when I say that an unperceived object neither exists nor does not exist, I am not saying that objects go in and out of reality. I am saying that outside all possible cognition, conception, designation, or disclosure, there is nothing of which existence or non-existence can be meaningfully asserted. You cannot truthfully say “it exists,” because existence is never encountered except in disclosure. But you also cannot say “it does not exist,” because there is no determinate object there to which the predicate “non-existent” could attach. — Wayfarer

When I perceive a brick in front of me, I have developed beliefs about an object: the brick. This includes the belief, "there is [=exists] a brick at some approximate distance from me". If I close my eyes, I no longer perceive the brick, but my beliefs persist: I continue to belief this brick is there [=exists] at that location. Continued perception is not necessary to maintain the belief. The belief is true because it corresponds to an aspect of reality. You omit belief formation and persistence from your account. This is called object permanence: "Knowing* that objects continue to exist when they cannot be directly observed or sensed." It's a capacity we develop as infants. (See: this) Undoubtedly, you went through this stage of development, and yet you're now expressing doubt about this.

*"Knowing" is true, justified belief. So I CAN truthfully say "the brick exists even though I do not currently see it". Do you deny the belief is justified?

Accordingly, existence and non-existence are not free-floating properties of a reality wholly outside cognition; they are predicates that arise only within the context of intelligibility. Outside that context, nothing positive or negative can be said at all. It's not a dramatic claim. — Wayfarer

Denying object permanence, which you learned in your first year of life, is a dramatic claim.

Existence isn't a property at all. To exist means to be part of the world. To say, "X exists" means that the word "X" has a real-world referrent. We apply the term, "non-existence" to concepts (mental objects) with no referrent in the world.

If you take any object — this rock, that tree — and ask, “Does it exist when unperceived?” you have already brought it into cognition. To refer to it, designate it, or even imagine its absence is already to posit it as an object for thought. The very act of asking the question places the object within the space of meaning and predication. — Wayfarer

You use "object" in 3 incompatible ways:
1) to refer to a tangible, real-world object
2) to refer to the direct sense impression you experience as you look at it (directly perceiving it as a gestalt).
3) to refer to the mental object in your memory that you use in your reasoning as a proxy (referrent) for the tangible real world object that you are not presently looking at (also a gestalt).

You then conflate 2 or more of these senses of the word and arrive at absurdities. I think if you treated these as distinctions, and acknowledged that we establish beliefs about real-world objects, many of your issues would disappear. Consider,"If you take any object — this rock, that tree — and ask, “Does it exist when unperceived?” The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it. The perception of the object exists only while perceiving it, and the mental concept/picture of the object exists as a memory of the perception along with beliefs about the object.

The gestalt of tree (directly perceived or the memory object) reflects the way we cognitively organize our perceptions/conceptions - but it nevertheless corresponds to a functional object in the real world, an object about which true statements can be made - including it's interactions with other functional (and real) elements of reality.

‘Does the moon continue to exist when nobody is looking at it?’ " — Wayfarer

I believe the real-world object that we refer to as "the moon" exists when no one is looking at it; this is entailed by my belief in object permanance and my beliefs about this particular object. I believe real world objects have no ontological dependency on being either perceived directly, or remembered.

Is there someting wrong with this answer? Is my stated belief (in bold) unjustified?

Why did Einstein ask this? My understanding is that he was challenging the notion that observation plays a role in determining physical realty, an idea suggested by the Copenhagan interpretation of QM. His implied answer was, "of course not!".

Nothing you've described is inconsistent with physicalism.

That’s not surprising because I’m in agreement with most of what physicalism says. I was narrowing down what part of existence we know. Existence as a whole and the mechanism of existence is not part of that. So to say;

-that mind is foundational to existence;

Is to conflate that bit which isn’t part of it with the existence we know. The bit of existence which we experience isn’t all of existence and isn’t foundational. This is self evident because we have limited capacities to experience and know things.

This is a mereological issue. Just because objects are reducible to particles doesn't imply they are not actual, functional entities in the world. By "functional", I mean that they can be analyzed in terms of their interactions with other functional entities.

Yes, but I’m saying something broader than that. For example in a thought experiment I can say the Earth is a being, Gaia for Gaia the physical world might be like a thin protective layer in her skin, that she is barely aware of and her family is made up of other planets and stars. In conversation what to her is the equivalent of a word spoken in a minute might in our terms be a few million years of seismic events and most of her life is an experience of transcendent realities entirely inconceivable to us. Rather like comparing our lives to that of an individual cell in our bodies. The cell could not comprehend, or understand anything about our lives and yet we share consciousness and there is a germ of being that the cell feels, which we and Gaia also feel in some way.

