if mind and brain supervene, no given brain event should be said to cause the subjective event. — J

Thinking more about this, I realize that it's important to emphasize the difference between a single, given brain event -- a firing of neurons that occurs at a particular time -- and the entire physical system we call the brain (and nervous system). I believe it's true that, without my brain, I would not be conscious. And the opposite is, trivially, false: "Without my consciousness, I wouldn't have a brain." This demonstrates a grounding or priority that we don't need to contest because we fear it leads to physicalism.

What happens at time T1 is different. Neurons fire = I picture a purple cow. Why? There is no necessarily correct temporal order. We could say, "The neurons fire and so I picture the cow." Or we could say, "I decide to picture the cow and so the neurons fire." Which causes which? To me, the answer is clearly "Neither one," hence supervenience.

We can reliably, and precisely, induce subjective experiences with chemical, electrical or mechanical effects on the brain. — Mijin

Yes, but the opposite is also the case: We can reliably induce chemical and electrical effects on the brain by subjective experiences.

Yes, but the opposite is also the case: We can reliably induce chemical and electrical effects on the brain by subjective experiences. — J

Sure: both support the position that thoughts, and subjective experience, are based in neurochemistry.
Or put it this way: are there ever subjective experiences that aren't coincident with activation of areas of the brain?

Of course it's the brain. Nobody's questioning that. But that's where, not how. We know that wings make an airplane fly. When we ask how, simply repeating "the wings do it" isn't an answer. Certainly, we can mess with subjective experience by affecting voltage gated calcium channels, serotonin reuptake proteins, and any number of other parts of neurons. But that doesn't even begin to address how those physical things don't only release ions when photons of one particular range of wavelengths hit the retina, but experience redness, and don't only act on themselves in feedback loops, but are aware of their own existence.

Sure: both support the position that thoughts, and subjective experience, are based in neurochemistry. — Mijin

I understand what you mean, but "based in" is tricky. If I have a thought of someone I love, and the brain fires up in all the ways we can now observe, was my thought caused by a yet previous piece of neurochemistry? Couldn't we equally say that the chicken of neurochemistry was preceded by the egg of subjective thought? In other words, if "based in" is supposed to prioritize one level over the other in this way, it doesn't really hold up. But see my previous post. If "based in" merely means that the brain is necessary for subjective experiences to exist, but subjective experiences are not necessary for the brain to exist, then yes, "based in", in that sense, is fine.

Of course it's the brain. Nobody's questioning that. — Patterner

Much pithier than my version! Though in fact there are those who question whether brains are necessary for subjective experience; on this forum many people suggest that a nonbiological entity may achieve consciousness. I find this conceivable but unlikely.

But that's where, not how. — Patterner

Right, simply saying "Subjectivity is neurochemical" is like saying "Consciousness is an emergent property" or "The brain is the seat of the mind." It gives the illusion of understanding something but no actual content.

Right, simply saying "Subjectivity is neurochemical" is like saying "Consciousness is an emergent property" or "The brain is the seat of the mind." It gives the illusion of understanding something but no actual content. — J

Right. and, even though I suspect consciousness is something very different than what you think it is, it needs to be explained either way. It can't just be "Put enough physical stuff together, and it just happens."

:up: You've hit hte skeptical nail on the head when it comes to consciousness, I think. You explain here extremely well what I struggle to find words for in the moments its required. Thanks for that.

Thank you.

I suspect consciousness is something very different than what you think it is, — Patterner

Is there a post on TPF where you sketch out your view of consciousness? I'm curious . . .

this is the closest I've come here.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15877/property-dualism/p1

But it's kind of sloppy in ways. Working on getting my thoughts down better.

Of course it's the brain. Nobody's questioning that. But that's where, not how. We know that wings make an airplane fly. When we ask how, simply repeating "the wings do it" isn't an answer. Certainly, we can mess with subjective experience by affecting voltage gated calcium channels, serotonin reuptake proteins, and any number of other parts of neurons. But that doesn't even begin to address how those physical things don't only release ions when photons of one particular range of wavelengths hit the retina, but experience redness, and don't only act on themselves in feedback loops, but are aware of their own existence. — Patterner

The topic of this thread is not the hard problem of consciousness though. There are plenty of threads on that, and in those threads I have always been happy to say "we don't know".

