There's a through-line, so to speak. I've acquired a textbook on Husserl (David Bell) but haven't made a lot of headway with it. But Husserl's noesis and noema surely has Platonist roots. Kant adopted and modified both Plato and Aristotle, and Husserl adopted and modified Kant.

If order is posited as basic, it suggests a universal intelligence or God. — Janus

I suppose it's inevitable to see it in those terms. But bear in mind, there is another Axial-age term which has very similar functions, namely 'dharma'. Both logos and dharma refer to:

• the intrinsic order of reality
• the principle that makes the cosmos intelligible
• the way things ought to unfold, not merely how they do

In other words, each is at once descriptive and normative.

Logos (Heraclitus, the Stoics, Middle Platonism) is the rational structure, the measure, the reason, the intelligible order pervading nature.

Dharma is the law, the ordering principle, the truth of things — ranging from cosmic law to ethical duty to the basic structure of experience itself.

Both serve as the intelligible pattern through which beings have their roles and right relations.

But dharma is associated with non-theistic religions (Buddhism and Jaina). A big cultural factor is the absorption of Greek philosophy into Biblical theology and the subsequent identification of 'logos' with 'the word of God' or simply 'the Bible'. So it all tends to be rejected together with religion.

A big cultural factor is the absorption of Greek philosophy into Biblical theology and the subsequent identification of 'logos' with 'the word of God' or simply 'the Bible'. — Wayfarer

The Christian Logos isn't the Bible. It's Jesus.

I stand corrected but the basic point remains - the re-interpretation of the Greek 'logos' in theological terminology.

I stand corrected but the basic point remains - the re-interpretation of the Greek 'logos' in theological terminology. — Wayfarer

The stoics thought of the logos as a kind of divinity. I don't think it was a re-interpretation.

It is in Heraclitus that the theory of the Logos appears for the first time, and it is doubtless for this reason that, first among the Greek philosophers, Heraclitus was regarded by St. Justin (Apol. I, 46) as a Christian before Christ. For him the Logos, which he seems to identify with fire, is that universal principle which animates and rules the world. This conception could only find place in a materialistic monism. The philosophers of the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ were dualists, and conceived of God as transcendent, so that neither in Plato (whatever may have been said on the subject) nor in Aristotle do we find the theory of the Logos.

It reappears in the writings of the Stoics, and it is especially by them that this theory is developed. God, according to them, "did not make the world as an artisan does his work, but it is by wholly penetrating all matter that He is the demiurge of the universe" (Galen, "De qual. incorp." in "Fr. Stoic.", ed. von Arnim, II, 6); He penetrates the world "as honey does the honeycomb" (Tertullian, "Adv. Hermogenem", 44), this God so intimately mingled with the world is fire or ignited air; inasmuch as He is the principle controlling the universe, He is called Logos; and inasmuch as He is the germ from which all else develops, He is called the seminal Logos (logos spermatikos). This Logos is at the same time a force and a law, an irresistible force which bears along the entire world and all creatures to a common end, an inevitable and holy law from which nothing can withdraw itself, and which every reasonable man should follow willingly (Cleanthus, "Hymn to Zeus" in "Fr. Stoic." I, 527-cf. 537). Conformably to their exegetical habits, the Stoics made of the different gods personifications of the Logos, e.g. of Zeus and above all of Hermes. — New Advent Encylopedia

I've always liked that passage and its metaphors.

I've always liked that passage and its metaphors. — Wayfarer

Yes. It's a nice passage.

I suppose it's inevitable to see it in those terms. But bear in mind, there is another Axial-age term which has very similar functions, namely 'dharma'. Both logos and dharma refer to:
the intrinsic order of reality
the principle that makes the cosmos intelligible
the way things ought to unfold, not merely how they do
In other words, each is at once descriptive and normative. — Wayfarer

Yes, I'm familiar with those ideas. the Dao is another one. There are of course some commonalities given that all three were conceived of as eternal universal principles governing how things are and how they become, how they change.

So they are also understood as principles of intelligibility, and indeed, prior to modern science they were the only way that observed invariances could be understood. And, as you note, they were also normative, insofar as living in accordance with them was understood to be the way of harmony, while failing to live according to them was seen as the way of discord and strife.

