when I say that an unperceived object neither exists nor does not exist, I am not saying that objects go in and out of reality. I am saying that outside all possible cognition, conception, designation, or disclosure, there is nothing of which existence or non-existence can be meaningfully asserted. You cannot truthfully say “it exists,” because existence is never encountered except in disclosure. But you also cannot say “it does not exist,” because there is no determinate object there to which the predicate “non-existent” could attach. — Wayfarer

When I perceive a brick in front of me, I have developed beliefs about an object: the brick. This includes the belief, "there is [=exists] a brick at some approximate distance from me". If I close my eyes, I no longer perceive the brick, but my beliefs persist: I continue to belief this brick is there [=exists] at that location. Continued perception is not necessary to maintain the belief. The belief is true because it corresponds to an aspect of reality. You omit belief formation and persistence from your account. This is called object permanence: "Knowing* that objects continue to exist when they cannot be directly observed or sensed." It's a capacity we develop as infants. (See: this) Undoubtedly, you went through this stage of development, and yet you're now expressing doubt about this.

*"Knowing" is true, justified belief. So I CAN truthfully say "the brick exists even though I do not currently see it". Do you deny the belief is justified?

Accordingly, existence and non-existence are not free-floating properties of a reality wholly outside cognition; they are predicates that arise only within the context of intelligibility. Outside that context, nothing positive or negative can be said at all. It's not a dramatic claim. — Wayfarer

Denying object permanence, which you learned in your first year of life, is a dramatic claim.

Existence isn't a property at all. To exist means to be part of the world. To say, "X exists" means that the word "X" has a real-world referrent. We apply the term, "non-existence" to concepts (mental objects) with no referrent in the world.

If you take any object — this rock, that tree — and ask, “Does it exist when unperceived?” you have already brought it into cognition. To refer to it, designate it, or even imagine its absence is already to posit it as an object for thought. The very act of asking the question places the object within the space of meaning and predication. — Wayfarer

You use "object" in 3 incompatible ways:
1) to refer to a tangible, real-world object
2) to refer to the direct sense impression you experience as you look at it (directly perceiving it as a gestalt).
3) to refer to the mental object in your memory that you use in your reasoning as a proxy (referrent) for the tangible real world object that you are not presently looking at (also a gestalt).

You then conflate 2 or more of these senses of the word and arrive at absurdities. I think if you treated these as distinctions, and acknowledged that we establish beliefs about real-world objects, many of your issues would disappear. Consider,"If you take any object — this rock, that tree — and ask, “Does it exist when unperceived?” The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it. The perception of the object exists only while perceiving it, and the mental concept/picture of the object exists as a memory of the perception along with beliefs about the object.

The gestalt of tree (directly perceived or the memory object) reflects the way we cognitively organize our perceptions/conceptions - but it nevertheless corresponds to a functional object in the real world, an object about which true statements can be made - including it's interactions with other functional (and real) elements of reality.

‘Does the moon continue to exist when nobody is looking at it?’ " — Wayfarer

I believe the real-world object that we refer to as "the moon" exists when no one is looking at it; this is entailed by my belief in object permanance and my beliefs about this particular object. I believe real world objects have no ontological dependency on being either perceived directly, or remembered.

Is there someting wrong with this answer? Is my stated belief (in bold) unjustified?

Why did Einstein ask this? My understanding is that he was challenging the notion that observation plays a role in determining physical realty, an idea suggested by the Copenhagan interpretation of QM. His implied answer was, "of course not!".

Nothing you've described is inconsistent with physicalism.

That’s not surprising because I’m in agreement with most of what physicalism says. I was narrowing down what part of existence we know. Existence as a whole and the mechanism of existence is not part of that. So to say;

-that mind is foundational to existence;

Is to conflate that bit which isn’t part of it with the existence we know. The bit of existence which we experience isn’t all of existence and isn’t foundational. This is self evident because we have limited capacities to experience and know things.

This is a mereological issue. Just because objects are reducible to particles doesn't imply they are not actual, functional entities in the world. By "functional", I mean that they can be analyzed in terms of their interactions with other functional entities.

Yes, but I’m saying something broader than that. For example in a thought experiment I can say the Earth is a being, Gaia for Gaia the physical world might be like a thin protective layer in her skin, that she is barely aware of and her family is made up of other planets and stars. In conversation what to her is the equivalent of a word spoken in a minute might in our terms be a few million years of seismic events and most of her life is an experience of transcendent realities entirely inconceivable to us. Rather like comparing our lives to that of an individual cell in our bodies. The cell could not comprehend, or understand anything about our lives and yet we share consciousness and there is a germ of being that the cell feels, which we and Gaia also feel in some way.

‘Does the moon continue t exist when nobody is looking at it?’ Einstein asked Abraham Pais.