‘Does the moon continue t exist when nobody is looking at it?’ Einstein asked Abraham Pais.

Why do you think he asked that question? — Wayfarer

The question is unwarranted (like 'Cartesian doubt'), so why it was asked is philosophically trivial. In a scientific sense, however, Einstein's question exposes the absurdity (i.e. category error) of speculatively extrapolating – as (scientistic quantum-woo) idealists/antirealists tend to do – properties from unmeasured quantum states to interacting (i.e. measured) ergo decoherent states such as "the moon" – after all, strawberries do not get their flavor from 'strawberry-flavored subatomic particles'. :smirk:

The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it — Relativist

This is the whole point at issue. I've given my reasons in detail, if you can't see them, so be it, (although it might be noted that AI has no trouble understanding them). But I see no point in responding further, I'll leave it at that.

The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it…
— Relativist

This is the whole point at issue. — Wayfarer

The real world object (the named, experienced representation)….

One of these things is not like the other.

Everydayman could care less iff it occurred to him to ask himself about it; the philosopher wants to know because he does.

The point should have been but never was, not whether a thing exists, but the myriad of necessary principles detailing that intelligence alone is entirely insufficient causality for the naturally occurring things that do.

Oh how they laugh at speculative metaphysics the contents of which can never be empirically rendered, but just love the waveform collapse even though restricted to the very same criterion. The former is merely logical, the latter is merely mathematical, yet both represent that of which the observation will always be missing from the very thing explained by them.

They insist the brain causes human consciousness, but human consciousness is not an observation the brain permits. Human observation causes waveform collapse, but waveform collapse is not what the human observes. Odd, innit? The human intellect immerses itself into the less explainable in its attempts to explain.

And then, it is found the continuous existence of a thing, if determinable by my mere belief in temporal consistency, is catastrophically insufficient reason for anything at all having to do with empirical conditions. Constant conjunction has been relegated to the back-burner for centuries, after all, not that it ever should have been otherwise. How would I ever be able to justify the closing of my eyes momentarily, as different in principle from having my eyes open continuously but the thing in question not in its field? Shades of that stupid cup-in-the-dishwasher scenario, made popular by less critical methods.

That I believe a thing remains after I’ve closed my eyes is the weakest possible justification for it doing so, insofar as the construction of such belief is grounded in the mere contingency of its possibility, re: there can only be a belief in the continuance of an existence iff there has been an antecedent experience of it. Such experience is then ground for the presupposing the thing as object of the belief, in which case, the logical conclusion is not that the thing continues to exist, but the contradiction involved in the possibility that it does not.

….leaving it at that sounds good to me.

The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it
— Relativist

This is the whole point at issue — Wayfarer

Your equivocate on this point.

You had pointed to your essay after I challenged your justification for your metaphysical beliefs — Relativist

I am not positing 'metaphysical beliefs'. I am pointing out the inherent contradiction in the concept of the mind-independent object. It's actually physicalism that is posing a metaphysical thesis (and a mistaken one.)

As for 'the constituents of objective reality', I said in the essay, I leave that to science, whilst also saying 'I’m well aware that the ultimate nature of these constituents remains an open question in theoretical physics' - which it does.

My challenge to physicalism is that it posits that there are objects that exist independently of any mind or act of observation. Physicalism doesn't just say "physical things exist"—it says they exist as determinate objects with specific properties prior to and independent of any cognitive relation. But "determinate object with specific properties" is already a description that presupposes a framework of conceptual articulation. The physicalist wants to stand outside all frameworks and describe what's there anyway—but that move is incoherent. You cannot meaningfully refer to "the mind-independent object" without already employing the cognitive apparatus you're trying to transcend.

This isn't a rival metaphysical thesis. It's pointing out that the foundational claim of metaphysical realism—that objects exist as determinate things-in-themselves wholly apart from cognition—cannot be coherently formulated.

:ok:

I am not positing 'metaphysical beliefs'. I am pointing out the inherent contradiction in the concept of the mind-independent object. — Wayfarer

You made these assertions that apply to ontology:

1. Mind is foundational to the nature of existence

2. To think about the existence of a particular thing in polar terms — that it either exists or does not exist — is a simplistic view of what existence entails. In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it."

Both of these pertain to ontology (metaphysics). By stating them, you are expressing something you believe. Hence, they reflect metaphysical beliefs.