We know they are ideas, and quite beautiful ideas at that, but we don't know if there is anything in nature that corresponds with them, whether they are anything more than human ideas. The picture science gives us of the evolution of the Universe suggests that the laws of nature have evolved as Peirce believed.

Is there any law at all that is absolutely fundamental to nature from the very beginning? The conservation laws: conservation of energy, mass, linear and angular momentum and electric charge as well as the second law of thermodynamics as well as the laws of logic and mathematics may be candidates. But again, we cannot be absolutely certain.

Much of philosophy seems to be a desperate scramble for foundational justifications that will 'beat' the other guy’s argument. The best one, of course, being God. If we can say a position we hold is part of God’s nature or the natural order of a designed universe, then we ‘win’ the argument (assuming winning means anything). — Tom Storm

I guess it depends on whether winning an argument or coming closer to what seems most likely to be the truth is the motivating desire. We can never be certain of the truth, so ideally we all should believe what seems most plausible to us, given that we have begun our inquiry with an open mind, or at least endeavored to do so to the best of our ability. That is what I admire about the scientific spirit. Even if we all achieved that impartiality it still wouldn't mean we will all agree, because plausibility is not something strictly determinable, just as beauty is not.

Historically in most mythologies around the world Chaos (Nun,Tiamat, etc) seem to have came before order (Logos, Maat, dharma etc).

As sedentary civilisations and writing gradually became the norm, Chaos starts to disappear in these mythologies and notions of order become more primary.

The most straightforward explanation for that historical evolution seems to me simply that ideologies evolved in tandem with changes in the societal organisation, from oral nomadic groups based around movement to the more static hierarchical organisation of civilisations.

For those interested I got this from Thomas Nail who is writing a book on the subject:

As I understand it, this objection misunderstands the claim. Saying "truth claims are always context-dependent" is a way of describing how claims function within particular social, historical, and conceptual contexts. This description is itself situated and arises from those contexts. I'm, nto sure there's a contradiction in making this statement because it does not claim to exist outside or above context. The objection only seems persuasive if one assumes that all claims must be judged from a perspective beyond any context, but anti-foundationalism does not make that assumption. — Tom Storm

But you're failing to address the objection. It can be set out inferentially:

1. If <Truth claims are always context dependent> then <Every truth claim, in every context, is context dependent>
2. "Every X, in every context, is Y," is a claim that is not context dependent
3. Therefore, <Truth claims are always context dependent> entails that there is a truth claim that is not context dependent

Your response is to try to tidy up Y, but the nature of Y is irrelevant to the objection. Again, it is the word "always" that causes you to contradict yourself. If "always" involves "every context" then you are contradicting yourself, regardless of what X and Y are.

(You are attempting to exempt yourself from your own rule, hence the self-contradiction. In effect you are saying, "No one can make claims of this sort, except for me.")

Another way to put it:

1. X is always Y
2. Therefore, every X, in every context, is Y
3. Therefore, the truth of (1) is not context dependent

The person who utters (1) is committed to at least one truth which is not context dependent.

---

I agree with you that if the relativist-postmodernist is treating their assertion that “truth claims are always context dependent” as itself a truth claim, then they are attempting to achieve a view from nowhere. — Joshs

Good, but note that my argument says nothing about a so-called "view from nowhere." The reductio does not arrive at, "there is a view from nowhere." It arrives at, "there is a truth claim that is not context dependent."

It seems clear to me that "learned" relativists still contradict themselves, they just do it with a bit more style and rhetoric. That @Tom Storm lacks the style and rhetoric to contradict himself more persuasively is not at all a bad thing. For example:

Enaction is speculative and experimental, not assertoric. — Joshs

Sorry, but this makes no sense. It is an attempt to have one's cake and eat it too. You are basically trying to assert without asserting, and then call this "enacting." One can have all the experiences they like, but the assertion of a predication is the assertion of a predication, whether or not it is believed to be based on those experiences. "Truth claims are always context dependent," is an assertion. Style, rhetoric, and neologisms don't change this.

