I really want to respond to your interesting post, but I have to be out a lot of the day. I'll check in later . . .

It's worth mentioning here that I reject many an historical dichotomy when it comes to the ontological basis for my position; they're found sorely lacking in their ability to take proper account of that which consists of both and is thus neither one nor the other. Thought and belief are such things. Belief content matters. The inadequate dichotomies include subject/object, physical/nonphysical, material/immaterial, internal/external, objective/subjective, linguistic/nonlinguistic.

Convention has been employing these for centuries. If they were capable of taking adequate account of thought and belief, they would have done a better job by now.

Does it matter if we include some non-artifactual objects in the list of things that are existentially dependent upon language? I don't think so. We can add sand dunes and the like without changing your schema. — J

Not according to the position I argue for/from.

On my view, sand dunes are not existentially dependent upon language. "Sand dunes" is. Sand dunes are not equivalent to "sand dunes".

That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to language. Sand dunes existed in their entirety prior to language use. "Sand dunes" did not. Sand dunes consist of grains of sand. "Sand dunes" does not. "Sand dunes" consists of meaningful marks. Sand dunes do not. You can find "sand dunes" in some books/literature. You cannot find a sand dune in any book.

"Sand dunes" is existentially dependent upon language use. Sand dunes are not.

The human intention to see it as a dune -- because we have uses for which the term "sand dune" is needed -- can't be ignored. — J

If I may...

In the above quote, does the term "it" refer to a sand dune? I think it must, because we do not see the term "sand dune" as a dune.

Substitution results in the following:

"The human intention to see a sand dune as a dune --- because we have uses for which the term "sand dune" is needed --- can't be ignored"

While the manner of speaking/writing I'm critiquing seems innocuous to many. I do not find a need for it. I'd rather not equivocate the term "see", because our visual capacity plays an integral role in the formation of thought and belief. Some content of thought are things we see. This holds good regardless of whether or not we've developing naming and descriptive practices about those things.

We use language(naming and descriptive practices) to talk about, learn about, and think about sand dunes, including knowing what "sand dunes" picks out of this world. <-----On my view that's much better than 'seeing sand dunes as dunes'. We use our eyes to see sand dunes - before and after - naming and describing them.

That's the point I want to return to. How does the question of whether a belief concerns a) something that is existentially dependent on language, or b) something that is not so dependent, affect whether a non-linguistic animal can be said to have linguistic beliefs or not? — J

I'm not okay with saying language less animals have linguistic beliefs.

Do you simply mean that we ought to extend the normal meaning of "linguistic belief" so that it can also mean "A belief about something that is existentially dependent on language"?

No, that's not what I mean. I reject the dichotomy for the reasons already explained. In addition, the terms have baggage I'm not willing to carry or explain away as a result of not practicing the normal usage. I find it's much better for me to employ a different framework. As above, I'm not okay with saying that a language less animal is capable of having linguistic belief. I'm okay with saying that language less belief can consist of some things that are existentially dependent upon language(assuming a shared world of course).

Nice additions. I'd like to give your post the attention it deserves. That's my intent...

Manana!

Thanks for all this. I will give it thought.

puzzling out what the difference between language-accompanied and language-less thought is seems at the core of this thread. — Dawnstorm

I agree, that's central to a lot of what's been discussed on the thread.

As the referential piece of reality the human and the cat may have, under a theory of comparison, similar believes: compatible ones. Their tied together in a situation: both the human and the cat might like for the cat to catch the mouse. — Dawnstorm

But this already presumes a tentative answer to the question. I'm trying to inquire into something even more basic: Does a cat even have a belief? To sharpen the question: A cat has a desire, arguably even an intention, but can she have beliefs that accompany either desire or intention?

humans and cats have comparable "thoughts" — Dawnstorm

The scare-quotes around "thoughts" are meant to indicate, I presume, that a thought in this sense is not linguistic. You agree that some thoughts depend on language. So here we're talking about the other kind, the kind that don't. Since we know very little about this kind of thought in ourselves -- or I, at any rate, find it mysterious -- and nothing about this kind of thought in cats, we're speculating at this point. But my speculation is that you're right, there is something cognate in my (instantaneous, language-less) thought "Mouse!" when I see one, and the cat's thought. In such a case, the language?/non-language? division isn't so important, as you suggest. My "Mouse!" thought is not couched in terms of the word "mouse," though usually it's instantly followed or categorized by the word, since I'm a very language-oriented person. This doesn't happen for the cat, presumably.

the putative difference between a langauge-having and a language-less creature is mostly that a language-less creature cannot and does not have to think about language. — Dawnstorm

Here I would take issue. Yes, thinking about language is one of the things that a language-using creature can do, that a language-less creature can't. But the more central difference concerns language as symbol, as a potential designator of universals. A dog unquestionably understands how the sounds I make refer to his world, and what he's supposed to do about them. But I find it very unlikely that he understands what "toy" means. He knows what that sound means for him. But he doesn't see that the word "toy" could be uttered in any other context (unless I've taught him another association) and with any other purpose. He can't, quite literally, think about "toy," because "toy" doesn't exist for him as a symbol. Can he, in his doggish non-linguistic way, have an image of a toy, or a desire for one? I'm sure he can. But he doesn't know it's a toy!