There is no "inherent contradiction" in the concept of a "mind independent object", but I think I understand why you say this: "object" is a concept - an invention of the mind. But this overlooks the possibility that there is a real-world referrent for the "objects"; and that there are good reasons to believe this is the case (irrespective of whether you find these to be compelling)

"determinate object with specific properties" is already a description that presupposes a framework of conceptual articulation. — Wayfarer

Agreed, but that fact does not entail that there are not determinable objects with specific determinable properties in the actual world. By "determinable", I simply mean that the mental object (along with identified properties) corresponds to something in the real world. It seems as if you deny this.

It's as if you think the fact of the "mind created world (model)" makes it impossible to have true beliefs about the actual world. (where "true" = a correspondence between the mental concept and the actual world). Is this indeed your view? If not, then clarify.

This isn't a rival metaphysical thesis. It's pointing out that the foundational claim of metaphysical realism—that objects exist as determinate things-in-themselves wholly apart from cognition—cannot be coherently formulated. — Wayfarer

My objection: it's irrelevant that our descriptions of objects is mind-dependent- because it's logically necessary that they be so. What is relevant is whether or not the descriptions MAP to reality (i.e. it corresponds).

Consider a tree. Our descriptions of the tree do not constitute anything ontological, but these descriptions may very well correspond to something ontological.

I'll turn again to your assertion, Mind is foundational to the nature of existence

It's undeniable that mind is foundational to understanding anything - because "understanding" is entirely mental.

But does "nature of existence" refer to the mind-independent (billions of years old) real world that you acknowledge? Whether or not your inclined to talk about it, the real world is something we can talk about, and we can talk about its "nature". That's an integral part of ontology, as a discipline. So I feel justified in asserting "mind is not foundational to the nature of existence". This does not contradict the notion that the "mind-created world (model)" is the cognitive basis for all our claims about the world.

I am not positing 'metaphysical beliefs'. I am pointing out the inherent contradiction in the concept of the mind-independent object.
— Wayfarer

You made these assertions that apply to ontology:

1. Mind is foundational to the nature of existence

2. To think about the existence of a particular thing in polar terms — that it either exists or does not exist — is a simplistic view of what existence entails. In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it."

Both of these pertain to ontology (metaphysics). By stating them, you are expressing something you believe. Hence, they reflect metaphysical beliefs.

There is no "inherent contradiction" in the concept of a "mind independent object", but I think I understand why you say this: "object" is a concept - an invention of the mind. But this overlooks the possibility that there is a real-world referrent for the "objects"; and that there are good reasons to believe this is the case (irrespective of whether you find these to be compelling) — Relativist

The reason I'm not making an ontological statement, is because I've already stated 'Adopting a predominantly perspectival approach, I will concentrate less on arguments about the nature of the constituents of objective reality, and focus instead on understanding the mental processes that shape our judgment of what they comprise.'

You, however, will interpret that as an 'ontological statement' because of your prior acceptance of the reality of mind-independent objects. Mind-independence is your criterion for what must be considered real. That is why I say at the outset that a perspectival shift is required.

I'm not saying that 'objects are an invention of the mind' but that any idea of the existence of the object is already mind-dependent. What they are, outside any cognitive activity or idea about them, is obviously unknown to us. What 'an object' is, outside any recognition of it by us, is obviously not anything. Neither existent, nor non-existent. (That I take as the actual meaning of Kant's 'in-itself' although he spoiled it by calling it a 'thing', as it hasn't even really reached the threshold of any kind of identity.)

But does "nature of existence" refer to the mind-independent (billions of years old) real world that you acknowledge? Whether or not your inclined to talk about it, the real world is something we can talk about, and we can talk about its "nature". That's an integral part of ontology. — Relativist

"though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle."

I accept that, at the outset, as an empirical fact. So I'm not denying it. What physicalism wants to do, though, is to say that the Universe with nobody in it is 'the real universe' (which is the same as 'the unseen object' or the 'mind-independent object'). Physicalism forgets that the mind provides the framework within which any ideas about the universe (or anything whatever) are meaningful.




If I challenge you, which tree are you talking about, you will say, 'I don't know, any tree.' But you and I both have ideas of the tree already in mind, which allows us to converse. What is the 'real' tree, outside any conception or experience of it - that is an abstraction which has no meaning. At that point it become an empty word, a stand-in for 'any object'. And the 'billions of years old universe' is reckoned in units which we derive from the annual rotation of the earth around the Sun. When you speak of it, you already have that unit in mind. Remove any idea of perspective or 'years' and then what do you see?

What this whole argument is about is, as Schopenhauer states clearly, is the 'subject who forgets himself'. That is precisely what physicalism does - it 'abstracts away' the subject from the so-called objective measurement of the primary attributes of bodies, and then tries to understand itself as a product of those objective entities that it has abstracted itself away from in the first place.