This thread is about causation, thoughts to thoughts, and that's very clear IMO. As I've said, it's intrinsic to the whole way our minds -- cognition and perception -- work. It's almost all associative. This is demonstrable and testable.

If I have a thought of someone I love, and the brain fires up in all the ways we can now observe, was my thought caused by a yet previous piece of neurochemistry? Couldn't we equally say that the chicken of neurochemistry was preceded by the egg of subjective thought? — J

Or, the position that I am espousing: that they are one and the same thing.
I feel you are poisoning your own well by beginning with the premise that one must cause the other.

Or, the position that I am espousing: that they are one and the same thing. — Mijin

If by "same thing" we mean two phenomena in a supervenience relationship, then yes, though "same thing" probably isn't nuanced enough, given how weirdly different they appear. I was trying to show that the chicken-and-egg questions get us nowhere. To re-quote myself:

if "based in" is supposed to prioritize one level over the other in this way, it doesn't really hold up. But see my previous post. If "based in" merely means that the brain is necessary for subjective experiences to exist, but subjective experiences are not necessary for the brain to exist, then yes, "based in", in that sense, is fine. — J

I feel you are poisoning your own well by beginning with the premise that one must cause the other. — Mijin

Again, I began with that premise (which many people do believe) in order to show what's wrong with it. Sorry if that wasn't clear. The relation of brain and mind is not a cause/effect relation. But the relation of one thought to another may be, and the OP asks, broadly, if there's such a thing as causation in the realm of ideas or propositions -- that sort of mental-to-mental causation, as opposed to brain events.

Ah I see, thanks for clarifying.

Hmm, from my perspective I do see it as obvious given the neurochemical underpinnings of thoughts and that the causal path is quite clear within that framing. But, now I'm clear on what you're saying, I need to think a bit more about what we can strictly say the entailment regarding ideas / propositions is.

Exactly. It's easy to tell a causal story about what happens in the brain. But is that all we're talking about when we say that certain thoughts imply certain conclusions? Going back to the OP -- am I wrong in thinking that the content of my thought about Ann caused the next thought?

am I wrong in thinking that the content of my thought about Ann caused the next thought? — J

The alternative would seem to be that, because of the laws of physics, the physical events progress from one arrangement to the next - potassium ions gathering in neuron X, calcium ions gathering in neuron Y, dopamine building in this synapse, GABA being moved back into the axon terminal of that neuron - in the only way they can, but the meaning of a progression of ideas about Anna that makes sense to us is only coincidental.

Yes, that would be a physicalist causal explanation. To be generous, we could say that the making-sense part is more than coincidental -- that it is what happens, from our 1st person perspective, when the described brain events take place, accounting for the utility of the whole process.

As I think I said somewhere in the OP, if one believes that's the only way in which the idea of causality can be used, then there's really nothing in the OP questions that are worth considering.

this is the closest I've come here.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15877/property-dualism/p1 — Patterner

Thanks. I didn't go on to read all 7 pages of the thread, so this may have been said already (and maybe by me!) but I'll say it anyway, since this is a different thread.

Property dualism, or something very like it, is what supervenience proposes, it seems to me. If brain and mind are to be understood as "the same thing" (and I'll come back to that troublesome terminology), we need to be able to say how they nonetheless (appear to) differ so dramatically. Property dualism says that "the same thing" can have different properties, depending upon the perspective of the perceiver. A brain, viewed from the outside, has physical properties. A brain, viewed or experienced from the inside, has mental properties. Some versions of property dualism (I think including yours) go on to say that these are actual objective properties which can be discovered using 3rd person inquiry.

I like this perspective because it cuts the knot of what-causes-what, and it doesn’t claim that consciousness is forever a mystery, inaccessible to objective investigation. Yes, it requires the postulate of consciousness, and a 1st person perspective, in order to get off the ground, but that’s a postulate I’m happy to accept.