Circling back to the question of beliefs, I would say this: We ought to keep an open mind. If you can illustrate what a non-linguistic belief would be like, perhaps I'll come around to believing (sorry!) that it's possible. It would of course involve a major reform of our current analyses of "belief," which emphasize that a belief requires an object of belief, and that one cannot set out a belief without language. But I'm game to try!

that it might be relevant that I grew up bilingually. — Dawnstorm

Yes! I'm sure that helped you recognize that what we do with words is quite arbitrary, in a way. We try to match them with the important stuff -- the concepts, the ideas, the perceptions, the events -- but which words we pick for the job aren't the point. Also, of course, that different languages emphasize different conceptual nuances. I'm always astonished, for instance, when intelligent Christians don't seem to care what New Testament Greek meant to its readers. They accept an English translation of, say, logos or agape, and build theological worlds on what they would have meant, had they been translated that way into English!

I'm trying to inquire into something even more basic: Does a cat even have a belief? — J

Ah, well, yes. I should have been more careful, I suppose. The problem here is that we might be having very differents of what a "belief" is. For example:

It would of course involve a major reform of our current analyses of "belief," which emphasize that a belief requires an object of belief, and that one cannot set out a belief without language. But I'm game to try! — J

I'll admit I'm on thin ice here. I never quite know what philosophers talk about when they talk about belief. I have two meanings present: one is a behavioural necessity: for the cat to want to catch that mouse over there she would have to believe there's a mouse over there. It's just activity and implicature. That seems too wide. And then there's the conscious commitment to some form of social meaning. This is mostly about belonging and individuation. This seems too narrow.

What you're interested in seems like I'd have to describe as some sort of interaction of the two concepts. I think the "propositional belief", if we were to call it that, is not a thing on its own.

And I'd probably agree a cat wouldn't have that, as the cat-human relevant shared context tends to be entirely located within the living-together context.

So:

Here I would take issue. Yes, thinking about language is one of the things that a language-using creature can do, that a language-less creature can't. But the more central difference concerns language as symbol, as a potential designator of universals. A dog unquestionably understands how the sounds I make refer to his world, and what he's supposed to do about them. But I find it very unlikely that he understands what "toy" means. He knows what that sound means for him. But he doesn't see that the word "toy" could be uttered in any other context (unless I've taught him another association) and with any other purpose. He can't, quite literally, think about "toy," because "toy" doesn't exist for him as a symbol. Can he, in his doggish non-linguistic way, have an image of a toy, or a desire for one? I'm sure he can. But he doesn't know it's a toy! — J

So what do humans do to themselves when they use words as designators for universals? That'd be the question here. A dog demonstrates what he understands a toy to be by playing with it, and so do humans. With humans, though, we also have the language layer, so that when we're thinking toy we're think non-active situations as far as they're present in our thought-habits. Dogs lack that. I agree.

I think we have a different scope in mind for "thinking about language". For example, a dog might play with his owner's shoe. For the dog in the moment, this is a toy, as demonstrated by the playing. But the activated guilt when the owner comes back shows that the dog knows he shouldn't have played with the shoe. A human can export these situationals into language: "a shoe is not a toy", so we can then, when we want to play, activate "toy" and auto-exclude "shoe". A dog can't. But you can train a dog not to play with shoes, and then we have a similar effect. And once that works, the concepts have aligned a little more.

That's not so different from how humans work when they interact with each other. When you internalise as a kid "this is not a toy", then you internalise two things: "don't play with this", and "play with toys(don't play with non-toys". That second layer is relevant, as - henceforth - you classify things into toys and non-toys so you can function socially. And you also grow emotionally attached to the concept of "toy" in some way: this is a toy, this isn't a toy - all's right with the world. Once you're secure in that you can handle exceptions.

Putting things into the categories play-with-this and don't-play-with-this is something a dog can do at the very least on a case-by-case basis, but there's probably some categorisation involved, too: you can teach your dog not to play with shoes (also future shoes you haven't bought yet), without going through all the possible ones. What changes when you have a word for "toy" is that it's practically always available as a category when you encounter something confusing. What is this? It's an "X".

