Well if you look at the paper they are primarily drawing from Aristotle's zoological works, and the Metaphysics is more subsidiary:

In part 1 of this study, these questions are addressed via an examination of aspects of Aristotle’s zoological works, specifically his use of the logical terms genos (genus) and eidos (species) in those works, and his brief discussion (in the Metaphysics) of the male-female difference in relation to species definition. — From Aristotle to Contemporary Biological Classification: What Kind of Category is Sex?

But the thesis of the paper is salutary. Sex is a cross-species or meta-species classification. It is something that subdivides species of animals, and therefore requires a level of abstraction and generality beyond zoological studies considered according to species. In a philosophical and theological sense sex has always been somewhat elusive in that way. This elusiveness of sex is therefore in some manner a metaphysical issue, given that it requires a reconceptualization of the whole in light of some common aspect. Even current day disputes between different schools of feminism could be cashed out in terms of this elusiveness, where "TERFs" will tend to emphasize sex as being more than a kind of accidental division subordinate to the animal species.

(This is incidentally why is mistaken when he views metaphysics as merely a matter of "height," as if it were a hermetically sealed compartment at a certain "altitude" of thought. That is a very common misunderstanding.)

That paper is narrowly focused on a particular set of issues. The Metaphysics draws sharp differences between the ease with which we can observe kinds as a grouping in a system of classification and what might be an understanding how those species came into being. The many discussions concerning the "actual" in relation to the "potential;" are problems that cut across all enquiries of the nature of beings. The methods of analysis in the biological works are attempts to apply the ideas of causality developed in the Metaphysics to figure how particular beings come into being.

If you search the site, you will see the issue has consumed much digital ink.

i think you and Leon are missing the point, i was just demonstrating that Metaphysics influenced taxonomy without asking anyone to read the book, i honstly don't even know what the paper is about...but it mentions aristotle's metaphysics in regards to zoology, i regret using that as an example...

Absolute presuppositions are not verifiable. This does not mean that we should like to verify them but are not able to; it means that the idea of verification is an idea which does not apply to them.... — R.G. Collingwood - An Essay on Metaphysics

This is an interesting idea. I have so many questions. But it seems better to read the book and then ask questions. It's 200 pages, so that will take time. It's a pity, but perhaps there will be an opportunity on another occasion. I have downloaded the book.

As I noted, this is a first take. I don't like it much. Definitely needs work. Beyond what's on the list, just general good writing rules also apply. — T Clark

I don't disagree with you, though I would vastly prefer - "explained" instead of "defined" in the first point. If one offers definitions, there is a serious risk one will never get any further. "Definitions first" is a recipe for stalling. "Definitions last" would be a lot more realistic. If that approach was good enough for Socrates, it is good enough for me.
But the biggest issue is about clarity. The analytic tradition sets a lot of store by it. I'm never quite sure what they mean. The standard of clarify in that tradition is logical analysis. But that is a poor model for many topics and requires a good deal of input on the part of most readers - in that they have to learn logic first, which presumably can only be clearly introduced and explained in ordinary language. I don't know what other traditions say about this, but one would think that they would be inclined to sign up, with a different idea of what clarify is.

It would help to bear in mind the question for which an answer is sought. — Mww

Oh yes, certainly. That's why I said that the question defines its answer (normally). What counts as an answer depends on the question. Different kinds of answer for different kinds of question.

no contradiction in treating metaphysics scientifically, that is, in accordance with basic principles as grounds for its speculative maneuvers. — Mww

OK. I understand why one might include logic and mathematics as sciences; they do have some basic principles. They are different from the principles of physics &c. That is the result of the kind of questions that they ask, so it is not a problem.
But what are the basic principles of metaphysics? Maybe one could venture that they are the principles of logic applied to certain concepts that are used in almost every context. One might get assent to the proposition, but then comes the question why no progress is made.
Perhaps we should not be asking that, but asking what counts as progress. That might reveal a good deal about the nature of the enquiry.
Here's what really puzzles me. Metaphysics is said to be about the world - de re. Why, then, is it not an empirical science like physics, etc.

