That would be my answer too. And how, exactly, does an assertion add something to a belief? — J

How, indeed. Although maybe "add" isn't the right word. Maybe it's two things at once, one of which is a belief. The other is... What? The possession, or awareness, of a fact?

Is there such a thing as possession/awareness of a fact that is not also belief? I would say so, if I am experiencing the fact. If I'm actually looking at the TV, it's not a belief that there's a TV there. If I hear it from the other room, it's not a belief that the TV is on.

If I'm actually looking at the TV, it's not a belief that there's a TV there. If I hear it from the other room, it's not a belief that the TV is on. — Patterner

Yet, in ordinary language, if someone asks you, "Do you believe the TV is on?" you'll answer yes. You might also point out that it's a rather strange question: "Why would I not believe it? It's on; see for yourself!" This highlights one of the uses of "believe". We tend to emphasize believing something when there could be doubt.

So what about the phenomenology? I'm actually looking at the TV; do I simultaneously believe that it's on? If belief is reduced to linguistic belief, then clearly not. No such sentence enters my mind. But we've been considering the other, non-linguistic senses of "belief". Is there some mental event that occurs while I watch TV, that's the equivalent of giving credence to the existence of the TV? This seems far-fetched. More likely is the opposite case, when we're watching, say, a pack of elves. The mental event "I don't believe this" is probably present, wouldn't you say? Or least "I don't know whether to believe this or not."

With the TV, we're thrown back on belief understood as analytical philosophy usually does: an attitude, a disposition, not a mental event and not linguistic. To say "I believe the TV is on" is to claim that my experience is factual, and that I am the one having it. It is all but the same as "I assert."

Yet, in ordinary language, if someone asks you, "Do you believe the TV is on?" you'll answer yes. — J

I might respond, "No. The TV is on." I've said that kind of thing at times.

You might also point out that it's a rather strange question: "Why would I not believe it? It's on; see for yourself!" This highlights one of the uses of "believe". We tend to emphasize believing something when there could be doubt. — J

Right. I think we should not. Where does it end? I believe I have ten fingers and toes. I believe my name is Eric. I understand the idea that I can't very well not believe something that I know is factual. But is not not believing it the same as belief? I don't, uh, believe it is.

Is there some mental event that occurs while I watch TV, that's the equivalent of giving credence to the existence of the TV? This seems far-fetched. — J

I agree it's far-fetched.

More likely is the opposite case, when we're watching, say, a pack of elves. The mental event "I don't believe this" is probably present, wouldn't you say? Or least "I don't know whether to believe this or not." — J

How about, "That's not real."? The flip-side of the above. Knowing something is not factual is not the same as not believing it.

There's a fantasy series called The Chronicles of Thomas Covenant, the Unbeliever. He had to consciously not believe something he knew could not be factual, even though he was living it.

You're not missing the point; our conscious experience certainly seems to rely on something like causation. But the OP question focuses on whether it's the content of a thought that causes another thought, or whether, as you describe, it's the neurons firing. Of course it's tempting to say, "They're the same thing," but as you probably know, that thesis has generated a lot of philosophical controversy. — J

If you can summarize one or two of the main points of controversy I would appreciate it, as my understanding is there is no issue with that description (though no-one would say it is complete either).

I think what can sometimes happen is that when we talk about neural correlates of consciousness, the temptation is to imagine it as some trivial mapping. That if I see a yellow ball say, there's a cascade of neural firings all resulting from that, like dominos.

But of course it's a lot more complex than that. While yes, some individual firings can be coupled to simple perception, the overall pattern of firings is continuous, extremely complex and largely based on referencing past data -- the brain running a complex internal model with outside perception just having an effect on the model.

I don't know if this slight rant is relevant here, it's just a framing that often seems assumed in these discussions. That as soon as we talk of synapses firing and cause and effect, the temptation to see cognition as serial, synchronous and passive seems too strong.

I'll single this line out:

"Your attitude/disposition about the possibility first required articulating the possibility."