For me it's an open question how much of these categories have to be accompanied by words to activate.

For example, when I go from the train station to work, I'll cross the street at a traffic light. However, there's an exit (relevant for buses, taxis, and a parking lot) that goes green at the same time my traffic light goes green for me. Cars have to take care not to hit pedestrians when they turn. This makes me nervous; I have cars coming from my back and swerving in. So my modus operandi is that I look at the traffic light for the cars on the main road (the one for the exit I can't see). There's a time when this is already red, but my traffic light (and presumably the one for the exit) isn't yet green. I usually start walking when the main-raod trafficlight goes red, but before the pedestrian traffic light becomes green. That way, I'm halfway across the road when the cars behind me start their engines. But there are exceptions: if I see cars still approaching on the main road, I don't walk. If I see mothers with small children on either side of the road, I don't walk. And so on. I make all these decisions without words. I just look. It's all thought habits. And I had terrible trouble even trying to describe this now (and I'm not even sure if I was remotely successful).

Traffic lights are non-linguistic signals. The rules of traffic are something I have learned, and needn't go through. And so on. And more imporantly, I'm usually thinking of other stuff (I might, for example, formulate a version of a post like this in my mind, so that'd be what my linguistic faculty would be busy with). It's not that relevant language never occurs, but it's fragmented and less coherent than what's expressed in me just acting.

In terms of behavioural implicature, you could say that I believe "green means go", even though I never think this. At some point in my life, I'll certainly have words to that effect. But that's just one aspect of the training that went into the belief.

I can, obviously, put into words what I blief. But I can also put into words what a dog or a cat believes. What I think is that it's all approximations, and I'll probably get closer for myself than for another person of the same culture, and then we have different cultures, different species... at some point I might discern no believes at all. What does a plant or a bacterium believe? Huh.

The problem is that language doesn't just go into describing believes: language goes partly into forming believes (for creatures that have language). Language, when it comes to thought, comes with its efficiencies and dangers. But it's plausible to me that language makes difference.

What difference, though? And how much? (And what does "how much" mean here, given that it's not immediately obvious we can quantify this.) My intuitive hunch is that we overestimate the importance of language. For example:

But I find it very unlikely that he understands what "toy" means. — J

Do we? That there's a meta-level the dog doesn't follow us onto seem plausible to me, but beyond that? Given that we can train a dog not to play with shoes, what about "toy" transcends this? It's not an easy question.

If you can illustrate what a non-linguistic belief would be like, perhaps I'll come around to believing (sorry!) that it's possible. — J

I'm not sure I'm up to it. What do you make of the traffic light example? You need to understand that the assumption that belief always has linguistic components is not intuitive to me, and I don't quite understand what it is that want me to illustrate. For me, figuring out what I believe is a matter of saying something like "I did that so I must believe X". Words are two unreliable. If I read something I wrote some time ago I might no longer know what I wanted to say, and I might be equally in need of interpretation than a non-originator. Even if I voice a thought, there's always a slight sense of unease as if these words are insufficient. In this thread, too. I'm never quite sure what I'm saying; I know better what I think. But especially on a message board I can't get across what I think without saying something. (In person I often substitute showing, demonstrating, etc. for speech. People often wonder why I don't just say what I mean. I often don't know how. What I can say approximates what I think, but might also change what I think via the desire to "own my words" - I must align my thought with what I said. That's a common struggle.)

Belief (in the present context), to me, means something like "working assumption" - nothing more.

A cat has a desire, arguably even an intention, but can she have beliefs that accompany either desire or intention? — J

What would be an example of a belief that you wonder if a cat might have?

:up:

Some thought, I do think, relies on language, as language supplies a retrievable label that stands in for a sub routine. If there isn't a word for something, we can still talk about it but it takes longer. If there's a word for it, we just say one word, but mean the same thing (wasting less time). And that process is iterative. "Hm, what do we call this reverse track ball? Kinda looks like a mouse, doesn't it?". There's grammatical crossreference that's quite common: the verb to marry, its participle form "married" ending up ambiguous between verbal and adjectival usage (an ambiguity striking in the analysis of passive voice...) — Dawnstorm

It seems to me that "Some thought relies on language" is undeniable. The content of some language less thought relies on language as well. Hence, such language less thought relies on language.

Cross referencing is a complex manner of drawing correlating/associating/connecting different things. As is naming. I'm curious if you'd agree with that?