The idea that proto-consciousness may turn out to be a property of matter, supporting a modest version of panpsychism, seems quite possible. It’s sheer speculation at this point. But it’s no more unwarranted than vague references to “emergent properties.”

My objections begin with the attempt to widen the terms “consciousness” and “experience” to include, say, photons. I think Chalmers is way off track when he says that a proton has “a degree” of consciousness. Might it be proto-conscious, in your sense of having a property that, when scaled up, can result in consciousness? Sure. But that just isn’t “a degree of consciousness,” any more than five or ten atoms have “a degree of liquidity.”

Likewise with “experiences.” We can insist on a reform of how to use that word, so that all material entities can now have them, but that’s arbitrary. If the word is used at all, it refers to events that can be perceived “from the inside,” and the constituents of your rock can’t do this. There are indeed “instantaneous, memory-less moments” involving the rock-particles, but the particles aren’t experiencing them. Or putting it differently: If you want to reform “experience” to include what particles can do, you need to explain what part of the concept of “experience” is being carried over, such that it can justify continuing to use the term.

Lastly . . . we should definitely come up with something better than “the same thing.” It’s a tempting, often useful locution, which I frequently fall back on, but I worry that too often it paints the wrong picture. In one sense, as we’ve already noted, it’s ludicrous to say my mental image of a purple cow and a particular set of neurons firing in my brain are the same thing. That can’t be what we mean when we claim some sort of identity between the two phenomena. What is the same here is what supervenience (and perhaps property dualism) is trying to capture.

We need the concept of “perspective” or “point of view” in order to understand it. From your perspective, having been kept in the dark for two days, a flaring match looks painfully bright. From mine, standing in the sunlight and looking in a window at your match, it’s so dim it’s hard to see. So, does the match have the property of brightness? Obviously, that depends. With 1st and 3rd person, the perspective shift is much more radical. A match, at least, “translates” in visual images and metaphors, but there’s no translation language (yet) between brain and mind. Still, this can help us understand how there might be a “same thing” underlying these two points of view. Or we can use my football-game analogy.

Maybe instead of “the same thing” we should say “the same essent”. I’m not fond of Heideggerian terminology, but this one (I think invented by Mannheim to translate seiend in the lectures on metaphysics) is close to what we want. We could stipulate that an essent is an item that exists, but stripped of perspective. Heidegger might be outraged at putting it this way, but I want a word we can use that acknowledges that there is a level of being beneath or beyond perspective. So brain and mind share the same essent.

Some versions of property dualism (I think including yours) go on to say that these are actual objective properties which can be discovered using 3rd person inquiry. — J

I claim consciousness is an objective fact. But it's not something that has physical properties, so cannot be discovered or studied with our physical sciences. 3rd person inquiry and introspection are the most obvious tools we have to work with. They are, of course, notoriously problematic.

It’s sheer speculation at this point. But it’s no more unwarranted than vague references to “emergent properties.” — J

Yes to both.

I think Chalmers is way off track when he says that a proton has “a degree” of consciousness. — J

I agree. I don't think there's any such thing as "a degree"of consciousness, or different levels of consciousness, higher consciousness, etc. I think consciousness is consciousness. What's different is the thing that is conscious. The subjective experience of a photon is extremely different from the subjective experience of a human.

Might it be proto-conscious, in your sense of having a property that, when scaled up, can result in consciousness? — J

I don't think so. I don't think anything results in consciousness. It's always there. We just subjectively experience "scaled up" mental abilities. A photon has none, of course. But our mental abilities are scaled up above those of anything we are aware of that has any mental abilities at all.