Unsure. I'm fairly sure that it's at least possible that that formulating some beliefs is what brings to your attention what you've implicitly believed so far. That is: sometimes formulating a belief is raising it from background to foreground status, and forgrounded beliefs are perceived more at risk. People might think they formed a belief, but really what happened is that - for the first time - they have cause to defend it. A conscious belief has entered the social arena, so to speak, and needs to be defended or modified or even abandoned. — Dawnstorm

Yes. That sounds about right, but I do not find that any of this is inevitably contradictory to what I've been saying, although it could be in its underpinnings. I agree that sometimes formulating a belief is raising it from background to foreground status, and in doing so one may have cause to defend it - for the very first time. However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background. In this case, the belief candidate under consideration is/was an attitude/disposition towards the following proposition:

"Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon propositions. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to it. Thus, there are no such things as "prelinguistic" propositional attitudes/dispositions.

Basically, the "possibility" needn't be articulated to act on it without a hiccup in social situations, and it's the hiccup in the social situation that causes you to formulate your belief. An attitude about a possibility is often part of the unacknowledged social praxis. We formulate possibilities to the degree that our beliefs have become problematic. We act on them without formulating them all the time. — Dawnstorm

Well, in our case, the possibility under consideration was whether or not it was/is possible for all belief to be prelinguistic. It was formulated like this: "Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".

While I agree that we act on our beliefs without formulating them all the time, that's not what was in question here, nor do those facts pose any issue with what I've been setting out. I now think that you may have meant something strikingly different than me when qualifying belief as "prelinguistic".

There's no doubt that most people hold all sorts of background(foundational) beliefs. I would further say that many people have never really identified, named, and/or talked about those background beliefs as subject matters in their own right. I think our views are commensurate regarding these matters.

I would further claim that these beliefs have efficacy(which returns to the OP's concerns).

I think that our views diverge when it comes to ontological concerns; what beliefs consist of.

For example, all native speakers of English "know" that English is a "nominative-accusative language", in the sense that they use it like that without trouble. But among native speakers of English, you rarely need to formulate this: linguists are one systematic example. They know, too, that one alternative is the "ergative-absolutive language", and they can talk about the difference. A native speaker of English might have trouble understanding what's going on while learning, say, Basque. You now need to go back and formulate what you've always been instinctively doing, so you can then get back at the difference. But you certainly don't need to be able to explain the difference (or even know it exists) to speak English.

We're seeing the same mismatch currently around the gender topic, I think. — Dawnstorm

I am not one who holds that knowledge of the rules governing language is shown by correct usage(following them). Knowing how to use language does not require knowing how to talk about the rules governing such language. Knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires both, knowing how to use English, and knowing what counts as being "a nominative-accusative language"(knowing which descriptions set that out and which do not). Knowing how to use English does not.

I do not find it at all helpful to say that all native English speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language. That's simply not true, even if it is the case that they'd assent to such a description after understanding what that means.

I'm currently working on a reply to the rest of that post. I wanted to address it separately, for it invoked meaning, and we both find it promising.

I'll skip a lot mostly because of a time limit, but this seems promising, as this seems to be where our perspectives mainly differ:

I don't know if I understand the first question, but I think you're asking something along the lines of how meaningful the mat is to the cat. That would all depend upon the sheer number of correlations that the mat had been a previous part of in the cat's thought, in addition to the content other than the mat. That's generally the case for all 'degrees' of meaningfulness, on my view. If you meant something else, perhaps you could rephrase the question?

I do not understand the second question at all. A mouse is a mouse. One hundred percent. If you're asking me whether or not the cat sees the mouse as a mouse, I'd defer to my last post which briefly discusses such manners of speaking, and ask if it is possible for a cat to look at a mouse and see something else?
— creativesoul

When I think of a thought, I think of what's currently present in the mind and how it presents itself to the "thinker" in question. So, yes, it's about "how meaningful the mat is to the cat," but not only as a generalised object, also how relevant it is in the current situation. What about the mat is represented in the cat, so to speak, and what about the situation draws the attention to the mat. It is entirely possible that whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat-in-general is entirely in the background for the present situation. To believe that "the mouse is on the mat" is to draw a connection between the mat and the mouse that may be entirely a potential. The cat *can* have such a belief, but currently doesn't. — Dawnstorm

If I understand this correctly, I'd agree that the importance that the mat plays in the cat's thought and/or belief is determined by its relevance to the cat in the current situation(at that time). So, if I understand you correctly, I think you're saying something like the mouse can be on the mat, and the cat can have a belief about the mouse that doesn't include the mat. I would agree.