What I'm ending up with in the current conversation is the question of what even is a "language-less creature"? — Dawnstorm

That's a great question. Thank you for asking it! A language less creature is one that has never drawn correlations/associations between language use and other things. In this discussion, I'm speaking a bit loosely as "language less creatures" are meant to denote those that do not draw correlations between our language use and other things.

Now, strictly speaking(and part of why I liked the question so much), if we were to begin talking about potential language use of creatures other than humans, I would definitely argue in the affirmative for the idea that some animals use language amongst themselves. Such language also consists of correlations/associations drawn between different things. While that language is starkly different than ours in many ways(all involving the complexity of the correlations and their consequences), it is also strikingly similar enough in its basic elemental constituency(what makes it a language) to ours.

One key point is that the candidates using language do so in precisely the same basic way that we do; language emergence/use by virtue of a plurality of individuals drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations between the use(basic ostension/sounding of alarm/calling/warning all come immediately to mind) and other things.

With respect to thought language is some kind of mental activity. And it seems clear to me that there isn't a clear-cut distinction between humans and other animals to be found. At some point we arrive at complexity we don't see in other creatures, sure. But the basics seem to cut across species.

Indeed. The basics do seem to cut across capable creatures, which makes perfect evolutionary sense. It's the complexities that distinguish us and our thought/belief/language from other animals.

Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic...

I find that this quandary undermines itself. My attitude/disposition about the suggestion required first reading the suggestion. Hence, clearly not before it. I believe that the suggestion is not true. Your attitude/disposition about the possibility first required articulating the possibility. Again, clearly not before language, assuming you believe it to be true.

I would readily agree that prelinguistic beliefs are sometimes formed by creatures prior to their capabilities for language acquisition. I have argued that language is impossible without prelinguistic beliefs. Unlike what you've suggested may be the case, it seems to me that belief begins prior to language acquisition and continue afterwards.

...they might be about things that couldn't exist if we didn't trick our limited attention spans with shortcuts, and then embed those shortcuts in thoughts that again get short-cutted, until we've got a thought-habit no longer reliant on the original thought process. In other words, we can switch on the light without knowing how to fix the circuits in the wall should they break.

Here the difference between animals and humans seems to break down: it's not so much about being "language-less". It's about not being an expert in the origin and nature of the generative concept. I'd argue it's more about result-based perception vs. process-based perception.

I don't see how the last statement follows from what preceded it. Although, I agree that there's a difference between result based thought/belief and process based, I would argue that it's not a difference in kind, but rather it's a difference in the complexity level necessary for forming/having it. All result-based thought/belief is process based. Furthermore, it seems to me that avoiding danger and gathering resources is results based. So, I do not see the value in the distinction here.

I could be being swayed by all the baggage that comes with the notion of "perception" as well. I've yet to have witnessed an acceptable sense of "perception" other than when it picks out the autonomous abilities sometimes called "sense perception". (Physiological sensory)"perception" is much better used, on my view, to talk about the autonomous biological structures that are necessary preconditions for drawing certain kinds of correlations/associations between specific things as compared/contrasted to being used to pick out the correlations/associations themselves, which conflates necessary biological preconditions for thought/belief with thought/belief.

"Seeing an ant hill as an ant hill" is guilty of the latter. "That's how s/he/they perceive the situation, but I perceive it differently" is another.

Of course, this is what makes sense to me, given what I hold to be true about thought and belief. I'm certain that I'm missing something. I'm not certain that what's missing matters, but I'm certainly not beyond reproach.

I'm addressing the rest in a separate post. Thanks again for the interesting additions!

A cat can think/believe that a mouse is on the mat. The content of the cat's thought/belief includes the mouse(which is not existentially dependent upon language) and the mat(which is).
— creativesoul

To what degree does the "mat" feature? There are other questions: to what degree is the "mouse" a mouse? Is there a sequence of: movement over there; focus attention; prey; plan: pounce. Now? Now? Now? Now! — Dawnstorm

I don't know if I understand the first question, but I think you're asking something along the lines of how meaningful the mat is to the cat. That would all depend upon the sheer number of correlations that the mat had been a previous part of in the cat's thought, in addition to the content other than the mat. That's generally the case for all 'degrees' of meaningfulness, on my view. If you meant something else, perhaps you could rephrase the question?

I do not understand the second question at all. A mouse is a mouse. One hundred percent. If you're asking me whether or not the cat sees the mouse as a mouse, I'd defer to my last post which briefly discusses such manners of speaking, and ask if it is possible for a cat to look at a mouse and see something else?