My objection: it's irrelevant that our descriptions of objects is mind-dependent- because it's logically necessary that they be so. What is relevant is whether or not the descriptions MAP to reality (i.e. it corresponds). — Relativist

:100: :up:

What physicalism wants to do ... Physicalism forgets ... That is precisely what physicalism does ... — Wayfarer

... and as if 'mind' itself is not physical (i.e. a mind-independent property).




.

The reason I'm not making an ontological statement, is because I've already stated 'Adopting a predominantly perspectival approach, I will concentrate less on arguments about the nature of the constituents of objective reality, and focus instead on understanding the mental processes that shape our judgment of what they comprise. ...You, however, will interpret that as an 'ontological statement' because of your prior acceptance of the reality of mind-independent objects — Wayfarer

No, it's not because of my acceptance of mind-independent objects. It was because of the words you used*. Can you understand why "mind is foundational to the nature of existence" sounds like an ontological claim? This is the root of what I referred to as equivocation. You don't fully cure this with the disclaimer (i.e. the text I underlined in the above quote) because you are discussing "judgements we make about the world" - and here, you appear to be referring to the real world. Then again, maybe you're referring to "judgements we make about the mind-created world(model)". I'm sure you aren't being intentionally equivocal, but your words ARE inherently ambiguous. Own this- they're your ambiguous words! Don't blame the reader for failing to disambiguate the words as you do. Rather, you should refrain from using terms like "world" and "nature of existence" to refer to the content of minds. It's easily fixed, just as I did when revising "mind-created world" to 'mind-created world(model)"

Also, I must point out that the "real world" (i.e. actual ontology) is lurking behind what you say, even though you "are concentrating less" on it. How else could you consider your essay to be critical of physicalism (your words: "physicalist naturalism that this essay has set out to criticize")? Physicalism is an ontology, and therefore a criticism of it is indirectly dealing with ontology. As I said, most of what you say in your essay is consistent with (i.e. does not directly contradict) physicalism. You may find it implausible that a mind grounded in material could account for a "mind-created world (model)", but the mere fact that we each have one of these in our minds does not falsify physicalism.

_________
* I actually did discern that you might not be making an ontological statement. Here's what I said:
____________________

Mind is foundational to the nature of existence
You could have justifiably said that mind provides the foundation for an understanding of existence, but as written, it was an unsupported ontological claim. — Relativist

I'm not saying that 'objects are an invention of the mind' but that any idea of the existence of the object is already mind-dependent. What they are, outside any cognitive activity or idea about them, is obviously unknown to us. — Wayfarer

But the concept of "object" is within minds, and therefore dependent on minds, just as each individual conceptual object (tree, dog, toilet...) is a mental construct.

The word "unknown" doesn't even apply. I suspect you're speaking in terms of a reality from which we subtract perspective - which we agree is impossible. You haven't analyzed WHY it's impossible, so I'll give you my take.

As you noted, "perspective is essential for any judgement about what exists". But perspective, in this sense, does not entail falsehood. It just means that understanding entails a perspective. Reality itself is perspective-less, because it just IS.

Understanding entails a mind grasping some aspect of reality - which means mentally relating sets of concepts. What else could it be? (This pertains directly to the quote of mine that 180 Proof just referenced).

What 'an object' is, outside any recognition of it by us, is obviously not anything. Neither existent, nor non-existent.

Aren't you refering to the impossibility of a perspective-less account of some named object? Refer to the bold part of my above comment.

"though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle." — Wayfarer

As noted, understanding necessarily entails perspective, and perspective does not entail falsehood.

When you say, "must have been..." you seem to be referring to something about the way the world actually was, at an earlier point of time. Right? That implies it is ontological. Yes, your description depends on a perspective, but this is because descriptions (and understandings) are necessarily based on a perspective.

So why say "supposedly unseen reality" when it is reference to a past, unseen state of actual reality?

No, it's not because of my acceptance of mind-independent objects. It was because of the words you used*. Can you understand why "mind is foundational to the nature of existence" sounds like an ontological claim? This is the root of what I referred to as equivocation. You don't fully cure this with the disclaimer (i.e. the text I underlined in the above quote) because you are discussing "judgements we make about the world" - and here, you appear to be referring to the real world. Then again, maybe you're referring to "judgements we make about the mind-created world(model)". I'm sure you aren't being intentionally equivocal, but your words ARE inherently ambiguous. Own this- they're your ambiguous words! Don't blame the reader for failing to disambiguate the words as you do. Rather, you should refrain from using terms like "world" and "nature of existence" to refer to the content of minds. It's easily fixed, just as I did when revising "mind-created world" to 'mind-created world(model)" — Relativist

You say I should distinguish between "judgements about the world" and "judgements about the mind-created world(model)." But this is precisely the distinction I'm arguing cannot be coherently maintained.

