When questions are so off the mark, yes, ignore them. But if you have a go at defining your ontology with clarity as requested, then sure, we can come back to them. — apokrisis
Dual aspect monism just starts with substance as unexplained fundamental stuff and then claims it has two different faces - the material and the experiential. It is not a causal story of nature at all. — apokrisis
You accept the weak form [of semiosis] and reject the strong form. — apokrisis
In the philosophy of mind, double-aspect theory is the view that the mental and the physical are two aspects of, or perspectives on, the same substance. It is also called dual-aspect monism.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-aspect_theory
What are you talking about? — apokrisis
The quick answer is that I am talking of a neuro-semiotic process of modelling the world in a self interested way. — apokrisis
And so just in saying that, we can see that there is active modelling going on. And why would we not expect modelling - of the vast complexity of a brain with trillions of connections, and plugged into real-time action - should not "feel like something"? — apokrisis
Ah TRILLIONS of connections is where that elusive Cartesian Theater lies now. — schopenhauer1
And yet when you get high, neuroscience finds that messing with neural signalling is the prosaic cause. — apokrisis
Or if you recognise your grandmother, specific neural connections light up. — apokrisis
This is an engaging introduction to semiotics — Galuchat
the Cartesian Theater — schopenhauer1
Neurons, brains, space … these are just symbols we use, they’re not real. It’s not that there’s a classical brain that does some quantum magic. It’s that there’s no brain! Quantum mechanics says that classical objects—including brains—don’t exist. — Donald Hoffman
However, the fact of neuroplasticity provides sufficient reason to reject epiphenomenalism. In other words, physical and mental conditions and activities have mutual effects. — Galuchat
This is evidence of correlation, not necessarily of causation. In other words, is it neurophysiological activity which causes recognition, or recognition which causes neurophysiological activity? — Galuchat
Now, I don't think that current philosophical lexicon allows that anything can have a 'degree of reality'; things are either existent, or not. — Wayfarer
Poor old Schop. The question was simple. Why shouldn't it feel like something to be modelling the world? — apokrisis
The quick answer is that I am talking of a neuro-semiotic process of modelling the world in a self interested way.
— apokrisis
Ah, the neuro brings with it the Cartesian Theaters.
And so just in saying that, we can see that there is active modelling going on. And why would we not expect modelling - of the vast complexity of a brain with trillions of connections, and plugged into real-time action - should not "feel like something"?
— apokrisis
Ah TRILLIONS of connections is where that elusive Cartesian Theater lies now. So it's neuro-transimtters and trillions of connections in triadic format that IS experience. I see. So the quantity of physical connections and the fact that it is neurons with axions, cell bodies, dendrites, carrying molecules of neurotransmitters, and the whole neurobiological package- these are the reasons why THIS triadic process is equivalent to the Cartesian Theater of experience? So, simply making sure the material is neuron-type in composition and the quantity is sufficiently in the trillions, that this triadic modelling is experiential and other triadic modelling is not experiential? Odd. Why cannot it be a matter of degree. Perhaps millions of connections, and other composites produce a lower degree of experience? Why cannot it be a matter of difference? Perhaps experience exists in other models but it is so different and unknown, that we cannot say much other than it exists as experiential in some way in terms of being a part of the modelling process, just like THIS modelling process. Somehow you always have a ghost in the machine lurking around and popping up when it is most convenient. The Cartesian Theater is hidden somewhere- you just have to tease it out to realize you are hiding it. So far you have hidden it in quantity, material-type, the concept of "emergence" and various others. — schopenhauer1
I think this 'Cartesian theater' is one of Dennett's ideas, isn't it? I agree with him that it is a very poor depiction or analogy for the nature of mind, but I also don't know how many people really hold to it. I certainly don't think it's anything like what Descartes himself would have thought. — Wayfarer
Did you even read what I wrote? I was suggesting just that.. It is YOU who are not excepting your own logic to its ultimate conclusion, which is that ANY modelling can be experiential. — schopenhauer1
Neurons, brains, space … these are just symbols we use, they’re not real. It’s not that there’s a classical brain that does some quantum magic. It’s that there’s no brain! Quantum mechanics says that classical objects — Donald Hoffman
Ah, the neuro brings with it the Cartesian Theaters. — schopenhauer1
You keep repeating what the modelling relation approach explicitly rejects. If you want someone to defend representationalism to you as an ontology, you need to go elsewhere. — apokrisis
You aren't getting the point.. willfully perhaps. — schopenhauer1
You ask why should an active modelling relation feel like something? I reply why shouldn't it? If you haven't got the flexibility of thought to even try to see an issue from its reverse perspective, then the problem is only yours. You disqualify yourself from proper discussion already. — apokrisis
Then a separate issue is this constant demand of "explain it so I can understand why it feels like what it feels like". We can have a meta-discussion about whether science should even do this. Science is the business of explaining through sufficiently abstract generalities. Like laws or mathematical forms. If we say a ball rolls due to Newtonian Mechanics, we don't expect to get what it feels like to "be in motion". — apokrisis
Even Hard Problem promoters like Chalmers agree that we know a lot about why it feels like what it feels like from neuroscientific explanations. Why is drunkenness what it is? Why do visual illusions have their particular quality? Why are the objects we see made artificial sharp by Mach bands around them, or organised by Gestalt effects?
It is just that Chalmers then calls these easy problems. The game is to raise the bar until it reaches the eternal self-referential metaphysical question of "why anything?". Why should anything be anything, let alone green be green, or the Universe a something rather than a nothing? — apokrisis
But that is my point.. Why shouldn't a modelling relation feel like something? — schopenhauer1
Then you throw in the word "neuro" and "trillions" and that is supposed to answer why this triadic modelling is different from all other triadic-modelling... — schopenhauer1
If you say only THIS modelling is experiential, your hidden theater comes into play- an irrevocable split between mind/body (your hated duality) then comes into play (whether you like it or not). — schopenhauer1
Who said I used Newtonian notions to explain this? Straw man. — schopenhauer1
So, yes, why is it that there is a "feels like" aspect to some modelling and not others is a great question, and Chalmers is willing to say that it is fundamental to the universe- possibly the modelling itself is somehow experiential. — schopenhauer1
Pan-semiosis is about putting a finger on what that actually is in the most general metaphysical sense. — apokrisis
A tornado arises because of a larger context of thermal gradients making up that day's weather. — apokrisis
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