The mat is meaningful to the cat in the sense of being an integral part of where the mouse is located. That's about all I meant by claiming the cat can believe the mouse is on the mat. Although, as you've suggested and I've mentioned, the mat could be much more meaningful than just that to the cat.

But here we stand perpendicular to the situation: whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat is not automatically the same as whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-human, though I expect there to be sufficient overlap for comparison. — Dawnstorm

I agree and may put that a bit stronger. Whatever the mat means to the cat is never exactly the same as whatever the mat means to the human.

Now, I think that we might - methodologically - assume a "hunting situation" that we assume we both understand. What then is the minimal overlap we'd expect, what are the opportunities for misunderstanding. The question about the mat then becomes to what degree does the cat have cause to form believes about what the human thinks of as a mat, in this very situation. This goes beyond the situation down to the bits of the cat's world-view that's inaccessible to us, but it always has the hunting situation at its core.

In short, we methodically assume a commonality, so that we don't have to assume commonalities outside of that context (hunting). But that also means we must attempt to scale back what we take for granted about mice and mats - and often the result of that is more a discovery about how we view the world than it is about how the cat views the world.

It's a methodology of controlled estrangement, if you will. The cat will not see anything but a mouse, in the sense that the mouse is there. But the mouse's mouse-ness is called into question - methodologically - by not assuming more commonalities than we must (and we must assume some commonalities, if we are to think at all).

So how to mats and mice correlate here? We can question mats, and we can question mice, and that's comparatively easier to questioning "mats and mice" at the same time. This assumes that there's no particular way any one individual (whether human or feline) might see anything else, though there's probably a set of restrictions of what's possible on the side of what becomes a mouse or a mat when presented to a consciousness.

I'd understand if this is hard going. You said earlier, you don't accept phenomenology (or something to that effect?), and this is definitely somewhat in the vicinity of Husserl, though viewed through the lense of sociology (say Alfred Schütz, or even Helmut Plessner). It's probably fine to drop that angle, if it gets in the way. But it'd be good to bear in mind the difference (if there be one), as I can't excise the influence easily, and it'll come up from time to time.

On the whole, we don't seem so far apart? — Dawnstorm

No, I do not think we're so far apart in that we seem to both understand that there are differences and similarities between the cat's point of view and our own, in addition to recognizing the need of a terminological framework capable of setting those out.

However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background. — creativesoul

I don't disagree. The question, though, is to what degree language needs to be involved in belief formation.

In this case, the belief candidate under consideration is/was an attitude/disposition towards the following proposition:

"Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic". — creativesoul

And it would definitely make sense to say that - in this case - language had to be involved, given what I've said in this thread. So this might count as an example of a belief that is not pre-linguistic.

But then we're almost exclusively talking about the proposition, and the attitude towards it:

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon propositions. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to it. Thus, there are no such things as "prelinguistic" propositional attitudes/dispositions. — creativesoul

But what's the relationship between a propositional attitude and a belief? I'm fairly sure I've heard beliefs defined as "propositional attitudes", but since I'm comparing language-using and lagnauge-less creatures here, that definition doesn't seem useful. In the traffic-lights example above I've treated belief as "behavioural implicature". But now I have the reverse problem that "behavioural implicature" doesn't quite cut it for "beliefs might all be prelinguistic". Is there away to tie these disparate situations together?

What does it mean to "have an attitude towards a proposition", and what does it mean to "imply a belief in your actions"?

