This is why I resisted giving a summary.

Perhaps you could provide references that support your interpretation. On the surface, your description does not account for the emphasis upon the intuitions of space and time.

On the surface, your description does not account for the emphasis upon intuition of space and time. — Paine

Per Kant, we don't learn about space and time a posteriori. As for a reference, I don't think we can do better than Kant himself. Have you read the Transcendental Aesthetic?

Per Kant, we don't learn about space and time a posteriori. — frank

That is more of an argument toward accepting an "ontological" limit than saying:

He's just saying that consciousness of my own existence requires something to compare and contrast with me. The use of dialectics runs through the CPR. This is a case of that. — frank

The Refutation of Idealism section previously linked to argues against the "any difference will do" idea.

Per Kant, we don't learn about space and time a posteriori.
— frank

That is a more of an argument toward accepting an "ontological" limit than saying: — Paine

I don't know what an ontological limit is. That we know about space and time a priori is the outcome of a series of arguments.

The Refutation of Idealism section previously linked to argues against the "any difference will do" idea. — Paine

I don't know what "any difference will do" refers to. It has nothing to do with anything I said.

He's just saying that consciousness of my own existence requires something to compare and contrast with me. The use of dialectics runs through the CPR. This is a case of that. — frank

He's just saying that consciousness of my own existence requires something to compare and contrast with me. The use of dialectics runs through the CPR. This is a case of that. — frank

And?

Since the intuitions are separated from the processes of reason a priori, differences of experience are neither what Descartes nor Berkeley described, as outlined in Kant's Refutation of Idealism.

That approach is different from observing there are "differences" of experience that provide a context for a subject as presented in Descartes and Berkeley. It is on the same grounds that Kant resisted Hume describing causality as only a story that is told.

Since the intuitions are separated from the processes of reason a priori, differences of experience are neither what Descartes nor Berkeley described, as outlined in Kant's Refutation of Idealism.

That approach is different from observing there are "differences" of experience that provide a context for a subject as presented in Descartes and Berkeley. It is on the same grounds that Kant resisted Hume describing causality as only a story that is told. — Paine

I'm not sure what you're saying. Kant is basically arguing that consciousness of the self is generated by the mind's organization of experience according to a priori categories. You could put it this way: as the mind goes about organizing experience, it develops the concept of a unified world that allows the disparate elements to become meaningful. Each thing has the potential to be meaningful relative to this cohesive world. It's just part of the mechanics of this process that a proto-subject appears as a kind of logical entity. Who is having these experiences? It's me!

I'm a really non-linear thinker, so I'm struggling to explain this. But Kant is suggesting that when consciousness of the self appears, it's consciousness of a unified grounding to experience. That unity reflects the unity of the world.

In Kant’s conception, by contrast, accounting for our sense of the identity of the conscious subject of different self-attributions requires that this subject be distinct from its representations. — SEP

Consciousness of the self requires a division between the subject and object. The self has to have boundaries, in other words.

The quote you provided from SEP comes from a particular contrast between Kant and Hume. The argument about what the "I" is in the context of representations is an important issue throughout the book.

The matter of intuition goes to a more "existential" cause of the difference of self and object when Kant says:

The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own
existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me. — Critique of Pure Reason, B275

I continue to have no idea what you're trying to say. I'm sure you're not being purposefully cryptic, but that is the way you're coming across.

I am trying to avoid being cryptic by referencing specific portions of the actual text. I was sincere in my general thumbnail that you asked for. But that generality is cryptic as all general descriptions tend to be. That is why I was so reluctant to offer it.

I am doing the best that I can as I understand effort.

I am trying to avoid being cryptic by referencing specific portions of the actual text. I was sincere in my general thumbnail that you asked for. But that generality is cryptic as all general descriptions tend to be. That is why I was so reluctant to offer it.

I am doing the best that I can as I understand effort. — Paine

We've long had this conflict between us (you and Foolos4) where you dissect passages of text, and I have a much broader outlook. No need to try to resolve it. :grin:

Pretty contemptuous last word.

I will leave you with it.

Pretty contemptuous last word.

I will leave you with it. — Paine

You're projecting.

I have a much broader outlook. — frank

I have a much broader outlook. — frank

I do. To get my bearings, I try to place the text in its historical context. Like, why is Descartes writing this? What is Kant responding to? I'm not saying my way is superior to anybody else's. It's what I do naturally.

You, on the other hand, take a bit of text and use it as the basis for what ends up being self reflection. You want every philosopher to be something like a materialist, and you take one word and draw out a materialist outlook.

Whose approach is more fruitful? Mine is fruitful for me. Yours is fruitful for you. Ultimately, neither is right or wrong.

You, on the other hand, take a bit of text and use it as the basis for what ends up being self reflection. You want every philosopher to be something like a materialist, and you take one word and draw out a materialist outlook. — frank

That is not the case. I have argued extensively against Gerson's interpretation of materialism as a general idea in Plato and subsequent literature. Are you remembering my objections to Cornford's view of the forms as an argument for materialism? Nothing could be further from the case. I see that I have only been a cypher in your mind.