When I then express this to you, I am reporting gmy experience as it renews itself moment to moment and extending an invitation to you to experience something similar. — Joshs

You are equivocating between experience and assertion. We could construe an assertion as, "Reporting my experience and extending an invitation to you to experience something similar," or the "foundationalist" could simply take your equivocations into his own mouth and respond to your objection with similar fiat, to the effect that he is "enacting" and not "asserting," so there is no problem to begin with.

The attempt to pretend that, "Truth claims are always context dependent," is not itself a truth claim does not even rise to the level of plausibility.

---

No, they are merely noting that no one has ever produced a context-independent truth claim. And that noting is itself not context-independent because it is made in relation to and within the context of human experience, language and judgement. — Janus

If that is all they are doing then their argument is invalid:

1. No one has ever produced a truth claim that is context-independent
2. Therefore, truth claims are always context dependent

This is the same fallacy that you make regarding issues such as slavery. Even if we grant that you have never seen a black swan, or even that there have never been any black swans in the past, your conclusion still does not follow.

(Bound up in this is the incoherence of induction within a Humean/modern epistemology.)

Good, but note that my argument says nothing about a so-called "view from nowhere." The reductio does not arrive at, "there is a view from nowhere." It arrives at, "there is a truth claim that is not context dependent." — Leontiskos

How does "there is a truth claim that is not context dependent” not imply a view from nowhere, or sideways-on, or God’s-eye?

Enaction is speculative and experimental, not assertoric.
— Joshs

Sorry, but this makes no sense. It is an attempt to have one's cake and eat it too. You are basically trying to assert without asserting, and then call this "enacting." One can have all the experiences they like, but the assertion of a predication is the assertion of a predication, whether or not it is believed to be based on those experiences. "Truth claims are always context dependent," is an assertion. Style, rhetoric, and neologisms don't change this… The attempt to pretend that, "Truth claims are always context dependent," is not itself a truth claim does not even rise to the level of plausibility. — Leontiskos

I already agree with you that "Truth claims are always context dependent”’takes itself as a predicative assertion. The key word here is ‘always’, because it makes a claim to generality or universality. You see enaction as equivalent to predicative assertion. A relativist sees what you see ( a statement of generality) but sees something else there too, something that particularizes the general and predicative in such a way that they notice what the statement is doing right now. Whenever they encounter what would conventionally be called a general statement, claim or assertion, they cannot help but notice a new ‘how’; how the statement is working right now, in this immediate context. The particularizing ‘how’ isn’t added onto to something called generality, it defines anew what it means to be something like ‘general’, categorical or objective.

You are equivocating between experience and assertion. We could construe an assertion as, "Reporting my experience and extending an invitation to you to experience something similar," or the "foundationalist" could simply take your equivocations into his own mouth and respond to your objection with similar fiat, to the effect that he is "enacting" and not "asserting," so there is no problem to begin with. — Leontiskos

I am making a distinction which is invisible to you, probably similar to the distinction between ‘continuing to be the same’ and ‘continuing to be the same differently’. But there are important implications for the difference between what a foundationalist is doing when they ‘enact’ and what the relativist is doing. The former is representational rather than simply presentational. Because what is enacted is supposed to represent something else, it can correspond to that something else correctly or incorrectly. A kind of ethical judgement is implied. Did the ‘enaction’ get it right or wrong?

By contrast, relativist enaction is not attempting to represent anything. It is instead bringing something new into existence. While the foundationalist uses the representationalist nature of their ‘enactivism’ as a cudgel to coerce conformity to what is ‘true’ in a correspondence sense, the relativist can only invite others to see things in a new light.

Your response is to try to tidy up Y, but the nature of Y is irrelevant to the objection. Again, it is the word "always" that causes you to contradict yourself. If "always" involves "every context" then you are contradicting yourself, regardless of what X and Y are.

(You are attempting to exempt yourself from your own rule, hence the self-contradiction. In effect you are saying, "No one can make claims of this sort, except for me.")