Mathematics is sufficient proof, in that for what reason proposes from itself metaphysically, experience proves with apodeictic certainty naturally. — Mww

What's the phrase - "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics"? It's a good point. Someone is sure to ask whether there are questions for which a mathematical answer is not appropriate and if so, why?

i was just demonstrating that Metaphysics influenced taxonomy without asking anyone to read the book, i honstly don't even know what the paper is about...but it mentions aristotle's metaphysics in regards to zoology, i regret using that as an example... — ProtagoranSocratist

I would suggest that the point is that the Aristotelian approach was developed to apply universally, but it seems reasonable to suppose that Aristotle got the model from his biological work. Certainly, it has turned out to be a lot more useful in biology than in physics. Against that idea is the fact that Plato developed the idea of "forms" or "ideas" in the context of mathematics, and Aristotle must have been influenced by that.

Sex is a cross-species or meta-species classification. It is something that subdivides species of animals, and therefore requires a level of abstraction and generality beyond zoological studies considered according to species. In a philosophical and theological sense sex has always been somewhat elusive in that way. — Leontiskos

I'm a bit surprised that you don't mention the distinction between sex and gender in this connection. It is, perhaps, only a beginning to addressing the complications you refer to. But it is at least a start.

This is incidentally why ↪Ludwig V is mistaken when he views metaphysics as merely a matter of "height," as if it were a hermetically sealed compartment at a certain "altitude" of thought. That is a very common misunderstanding.) — Leontiskos

I did recognize that I was pushing a metaphor. But I did so in order to bring it into question.

Metaphysics is not some hermetically sealed compartment that is distinct from all other compartments of thinking. It is more a kind of valence or mode or abstraction that occurs in thinking. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure I would put it in just that way, but I don't disagree with you. It seems to me that the difficulty of characterising it shows that metaphysics is not a discipline or subject like any other. That's why, in my book, presenting actual metaphysical discussions is the best way of introducing it to people.

Here's what really puzzles me. Metaphysics is said to be about the world - de re. — Ludwig V

Some metaphysical theories may be about the world, but I wouldn’t hold with any of them. But then, as well, metaphysics is sometimes said to be above or after physics, and I don’t agree with that at all.

Nahhhh….metaphysics, as a conception, is the “science” of human reason, the limitations and applicability thereof, at least according to some early modern, re: post-Renaissance, philosophers.

Then, of course, after having figured out the limitations and applicability of reason, it follows the investigations of the world, through the practice of empirical science, becomes attuned to it. So metaphysics is actually lower than and before physics, and thus not about the world, it being given whatever it may be, but establishes a method by which humans comprehend it.

Bottom line is, I suppose, because there’s no cut-and-dried consensual definition of metaphysics, you can call it just about anything you like, limited only be staying away from names already taken.
——————-

….whether there are questions for which a mathematical answer is not appropriate…. — Ludwig V

Hmmmm.

Maybe.

Because mathematics is conditioned by the impossibility of its negation…2 + 2 /= 4 is contradictory hence impossible….maybe it is, that for those questions conditioned by the impossibility of the negation of its answer, those answers are appropriately mathematical. It follows that those questions having nothing to do with, or make no allowances for, possible contradictions in their answers, mathematical answers would not be appropriate.

The most obvious, ubiquitous with respect to humanity in general, of these kinds of questions refer to feelings, the answers to questions of feelings being aesthetic, regulated not by pure logic, but merely how the subject doing the asking, finds himself inclined. From there, it’s a short hop to mathematical answers to moral questions are not appropriate.

Just a thought…..

I must have looked up this word at least 10 times. Here's what comes up:
the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space. — ProtagoranSocratist

"Metaphysics" may be the most debated concept on this forum. The confusion may stem from the fact that the idea of Nature, as a hierarchical system, can be found in the original source : Aristotle's treatise on Nature (Greek : physis)*1 began with with a review of then-current knowledge about the non-human natural world, describing classes, species & specific instances.

But, as an afterword (Meta-Physis) : principles and causes of change and motion in nature, he added an off-topic addendum to discuss, not specific items of objective Nature per se, but abstract subjective conjectures & generalizations & principles that had been imagined or inferred, not observed, by various philosophers, including Ari, Plato & Socrates. By contrast with the cycles of evolving Nature, Principles were presumed to be eternal and changeless.

Objective facts are seldom controversial, because you can point to an actual exemplar, instead of using abstract words to define what you are talking about. Therefore, I would categorize the main body of Aristotle's Physics as "hard" Science, but the addendum (the Meta) as"soft" Philosophy.