I think this is instructive here:

I am not one who holds that knowledge of the rules governing language is shown by correct usage(following them). — creativesoul

Nor am I. I've chosen the nominative-absolutive thing for a reason: it's so intuitive that most native speaker can't imagine it being different, and they usually have trouble learning an ergative-absolutive language. It's not the rules that determine what people do; it's what people do that determines the rules.

Language is interesting in that the expressed attitudes towards the propositions don't match what you would get from behavioural implicature. Linguists will, in these cases, side with behavioural implicature:

To make it clearer: People who will berate you for splitting an infinitive usually split infinitives themselves. That's not a one-rule-for-you-one-rule-for-me situation. They don't know they do it. They will correct themselves, and then err again. (I'm not sure this occurs with split-infinitives; but it's a common phenomenon.)

So the following is part of it:

Knowing how to use language does not require knowing how to talk about the rules governing such language.

But once you do try to talk about such language, you introduce the possibility of a disjunct between your propositional belief and your behavioural implicature.

Note that such a disjunct is not a factor for nominative-accusative languages. People out side of linguistics may have heard "nominative" and "accusative" (less so in English, as only pronouns still decline), but that's usually the extent of it.

Knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires both, knowing how to use English, and knowing what counts as being "a nominative-accusative language"(knowing which descriptions set that out and which do not). Knowing how to use English does not.

Knowing the associated propositions requires knowing about the typology. But the propositions are supposed to describe what people are doing. So if the propositions don't describe the behavioural implicature, the rule isn't there. So, from this perspective, either native speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language, or linguists are wrong in some way. That's the connection here.

More generally, this is the relationship between theory and praxis. It's a difficult subject to work through, but I think we need to, if we wish to consider what various creatures have in common.

However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background.
— creativesoul

I don't disagree. The question, though, is to what degree language needs to be involved in belief formation. — Dawnstorm

To the degree that the content therein is existentially dependent upon language.

In this case, the belief candidate under consideration is/was an attitude/disposition towards the following proposition:

"Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".
— creativesoul

And it would definitely make sense to say that - in this case - language had to be involved, given what I've said in this thread. So this might count as an example of a belief that is not pre-linguistic. — Dawnstorm

Okay. So, it is not the case that beliefs might all be prelinguistic.

But then we're almost exclusively talking about the proposition, and the attitude towards it:

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon propositions. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to it. Thus, there are no such things as "prelinguistic" propositional attitudes/dispositions.
— creativesoul

But what's the relationship between a propositional attitude and a belief? — Dawnstorm

Propositional attitudes are beliefs.

I invoked belief as propositional attitude because it fit the situation. I do not deny that some belief amounts to an attitude/disposition towards some proposition such that the individual takes the proposition to be true(or not). I deny that all belief can be properly taken account of by virtue of using that framework. Notably, because i)all belief must be meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief, and ii)propositions are utterly meaningless to language less creatures, it only follows that belief as propositional attitude is found lacking in its ability to take proper account of language less belief.

I think we're in agreement there.

I'm fairly sure I've heard beliefs defined as "propositional attitudes", but since I'm comparing language-using and lagnauge-less creatures here, that definition doesn't seem useful. — Dawnstorm

Indeed, it is not useful for taking account of language less belief, aside from setting out what it cannot consist of.

I am not one who holds that knowledge of the rules governing language is shown by correct usage(following them).
— creativesoul

Nor am I. I've chosen the nominative-absolutive thing for a reason: it's so intuitive that most native speaker can't imagine it being different, and they usually have trouble learning an ergative-absolutive language. It's not the rules that determine what people do; it's what people do that determines the rules.

Language is interesting in that the expressed attitudes towards the propositions don't match what you would get from behavioural implicature. Linguists will, in these cases, side with behavioural implicature:

To make it clearer: People who will berate you for splitting an infinitive usually split infinitives themselves. That's not a one-rule-for-you-one-rule-for-me situation. They don't know they do it. They will correct themselves, and then err again. (I'm not sure this occurs with split-infinitives; but it's a common phenomenon.) — Dawnstorm

Hmmm. Is that something like a performative contradiction?