Why do you think he asked that question? — Wayfarer

The question is unwarranted (like 'Cartesian doubt'), so why it was asked is philosophically trivial. In a scientific sense, however, Einstein's question exposes the absurdity (i.e. category error) of speculatively extrapolating – as (scientistic quantum-woo) idealists/antirealists tend to do – properties from unmeasured quantum states to interacting (i.e. measured) ergo decoherent states such as "the moon" – after all, strawberries do not get their flavor from 'strawberry-flavored subatomic particles'. :smirk:

The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it — Relativist

This is the whole point at issue. I've given my reasons in detail, if you can't see them, so be it, (although it might be noted that AI has no trouble understanding them). But I see no point in responding further, I'll leave it at that.

The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it…
— Relativist

This is the whole point at issue. — Wayfarer

The real world object (the named, experienced representation)….

One of these things is not like the other.

Everydayman could care less iff it occurred to him to ask himself about it; the philosopher wants to know because he does.

The point should have been but never was, not whether a thing exists, but the myriad of necessary principles detailing that intelligence alone is entirely insufficient causality for the naturally occurring things that do.

Oh how they laugh at speculative metaphysics the contents of which can never be empirically rendered, but just love the waveform collapse even though restricted to the very same criterion. The former is merely logical, the latter is merely mathematical, yet both represent that of which the observation will always be missing from the very thing explained by them.

They insist the brain causes human consciousness, but human consciousness is not an observation the brain permits. Human observation causes waveform collapse, but waveform collapse is not what the human observes. Odd, innit? The human intellect immerses itself into the less explainable in its attempts to explain.

And then, it is found the continuous existence of a thing, if determinable by my mere belief in temporal consistency, is catastrophically insufficient reason for anything at all having to do with empirical conditions. Constant conjunction has been relegated to the back-burner for centuries, after all, not that it ever should have been otherwise. How would I ever be able to justify the closing of my eyes momentarily, as different in principle from having my eyes open continuously but the thing in question not in its field? Shades of that stupid cup-in-the-dishwasher scenario, made popular by less critical methods.

That I believe a thing remains after I’ve closed my eyes is the weakest possible justification for it doing so, insofar as the construction of such belief is grounded in the mere contingency of its possibility, re: there can only be a belief in the continuance of an existence iff there has been an antecedent experience of it. Such experience is then ground for the presupposing the thing as object of the belief, in which case, the logical conclusion is not that the thing continues to exist, but the contradiction involved in the possibility that it does not.

….leaving it at that sounds good to me.

The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it
— Relativist

This is the whole point at issue — Wayfarer

Your equivocate on this point.

You had pointed to your essay after I challenged your justification for your metaphysical beliefs — Relativist

I am not positing 'metaphysical beliefs'. I am pointing out the inherent contradiction in the concept of the mind-independent object. It's actually physicalism that is posing a metaphysical thesis (and a mistaken one.)

As for 'the constituents of objective reality', I said in the essay, I leave that to science, whilst also saying 'I’m well aware that the ultimate nature of these constituents remains an open question in theoretical physics' - which it does.

My challenge to physicalism is that it posits that there are objects that exist independently of any mind or act of observation. Physicalism doesn't just say "physical things exist"—it says they exist as determinate objects with specific properties prior to and independent of any cognitive relation. But "determinate object with specific properties" is already a description that presupposes a framework of conceptual articulation. The physicalist wants to stand outside all frameworks and describe what's there anyway—but that move is incoherent. You cannot meaningfully refer to "the mind-independent object" without already employing the cognitive apparatus you're trying to transcend.

This isn't a rival metaphysical thesis. It's pointing out that the foundational claim of metaphysical realism—that objects exist as determinate things-in-themselves wholly apart from cognition—cannot be coherently formulated.

:ok:

I am not positing 'metaphysical beliefs'. I am pointing out the inherent contradiction in the concept of the mind-independent object. — Wayfarer

You made these assertions that apply to ontology:

1. Mind is foundational to the nature of existence

2. To think about the existence of a particular thing in polar terms — that it either exists or does not exist — is a simplistic view of what existence entails. In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it."

Both of these pertain to ontology (metaphysics). By stating them, you are expressing something you believe. Hence, they reflect metaphysical beliefs.

There is no "inherent contradiction" in the concept of a "mind independent object", but I think I understand why you say this: "object" is a concept - an invention of the mind. But this overlooks the possibility that there is a real-world referrent for the "objects"; and that there are good reasons to believe this is the case (irrespective of whether you find these to be compelling)

"determinate object with specific properties" is already a description that presupposes a framework of conceptual articulation. — Wayfarer

Agreed, but that fact does not entail that there are not determinable objects with specific determinable properties in the actual world. By "determinable", I simply mean that the mental object (along with identified properties) corresponds to something in the real world. It seems as if you deny this.

It's as if you think the fact of the "mind created world (model)" makes it impossible to have true beliefs about the actual world. (where "true" = a correspondence between the mental concept and the actual world). Is this indeed your view? If not, then clarify.