Likewise with “experiences.” We can insist on a reform of how to use that word, so that all material entities can now have them, but that’s arbitrary. If the word is used at all, it refers to events that can be perceived “from the inside,” and the constituents of your rock can’t do this. There are indeed “instantaneous, memory-less moments” involving the rock-particles, but the particles aren’t experiencing them. Or putting it differently: If you want to reform “experience” to include what particles can do, you need to explain what part of the concept of “experience” is being carried over, such that it can justify continuing to use the term. — J

It is a difficulty thing to try to imagine what part is being "carried over" such that it can be said that a particle has it. However, I think it's what is needed. It has to be there from the beginning. The alternative is that purely physical structures evolve without the presence of consciousness, without anything directing the evolution in order to bring about consciousness, yet one day, for no reason whatsoever, find themselves in configurations that gives rise to consciousness. I mean, holy cow! Didn't see that coming!!


Regarding "the same thing", is it possible to think of consciousness as another sense? There's no confusion or ambiguity with the idea of one person seeing me and another person hearing me. Consciousness happens to be a sense that only works on the self. Maybe? I don't know. I just thought of it right now. Heh

I claim consciousness is an objective fact. — Patterner

Yes, we both start from there. I was noting that your "proto-consciousness" might also be an objective fact, though you're clear that we can't find any physical property with which to identify it.

The subjective experience of a photon is extremely different from the subjective experience of a human. — Patterner

It is a difficult thing to try to imagine what part [of the concept of "experience"] is being "carried over" such that it can be said that a particle has it. However, I think it's what is needed. It has to be there from the beginning. — Patterner

We may have an aporia, then. If it's genuinely needed, and yet nothing can be said to give it content, that suggests to me that the path is closed to further inquiry, at least for now. I can't even posit the idea of a photon's subjective experience -- my mind is blank and the words seem empty. But of course, whenever someone says, "I just can't imagine how . . . " the right response is "Try harder!" So maybe you can!

I don't think anything results in consciousness. It's always there. We just subjectively experience "scaled up" mental abilities. — Patterner

This is perhaps important. Consistent with your idea that consciousness is a sort of irreducible natural kind, or property, we can view it as creating mental abilities of various sorts. What's "created" is not consciousness (it's there all along) but the mental ability. My concern about this picture is that it sounds like a shell game. We've substituted "mental ability" for "consciousness" in its traditional usages, and are now asserting the same mysterious things about mental abilities that were formally asserted about consciousness. How are they created? What are they? How do we know what has them? etc.

yet one day, for no reason whatsoever . . . — Patterner

Well, that couldn't be true. If this picture of consciousness as emergent turns out to be the case, we will understand the reasons for its emergence very well. I don't think anyone is suggesting that consciousness is random or fluky.

Regarding "the same thing", is it possible to think of consciousness as another sense? — Patterner

Hmm. Maybe, at least by analogy. Worth pondering.

This is perhaps important. Consistent with your idea that consciousness is a sort of irreducible natural kind, or property, we can view it as creating mental abilities of various sorts. What's "created" is not consciousness (it's there all along) but the mental ability. My concern about this picture is that it sounds like a shell game. We've substituted "mental ability" for "consciousness" in its traditional usages, and are now asserting the same mysterious things about mental abilities that were formally asserted about consciousness. How are they created? What are they? How do we know what has them? etc. — J

No, this isn't what I mean. I think consciousness and mental are not at all the same thing. Not even related. Thinking is just physical. I quote this frequently, and here I go again. From Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos, by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:

A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind.

Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
•​A sensor that responds to its environment
•​A doer that acts upon its environment — Ogas and Gaddam

The first mind they talk about is that if the archaea. Archaea "is an example of a molecule mind, the first stage of thinking on our journey. All the thinking elements in molecule minds consist of individually identifiable molecules."

The simplicity of this example stretches the definition of 'thinking' and 'mind' past what probably anyone is comfortable with. But it's the beginning. Going up the evolutionary ladder - neuron minds, module minds, super minds - just means adding more physical things. What else can be added, after all? Physical things that take in sensory input, store information, access information, initiate responses...

I think consciousness is always present, always giving the entity in question, whether a particle, person, or whatever else, subjective experience of itself. We subjectively experience the physical sensory input processes of a range of the electromagnetic spectrum as vision with colors and shapes. We subjectively experience the physical system that stores information as memory. You get the idea.