I'm sure there's movement involved(part of the correlational content), physiological sensory perception is necessary, the autonomous drive to eat(hunger pangs could very well be part of the correlation content), possibly previous experiences with hunting mice, etc. that all play a potential role in the current correlational content. I'm not at all keen or fond of the idea that we can read non-human animals' mind with any amount of well-grounded accuracy or precision. We, generally speaking, have a difficult enough time reading the minds of other humans, unless we know them very well. To the contrary, I think we can only provide a well-grounded basic outline for all cases. There are some cases, depending upon specific circumstances that garner a narrower scope of greater detail, but it is on a case-by-case basis.

Some ducks used to have me as their source of food and water. They definitely drew correlations between me and getting fed and/or watered. Did they believe they were about to be fed when I opened the sliding glass doors at the downstairs portion of the back of the house? I think they did based upon all the past correlations. They exhibited behaviours unique to eating. Did they believe they were about to be fed after hearing the food container lid being opened and/or the rustling of the synthetic fabric just before the sound of the plastic food dispenser being plunged into the food? Seems to me that they did. They'd come from everywhere within earshot and exhibit the aforementioned eating behaviours.

I know that they learned how to get fed when they were hungry. They would approach me, come very close, sometimes nipping at my basketball shorts, and exhibit all the feeding behaviours. By my lights, if they drew connections between their own behaviour(approaching me with open mouths) and me getting them food, then that would count as shared meaning between them and myself. A plurality of creatures drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations/associations between the same things. They were telling me they wanted to eat.

What's important here is that the overlap between worldviews seems stronger when it comes to "mouse", then when it comes to "mat". Or not. Maybe the mat is the place where it's not cold in winter, so there's a sense of "territory" in the situational background that the human lacks specifically for the mat, as it's relevant for the entirety of the house? — Dawnstorm

All sounds fine with me.

As the above paragraphs show, I think that humans and cats have comparable "thoughts". Language isn't irrelevant, but it's not where I would draw the line (given relevance to thought). — Dawnstorm

All looks fine here as well. Hopefully "the line" is a bit better understood after the past couple posts.

I'd say result-based concepts are thing we interact with, but are largely ignorant about and thus don't think of as processes. The light-switch is a thing I use. I have limited process-awareness of it, compared to the electrician who fixes the circuit when the switch doesn't work. The light switch is a thing that works or doesn't. I'd say that's pretty much the relationship between the cat and the mat (except that it might serve less of a function in the current activity).

I see language as an activity, much like switching on the light (but much more complex). It's related to thought, because usually when we utter a sentence we mean something by it. It is possible, though, to utter a sentence in a language we don't understand, maybe focusing on the aspect of getting the pronunciation right. It's hard to get foreign pronunciations right because of acquired speech habits. That is: language itself isn't only a possible tool for thought, it also always a target of thought (we monitor for mistakes, for example).

So the putative difference between a langauge-having and a language-less creature is mostly that a language-less creature cannot and does not have to think about language. But puzzling out what the difference between language-accompanied and language-less thought is seems at the core of this thread.

It occurred to me, while reading the current discussion, that it might be relevant that I grew up bilingually. I grew up in Austria, with my mum being Austrian and my dad being Croatian (which would have been "Yugoslavian" when I was a kid). I'd almost exclusively talk German, even when spoken to in Croation by my dad. Maybe that's why I never associated words and thoughts quite as closely as others, and in turn why I also don't think language is quite as important a creature feature during species distinction. Maybe? (Just an aside.)

Sure. I've no problem with this.

:smile:

What would be an example of a belief that you wonder if a cat might have? — Patterner

The one @Dawnstorm offered would be a good example:

for the cat to want to catch that mouse over there she would have to believe there's a mouse over there. — Dawnstorm

And see my somewhat chagrined response below!

This is persuasive. You've done what I asked, which was to paint a convincing picture of how we might think about, and use, the concept of a non-linguistic belief. You've helped me realize that what I called "our current analyses of belief" don't have to commandeer the conversation simply because a robust philosophical tradition -- analytic/language philosophy -- has adopted these analyses. This is ironic, because I'm the one who so often warns against being beguiled by a certain word or term, and believing we can find the Correct Definition.

So: I would still say that propositional or linguistic or "belief that" beliefs are probably not accessible to most non-human animals. The interesting discussion instead focuses on the other kind, about which I was skeptical but now see as a legitimate way of thinking about what a belief is. What should we understand, and say, about the cat's beliefs concerning the mouse, or about your own beliefs concerning the traffic-light situation?

I make all these decisions without words. I just look. It's all thought habits. — Dawnstorm

Yes. What you describe (very well) is similar to the idea of background beliefs, which have always given trouble to the analysis of belief as a mental event. But in your case, the necessary beliefs you hold in order to act as you do are not exactly "in the background"; they come into play in this actual situation, and are probably mental events. This contrasts with "I believe the Earth revolves around the Sun" as a background belief, which is merely available to the mind.