However, the label "Metaphysics"*2 was later associated with a legalistic sub-category of General Philosophy : Theology (god-science). And that ideology is further associated with a sub-category of Religion known as scriptural Monotheism. Unfortunately, it's the dogmatic & legalistic sophistry & casuistry of Theology that have given Aristotle's philosophy of principles a bad name. :cool:


*1. Aristotle's Physis is his foundational text on nature, or "physics," which explores the principles of change, motion, and existence, and is a cornerstone of Western thought. It introduces concepts like potentiality and actuality, the four causes (material, efficient, formal, and final), and argues that all things are in motion, driven by an Unmoved Mover. This work laid the groundwork for many subsequent fields, including biology and psychology, and has influenced scientific and philosophical inquiry for centuries
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=aristotle+physis

*2. Aristotle Physics vs Metaphysics :
Aristotle's physics was the study of nature and change, focusing on the physical world through observation and empirical study. In contrast, his metaphysics (which he called "first philosophy") was the study of being itself and the unchanging, immaterial entities that underlie the physical world, such as God. While physics dealt with the changeable, metaphysics addressed the principles behind things, like "being as such".
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=aristotle+physics+vs+metaphysics

This is an interesting idea. I have so many questions. But it seems better to read the book and then ask questions. It's 200 pages, so that will take time. It's a pity, but perhaps there will be an opportunity on another occasion. I have downloaded the book. — Ludwig V

For what it’s worth, the big ideas are upfront in the first few chapters. The rest of the book tracks the implications and gives some examples. And there will definitely be plenty of more opportunities to discuss. Metaphysics pops up at least a couple of times a month.

"Definitions first" is a recipe for stalling. "Definitions last" would be a lot more realistic. — Ludwig V

@Jamal and I have disagreed about this in the past. This thread provides good evidence that you need to put your money down on specific definitions or you’ll never be able to discuss beyond just the surface of metaphysics. If we come back in a month and have the same discussion, the same arguments will just get recycled over and over without ever having a resolution. If you want to go deeper, you have to commit.

understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term. — Wilfrid Sellars

This is too permissive in my understanding. Aristotle regards metaphysics as the first science since it deals with all that is unchangeable & immaterial. By this qualification, the "things" cannot be reduced to any natural substances, such as material entities and/or their compositions. In other words, metaphysics deals primarily with the intelligible realm - the realm of grounding & causality, with universals & forms.

Now if natural substances are the first of existing things, physics must be the first of sciences; but if there is another entity and substance, separable and unmovable, the knowledge of it must be different and prior to physics and universal because it is prior — Aristotle, Metaphysics book XI - 8

This quote has a radical proposal. It's not saying metaphysics can be physics, which would be a plain contradiction to Aristotle, but that if physics is the first science, then there can never be metaphysics. It would be unintelligible. The possibility of metaphysics hinges on metaphysical naturalism & its adjacent views like materialism, empiricism (YES), nominalism, mechanism being flawed or incomplete.

Aristotle's physics was the study of nature and change, focusing on the physical world through observation and empirical study. In contrast, his metaphysics (which he called "first philosophy") was the study of being itself and the unchanging, immaterial entities that underlie the physical world, such as God. While physics dealt with the changeable, metaphysics addressed the principles behind things, like "being as such". — Gnomon

:up: ... That said, I often wonder (like Heraclitus, Buddha & Nietzsche) if it's even possible to understand movable & immovable, material & immaterial etc as strict contraries, whether as substances or modes or what have you. Why not collapse the categories ? But that would destroy the reliability & intelligibility of both metaphysics & natural sciences. The flux of Heraclitus destroys the possibility of any knowledge. It throws us before life with no wits.

However, the label "Metaphysics"*2 was later associated with a legalistic sub-category of General Philosophy : Theology (god-science). And that ideology is further associated with a sub-category of Religion known as scriptural Monotheism. Unfortunately, it's the dogmatic & legalistic sophistry & casuistry of Theology that have given Aristotle's philosophy of principles a bad name — Gnomon

This isn't fair. I regard the Neoplatonist polytheists, Muslims & Christians as some of the best commentators of Aristotle & you can't grasp the peripatetic TRADITION without them. Aristotle himself regarded metaphysics as a divine science, with the unmoved mover(s) serving as Gods or our philosophical models of Gods - the divine of divine. Metaphysics is Theology.