But consciousness does not create those things. Rather, it is the property by which we subjectively experience them. And things without any mental abilities still have subjective experiences. But they don't have thoughts or memories about the experiences.

yet one day, for no reason whatsoever . . .
— Patterner

Well, that couldn't be true. — J

It most certainly couldn't.

If this picture of consciousness as emergent turns out to be the case, we will understand the reasons for its emergence very well. I don't think anyone is suggesting that consciousness is random or fluky. — J

If there is a reason for the emergence of consciousness, then wouldn't that mean it was intended? If it's emergent, isn't it either blind chance or not blind chance?

However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background.
— creativesoul

I don't disagree. The question, though, is to what degree language needs to be involved in belief formation.
— Dawnstorm

To the degree that the content therein is existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

Sure. To me that's just rephrasing the question. — Dawnstorm

And yet, it's an answer, not a question. The question was to what degree "language needs to be involved" in belief formation. I answered as clearly and concisely as I know how. Language needs to be involved in belief formation to the degree(extent) that the belief content is existentially dependent upon language. For instance, if one believes that there's milk in the fridge, then language needs to be involved in that belief in a number of ways. The milk and the fridge are both existentially dependent upon language. Thus, the belief cannot exist in a world that is completely absent of language.

If a cat watches a mouse run behind the stove and subsequently believes that the mouse is behind the stove, then that belief is existentially dependent upon language in the same way that the previous example is. The stove is existentially dependent upon language. So, language needs to be involved in those particular beliefs as an existential precondition for the possibility thereof.

However, if a cat watches a mouse run into a hole burrowed into the hillside and believes that the mouse will eventually come out of that hole, then that belief is not at all existentially dependent upon language. Hence, language does not need to be involved whatsoever in that belief formation.

This hints at two different existential dependency scenarios. It sheds light on the overlap between language less creatures' belief and language users'.

There are far more complex varieties of belief that language needs to be involved to a much greater degree/extent. Belief as propositional attitude fits here, as does believing that English is a nominative-accusative language, understanding and contemplating Gettier's paper, doing theoretical physics, philosophy, etc.

Agreeing to this feels like a conversation stopper: I no longer know what to say, and I don't feel anything has been accomplished either. I end up walking away feeling vaguely foolish. — Dawnstorm

I didn't see it that way at all. You do not look foolish to me. Becoming aware of our own false belief seems like an accomplishment. I mean, we're all aware of our own fallibility, aren't we?

By behavioural implicature, I simply mean that if we do X, that implies we believe Y, otherwise our behaviour would be random. On this level, "we" includes any creature capable of meaning. — Dawnstorm

I see. So, how does this notion of behavioural implicature deal with the fact that behaviour alone is indeterminate regarding that? I mean, for example, shrugging one's shoulders can mean more than one thing as a result of having more than one vein of thought going through the individual's mind. For some it means they could not care less. For others, it means they have no clue.

These are the sort of ambiguities my position aims to lessen/minimize.

If we are to attribute thought and belief to another creature, we ought to have at least a well-grounded idea and/or standard regarding what sorts of creatures are capable of forming which sorts of beliefs.

We all know, I presume anyway, that a mouse is incapable of contemplating the consequences of the double slit experiment.

For example, all native speakers of English "know" that English is a "nominative-accusative language", in the sense that they use it like that without trouble.
— Dawnstorm

They display behavioural implicature that leads linguists to make the appropriate generalisations. — Dawnstorm

What's the difference between using the English language and using the English language like one knows it is a nominative-accusative language?

I originally thought that this focus upon English was meant to be an example of a background belief that is brought to the foreground.

This bit is something I'm intrigued by.

I suppose it boils down to what it takes in order to know that English is a nominative-accusative language. I mean, I didn't know that at all until this conversation, where you've brought it to my attention, and I've did a bit of reading about it.