In terms of behavioural implicature, you could say that I believe "green means go", even though I never think this. — Dawnstorm

Again, this could be understood as a background belief, one which you hold at all times. But the traffic-light situation is a little different. When preparing to cross, you don't think "green means go" in words, but aren't you proposing that the belief is activated and present for you, as your behavior demonstrates? I want to say that therefore you do think it, in the same way the cat thinks that the mouse is present. So I'm agreeing with you about non-linguistic beliefs but going even further.

But what exactly is "the same way"? What actually happens in the cat's mind, in your mind? The only clue I have is a common experience (for me) that I've alluded to earlier in this thread (I think). I am often aware that I've formed a thought or an idea much more quickly than I could form the corresponding language, assuming there is any. I then backtrack, as it were, and "say it to myself" (often, as you point out, having trouble finding the right words). So I'm claiming to have had an extremely rapid thought that is non-linguistic yet contentful, something to which words can then be put. Is this how the cat thinks? She can't find the words, of course, but she may very well think in this same rapid manner. I would add that it's not a matter of thinking in images either, thought that sometimes happens. The non-verbal thought I'm trying to describe is also non-visual or non-imagistic.

Now to claim all this is to explain nothing. But it leads me to agree that we shouldn't insist on narrowing "belief" to its linguistic uses. We can corral such uses into a pen and call them Beliefs1 or whatever, and go on to say very interesting and significant things about how they work. The challenge is to better understand what we can say, philosophically, about the other kind(s).

It seems to me that "Some thought relies on language" is undeniable. The content of some language less thought relies on language as well. Hence, such language less thought relies on language.

Cross referencing is a complex manner of drawing correlating/associating/connecting different things. As is naming. I'm curious if you'd agree with that? — creativesoul

This sounds mostly fine. The thing is I don't have a clear grasp on what that means, so I can't sign this just yet. We have differences in, I think, terminology that I'll adress further down this post.

But I'm cautiously agreeing here. (What I'm slightly worried about is whether you would agree with my reasons for agreeing with this... It gets complicated. You'll see later.)

I find that this quandary undermines itself. My attitude/disposition about the suggestion required first reading the suggestion. Hence, clearly not before it. I believe that the suggestion is not true. Your attitude/disposition about the possibility first required articulating the possibility. Again, clearly not before language, assuming you believe it to be true. — creativesoul

Yes, this happens when I got lost in my inner "quicksand" (to get the reference, refer to the David Bowie song of the same name). I over-extend myself. There are clearly beliefs that are impossible without language. I'll single this line out:

"Your attitude/disposition about the possibility first required articulating the possibility."

Unsure. I'm fairly sure that it's at least possible that that formulating some beliefs is what brings to your attention what you've implicitly believed so far. That is: sometimes formulating a belief is raising it from background to foreground status, and forgrounded beliefs are perceived more at risk. People might think they formed a belief, but really what happened is that - for the first time - they have cause to defend it. A conscious belief has entered the social arena, so to speak, and needs to be defended or modified or even abandoned.

Basically, the "possibility" needn't be articulated to act on it without a hiccup in social situations, and it's the hiccup in the social situation that causes you to formulate your belief. An attitude about a possibility is often part of the unacknowledged social praxis. We formulate possibilities to the degree that our beliefs have become problematic. We act on them without formulating them all the time. For example, all native speakers of English "know" that English is a "nominative-accusative language", in the sense that they use it like that without trouble. But among native speakers of English, you rarely need to formulate this: linguists are one systematic example. They know, too, that one alternative is the "ergative-absolutive language", and they can talk about the difference. A native speaker of English might have trouble understanding what's going on while learning, say, Basque. You now need to go back and formulate what you've always been instinctively doing, so you can then get back at the difference. But you certainly don't need to be able to explain the difference (or even know it exists) to speak English.

We're seeing the same mismatch currently around the gender topic, I think.

I don't see how the last statement follows from what preceded it. Although, I agree that there's a difference between result based thought/belief and process based, I would argue that it's not a difference in kind, but rather it's a difference in the complexity level necessary for forming/having it. All result-based thought/belief is process based. Furthermore, it seems to me that avoiding danger and gathering resources is results based. So, I do not see the value in the distinction here. — creativesoul

Yes, I'm on shaky ground here. I'm not at all confident about the distinction. However, I also think I might think in a different direction than you do, here. When it comes to ongoing thoughts, a process would provide something like an ongoing stream, a frame for the situation. And a result is something that was likely a frame in some other situation but not the present one with this precise ongoing thought.