This isn't a rival metaphysical thesis. It's pointing out that the foundational claim of metaphysical realism—that objects exist as determinate things-in-themselves wholly apart from cognition—cannot be coherently formulated. — Wayfarer

My objection: it's irrelevant that our descriptions of objects is mind-dependent- because it's logically necessary that they be so. What is relevant is whether or not the descriptions MAP to reality (i.e. it corresponds).

Consider a tree. Our descriptions of the tree do not constitute anything ontological, but these descriptions may very well correspond to something ontological.

I'll turn again to your assertion, Mind is foundational to the nature of existence

It's undeniable that mind is foundational to understanding anything - because "understanding" is entirely mental.

But does "nature of existence" refer to the mind-independent (billions of years old) real world that you acknowledge? Whether or not your inclined to talk about it, the real world is something we can talk about, and we can talk about its "nature". That's an integral part of ontology, as a discipline. So I feel justified in asserting "mind is not foundational to the nature of existence". This does not contradict the notion that the "mind-created world (model)" is the cognitive basis for all our claims about the world.

I am not positing 'metaphysical beliefs'. I am pointing out the inherent contradiction in the concept of the mind-independent object.
— Wayfarer

You made these assertions that apply to ontology:

1. Mind is foundational to the nature of existence

2. To think about the existence of a particular thing in polar terms — that it either exists or does not exist — is a simplistic view of what existence entails. In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it."

Both of these pertain to ontology (metaphysics). By stating them, you are expressing something you believe. Hence, they reflect metaphysical beliefs.

There is no "inherent contradiction" in the concept of a "mind independent object", but I think I understand why you say this: "object" is a concept - an invention of the mind. But this overlooks the possibility that there is a real-world referrent for the "objects"; and that there are good reasons to believe this is the case (irrespective of whether you find these to be compelling) — Relativist

The reason I'm not making an ontological statement, is because I've already stated 'Adopting a predominantly perspectival approach, I will concentrate less on arguments about the nature of the constituents of objective reality, and focus instead on understanding the mental processes that shape our judgment of what they comprise.'

You, however, will interpret that as an 'ontological statement' because of your prior acceptance of the reality of mind-independent objects. Mind-independence is your criterion for what must be considered real. That is why I say at the outset that a perspectival shift is required.

I'm not saying that 'objects are an invention of the mind' but that any idea of the existence of the object is already mind-dependent. What they are, outside any cognitive activity or idea about them, is obviously unknown to us. What 'an object' is, outside any recognition of it by us, is obviously not anything. Neither existent, nor non-existent. (That I take as the actual meaning of Kant's 'in-itself' although he spoiled it by calling it a 'thing', as it hasn't even really reached the threshold of any kind of identity.)

But does "nature of existence" refer to the mind-independent (billions of years old) real world that you acknowledge? Whether or not your inclined to talk about it, the real world is something we can talk about, and we can talk about its "nature". That's an integral part of ontology. — Relativist

"though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle."

I accept that, at the outset, as an empirical fact. So I'm not denying it. What physicalism wants to do, though, is to say that the Universe with nobody in it is 'the real universe' (which is the same as 'the unseen object' or the 'mind-independent object'). Physicalism forgets that the mind provides the framework within which any ideas about the universe (or anything whatever) are meaningful.




If I challenge you, which tree are you talking about, you will say, 'I don't know, any tree.' But you and I both have ideas of the tree already in mind, which allows us to converse. What is the 'real' tree, outside any conception or experience of it - that is an abstraction which has no meaning. At that point it become an empty word, a stand-in for 'any object'. And the 'billions of years old universe' is reckoned in units which we derive from the annual rotation of the earth around the Sun. When you speak of it, you already have that unit in mind. Remove any idea of perspective or 'years' and then what do you see?

What this whole argument is about is, as Schopenhauer states clearly, is the 'subject who forgets himself'. That is precisely what physicalism does - it 'abstracts away' the subject from the so-called objective measurement of the primary attributes of bodies, and then tries to understand itself as a product of those objective entities that it has abstracted itself away from in the first place.

My objection: it's irrelevant that our descriptions of objects is mind-dependent- because it's logically necessary that they be so. What is relevant is whether or not the descriptions MAP to reality (i.e. it corresponds). — Relativist

:100: :up:

What physicalism wants to do ... Physicalism forgets ... That is precisely what physicalism does ... — Wayfarer

... and as if 'mind' itself is not physical (i.e. a mind-independent property).




.

