience, but contradiction with the description of what was experienced.

Then you mention the cause of discord, but causation is irrelevant here.

Further, you conclude with a statement about "possible cognitions". But we were talking about actual judgements or actual cognitions, and neither one of us provided any principles to establish a relation between actual and possible judgements/cognitions. You simply assumed another meaningless, nonsense principle, "the sum of all possible cognitions is incomplete".

It's nonsense because "possible cognitions", as individual items which could be counted, summed, doesn't make any sense in itself. To count them requires that they be cognized. Therefore the sum would be a sum of actual cognitions. A sum of possible cognitions is nonsensical, due to that impossibility.

So you’re saying, because how I represent my perspective, insofar as it is at least non-sensical or at most just plain wrong, I couldn’t possibly agree with you that all truths are known?

WTF, man. You shoulda just left it at thanks, and gone your merry way.

That doesn't seem to me to be addressing Fitch, nor antirealism, which is the epistemic position that if something is true, then it is knowable. You use ◇~Kp, where Fitch uses ~◇Kp.

If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality? — an-salad

Our reality? All reality is subjective private mental state. There is no such a thing as "our reality".
Again all experience is private mental event. There is no other mind involved in an experience than "I" or "my mind.

You shoulda just left it at thanks, and gone your merry way. — Mww

As I said, I didn't see anything to thank you for. And to be insincere in a discussion about truth is self-defeating.

All reality is subjective private mental state. — Corvus

...conflates reality and private mental states. The very fact that you are posting on this forum shows that you do not agree with this. Moreover, that you are trying to communicate, to use language, demonstrates that there is more than your private mental state. You want a reply such as this.

But on it goes, around and around, Corvus trying to prove to everyone else that there is only Corvus.

Moreover, that you are trying to communicate, to use language, demonstrates that there is more than your private mental state. — Banno

Private mental state is the core of your mind which is your perception. You build your extra mind with your imagination and belief. Remember the external world and other minds are just figment of your imagination. There is no actual concrete existence on these objects, but fleeting impressions and ideas.

It proves that Banno has never read Hume or Kant, and has been trying to discuss philosophy in the public forum with his very limited mind.

Banno read both Hume and Kant, then read a bit more. Yet neither Hume nor Kant would agree with you.

If I am but a figment of your imagination, then why am I so aggravating? Some sort of self-loathing on your part?

If this post does not exist, then what is it you are now reading?

There's something quite mad in your solipsism.

I assume you have also read Philosophical Investigations? What about the private language argument?

All reality is subjective private mental state — Corvus

It proves that Banno has never read Hume or Kant — Corvus

Kant wrote his massive tome to show this is wrong.

If this post does not exist, then what is it you are now reading? — Banno

I never said the post doesn't exist. Where did you get that? I see the post, and I was responding to that. But I don't see you. I am imaging you might exist. There is difference between you do exist, and you might exist. To me, you are just a author of your post, and might exist. But I don't have any more perceptual data apart from it.

It is not a solipsism. You are not understanding the difference between solipsism and foundation for perceptual existence.

I assume you have also read Philosophical Investigations? What about the private language argument? — Colo Millz

It is still in my reading list.

I never said the post doesn't exist. — Corvus

You said:

All reality is subjective private mental state. — Corvus

Then

...the external world and other minds are just figment of your imagination. — Corvus

The post you read, and this post, are your own private mental state, on your own account. I've got nothing to do with this, being just part of your own imaginings. You are addressing your posts to yourself. You did not read my post, you imagined it. My post doesn't exist, separately to your imaginings. Nor do I. You don't see the post, you just imagine that you see it. You are responding to your own imaginations, not to me. You are inflicting this thread on yourself. I am not the author of this post - your imagined that , too. You only imagined a difference between your solipsism and the "perceptions" you imagine that you have.

Either that, or your account is absurd.

Kant wrote his massive tome to show this is wrong. — Jamal

Yes, I agree. But I recall a book called "Imagination in Kant's Philosophy" by a German philosopher I cannot recall his name. The book was emphasizing the fact, imagination and belief is critical part for constructing reality and the external world. I was totally agreeing with his point.

I mean Banno does exist, surely he must. But I don't have any factual perceptual data on Banno. I know Banno from his posts in the forum, and that is all what Banno is to me. The rest of Banno is my belief and imagination about Banno, which might be totally wrong and fictional in reality. And I do accept my existence to Banno must be the same.

That is the reality of our reality. It is not a solipsism.

You only imagined a difference between your solipsism and the "perceptions" you imagine that you have. — Banno

If you claim that you have more than your imagination and irrational belief on the external world, then you are pretending. It is not a philosophical account.

I mean Banno does exist, surely he must. — Corvus

No I don't. I'm just your imagination, tormenting you. Jamal and Colo don't exist, either. You imagined their replies, as you did the writings of Hume and Kant.

If you have more than your imagination and irrational belief on the external word, then you are pretending. It is not a philosophical account. — Corvus

But I don't exist, so I don't have an irrational belief in the external world. You are typing as if I exist, but of course I might be just your imagination. It's not me doing the pretending - you are the only one here. If my account is not a philosophical account, that's because that is what you imagined.

Or I am here, pointing to the errors in your account.

Or I am here, pointing to the errors in your account. — Banno

You may well exist, I was not saying that you don't exist. There is a difference, and you don't seem to see the difference.

I don't have the perceptual evidence on the existence apart from your misleading posts. That is the philosophical dissection of reality. I am not taking into account all the hypes in the media about the world, and refusing to be non philosophical frame of mind of the ordinary folks on the street.

You may well exist, I was not saying that you don't exist. — Corvus

No, that's right - your claim is that I may not exist. This is understood. While it is good to see you move that little bit towards admitting that I might exist, the remainder of your account stands at odd with such generosity.

You said;

All reality is subjective private mental state. — Corvus

and:

...the external world and other minds are just figment of your imagination. — Corvus

and added:

There is no actual concrete existence on these objects, but fleeting impressions and ideas. — Corvus

You apparently think these annoying posts are "subjective private mental state", since "all reality is subjective private mental state". You also say that this post is "just a figment of your imagination", and that I have "no actual concrete existence", but am only "fleeting impressions and ideas".

The ambiguity here is in your account, in your insistence that the "fleeting impressions and ideas" you have of me are insufficient for you to conclude that I exist; that on amount of evidence could be enough to convince you that I am here, posting these annoying and rude bits of text, rather than your having just imagined them yourself, that these are some manifestation of the "private mental state (that) is the core of your mind which is your perception".

And yet you are replying to these "private mental states", in what is presumably a form of autotalk, responding consciously to this manifestation of your unconscious mind, or something along these lines. And somehow you think this at least as good an explanation as that there is an annoying Australian who keeps pestering you about your posts.

I don't have the perceptual evidence on the existence apart from your misleading posts. — Corvus

What would count as sufficient evidence for you? What more do you think you need, what could be added to your perceptions that would lead you to decide that there is more to me than your fantasies? What could produce certainty for you? But more, why do you demand certainty? You will no doubt respond to this post anyway, as you have in the past, and even though you hold that I might not be here to read your post. Your actions show that, despite your "philosophical" rumination, you think me sufficiently real to warrant a response.

Your responding to me, and indeed your participation in the forum, puts the lie to your account. You do believe we are here, watching for your response. The account you have offered is dishonest.