Unsure, though. Not sure if this even makes sense. I need to think more on this (and I mean beyond the scope of this conversation; ask me again in a few years, and if I don't remember the distinction I didn't find it useful).

I'll skip a lot mostly because of a time limit, but this seems promising, as this seems to be where our perspectives mainly differ:

I don't know if I understand the first question, but I think you're asking something along the lines of how meaningful the mat is to the cat. That would all depend upon the sheer number of correlations that the mat had been a previous part of in the cat's thought, in addition to the content other than the mat. That's generally the case for all 'degrees' of meaningfulness, on my view. If you meant something else, perhaps you could rephrase the question?

I do not understand the second question at all. A mouse is a mouse. One hundred percent. If you're asking me whether or not the cat sees the mouse as a mouse, I'd defer to my last post which briefly discusses such manners of speaking, and ask if it is possible for a cat to look at a mouse and see something else? — creativesoul

When I think of a thought, I think of what's currently present in the mind and how it presents itself to the "thinker" in question. So, yes, it's about "how meaningful the mat is to the cat," but not only as a generalised object, also how relevant it is in the current situation. What about the mat is represented in the cat, so to speak, and what about the situation draws the attention to the mat. It is entirely possible that whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat-in-general is entirely in the background for the present situation. To believe that "the mouse is on the mat" is to draw a connection between the mat and the mouse that may be entirely a potential. The cat *can* have such a belief, but currently doesn't.

But here we stand perpendicular to the situation: whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat is not automatically the same as whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-human, though I expect there to be sufficient overlap for comparison.

Now, I think that we might - methodologically - assume a "hunting situation" that we assume we both understand. What then is the minimal overlap we'd expect, what are the opportunities for misunderstanding. The question about the mat then becomes to what degree does the cat have cause to form believes about what the human thinks of as a mat, in this very situation. This goes beyond the situation down to the bits of the cat's world-view that's inaccessible to us, but it always has the hunting situation at its core.

In short, we methodically assume a commonality, so that we don't have to assume commonalities outside of that context (hunting). But that also means we must attempt to scale back what we take for granted about mice and mats - and often the result of that is more a discovery about how we view the world than it is about how the cat views the world.

It's a methodology of controlled estrangement, if you will. The cat will not see anything but a mouse, in the sense that the mouse is there. But the mouse's mouse-ness is called into question - methodologically - by not assuming more commonalities than we must (and we must assume some commonalities, if we are to think at all).

So how to mats and mice correlate here? We can question mats, and we can question mice, and that's comparatively easier to questioning "mats and mice" at the same time. This assumes that there's no particular way any one individual (whether human or feline) might see anything else, though there's probably a set of restrictions of what's possible on the side of what becomes a mouse or a mat when presented to a consciousness.

I'd understand if this is hard going. You said earlier, you don't accept phenomenology (or something to that effect?), and this is definitely somewhat in the vicinity of Husserl, though viewed through the lense of sociology (say Alfred Schütz, or even Helmut Plessner). It's probably fine to drop that angle, if it gets in the way. But it'd be good to bear in mind the difference (if there be one), as I can't excise the influence easily, and it'll come up from time to time.

On the whole, we don't seem so far apart?

Hopefully "the line" is a bit better understood after the past couple posts. — creativesoul

Maybe. I'll know when the dust has settled (I tend to tire myself out.)

When preparing to cross, you don't think "green means go" in words, but aren't you proposing that the belief is activated and present for you, as your behavior demonstrates? — J

Yes, that's the gist of it.

I didn't actually think of "background beliefs" here. I'm not educated enough in philosophy to have that term at the fore of my mind, so I didn't consider that this could interfer (I've heard of those "background beliefs" before, but they're not likely to bubble up into my active consciousness.)

When I was talking about foreground vs. background here, I was thinking more about what's already active in the situation. We're talking about language and thought here: langauge-thought commands attention; that's why I think of it as the foreground. The trafficlight example just demands enough attention so that I don't miss danger. It's active, but background to whatever goes on in the foreground (that might be a book I've read on the train, or a problem I expect to face at work, etc.). If I were to witness an accident, I'd certainly have some of that bumped up to foreground, with a likely lasting effect on future backgrounds (i.e. I might be more cautious for a while, until routine reasserts itself).

That sort of foreground-background analysis is not something I'd dare do for a cat, now that I think of it. Maybe one of the functions of language is to facilitate a foreground? This something I actually haven't thought of before. If there's something to this, how would I handle it?