The reason I'm not making an ontological statement, is because I've already stated 'Adopting a predominantly perspectival approach, I will concentrate less on arguments about the nature of the constituents of objective reality, and focus instead on understanding the mental processes that shape our judgment of what they comprise. ...You, however, will interpret that as an 'ontological statement' because of your prior acceptance of the reality of mind-independent objects — Wayfarer

No, it's not because of my acceptance of mind-independent objects. It was because of the words you used*. Can you understand why "mind is foundational to the nature of existence" sounds like an ontological claim? This is the root of what I referred to as equivocation. You don't fully cure this with the disclaimer (i.e. the text I underlined in the above quote) because you are discussing "judgements we make about the world" - and here, you appear to be referring to the real world. Then again, maybe you're referring to "judgements we make about the mind-created world(model)". I'm sure you aren't being intentionally equivocal, but your words ARE inherently ambiguous. Own this- they're your ambiguous words! Don't blame the reader for failing to disambiguate the words as you do. Rather, you should refrain from using terms like "world" and "nature of existence" to refer to the content of minds. It's easily fixed, just as I did when revising "mind-created world" to 'mind-created world(model)"

Also, I must point out that the "real world" (i.e. actual ontology) is lurking behind what you say, even though you "are concentrating less" on it. How else could you consider your essay to be critical of physicalism (your words: "physicalist naturalism that this essay has set out to criticize")? Physicalism is an ontology, and therefore a criticism of it is indirectly dealing with ontology. As I said, most of what you say in your essay is consistent with (i.e. does not directly contradict) physicalism. You may find it implausible that a mind grounded in material could account for a "mind-created world (model)", but the mere fact that we each have one of these in our minds does not falsify physicalism.

_________
* I actually did discern that you might not be making an ontological statement. Here's what I said:
____________________

Mind is foundational to the nature of existence
You could have justifiably said that mind provides the foundation for an understanding of existence, but as written, it was an unsupported ontological claim. — Relativist

I'm not saying that 'objects are an invention of the mind' but that any idea of the existence of the object is already mind-dependent. What they are, outside any cognitive activity or idea about them, is obviously unknown to us. — Wayfarer

But the concept of "object" is within minds, and therefore dependent on minds, just as each individual conceptual object (tree, dog, toilet...) is a mental construct.

The word "unknown" doesn't even apply. I suspect you're speaking in terms of a reality from which we subtract perspective - which we agree is impossible. You haven't analyzed WHY it's impossible, so I'll give you my take.

As you noted, "perspective is essential for any judgement about what exists". But perspective, in this sense, does not entail falsehood. It just means that understanding entails a perspective. Reality itself is perspective-less, because it just IS.

Understanding entails a mind grasping some aspect of reality - which means mentally relating sets of concepts. What else could it be? (This pertains directly to the quote of mine that 180 Proof just referenced).

What 'an object' is, outside any recognition of it by us, is obviously not anything. Neither existent, nor non-existent.

Aren't you refering to the impossibility of a perspective-less account of some named object? Refer to the bold part of my above comment.

"though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle." — Wayfarer

As noted, understanding necessarily entails perspective, and perspective does not entail falsehood.

When you say, "must have been..." you seem to be referring to something about the way the world actually was, at an earlier point of time. Right? That implies it is ontological. Yes, your description depends on a perspective, but this is because descriptions (and understandings) are necessarily based on a perspective.

So why say "supposedly unseen reality" when it is reference to a past, unseen state of actual reality?

No, it's not because of my acceptance of mind-independent objects. It was because of the words you used*. Can you understand why "mind is foundational to the nature of existence" sounds like an ontological claim? This is the root of what I referred to as equivocation. You don't fully cure this with the disclaimer (i.e. the text I underlined in the above quote) because you are discussing "judgements we make about the world" - and here, you appear to be referring to the real world. Then again, maybe you're referring to "judgements we make about the mind-created world(model)". I'm sure you aren't being intentionally equivocal, but your words ARE inherently ambiguous. Own this- they're your ambiguous words! Don't blame the reader for failing to disambiguate the words as you do. Rather, you should refrain from using terms like "world" and "nature of existence" to refer to the content of minds. It's easily fixed, just as I did when revising "mind-created world" to 'mind-created world(model)" — Relativist

You say I should distinguish between "judgements about the world" and "judgements about the mind-created world(model)." But this is precisely the distinction I'm arguing cannot be coherently maintained.

When you speak of "the real world" that my judgements are about, you're already conceptualizing it, referring to it, bringing it within intelligibility. The "real world" you have in mind—the one you want to contrast with my "model"—is itself always already a conception. You cannot step outside all conceptualization to point at what lies beyond and say "that's what I really mean."

This isn't ambiguity on my part. It's the recognition that there is no meaningful way to refer to "the world" apart from how it shows up within some framework of intelligibility. Not because mind creates or invents the world, but because "world," "object," "tree," "exists"—all these terms only have content within a cognitive framework.

You want me to say: "Here's my model, and there's the real world my model is about." But I'm saying: the "real world" in that sentence is still part of your conceptual apparatus. You're not escaping the framework; you're just pretending you have.

So no—I won't adopt your terminology, because it presupposes the very thing at issue: that we can meaningfully refer to a "real world" wholly independent of cognition, and then compare our "models" to it. We cannot. Every comparison is already within cognition.