I don't want Kant to say this or that. Or if I do, it needs to be a way to read what was written. I don't see the world the way he does in many ways. But he deserves to be fairly represented.

But he deserves to be fairly represented. — Paine

Cool. How do you interpret the passage you originally posted? I'm curious.

I am not going to say more until we deal with your charges about my agenda.

I am not going to say more until we deal with your charges about my agenda. — Paine

I'm cool with resolving it with a "fair enough." What else?

Interestingly, this is how I've been taught consciousness operates:

Conscious
Preconscious (might become conscious
Subconscious (cannot become conscious).

That would be a neat trick for a God to play on themselves.

Then what will be the difference between our points of view?

Will you no longer challenge what I have said in the past as you just did?

I would rather work with that gap than agree to disagree. It is more interesting.

Ok. It's just that you posted a passage from Kant in a thread about disproving solipsism. Subsequently, I've been unable to determine how you're reading that passage. Since Kant is known for a persuasive argument that we know about time and space prior to any experience with the world, it seems a little odd to put him forward as disproving solipsism.

I can deal with that challenge tomorrow. I will quote from the text I have been referring to and link it to other sections of the other Critiques.

I can deal with that challenge tomorrow. I will quote from the text I have been referring to and link it to other sections of the other Critiques. — Paine

Ok. I was just asking you to tell me what you think it means.

For Kant, in his time, the statement that awareness of self required the existence of "exterior" things was his argument against solipsism.

That would be a neat trick for a God to play on themselves. — AmadeusD

What kind of god would I be if I couldn’t do something like that?

For Kant, in his time, the statement that awareness of self required the existence of "exterior" things was his argument against solipsism. — Paine

That's definitely food for thought. Thanks :up:

Searle's tongue was in his cheek: whoever "disproves everybody else's solipsism" presupposes that s/he is not a solipsist. — 180 Proof

You are right. That remark is more complicated than it seems. It is true that to seek to disprove everybody else's solipsism is something that only a non-solipsist would want to do. That's why the addition that you can't disprove it to your self is such a surprise.
I can't tell whether he is trying to say that proof or disproof are not relevant to the argument. Everything that others might say can be interpreted in a way compatible with solipsism and vice versa for the non-solipsist. It's not helpful to see solipsism as a thesis or doctrine about the world. It is more like an interpretation (for lack of a better word) of it.

We should start by accepting that the solipsist has a point. That needs to be recognized, and understood. Then it may be possible to show how that point is being misinterpreted, But it is difficult to express the point clearly.
We need to recognize, alongside the recognition of other selves, the unique place in our worlds of our own selves. Put simply, I cannot experience other people's experience or perform other people's actions. There is a sense in which we cannot eat another person's food, or suffer another person's illness or live another person's life. The self - the meaning of "I" - has a uniquely complicated logic. Self-control, self-deception, unselfish action are all difficult issues. I have a unique place in my world, which is curiously close to having no place in it at all. We put too much emphasis on the truth that we are no different from anyone else and too little on the equally true point that we are also unique and not in virtue of the emprical differences (and similarities) between us.

There really is no way of knowing whether or not you are just a product of my imagination.. — ProtagoranSocratist

It depends on what you are paying attention to. As long as you are immersed in your dream, there is no way to understand that it is a dream. It is only after you wake up that you can appreciate a wider context, extract yourself from your immersion, and realize the wider world that shows that it was a dream.

For Kant, in his time, the statement that awareness of self required the existence of "exterior" things was his argument against solipsism. — Paine

That's one nail that he hits right on the head. I take it as pointing out that one can only grasp one's self by also grasping the not-self all around. The same applies to many (I nearly said "all") concepts. One can only understand what a table is if one understands what is not a table. However, the second half of that process is to understand the distinction between one table and the next. Similarly, awareness of self requires an understanding of what other selves are. (Here comes the specialness of "I" - there is no possibility of my mistaking someone else for myself. What I mean is the understanding that other people are also "I".) The tricky bit is understanding that the differences and similarities are not at all like understanding the difference between one table and the next. Neither table is me.

As you well know, Kant’s refutation concerns itself with the existence of things, but the OP asks about the existence of minds.

It seems that if you’re going to prove the existence of bodies in general from the apodeictic certainty of your own, you still have to prove, given that certainty, the existence of other minds, that is not mere inference.

Even if every human ever, already granted Kant’s argument by and for himself, perhaps without even knowing of its precedence, he still hasn’t proved it for any human not himself.

For Kant, in his time, the statement that awareness of self required the existence of "exterior" things was his argument against solipsism. — Paine

I’m not so sure the refutation of the established idealism of the day, is the refutation of solipsism itself. The proof for the consciousness of your self cannot follow from my proving the consciousness of my own.

Existence itself is misused with respect to minds anyway. Existence is a category, categories apply only to phenomena, mind is not and cannot be phenomena, so mind is not conditioned by existence. Or, mind in not that which exits, so trying to prove it does or doesn't exist, is unintelligible.

Seems to me, anyway.