What would be an example of a belief that you wonder if a cat might have?
— Patterner

The one Dawnstorm offered would be a good example:

for the cat to want to catch that mouse over there she would have to believe there's a mouse over there.
— Dawnstorm — J

I don't know about this. When you play with little kittens who have never seen a mouse, have never hunted for anything, and never been threatened because they were born in your closet a couple months ago, they have the instincts. It's so adorable when you play with them and they play with each other, but what they're doing is practicing hunting, killing, and ripping thing apart. I wonder if, as they get older, and put this stuff to actual use, it clicks in their head. "Oh! That's why I've been doing that! Now I see that little thing over there, and I know what to do with it.". from then on, do they do it with the belief that there's a mouse somewhere around the corner or in the wall? Or do they just do what they were instinctually doing all along, they just have more practice now?

All good questions. I agree that the instinctual practice precedes any actual mice. And the story you're telling seems plausible: At a certain point, a cat "gets it" and discovers a purpose for all that kitteny stuff. When that happens, when a mouse appears, what does the cat believe? As you say, the behaviors she's practiced are always available; she doesn't have to rethink them, or give them any thought at all. But when she stalks a mouse, waiting patiently outside its mouse-hole, I think she does have a belief of sorts. In other words, she's not just along for the ride: "Oh, how interesting what my body is doing now!" Her mind, harboring the beliefs it does, can control her body towards a purpose. At any rate, if you grant her an intention or purpose -- to catch the mouse -- then a (non-linguistic) belief doesn't seem such a stretch.

I think I'm not sure about the word belief in this context. I don't think I believe there's a television in my living room. It's a fact that there's a tv in the living room. What's the difference between belief and certainty of facts?

If I go in and the tv isn't there - that is, there isn't a tv in the living room...? Was it only a belief? Is that what being mistaken of the facts is?

When you play with little kittens who have never seen a mouse, have never hunted for anything, and never been threatened because they were born in your closet a couple months ago, they have the instincts. — Patterner

When I did a unit in cog sci we were told of an experiment where kittens were brought up in an environment where all the obstacles were vertical. They became adept at navigating them, but when after some period of time horizontal obstacles were introduced they would run into them, until they were able to assimilate the new information. I'm hazy on the details (it was a long time ago) but googling it, it was the Blakemore and Cooper experiments.

The challenge is to better understand what we can say, philosophically, about the other kind(s). — J

Indeed, it is. I've found that this particular pursuit can challenge one's basic ontological underpinnings in unfamiliar ways that can result in cognitive dissonance.

Methodological approach seems key here. I'm thinking that there are a few things we need to carefully consider, in addition to any inevitable consequences. This basics of this pursuit are incommensurate with many conventional positions. That explains the broadly held denial of language less creatures' having thought or belief, on pains of coherency alone.

All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief.<----That seems like an undeniable basic tenet.

Would you agree?

We have differences in, I think, terminology... — Dawnstorm

Yes, we certainly do. I think that those differences could be causal in nature in a certain sense similar to what the OP has been talking about. All of us share the pursuit to remain consistent in our respective positions. Hence, the differences themselves cause us to think a bit differently as a result.

What is interesting to me is that we share the same target. The thought and/or belief of non-human creatures. The key, it seems to me, is understanding what that target consists of.

I'll address your response sometime tomorrow. Looks promising to me in many ways. :smile:

it's a fascinating topic. I find it mind blowing that DNA doesn't determine every detail, but allows for as much variability in response to circumstances as it does.

Right! The role of epigenetics.

I don't think I believe there's a television in my living room. It's a fact that there's a tv in the living room. What's the difference between belief and certainty of facts? — Patterner

One reply would be: "Oh, so you don't believe there's a TV in your living room?" But I think your point is rather that belief doesn't enter into it at all.

If I go in and the tv isn't there - that is, there isn't a tv in the living room...? Was it only a belief? Is that what being mistaken of the facts is? — Patterner

Sort of, yes. "There is a TV in the living room" doesn't assert the same thing as "I believe there's a TV in the living room." The first statement can be false while the second remains true. But . . . if you assert both statements, then, conventionally, they do mean the same thing; they both express something you claim to be true. This isn't really mysterious, just a matter of equivocal usages.

All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief.<----That seems like an undeniable basic tenet.

Would you agree? — creativesoul

Long answer: We'd need to be sure we're on the same page about what "meaningful" is supposed to represent. Short answer: But yes, probably.

But I think your point is rather that belief doesn't enter into it at all. — J

Right. I'm not stating, or even thinking of, it as a belief. But is that what it is? Even if it amounts to the same thing, is it actually the same thing?