This incidentally harks back to an earlier discussion about correspondence in respect of truth.

the adherents of correspondence sometimes insist that correspondence shall be its own test. But then the second difficulty arises. If truth does consist in correspondence, no test can be sufficient. For in order to know that experience corresponds to fact, we must be able to get at that fact, unadulterated with idea, and compare the two sides with each other. ...When we try to lay hold of it, what we find in our hands is a judgement which is obviously not itself the indubitable fact we are seeking, and which must be checked by some fact beyond it. To this process there is no end. And even if we did get at the fact directly, rather than through the veil of our ideas, that would be no less fatal to correspondence. This direct seizure of fact presumably gives us truth, but since that truth no longer consists in correspondence of idea with fact, the main theory has been abandoned. In short, if we can know fact only through the medium of our own ideas, the original forever eludes us; if we can get at the facts directly, we have knowledge whose truth is not correspondence. The theory is forced to choose between scepticism and self-contradiction. — Blanshard, Brand - The Nature of Thought,1964, v2, p268

But none of this is an argument that 'we don't know anything about the world'. It's an argument to the effect that our knowledge of world has an ineliminably subjective pole which does not show itself amongst the objects of cognition, but inheres in the way that objects are known by us. Again, you think that by saying that, I'm claiming that the world is all in the mind or the content of thought. I'm not claiming that, but I'm saying that positing of anything that exists entirely independently of the mind is mistaken, because our cognitive appropriation of the object is necessary for us to say anything about it.

As noted, understanding necessarily entails perspective, and perspective does not entail falsehood. — Relativist

I didn't say that perspective entails falsehood. I said that perspective is necessary for any proposition about what exists, and that only the mind can provide that perspective. Physicalism wants to assign inherent reality to the objects of cognition, as if they are real apart from and outside any cognition of them. But if they're apart from and outside cognition, then nothing can be said. Objects being independent of individual subjectivity is a methodological practice, but then transposing that to the register of 'what exists' becomes metaphysical naturalism, which is of a piece with physicalism.

I have mentioned I published The Mind Created World on Medium three weeks before ChatGPT went live, in November 2022 (important, in hindsight). A couple of weeks back, I pasted the text into Google Gemini for comment, introducing it as a 'doctrinal statement for a scientifically-informed objective idealism' (hence Gemini's remarks about that point.) You can read the analysis here. I take Google Gemini as an unbiased adjuticator in such matters.

And I do know how non-obvious this idea is, due to the 'naturalism which is the inherent disposition of the intellect' as Bryan Magee puts it in Schopenhauer's Philosophy. He says it is something that can only be ameliorated with a considerable degree of intellectual work, 'something akin to the prolonged meditative practices in Eastern philosophy'.

Lastly, the book I refer to in that OP, is Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics, Charles Pinter. Pinter was a professor of mathematics, all his other books are on that subject (he's since died, he published this book at a very great age. Regrettably, it hasn't received much attention, as he wasn't an insider in the philosophy profession.) But this book is grounded in cognitive science and philosophy, discussing many of the issues we're talking about here. And I don't regard the argument I put forward in Mind Created World as at odds with science in any sense - only with metaphysical naturalism, which is a different matter.

And that really, really is all I have to say for now. I am engaged in other writing projects and need to give them the time and attention they deserve. Thank you once again for your questions and criticisms.

metaphysical naturalism — Wayfarer

By which you mean exactly what?

(I ask because you've unjustifibly opposed 'mind-independence' (ontology) which you've conflating with a caricature of physicalism (epistemology))

I said that perspective is necessary for any proposition about what exists, and that only the mind can provide that perspective. — Wayfarer

This is an inarguable fact of reality. That people have spent pages darting around it is bewildering.

Existence is only ever encountered through the senses. That's the case. We need go no further. Speculations about that outside of perception is generally speaking, unwarranted. So, Einsten's question was unwarranted. As are most of the arguments made (including you Wayf.. imo).

I have mentioned I published The Mind Created World on Medium three weeks before ChatGPT went live, in November 2022 (important, in hindsight). A couple of weeks back, I pasted the text into Google Gemini for comment, introducing it as a 'doctrinal statement for a scientifically-informed objective idealism' (hence Gemini's remarks about that point.) You can read the analysis here. I take Google Gemini as an unbiased adjuticator in such matters. — Wayfarer

I haven't objected at all to your version of idealism, which I believe I understood. My criticism is that the essay does not provide a justification for claims you made in our discussion in this thread. Here's what sent us off in this direction:

What I'm looking for is your own epistemic justification to believe what you do. You previously shared the common view - it was a belief you held
— Relativist

I've laid it out in the OP, The MInd Created World. It makes a rational case for a scientifically-informed cognitive idealism. We had a long discussion in that thread. We'll always be at odds. Simple as that. — Wayfarer

What I was referring to was this prior exchange:

So when you say:

"I am an objective existent. I engage in mental activities; I experience qualia."

you are illicitly fusing:

The organism that can be studied objectively, and

The subjectivity in virtue of which anything is experienced at all.
— Wayfarer
I'm "Illicitly fusing?! You seem to implying my view is the idiosyncratic one. Hardly. Nearly everyone on earth does this implicitly! You have devised a dichotomy that is counterintuitive - at odds with our innate view of ourselves and the world - you need to make the case for why the intuitive/innate view is wrong, and your claims are correct. It seems unnecessarily complex - you need a reason to embrace this complexity over a simpler, more intuitive view. — Relativist

To focus on one thing: I indeed believe that I am an objective existent- an element of mind-independent actual reality. Your essay does not undercut this belief, and it does not justify referring to this as an "illicit fusing" - because it's possibly true - even though it entails judging through the lens of beliefs within the context of a "mind created world(model).