Another way to put it:

1. X is always Y
2. Therefore, every X, in every context, is Y
3. Therefore, the truth of (1) is not context dependent

The person who utters (1) is committed to at least one truth which is not context dependent. — Leontiskos

Here I am assuming I have avoided stating the relativist fallacy. Either I suck at expressing this or I failed to properly “tidy up” Y.

@Joshs is the account of antifoundationalism I sketched earlier too simplistic?

Nothing we justify ever rises above our own ways of justifying and that includes this statement.

Nothing we justify ever rises above our own ways of justifying and that includes this statement. — Tom Storm

I understand what you're saying. But the opposing point of view goes back a long way. Plato has Socrates say that all philosophers long for death because they yearn for a vantage point beyond life. In other words, the philosopher wants to be able to say something universal about life, but stuck in the midst of it, there's no way to justify anything we might say. The eye can't see itself.

Yet much of philosophy is that very thing. Even Wittgenstein did: after pointing out that we can't talk about life from an external viewpoint, he went ahead and did it.

Thanks. I thought the argument and above statement avoided the relativist fallacy because it doesn’t say “all opinions are equally true” or that truth is random. Instead, it’s saying that whenever we justify something, we do it using the tools and standards we already have: and that’s true even for this statement itself. This makes it self-aware and not self-contradictory. It also leaves room for debate within those frameworks, rather than claiming there’s no way to judge anything. That’s why I thought it was anti-foundationalist, not relativist.

But yes, the issue of self-reflexivity seems to be a real problem. Hilary Lawson, a minor British philosopher, argues that we can’t avoid the problem of self-reflexivity in modern philosophy, our theories and claims inevitably turn back on themselves. His reponse is to say, so what!

I didn't think what you were saying was relativist. :up:

Hilary Lawson, a minor British philosopher, argues that we can’t avoid the problem of self-reflexivity in modern philosophy, our theories and claims inevitably turn back on themselves. His reponse is to say, so what! — Tom Storm

I think Quine did something similar. After explaining that there's no fact of the matter about what anyone is talking about, he was asked to address how that impacted his own theory. He was like "meh." Or something like that.

He was like "meh." Or something like that. — frank

Funny.

You can understand why people find theism attractive in all this, since it seems to effectively provide a grounding that resolves the confusions and tautologies created by anti-foundationalist views.

You can understand why people find theism attractive in all this, since it seems to effectively provide a grounding that resolves the confusions and tautologies created by anti-foundationalist views. — Tom Storm

I think that's true sometimes. But I wouldn't necessarily line up foundationalism with religion. A naturalist is just as committed to an unjustifiable metaphysical scheme.

A naturalist is just as committed to an unjustifiable metaphysical scheme. — frank

Yes, that's true. Have you come to any metaphysical conclusions yourself?

Yes, that's true. Have you come to any metaphysical conclusions yourself? — Tom Storm

I had a reality crisis when I was young where I realized I have no way to determine if what I'm experiencing is real. It wasn't armchair philosophy, it was a psychological crisis. The way I recovered was to adopt a rule: I never deny the content of my own experience. Whatever I experienced, that's it. I experienced that. But explanations for what I experienced will always be in flux. Maybe my brain wasn't working properly, maybe I have a window into other realities, I really don't know. That rule has worked well for me for a long time.

How about you?

I had a reality crisis when I was young where I realized I have no way to determine if what I'm experiencing is real. — frank

Interesting. I had a similar experience when I was 15 or 16.

My current position is that I have no choice but to accept the reality I’m in and that humans are sense-making creatures who use language (and other tools) to manage their environment. It's likely we don’t have the capacity to access a Capital-T Truth, and philosophy is perhaps best avoided, as it tends only to lead to 1) convoluted attempts to justify seemingly impossible beliefs or 2) endless confusion and self-reflexivity. :wink:

1. If <Truth claims are always context dependent> then <Every truth claim, in every context, is context dependent> — Leontiskos

Thomas Nagel's 'The Last Word' is devoted to this topic.