Physics deals with the things that have a principle of movement in themselves; mathematics is theoretical, and is a science that deals with things that are at rest, but its subjects cannot exist apart. Therefore about that which can exist apart and is unmovable there is a science different from both of these, if there is a substance of this nature (I mean separable and unmovable), as we shall try to prove there is. And if there is such a kind of thing in the world, here must surely be the divine, and this must be the first and most dominant principle. Evidently, then, there are three kinds of theoretical sciences-physics, mathematics, theology. The class of theoretical sciences is the best, and of these themselves the last named is best; for it deals with the highest of existing things, and each science is called better or worse in virtue of its proper object. — Aristotle, Metaphysics book XI - 7

Things like substances, essences, and unchanging truths, are mostly just fictional. Metaphysics is mostly "what a human says about a thing." A reification through grammar. A grammatical seduction — DifferentiatingEgg

Lol. Except Wittgenstein doesn't regard any of these as fictional or non fictional for that matter. That would involve backdoor metaphysics & Wittgenstein is smart enough to avoid that.

If I have to give a name to his position, it would be weak paradigmatic linguistic transcendentalism. He is niether a strict transcendentalist like Kant who searches for private a priori, fixed categories or conditions, nor is he is conventionalist like Carnap or other neo-positivists.

If you told Wittgenstein, the existence of electrons is fictional just like the existence of Harry Potter, he would clearly be disappointed since the usage of "fictional" in physics & story telling is quite different. In fact, deciding whether something is fictional or not is itself a language game & not a pseudo property of language games.

Turning different usages of languages, such as language acquisition, into conditions for the possibility of language is a mistake Wittgenstein corrects quite early on. The foundation of language games must be sought in life forms, which are evidently beyond the crude categories of fictional or non fictional.

The possibility of metaphysics hinges on metaphysical naturalism & its adjacent views like materialism, empiricism (YES), nominalism, mechanism being flawed or incomplete. — Sirius

It is my understanding, which admittedly is not deep, that ancient philosophers were not materialists or empiricists. For them, the world was infused with spirit and human value.

Some were materialists, some were not. Democritus, Leucippus and Epicurus believed the soul was material (made of atoms, specifically), along with everything else.

It is my understanding, which admittedly is not deep, that ancient philosophers were not materialists or empiricists. For them, the world was infused with spirit and human value. — T Clark

I understand where you are coming from. Does the atom of Democritus belong to the same kind of atom modern physics posits ? A simple way to go about this is to distinguish the methods by which the two paradigms arrive at the "atom", pre/pseudo (fill your criteria) scientific & scientific. But that's a lost cause. You can check Feyerabend on this.

Instead, we should look at the subject matter.

A safe bet is to see if we can extend Aristotle's categorization of physics (a branch of natural philosophy) to the present & to see if it would result in the destruction of metaphysics if it is taken to be basic. The study of all that changes & is inseparable from matter (not intelligible & extra mental)

Democritus's atom is clearly something which changes & it is inseparable from matter. It's easy to see where nominalism fits in this. The particular atoms are all that happen to be. At worst, the atoms can instantiate universals in our minds (also atoms), we can take this kind of moderate realism to be a weak version of nominalism, in so far as the basic make-up/grounding of the world is concerned. Mechanism is a tough nut to crack but it can be understood as a subcategory of change which is restricted to space & time. This is a minimalist description which covers all kinds of mechanistic systems.

All of this fits quite nicely with people who champion modern physics as the best guide to understanding the world in of itself. They are committed to all of the above.

I should have clarified, by empiricism, I mean the Humean kind, which reduces the world to appearances, the sensible realm. All ideas are obtained from basic impressions, "X appears as Y". This can be traced back to the Pyrrhonists or Skeptics in general. I'm not sure if I would ascribe this kind of epistemic attitude to Democritus though. I would not...After all, Hume was NOT a materialist (or an anti materialist). He discarded substances & accidents (to be immanent forms) all together :lol: , AND without forms or substantial forms, there can be NO metaphysics

I understand where you are coming from. — Sirius

Well, I must admit I have no idea where you’re coming from. I learned a new word recently— incommensurable. That’s what your philosophy and mine are. That’s not a criticism, you really sound like you know what you’re talking about. It’s just that I see things really differently.

The whole is infinite and eternal (nature); its constituents and their configurations are finite and temporal (physics). Logical relations – entailments – between the whole and subwholes naturalists compose as rational mandalas. Thus, 'contemplating, without explaining or justifying, the current best explanations for nature' is how I understand m e t a p h y s i c s (as practiced by e.g. Laozi, Democritus-Epicurus, Spinoza ...)