If a cat watches a mouse run behind the stove and subsequently believes that the mouse is behind the stove, then that belief is existentially dependent upon language in the same way that the previous example is. The stove is existentially dependent upon language. So, language needs to be involved in those particular beliefs as an existential precondition for the possibility thereof. — creativesoul

Sounds like the belief of the cat the mouse is behind the stove is as dependent on language as my belief that the milk is in the fridge is dependent on cows (if it's cowmilk) - as a cat-external factor (and one the cat might only dimly understand to begin with). Why, then, are we talking about language and not, say, gravity. The stove's existentially dependent on many, many things, few of which seem part of the present belief.

I didn't see it that way at all. You do not look foolish to me. Becoming aware of our own false belief seems like an accomplishment. I mean, we're all aware of our own fallibility, aren't we? — creativesoul

I didn't become aware of a false belief in that case: I lost track of why I was uttering the proposition, given that statements that include "all" tend to not reflect beliefs of mine, but function more as attractors for... something. I'd forgotten what that was, partly through focussing too much on the truth content.

Truth, for me, tends to erode meaning. Hard to explain psychological process.

What's the difference between using the English language and using the English language like one knows it is a nominative-accusative language? — creativesoul

There is none. Since English is a nominitave-accusative language, speaking English is speaking a nominative-accusative langue. I'll have to highlight again that I said "in the sense that they use it like that without trouble". It's not the most precise phrasing, I'll admit, but the point here is very important.

English native speakers needn't reflect that English is a nominative-accusative language, ever. And since they don't need to, they usually don't. In fact they usually don't know that they could reflect on that.

So:

I originally thought that this focus upon English was meant to be an example of a background belief that is brought to the foreground. — creativesoul

For a linguist, or someone who knows a linguist, or for someone who's confronted with, say, an ergative-absolutive language, this comes to the foreground. Usually it doesn't. When it does come to the foreground for the first time, it's usually a recontextualisation of what you've been always doing: things could have been very different - in a way that's not immidately, intuitively understandable.

So knowing "that English is a nominative-accusative language" (in the theoretical sense) includes knoledge that knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language (in the practical sense) doesn not include. In the previous sentence I used quotationmarks to distinguish the knowledge-levels, here. This is related.

However, the practical knowledge comes first: it's a way of talking, something you do. The theoretic knowledge is derived, and now a nominative-accusative language is both something you speak and something you can speak about.

Learning that "English is a nominative-accusative language" doesn't impact the way you speak English at all - but understanding what you're doing when you speak English might make it easier to learn, say, Basque. Theorising this way is necessary not to speak English, but to contextualise English. There's potential for new practical knowledge.

Also, a potential for greater awareness of what you're doing, though that might come at the cost of your practical efficiency when speaking English (thought patterns previously impossible might interfere now).

And to some degree this is the relationship between human and cat in the example: when we talk about what the cat believes, we take the point of view of the theoriser. There's a mat and a mouse. And so on.

This is what "behavioural implicature" means to me. A perspectival imputation. Basically: linguist:native speaker = human:cat. And since I'm a pretty staunch relativist, I'm fairly sure there's no way around behavioural implicature.

So, how does this notion of behavioural implicature deal with the fact that behaviour alone is indeterminate regarding that? — creativesoul

Via an iterative process of situational compatibility. Behavioural implicature is reinforced when our expectations are met.

So:

We all know, I presume anyway, that a mouse is incapable of contemplating the consequences of the double slit experiment. — creativesoul

Under behavioural implicature the question is: what sort of behaviour from a mouse would have you question this piece of "knowledge"? We're not coming at this from a neutral postion. We make working assumptions until they fail us. I mean, I certainly wouldn't assume that a mouse was reading this thread, just because I catch it looking at the screen...

If we are to attribute thought and belief to another creature, we ought to have at least a well-grounded idea and/or standard regarding what sorts of creatures are capable of forming which sorts of beliefs. — creativesoul

What sort of commonalities do we start off from here, each of us, to begin with? I mean, in this thread I'm not even quite clear yet what counts as a "thought". Meanings and context relevances change the further we draw back, or the further we move in. I mean, the cat might believe that there's a mouse on the mat, and we might ask questions about meaning overlap and distinct life environments until the cows come home. If we go all the way back to the opening post, I'm fairly sure none of us would assume that the cat's going from "how's Ann doing" to "it's Ann's birthday, I need to catch a juicy mouse for her and drop it in front of her bedroom", at least not if we involve the words. Part of the problem here is scope.