Thomas Nagel's 'The Last Word' is devoted to this topic. — Wayfarer

Yes, and Nagel is fairly cognizant of the problem I am talking about. For example, he says this in his chapter on ethics, and there is an analogy between "subjectivism" and "relativism":

The situation here is like that in any other basic domain. First-order thoughts about its content—thoughts expressed in the object language—rise up again as the decisive factor in response to all second-order thoughts about their psychological character. They look back at the observer, so to speak. And those first-order thoughts aim to be valid without qualification, however much pluralism or even relativism may appear as part of their (objective) content. It is in that sense that ethics is one of the provinces of reason, if it is. That is why we can defend moral reason only by abandoning metatheory for substantive ethics. Only the intrinsic weight of first-order moral thinking can counter the doubts of subjectivism. (And the less its weight, the more plausible subjectivism becomes.) — Nagel, The Last Word, 125

In general Nagel is good on the manner in which second-order claims cannot simply reign over first-order claims (and "Truth claims are always context dependent" is a great example of a second-order claim in the context of epistemology).

Or from the introduction:

Claims that something is without relativistic qualification true or false, right or wrong, good or bad, risk being derided as expressions of a parochial perspective or form of life—not as a preliminary to showing that they are mistaken whereas something else is right, but as a way of showing that nothing is right and that instead we are all expressing our personal or cultural points of view. The actual result has been a growth in the already extreme intellectual laziness of contemporary culture and the collapse of serious argument throughout the lower reaches of the humanities and social sciences, together with a refusal to take seriously, as anything other than first-person avowals, the objective arguments of others. — Nagel, The Last Word, 6

---

Here I am assuming I have avoided stating the relativist fallacy. — Tom Storm

You must argue rather than assume. You have made a claim of the form, "X is always Y," and yet you want to claim that this does not imply that X is Y in every context. I've given many arguments showing why it does imply that. Now it is your job to respond to those arguments.

Nothing we justify ever rises above our own ways of justifying and that includes this statement. — Tom Storm

Fallibilism arguments suffer the same self-contradictory fate. See, for example, Simpson's discussion <beginning on page 103>.

I don't want to offer a new set of arguments against your new thesis, given that you have yet to answer my old set of arguments against your old thesis. If I do that then every time I respond you will just offer a different thesis, but Simpson's analysis should suffice for your new thesis.

---

How does "there is a truth claim that is not context dependent” not imply a view from nowhere, or sideways-on, or God’s-eye? — Joshs

Perhaps it does, but that is not my concern. I mostly think that people end up not knowing what they mean by such terms. They are just labeling and then morally distancing themselves from labels. Arguments become unnecessary.

I already agree with you that "Truth claims are always context dependent”’takes itself as a predicative assertion. The key word here is ‘always’, because it makes a claim to generality or universality. — Joshs

Okay good, we agree on this.

I am making a distinction which is invisible to you, probably similar to the distinction between ‘continuing to be the same’ and ‘continuing to be the same differently’. — Joshs

Or are you making a distinction that is specious? And how do we tell?

I am well aware that you are trying to distinguish two different senses of "always context dependent," and thus object that my argument is equivocal between the two distinct senses. But I don't see that you have succeeded in that task. Indeed I grant that there are different conceptions of universalization, but I am in no way convinced that one of the ways of universalizing escapes the problem I have pointed up. So one could universalize in the sense of "continuing to be the same differently," but it's not clear how this form of universalization does not suffer the same fate. (Indeed, I think "continuing to be the same differently" is just what universalization means in the first place, and that your other conception is a strawman of the tradition of universals.)

By contrast, relativist enaction is not attempting to represent anything. It is instead bringing something new into existence. While the foundationalist uses the representationalist nature of their ‘enactivism’ as a cudgel to coerce conformity to what is ‘true’ in a correspondence sense, the relativist can only invite others to see things in a new light. — Joshs

You are moralizing and you are introducing factionalist camps. "Foundationalist," "Representationalist," "Enactivist," "Cudgel," "Coerce," "Invite," etc. I've made an argument and I am interested in arguments, not labels and emotivism.

You can understand why people find theism attractive in all this, since it seems to effectively provide a grounding that resolves the confusions and tautologies created by anti-foundationalist views. — Tom Storm

All you have to do is stop contradicting yourself. No one is asking you to become a theist.