The whole is infinite and eternal (nature); its constituents and their configurations are finite and temporal (physics). Logical relations – entailments – between the whole and subwholes compose naturalists' rational mandalas. Not explaining but contemplating the current best explanations for nature is how I understand m e t a p h y s i c s (as practiced by e.g. Laozi, Democritus-Epicurus, Spinoza — 180 Proof

I will leave Laozi aside for now. He is a Neoplatonist to me, a perfect non-dualist.

The infinite & indivisible substance of Spinoza is a bare substratum, which can never be actual in of itself, since it lacks determination altogether. An undetermined being violates the Permeinides unity of being & intellect, the ground of metaphysics ; what can be thought of/be as must be intelligible & that which we can't think or be as, it is non-existent.

Guess who else doubted the Permeinides unity of being & intellect ? Kant. But he was far more intelligent than Spinoza & understood the consequences it entailed. (Reality is ultimately unintelligible & non critical metaphysics a fool's quest). Unfortunately, his project has deep contradictions & at best, you end up with Pyrrhonism or worse Academic Skepticism, nothing close to metaphysics.

There's a problem with the logical entailments you mentioned. It's a nice attempt at smuggling EXPLANATIONS (answers to why ?)

As I see, it's clear your logical entailments will be dependent on the mental modes of the infinite substance & incapable of playing the causal role required of them to establish the connection between various minds (passive intellect for peripatetics) & matters. BUT if you allow them independence from both mind & matter & all other modes, then we are back with forms as substantial forms. Now unless you want the forms to be free floating (nowhere) - which is bad to both Aristotle AND Plato, you will ground them in the active intellect, thought thinking itself, the prime mover, the pure act, the first substance. Everything other than it is its effect or consequent, not its mode, since that which is completely actual has no parts or dependence (all of which are potentials)

This thread provides good evidence that you need to put your money down on specific definitions or you’ll never\\ be able to discuss beyond just the surface of metaphysics. If we come back in a month and have the same discussion, the same arguments will just get recycled over and over without ever having a resolution. If you want to go deeper, you have to commit. — T Clark

I agree that one has to pay attention to the ways that words are used - the concepts that define the discussion. But I do not agree that laying down a definition at the start avoids the issues - though I do not deny that it may sometimes be helpful.
But no definition (rule) can cater for all future possibilities - there can always be cases where interpretations of the rule differ. There's no reason why these can't be sorted out, but they can only be sorted out when they appear; they cannot be sorted out in advance.
This is all particularly tricky in philosophy, because disagreements so often turn on different uses of words - different presuppositions.

To be fair the term "metaphysics" confuses everybody. I still am not 100% sure what it is despite studying it as a profession for several years. You are in good company.

What is metaphysics?

One aspect is that metaphysics is not verifiable, as metaphysics is undertaken using language, and truth cannot be discovered within language. Truth transcends language.

It is not the case that i) “everything within the empirical realm is in constant state of actuality (what it is now) versus potentiality (what it could be) is true” but rather ii) “everything within the empirical realm is in constant state of actuality (what it is now) versus potentiality (what it could be)” is true IFF everything within the empirical realm is in constant state of actuality (what it is now) versus potentiality (what it could be).

As Collingwood said, absolute presuppositions are not verifiable, because, as Hume pointed out, even though all our knowledge comes from sensory experiences, we can only directly observe the regularity of events, never the cause of these regularities. Through reason and logic we hypothesise a speculative cause for these regularities, and we can only reason about our sensory observations. In the absence of any sensory observation, there would be nothing for reason to reason about.

The speculations of metaphysics are not verifiable, and can only be supported by empirical observation. In physics, it is a supposition that the speed of light is 299,792,458 m/s, and in metaphysics it is a supposition that stealing is wrong. These suppositions cannot be arrived at by reason alone. The supposition of the speed of light is supported by empirical observation of astronomical events and the supposition that stealing is wrong is supported by empirical observation of human behaviour.

As with Kant, there must be a unity between what the mind observes, empirical sensory observations, and the mind’s comprehension in what it observes, logical reasoning. Also with Aristotle, there is unity between passive intellect, receiving and processing of sensory information, and active intellect, thought and reasoning.

Reason may be used to generalise the particular. From the particular, that his stealing that woman’s bag is wrong, to the general and universal, that stealing is wrong. Reasoning about empirical observations enables generalisations about particulars. Only particulars can be empirically observed. Last year in Paris the speed of light was measured as 299,792,458 m/s. Last week in Seattle, the speed of light had the same measurement. This morning, here in Copenhagen, the speed of light also had the same measurement. That the speed of light is universally 299,792,458 m/s cannot be empirically observed. It is only through reason that particular facts in the world may be universally classified. It is not only in physics that the speed of light is 299,792,458 m/s, but also in mathematics that 1+1=2. In chemistry, water is H2O, in ethics stealing is wrong, in religion that God exists and in psychology humans have free will.