When you speak of "the real world" that my judgements are about, you're already conceptualizing it, referring to it, bringing it within intelligibility. The "real world" you have in mind—the one you want to contrast with my "model"—is itself always already a conception. You cannot step outside all conceptualization to point at what lies beyond and say "that's what I really mean."

This isn't ambiguity on my part. It's the recognition that there is no meaningful way to refer to "the world" apart from how it shows up within some framework of intelligibility. Not because mind creates or invents the world, but because "world," "object," "tree," "exists"—all these terms only have content within a cognitive framework.

You want me to say: "Here's my model, and there's the real world my model is about." But I'm saying: the "real world" in that sentence is still part of your conceptual apparatus. You're not escaping the framework; you're just pretending you have.

So no—I won't adopt your terminology, because it presupposes the very thing at issue: that we can meaningfully refer to a "real world" wholly independent of cognition, and then compare our "models" to it. We cannot. Every comparison is already within cognition.

This incidentally harks back to an earlier discussion about correspondence in respect of truth.

the adherents of correspondence sometimes insist that correspondence shall be its own test. But then the second difficulty arises. If truth does consist in correspondence, no test can be sufficient. For in order to know that experience corresponds to fact, we must be able to get at that fact, unadulterated with idea, and compare the two sides with each other. ...When we try to lay hold of it, what we find in our hands is a judgement which is obviously not itself the indubitable fact we are seeking, and which must be checked by some fact beyond it. To this process there is no end. And even if we did get at the fact directly, rather than through the veil of our ideas, that would be no less fatal to correspondence. This direct seizure of fact presumably gives us truth, but since that truth no longer consists in correspondence of idea with fact, the main theory has been abandoned. In short, if we can know fact only through the medium of our own ideas, the original forever eludes us; if we can get at the facts directly, we have knowledge whose truth is not correspondence. The theory is forced to choose between scepticism and self-contradiction. — Blanshard, Brand - The Nature of Thought,1964, v2, p268

But none of this is an argument that 'we don't know anything about the world'. It's an argument to the effect that our knowledge of world has an ineliminably subjective pole which does not show itself amongst the objects of cognition, but inheres in the way that objects are known by us. Again, you think that by saying that, I'm claiming that the world is all in the mind or the content of thought. I'm not claiming that, but I'm saying that positing of anything that exists entirely independently of the mind is mistaken, because our cognitive appropriation of the object is necessary for us to say anything about it.

As noted, understanding necessarily entails perspective, and perspective does not entail falsehood. — Relativist

I didn't say that perspective entails falsehood. I said that perspective is necessary for any proposition about what exists, and that only the mind can provide that perspective. Physicalism wants to assign inherent reality to the objects of cognition, as if they are real apart from and outside any cognition of them. But if they're apart from and outside cognition, then nothing can be said. Objects being independent of individual subjectivity is a methodological practice, but then transposing that to the register of 'what exists' becomes metaphysical naturalism, which is of a piece with physicalism.

I have mentioned I published The Mind Created World on Medium three weeks before ChatGPT went live, in November 2022 (important, in hindsight). A couple of weeks back, I pasted the text into Google Gemini for comment, introducing it as a 'doctrinal statement for a scientifically-informed objective idealism' (hence Gemini's remarks about that point.) You can read the analysis here. I take Google Gemini as an unbiased adjuticator in such matters.

And I do know how non-obvious this idea is, due to the 'naturalism which is the inherent disposition of the intellect' as Bryan Magee puts it in Schopenhauer's Philosophy. He says it is something that can only be ameliorated with a considerable degree of intellectual work, 'something akin to the prolonged meditative practices in Eastern philosophy'.

Lastly, the book I refer to in that OP, is Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics, Charles Pinter. Pinter was a professor of mathematics, all his other books are on that subject (he's since died, he published this book at a very great age. Regrettably, it hasn't received much attention, as he wasn't an insider in the philosophy profession.) But this book is grounded in cognitive science and philosophy, discussing many of the issues we're talking about here. And I don't regard the argument I put forward in Mind Created World as at odds with science in any sense - only with metaphysical naturalism, which is a different matter.

And that really, really is all I have to say for now. I am engaged in other writing projects and need to give them the time and attention they deserve. Thank you once again for your questions and criticisms.