I'm fairly certain I do not quite understand the point being made here. I'm curious about this notion of behavioural implicature. Could you explain it more, please? Thank you.

Knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires both, knowing how to use English, and knowing what counts as being "a nominative-accusative language"(knowing which descriptions set that out and which do not). Knowing how to use English does not.

Knowing the associated propositions requires knowing about the typology. But the propositions are supposed to describe what people are doing. So if the propositions don't describe the behavioural implicature, the rule isn't there. So, from this perspective, either native speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language, or linguists are wrong in some way. That's the connection here. — Dawnstorm

Is that the only two options: Either native English speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language, or linguists are wrong in some way? Do all linguists hold that to be true? If they do, then I would say they are wrong in some way.

All I'm saying is that knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires knowing how to use "nominative-accusative", whereas plenty of native English speakers have no clue what those words mean(how to use them). They are native English speakers nonetheless.

I suppose that if knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language could somehow be acquired without knowing what "nominative-accusative" means, then it could be possible for all native English speakers to know that English is a nominative-accusative language. I cannot make much sense of what that would entail.

All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief.<----That seems like an undeniable basic tenet.

Would you agree?
— creativesoul

Long answer: We'd need to be sure we're on the same page about what "meaningful" is supposed to represent. Short answer: But yes, probably. — J

Okay. That's good.

I would think that any acceptable notion/conception/theory of "meaning" would be capable of setting out how things become meaningful, including how thought and/or belief becomes meaningful to thinking/believing creatures.

If you can summarize one or two of the main points of controversy I would appreciate it, as my understanding is there is no issue with that description (though no-one would say it is complete either). — Mijin

Neuronal events are nothing like thoughts, so the question is, how can they be the same thing? And if they are co-dependent in some way, does one cause the other? How does that happen? Why should physical experiences such as neurons firing give rise to conscious experience? Are thoughts "really" just brain events?

If you look into the so-called "hard problem of consciousness" as described by Chalmers and others, it will give you a good sense of what the controversy is.

Neuronal events are nothing like thoughts, so the question is, how can they be the same thing? — J

Many phenomena have different characteristics that might seem wholly separate prior to establishing a model linking them. Imagine trying to explain smallpox symptoms as a cellular phenomenon to someone unfamiliar with germ theory. Microscopic jelly-bags with long helices inside is nothing like pain and pustules.

Why should physical experiences such as neurons firing give rise to conscious experience? Are thoughts "really" just brain events? — J

Well I wouldn't use the "really" framing, because I believe both descriptions are valid. We have thoughts and we also have brain events.
But yes, they are different facets of the same thing; this is trivially demonstrable from the fact that physical changes to our brain have a corresponding effect on our conscious experience (e.g. taking an opioid and the effect it has on dopamine receptors and what that feels like).

If you look into the so-called "hard problem of consciousness" as described by Chalmers and others, it will give you a good sense of what the controversy is. — J

I'm familiar with the hard problem of consciousness. Indeed I would put it to you that you have misunderstood it, if you believe the point is to claim that the mind cannot be a neural phenomenon.

Knowing how to use language does not require knowing how to talk about the rules governing such language.

But once you do try to talk about such language, you introduce the possibility of a disjunct between your propositional belief and your behavioural implicature. — Dawnstorm

Would you care to set this disjunct out a bit more?

But yes, they are different facets of the same thing; this is trivially demonstrable from the fact that physical changes to our brain have a corresponding effect on our conscious experience (e.g. taking an opioid and the effect it has on dopamine receptors and what that feels like). — Mijin

Noting correlation is not the same as explaining how one causes the other. There is nothing about the physical events that suggests subjective experience, and there is no wild guess of an explanation. Dopamine binds to the dopamine receptor. The dopamine receptor is coupled with a G-protein. The binding changes the shape of the dopamine receptor, which activates the G-protein. activating the G-protein stimulates or inhibits enzymes, depending on what kind of receptor cell we're dealing with. But the functioning of ion channels is key. So a channel mighty open, and sodium ions flow in.

Where do you suspect the subjective experience shows up?