Even logic cannot be thought about in the absence of reference to facts external to the thinker. The logic of the syllogism that i) all x are y, ii) z is x, iii) therefore z is y is part of linguistic thought, and as Wittgenstein pointed out, language cannot be private. Logical thought is founded on elements such as “all”, “x” and “therefore”, elements that can only be known to the thinker within a public language, and being public only accessible through sensory empirical observations.

All knowledge is speculative, whether that of physics or metaphysics, as knowledge is contained within language, and truth transcends language. Such speculation is founded on the unity between the passive intellect, empirical sensory observations, and the active intellect, reasoning, thought and logic. The only difference is the degree of public consensus. A more general consensus is that the speed of light is 299,792,458 m/s, and a more limited consensus is that stealing is wrong. All knowledge requires a fusion of reason with observation. Yesterday’s metaphysical knowledge might be today’s physical knowledge.

I recommend “Introduction to Metaphysics,” by Heidegger. Don’t let his reputation dissuade you; it’s worth the read. — Mikie

yes, someone on the internet recommended Heidegger to me a while ago for ontology reflections with "Being and Time". I purchased it over 5 years ago and I didn't like it, but the Joan Stambaugh translation seems to be better. Heideggar himself seems to be a pretty pivotal figure in modern philosophy. I'll definitely consider "introduction to metaphysics" as a companion to aristotle's work, because i'm currently determined to read as much about ancient philosophy as I can. It will probably be a project that lasts a few years.

And yeah I don't really care that Heideggar fell for Nazi ideology and promoted it a little bit as a professor, what matters to me more is the actual content that someone wrote, not their political identity. The Milgram experiment in psychology was largely designed to show that the Third Reich and The Holocaust could have basically happened anywhere. As I've talked about in other threads, part of not falling for authoritarian techniques is being able to understand that people like Heideggar may still have something valuable in their work even though they made some mistakes and fell for the popular ideas of their contemporaries.

what's all this Jazz about Wittgenstein? I guess you thought I'm quoting him or something? Sorry homie, mostly my thoughts from reading Nietzsche (and Others) while considering the Platonic representation of words and how words shape human psychology... if those thoughts are like ole Witty's then he probably gathered a good deal from Nietzsche.

But no definition (rule) can cater for all future possibilities - there can always be cases where interpretations of the rule differ. There's no reason why these can't be sorted out, but they can only be sorted out when they appear; they cannot be sorted out in advance. — Ludwig V

As I noted previously, this is why our discussions of metaphysics never get beneath the surface—why we repeat the same arguments over and over again.

That paper is narrowly focused on a particular set of issues. The Metaphysics draws sharp differences between the ease with which we can observe kinds as a grouping in a system of classification and what might be an understanding how those species came into being. The many discussions concerning the "actual" in relation to the "potential;" are problems that cut across all enquiries of the nature of beings. The methods of analysis in the biological works are attempts to apply the ideas of causality developed in the Metaphysics to figure how particular beings come into being. — Paine

Well said.

I'm not sure I would put it in just that way, but I don't disagree with you. It seems to me that the difficulty of characterising it shows that metaphysics is not a discipline or subject like any other. That's why, in my book, presenting actual metaphysical discussions is the best way of introducing it to people. — Ludwig V

Sure, I agree with that.

what's all this Jazz about Wittgenstein? I guess you thought I'm quoting him or something? Sorry homie, mostly my thoughts from reading Nietzsche (and Others) while considering the Platonic representation of words and how words shape human psychology... if those thoughts are like ole Witty's then he probably gathered a good deal from Nietzsche. — DifferentiatingEgg

Then that's a terrible reading of Nietzsche & "seduction of grammar" is such a Wittgensteinian turn of phrase that you can forgive me for thinking you are lying & very bad at that.

You don't become an anti-Platonist by creating a God out of logos (discourse), who rules over all of us & there's no escape from him. Language as a cage. It's all immanent Platonism if anything else, as noted by Deleuze.

So here's the deal buddy, Nietzsche did have a metaphysics of becoming & his essence or substance (what it is) of the world was nothing other than "will to power" - in tribute to Heraclitus. Yes. Pure difference. Check the reading of Heidegger here.