The issue is realism vs nominalism, not theism vs atheism - as much as many of our members wish to make every difference of opinion about theism vs atheism.

-

Instead, it’s saying that whenever we justify something, we do it using the tools and standards we already have: and that’s true even for this statement itself. — Tom Storm

But is this a valid argument?

1. Nothing we justify ever rises above our own ways of justifying
2. Therefore, Truth claims are always context dependent

In fact (2) does not follow. So did you mean to support (2), or are you abandoning (2)?

The deeper equivocation at play here is between <truth claims always emerge from a context> and <a claim is never true beyond a subset of contexts>. If (2) means the former, then it is innocuous and easily admissible, not to mention not self-contradictory. But (2) does not mean the former. (2) is meant to limit the "power" of truth claims, not merely to explain something about them that bears in no way on their universal validity. What is at play here is Motte and Bailey.

(Else, if (1) is meant to support the substantive version of (2) then it must rely on the invisible and contentious premise, <...and our own ways of justifying/reasoning never achieve universality>. But in that case the self-contradiction applies not only to (2) but also to this premise which (1) depends upon.)

My current position is that I have no choice but to accept the reality I’m in and that humans are sense-making creatures who use language (and other tools) to manage their environment. It's likely we don’t have the capacity to access a Capital-T Truth, and philosophy is perhaps best avoided, as it tends only to lead to 1) convoluted attempts to justify seemingly impossible beliefs or 2) endless confusion and self-reflexivity. :wink: — Tom Storm

:up:

Thanks for your forensic analysis of my summary of anti-foundationalism. I’ll mull over what you wrote. Maybe someone else will chime in with a view on it.

I’m arguing that in anti-foundationalism all justification occurs within our own systems, even for statements about justification itself. You seem to be saying that this implies that truth itself is context-dependent, which is not what I am claiming. Your point is valid but misdirected, my focus is on justification, not the nature of truth.

My wording may well have been sloppy, given this is not an area of expertise, only a matter I’m interested in and trying to articulate. As you said before, I’m also short on style and rhetoric.

I’m arguing that in anti-foundationalism all justification occurs within our own systems, even for statements about justification itself. You seem to be saying that this implies that truth itself is context-dependent, which is not what I am claiming. Your point is valid but misdirected, my focus is on justification, not the nature of truth. — Tom Storm

@Leontiskis Seems to be conflating truth claims, which as you say, are always (or at least should be) justified within some context or other. and truth itself, which is in no need of justification. So truth claims are given in the context of language, and their justifications are given in the contexts of logic or empirical evidence.

Justifications relying merely on personal experience and testimony cannot be binding on others. Justifications in terms of authority, scriptural or otherwise, need to be underpinned by either logic or empirical evidence. If anyone disagrees they can cite some other criteria that serve to justify truth claims. I am yet to see anything of that nature offered here or elsewhere.

I may not have done much of a job of articulating this and have tried to be more precise as I go, But philosophy is @Leontiskos interest and so he has more tools at his disposal . He’s probably pretty good at it. I wasn’t trying to offer a conventional relativist position but maybe that’s what I did earlier.

I found your articulation clear enough. Again, I think the salient distinction is between the relativity of (certain kinds of) truth claims vs the non-relativity of the truth. The truth, if it exists, is simply what it is the case. Leaving aside extreme skepticism, we can know the truth in logic, mathematics and everyday observational matters, but when it comes to metaphysics and even scientific theory it is a different matter. That's my take, for what it's worth.

Fair enough. Richard Rorty once said in an interview, something like, “We can talk all about justification, but about truth we can say very little. “ No doubt a contestable and controversial claim.

I can relate to that; we can't say much about truth except that it is what is the case. The real problem does not lie in not knowing how to define 'truth', but in not knowing what is true in many areas of conjecture. It is not surprising that those who are uncomfortable with uncertainty don't find this palatable.

You say "fair enough", but I would like to know whether you agree or disagree or are uncertain and why.

You say "fair enough", but I would like to know whether you agree or disagree or are uncertain and why. — Janus

Not sure. I wanted to say something more interesting...