If you remove language what remains? Can you compare across different life environments? And so on.

What does it mean to say: "the cat believes there's a mouse on the mat"? Any question, any answer, any puzzlement around this always comes from a particular perspective within that entire field. It's the philosophy tango. (Can you tell I'm getting tired?)

I think consciousness is always present, always giving the entity in question, whether a particle, person, or whatever else, subjective experience of itself. — Patterner

But consciousness does not create those things [such as physical sensory input]. Rather, it is the property by which we subjectively experience them. — Patterner

I think I understand the distinction you're making better than I did before. Am I right that the major reason for proposing this ontology is to avoid needing to have consciousness emerge, or arise, or be caused by something physical?

If there is a reason for the emergence of consciousness, then wouldn't that mean it was intended? — Patterner

Not sure I follow that. Intended by whom? I'm using "reason" here in the sense of "What's the reason the seasons change?" But if that's confusing, we could, if you like, reserve the term "reason" for situations involving rationality and intention, and instead speak here of causes. So: "If this picture of consciousness as emergent turns out to be the case, we will understand the causes of its emergence very well." Is that less objectionable? (And mind you, neither of us is necessarily buying the "if" part. We're looking into what the hypothesis would entail.)

Am I right that the major reason for proposing this ontology is to avoid needing to have consciousness emerge, or arise, or be caused by something physical? — J

The reason is more that it doesn't make sense to think that consciousness can emerge, or arise, or be caused by something physical, so we need another explanation.

I'm open to hearing how consciousness does emerge from purely physical things. But people like Greene, Hoffman, Crick, and Eagleman say they don't have any clue as to how that can be.

If there is a reason for the emergence of consciousness, then wouldn't that mean it was intended?
— Patterner

Not sure I follow that. Intended by whom? I'm using "reason" here in the sense of "What's the reason the seasons change?" But if that's confusing, we could, if you like, reserve the term "reason" for situations involving rationality and intention, and instead speak here of causes. So: "If this picture of consciousness as emergent turns out to be the case, we will understand the causes of its emergence very well." Is that less objectionable? (And mind you, neither of us is necessarily buying the "if" part. We're looking into what the hypothesis would entail.) — J

I gotcha. And yes, that's fine. But wouldn't that have to mean there are lower level properties? How do we understand liquidity? How do we understand that solid H2O floats in liquid H2O? That plants thrive in sunlight? Where the bulk of trees comes from?

We know the micro properties that are responsible for the structures the next level up; the properties of those structures that are responsible for the structures the next level up; etc.

If we understand the causes of the emergence of consciousness very well, can it be possible that it will not involve the properties of the lower levels?

The reason is more that it doesn't make sense to think that consciousness can emerge, or arise, or be caused by something physical, so we need another explanation. — Patterner

OK. We're saying similar things: Faced with what seems (to you) a nonsensical demand for an explanation of how consciousness could arise from the physical, we have to postulate its permanent existence. My slant is more like: The demand may or not make sense; all we can say is that, as of now, we don't know how to think about it; our conceptual scheme creates a roadblock that might prove decisive, but we can't say.

I'm underlining the reasons for positing this kind of consciousness (call it Ur-consciousness) because I want to see if there are any other, independent reasons for thinking the thesis might be true. I myself don't see any, but tell me what you think: Is there any evidence for Ur-con? Is there a physical theory that can include it? What would be our research program, to find out if Ur-con did or did not exist? Is it, in short, the result of a transcendental argument alone? Something like the cosmological constant used to be? (And there's a lesson there, because the CC now has new conceptual arguments to back it up, so the transcendental arguers were right all along!)