I know there are interpreters who read "will to power" as some physiopsychological drive inherent in all of us, but that commits Nietzsche to a prioritization of the unsophisticated & reductive "natural" over other interpretations of the world, in flat contradiction to his perspectivism.

Then that's a terrible reading of Nietzsche — Sirius

Nah, you're just trying to reify what I'm saying through your filters and it's not registering because, you simply haven't the right optics for understanding. A similar but all together different set of stimulus receptors after all.

Nietzsche has many facets, that metaphysics is fictional doesn't mean it doesn't exist within thought...it's conceptual device created by humans.

As to knowing your Nietzsche it's obvious you didn't get his take on grammar

Nietzsche on Truth as a seduction via grammatical construction:

Suppose truth is a woman, what then? Wouldn't we have good reason to suspect that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, had a poor understanding of women, that the dreadful seriousness and the awkward pushiness with which they so far have habitually approached truth were clumsy and inappropriate ways to win over a woman? It's clear that truth did not allow herself to be won over. And every form of dogmatism nowadays is standing there dismayed and disheartened - if it's still standing at all! For there are mockers who assert that they've collapsed, that all dogmatisms are lying on the floor, even worse, that they're at death's door. Speaking seriously, there are good reasons to hope that every dogmatism in philosophy - no matter how solemnly, conclusively, and decisively it has conducted itself - may have been merely a noble and rudimentary childish game, and the time is perhaps very close at hand, when people will again and again understand just how little has sufficed to provide the foundation stones for such lofty and unconditional philosophical constructions of the sort dogmatists have erected up to now - any popular superstition from unimaginably long ago (like the superstition of the soul, which today, in the form of the superstition about the subject and the ego, has still not stopped stirring up mischief), perhaps some game with words, a seduction by some grammatical construction, or a daring generalization from very narrow, very personal, very human, all-too-human facts. — Preface BGE

Of which he goes through several of these seductions through the opening of BGE...

And furtherstill we see in books like Twilight of Idols Nietzsche details that grammar shapes how we view the world in Reason in Philosophy...

Nothing indeed has exercised a more simple power of persuasion hitherto than the error of Being, as it was formulated by the Eleatics for instance: in its favour are every word and every sentence that we utter!—Even the opponents of the Eleatics succumbed to the seductive powers of their concept of Being. Among others there was Democritus in his discovery of the atom. “Reason” in language!—oh what a deceptive old witch it has been! I fear we shall never be rid of God, so long as we still believe in grammar. — Twilight § 5 Reason in Philosophy

How is it that grammar creates Gods? By the way we end up categorizing things. The "will", or "nature" or "God" all unify a multiplicity of experience stimuli into a single word—a daring generalization—that exists as is, as the thing in itself...you can check out more on that via BGE 19 and 24, and Twilight: The Four Great Errors § 3 The Error of False Causality.

One aspect is that metaphysics is not verifiable, as metaphysics is undertaken using language, and truth cannot be discovered within language. Truth transcends language — RussellA

It's useless to tell us whether this or that is unverifiable until you tell us your criteria for verification. Not only that, you will also have to justify it.

Ofcourse, if language is a tool, then it cannot be the subject matter of any science which aims to discover truths. This was known to Aristotle. But the [neo-] positivists you are echoing actually disputed this. They regarded language as unveiling the structure of the world & mind. How ? Well, they never justified it. It was always begged. The Tractatus has no arguments & Wittgenstein was intelligent enough to cast all of it under the mystical (ineffable woo woo). The whole movement was an utter sham, complete embarrassment.

It is not the case that i) “everything within the empirical realm is in constant state of actuality (what it is now) versus potentiality (what it could be) is true” but rather ii) “everything within the empirical realm is in constant state of actuality (what it is now) versus potentiality (what it could be)” is true IFF everything within the empirical realm is in constant state of actuality (what it is now) versus potentiality (what it could be). — RussellA

This is a mistake. Actual & Potential are not mere substitutes for what is & what is possible. Both the actual & possible participate in being for Aristotle. The actual exists, the possible subsists. They come equipped with ontology. Both are also capable of interacting with one another. Why ? Because the possible has 2 aspects, one of which coincides with the actual & the other of which is oriented towards the future.

Secondly, pure actuality is never in time & is prior to time. It has essential priority, which cannot be described as "what is now". "Now" involves temporal ordering.