A metaphysical theory (e.g. The Thomist metaphysics that Ed Feser defends, or essentialism or physicalism) is a theory about the actual, real world. Your idealist theory only adds a layer to the analysis - a layer that may add a level of doubt, but it does not falsify any theory. My criticisms concern what your essay does not do. You have wrongly inferred that I am misunderstanding it. My quibbling with some instances of ambiguity are intended solely to relate your idealistic theory to ontology (theories about the real world). IOW, my position is that ontology can be entertained (and beliefs can be justified) in spite of the phenomenology and logical necessity of a perspective that your essay focuses on.

You say I should distinguish between "judgements about the world" and "judgements about the mind-created world(model)." — Wayfarer

I said no such thing. I said you should avoid using words ambiguously. It's not hard to avoid the ambiguity: judgements about the real-world are made through analysis of the world(model). IOW, we can entertain ontology and can justify beliefs in statements about the real world.

The issue I've repeatedly brought up is that this mental world(model) is BELIEF: it constitutes beliefs about the real-world. Judgements are made by analyzing these beliefs ; the resulting judgement is also a belief, grounded in the prior beliefs. Your essay doesn't put it this way, but I'd like you to understand that it is valid to consider one's mentally constructed "world" as belief- belief that is possibly true.

that there is no meaningful way to refer to "the world" apart from how it shows up within some framework of intelligibility. Not because mind creates or invents the world, but because "world," "object," "tree," "exists"—all these terms only have content within a cognitive framework. — Wayfarer

Of course there is, as long as one acknowledges that there IS a real-world. And notice that the term "real-world" is not ambiguous. An extreme skeptic might claim that it's inaccessible and therefore a complete mystery, because of the phenomenology/perspective-ness,, but even so - it is something we can refer to.

I won't adopt your terminology, because it presupposes the very thing at issue: that we can meaningfully refer to a "real world" wholly independent of cognition, and then compare our "models" to it. We cannot. Every comparison is already within cognition. — Wayfarer

You literally just referred to the "real world". Further, you acknowledged there is a mind-independent reality in your essay when you said: "there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind."

The next sentence begins reasonably, but ends problematically:

But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective.

"It's" clearly refers to the real world mind-independent universe. I agree that what we "know" (an expression of belief) is bound to the mind, but then you shift from real world to mental model by saying "reality is not straightforwardly objective. Here's a re-wording that I suggest expresses your point unambiguously:

But what we know of the mind-independent universe's existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, our understanding of actual reality is not straightforwardly objective.

Even if actual reality is inscrutable, it is nevertheless present. And since I'm dealing with ontology, the distinction is critical.

This incidentally harks back to an earlier discussion about correspondence in respect of truth.

the adherents of correspondence sometimes insist that correspondence shall be its own test. But then the second difficulty arises. If truth does consist in correspondence, no test can be sufficient.... — Wayfarer

This does not imply that correspondence theory should be rejected. The meaning of the word "true" is what matters. The quote merely argues that we can never directly verify the correspondence, which is irrelevant to the concept. Your observations about phenomenology could be treated as an argument against the possibility of knowledge (strict sense) of the real world- which could possibly be rational. But we need a concept of "true". There are other truth theories; correspondence is just the most widely accepted among philosophers (and for good reason).

Again, you think that by saying that, I'm claiming that the world is all in the mind or the content of thought. — Wayfarer

No, I had understood that you do not believe that. My complaint is that the language you use is prima facie ambiguous in the context of discussing "the actual, real world" - which was what I was discussing.

It is logically possible that some elements of our mental image of the real world are true- that they correspond to the actual, real world. You don't confront this possibility, but this doesn't stop you from judging that physicalism (which is a world(model)) is false. I do regard this as a flaw in your essay, because you include no reasoning for the judgement.

As noted, understanding necessarily entails perspective, and perspective does not entail falsehood.
— Relativist

I didn't say that perspective entails falsehood. I said that perspective is necessary for any proposition about what exists, and that only the mind can provide that perspective. — Wayfarer

I hadn't accused you of saying that, and I agree that perspective is a logical necessity for even entertaining propositions about the real world. That also follows when we examine this on the basis of beliefs. Beliefs are mental constructs, so a mind is necessary.