If we understand the causes of the emergence of consciousness very well, can it be possible that it will not involve the properties of the lower levels? — Patterner

Right, that's the argument. Consciousness can't simply "emerge" like a rabbit out of a hat. So we have to ask what it is about the lower levels of physical reality that might be responsible. Your idea is that proto-consciousness was there all along, and it is this property of all matter that allows what we call mental realities to emerge. (I'm not persuaded that this "mental emergence" is any easier to explain than would be the emergence of consciousness itself, but let that go for now.)

The question I'd want to reflect on is, Are we being too parsimonious in our description of the "lower levels"? Must it be a matter of properties, exclusively? On the analogy with liquidity, then yes, it must be. But what about the analogy of the football game? What is the "property" which, added to the properties of the players and the field, creates the game? Two answers spring to mind: It's the intentions of the players; or, It's the rules that humans have put in place. I'm not sure which of these is right, but they both have the feature of bringing in something from an entirely different category of being, something that really can't be considered a lower-level property. Food for thought, perhaps.

My slant is more like: The demand may or not make sense; all we can say is that, as of now, we don't know how to think about it; our conceptual scheme creates a roadblock that might prove decisive, but we can't say. — J

You are certainly correct. However, if I'm putting thought into this puzzle, I'm not going to focus it in a direction that doesn't make sense. I don't think I can't possibly be wrong about consciousness being fundamental, or physicalism being impossible. Maybe a third alternative is the actual answer. If someone has evidence for anything, I'd love to see it. But they don't. Neither do I.

I'm underlining the reasons for positing this kind of consciousness (call it Ur-consciousness) because I want to see if there are any other, independent reasons for thinking the thesis might be true. I myself don't see any, but tell me what you think: Is there any evidence for Ur-con? Is there a physical theory that can include it? What would be our research program, to find out if Ur-con did or did not exist? Is it, in short, the result of a transcendental argument alone? Something like the cosmological constant used to be? (And there's a lesson there, because the CC now has new conceptual arguments to back it up, so the transcendental arguers were right all along!) — J

I can't see a way to validate any hypothesis, or rule out any. Nobody has come up with a way. All scenarios play out the same. We can't study, or even detect, consciousness with our sciences, so we can't see it come into being. We know it exists, because it's us. But we can't

Is there a physical theory that can include it? Not a physical-only theory. We're physical beings, and we're conscious. One way or another, it happens together.

The question I'd want to reflect on is, Are we being too parsimonious in our description of the "lower levels"? Must it be a matter of properties, exclusively? On the analogy with liquidity, then yes, it must be. But what about the analogy of the football game? What is the "property" which, added to the properties of the players and the field, creates the game? Two answers spring to mind: It's the intentions of the players; or, It's the rules that humans have put in place. I'm not sure which of these is right, but they both have the feature of bringing in something from an entirely different category of being, something that really can't be considered a lower-level property. Food for thought, perhaps. — J

Whether it's the intentions of the players or the rules that humans have put in place, football would not exist without consciousness. Football's lower level is consciousness, but we don't know what all of consciousness' lower levels are yet.

Football's lower level is consciousness, — Patterner

Kind of. Since there are players, and the players are conscious, then yes. But I meant to include that in saying that the lower levels include players and the field. There's still something missing from the description: What makes it a game? What makes it something with rules that we can articulate no matter who the individual players are, and which field they're playing on? I agree that it's human consciousness which does this, but not by virtue of what the players may be thinking about. That would be true bottom-up emergence, but we know that's not how it happens. Rather, something seems to be added to all this activity (and thinking) which comes from a different category; it's not the same as putting enough molecules together in the right way so as to get liquidity.

Rather, something seems to be added to all this activity (and thinking) which comes from a different category; it's not the same as putting enough molecules together in the right way so as to get liquidity. — J

I agree. But I'm thinking the "kind of" is key. Lower level properties account for higher level properties. At least they play a big role in the higher level properties, and the specific higher level properties would not exist if the lower level properties were different.

Micro properties can account for various higher level properties, such as liquidity and solidity.

Solidity can account for higher level properties, such as height and sharpness.

Consciousness can account for higher level properties, such as games with rules and mathematics.

What lower level properties account for consciousness, of course, is hotly debated.