Thirdly, nothing in the empirical realm can be described as actual if you take empiricism in the sense of Hume. The sensible realm is the realm of potentiality by default for Aristotle. If you really want some modality within empiricism, it better be cashed out as your ignorance of the complete picture of the world. "What is possible" turns into "What is probable". There's no point in using Aristotelian terminology here.

As Collingwood said, absolute presuppositions are not verifiable, because, as Hume pointed out, even though all our knowledge comes from sensory experiences, we can only directly observe the regularity of events, never the cause of these regularities. Through reason and logic we hypothesise a speculative cause for these regularities, and we can only reason about our sensory observations. In the absence of any sensory observation, there would be nothing for reason to reason about. — RussellA

"All of our knowledge comes from sensory experience", a statement which can never be verified by any empirical method - that's an absolute presupposition if there ever was one. It's not ? Then you lose your reason for denying the possibility of non sensible or sensible intuition as an infallible source of knowledge. I recommend you to check the Critique of Pure Reason. Hume easily went too far. If you want a metaphysics which determines our conditions for the possibility of experience, then Kant is your guy, not Hume.

As with Kant, there must be a unity between what the mind observes, empirical sensory observations, and the mind’s comprehension in what it observes, logical reasoning. Also with Aristotle, there is unity between passive intellect, receiving and processing of sensory information, and active intellect, thought and reasoning. — RussellA

Except the active intellect of Aristotle has non sensible direct intuition of intelligible forms. It is immaterial & described as the highest aspect of the soul. Kant denied all of this. You guys need to stop with the lazy comparisons.

Nietzsche has many facets, that metaphysics is fictional doesn't mean it doesn't exist within thought...it's conceptual device created by humans — DifferentiatingEgg

No. You have the cart before the horse. The metaphysics of being is a fiction because the metaphysics of Nietzsche is related to becoming.

Nothing indeed has exercised a more simple power of persuasion hitherto than the error of Being, as it was formulated by the Eleatics for instance: in its favour are every word and every sentence that we utter! — Twilight § 5 Reason in Philosophy

Thanks for proving my point with the quote you brought. The reason language & thought itself is deceptive for Nietzsche is because it conceals the metaphysics of becoming & provides support to the metaphysics of being. Nietzsche clearly knows there's a way to overcome the limitations of language to grasp the true reality of the world. This would be impossible if metaphysics was SOLELY a byproduct of misunderstandings caused by language. Which it isn't. This is what I am disputing. You reducing Nietzsche to some sort of pseudo/proto Wittgensteinian.

Now it's my turn to quote Nietzsche but I don't want to turn this into a Nietzschean Bible quoting competition.

If you aren't functionally illiterate, then after having read all these quotes, you will acknowledge Nietzsche is a metaphysician & he isn't beholden to conceptual schemes. That would be a complete mockery & caricature of his actual stance, which favors direct sensible intuition to uncover reality. He even lists his "doctrines", which are the positive elements of his thoughts.

I still remained a little doubtful about Heraclitus, in whose presence, alone, I felt warmer and more at ease than anywhere else. The yea-saying to the impermanence and annihilation of things, which is the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy; the yea-saying to contradiction and war, the postulation of Becoming, together with the radical rejection even of the concept in all these things, at all events, I must recognise him who has come nearest to me in thought hither to. The doctrine of the “Eternal Recurrence” —— that is to say of the absolute and eternal repetition of all things in periodical cycles — this doctrine of Zarathustra’s might, it is true, have been taught before. In any case, the Stoics, who derived nearly all their fundamental ideas from Heraclitus, show traces of it. — Ecce Homo

But Heraclitus will remain eternally right with his assertion that being is an empty fiction. The “apparent” world is the only one: the “true” world is merely added by a lie. — The Twilight of the Idols

Heraclitus has as his royal property the highest power of intuitive conception, whereas towards the other mode of conception which is consummated by ideas and logical combinations, that is towards reason, he shows himself cool, apathetic, even hostile, and he seems to derive a pleasure when he is able to contradict reason by means of a truth gained intuitively, and this he does in such propositions as: “Everything has always its opposite within itself,” so fearlessly that Aristotle before the tribunal of Reason accuses him of the highest crime, of having sinned against the law of opposition. Intuitive representation however embraces two things: firstly, the present, motley, changing world, pressing on us in all experiences, secondly, the conditions by means of which alone any experience of this world becomes possible: time and space. For these are able to be intuitively apprehended, purely in themselves and independent of any experience; i.e., they can be perceived, although they are without definite contents — Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks

Maybe you two should have this argument in a Nietzsche specific conversation.