My statement was just another way of saying that HAVING a perspective doesn't preclude having true beliefs about the real-world (irrespective of whether those beliefs are justified- that's another discussion).

metaphysical naturalism
— Wayfarer
By which you mean exactly what? — 180 Proof

Exactly as defined:

Metaphysical naturalism is a philosophical worldview that holds only natural elements, principles, and forces exist, and the supernatural does not. It is an ontological claim about the composition of reality, asserting that the universe is a unified whole that can be explained by natural laws and processes, such as those studied by science. This perspective excludes the possibility of deities, spirits, miracles, or supernatural intervention.

Einsten's question was unwarranted. — AmadeusD

Who are you to say? Einstein's question was 'does the moon continue to exist when nobody is looking at it?' He had very good reasons to ask that question, which is still highly relevant. That it could have been called into question by physics itself is highly significant.

To focus on one thing: I indeed believe that I am an objective existent- an element of mind-independent actual reality. — Relativist

My response is that you are an “objective existent” only when viewed from a perspective other than the first-person. Your own conscious existence is accessible to you only first-personally, and even then not in the same way you know where your car keys are. To say of yourself “I am objectively existent” is already to adopt a third-person stance toward your own being and then retroject it into the first-person. In other words, you are importing the conditions under which others know you into the conditions under which you exist for yourself—and that distinction is precisely what the claim glosses over.

From the first-person standpoint, one does not encounter oneself as an “object in mind-independent reality” at all, but only as immediate subjective awareness. The moment you describe yourself as an “objective existent,” you have silently shifted to a third-person perspective—precisely the standpoint from which you appear as an object among others.

my position is that ontology can be entertained (and beliefs can be justified) in spite of the phenomenology and logical necessity of a perspective that your essay focuses on. — Relativist

The term “ontology” is important in disciplines like computer science, where it names a formal scheme for classifying components within a system, and in biology, where it underwrites taxonomies of genera and species. But that is not what ontology originally meant in philosophy. As Aristotle makes clear in the Metaphysics, ontology is not the classification of beings within a given framework, but inquiry into being qua being.

So when you say that ontology can be pursued “in spite of” the phenomenological and perspectival conditions my essay focuses on, what you are really doing is presupposing precisely what philosophical ontology is meant to examine: namely, the conditions under which objectivity, mind-independence, and even “being a thing” are first made intelligible to us.

(I’d also add that there is a strong tendency in modern analytic philosophy to deny that there even can be a “first philosophy” in Aristotle’s sense—no inquiry into being qua being, only local ontologies tied to particular sciences or formal frameworks. But that denial is itself a substantive metaphysical commitment, not a neutral methodological choice. Or rather, it often amounts in practice to projecting the methods and representational constraints of the special sciences onto the domain of reality as such—thereby quietly substituting a methodological limitation for an ontological conclusion.)

You literally just referred to the "real world". Further, you acknowledged there is a mind-independent reality in your essay when you said: "there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind." — Relativist

You're insisting that you 'understand what I mean' but your remarks tend to undermine that. There are empirical facts, of that I have no doubt. But:

If we take away the subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B Edition, B59

At the same time, Kant also acknowledges the role of empirical fact in his reckonings, saying that he is at once an empirical realist and a transcendental idealist (ref.)

It is logically possible that some elements of our mental image of the real world are true- that they correspond to the actual, real world. You don't confront this possibility, but this doesn't stop you from judging that physicalism (which is a world(model)) is false. I do regard this as a flaw in your essay, because you include no reasoning for the judgement. — Relativist

I am not saying that the world is illusory, nor that none of our representations correspond to reality. I do know where my car keys are! My claim is different: that what we call the “objective world” has an ineliminably subjective foundation—that objectivity itself is constituted through perspectival, experiential, and cognitive conditions. In that sense, the world is not “self-existent” in the way naïve realism supposes; it lacks the kind of intrinsic, framework-independent reality we ordinarily project onto it.

This is not a denial of realism in the sense of stable, law-governed regularity, but a rejection of the stronger metaphysical thesis that the world, as described by physics, exists exactly as it is described, wholly independent of the conditions of its intelligibility (i.e. 'metaphysical realism'). And in fact, modern physics—especially quantum theory—has undermined the idea of observer-free, self-standing physical reality. Hence Einstein's question!

You keep pressing me to affirm some alternative “substance” to take the place of the physical—some immaterial stuff, or “mind as substance.” But that is precisely what I am not doing. My critique targets the shared presupposition of both physicalism and substance dualism: that ultimate reality must consist of self-subsisting things. What I am questioning is that very framework, not merely substituting one kind of substance ('mind') for another ('matter'). That is still the shadow of Cartesian dualism.

quantum theory—has undermined the idea of observer-free, self-standing physical reality. — Wayfarer

But this is not necessarily anything to do with subjectivity or consciousness. Views of quantum theory that do are fringe. The observer-dependence in QM has nothing to do with conscious. It has nothing even to do with people.

My critique targets the shared presupposition of both physicalism and substance dualism — Wayfarer

I think your actual target for your claims is much closer to metaphysical and scientific realism, not physicalism or substance dualism. So I think in a sense there is a kind of category error in your arguments in that keep framing them against the wrong target

Who are you to say? Einstein's question was 'does the moon continue to exist when nobody is looking at it?' He had very good reasons to ask that question, which is still highly relevant. That it could have been called into question by physics itself is highly significant. — Wayfarer

No. It's not capable of answer. It was unwarranted. We have no reason to ask questions we cannot answer.

I think in a sense there is a kind of category error in your arguments in that keep framing them against the wrong target — Apustimelogist

It's also possible you don't see the target.

My claim is different: that what we call the “objective world” has an ineliminably subjective foundation—that objectivity itself is constituted through perspectival, experiential, and cognitive conditions. In that sense, the world is not “self-existent” in the way naïve realism supposes; it lacks the kind of intrinsic, framework-independent reality we ordinarily project onto it. — Wayfarer

The epistemic foundation is subjective. But I believe that (mind-independent) objective reality exists - irrespective of whether or not any metaphysical theories are true. Like all beliefs, this belief of mine is subjective. But if the belief is true, then it is the case that objective reality exists; IOW, this would be objective fact.

The modern discipline of ontology is the study of being, where "being" encompasses what exists, and covers all of actual reality, so my stated belief about objective reality constitutes a first principle of my ontological (AKA metaphysical) theory - one that I am fully committed to (in contrast to my considering naturalism the best explanation for all facts).

This is not a denial of realism in the sense of stable, law-governed regularity, but a rejection of the stronger metaphysical thesis that the world, as described by physics, exists exactly as it is described, wholly independent of the conditions of its intelligibility (i.e. 'metaphysical realism').

I don't believe that objective reality is exactly as described by physics either. But I do believe that if one chooses to embrace a metaphysical theory (=ontological theory), that at minimum it must be able to account for all known facts. So in that sense, it must be consistent with physics. This consistency need not include the "ontological models" physicists discuss (including, for example, interpretations of QM).

modern physics—especially quantum theory—has undermined the idea of observer-free, self-standing physical reality. Hence Einstein's question!

It only does this if one commits to a particular sort of interpretation of quantum mechanics. I am generally agnostic to specific interpretations, because I see no means of justifying a belief in a specific one. AFAIK, the so-called "observer dependent" interpretations have been supplanted by generalizing "observer" to include anything classical (like a measurement device) that interacts with the quantum system.

So what's your justification for embracing an interpretation that treats observers in a special way? Is it because it dovetails a commitment to a denial that there exists an observer-free reality (if that's what you believe)? If you're choosing it because it's consistent with your predisposition, then it doesn't serve as support for that predisposition (that would be circular).

To say of yourself “I am objectively existent” is already to adopt a third-person stance toward your own being and then retroject it into the first-person. In other words, you are importing the conditions under which others know you into the conditions under which you exist for yourself—and that distinction is precisely what the claim glosses over. — Wayfarer

That's not entirely correct. You are imposing your perspective of what is entailed by my claim. My belief that I am an objective existent is actually a consequence of my reasoning about reality: people, society, and the world at large and considering my role in these contexts. Regarding my relation to people: I recognized that I am similar to other people. I engage in thoughts (and have sensory sensations), and I infer that they do, as well. I also infer that the qualities that comprise my first-person-ness to me, also applies to them: I conclude that everyone is egocentric, so that my own egocentricity is not unique or special.

Label this a "third-person stance" if you like, but the label does not entail an obvious reasoning error on my part, but feel free identify an error.

So when you say that ontology can be pursued “in spite of” the phenomenological and perspectival conditions my essay focuses on, what you are really doing is presupposing precisely what philosophical ontology is meant to examine: namely, the conditi

ons under which objectivity, mind-independence, and even “being a thing” are first made intelligible to us. — Wayfarer

More or less true. Why should I not? It doesn't entail denying the role of phenomenology and perspective that you discussed. As I said, having a perspective doesn't imply falsehood. Do you believe it is impossible to make true statements about objective reality, under the premise that there does exist a mind-independent objective reality?

My claim is different: that what we call the “objective world” has an ineliminably subjective foundation—that objectivity itself is constituted through perspectival, experiential, and cognitive conditions. In that sense, the world is not “self-existent” in the way naïve realism supposes; it lacks the kind of intrinsic, framework-independent reality we ordinarily project onto it. — Wayfarer

You're blending 2 questions:
1) does there exist a mind-independent objective reality?
2) what is the nature of this mind-independent objective reality?

What is your answer to question 1?

You keep pressing me to affirm some alternative “substance” to take the place of the physical—some immaterial stuff, or “mind as substance.”...My critique targets the shared presupposition of both physicalism and substance dualism: that ultimate reality must consist of self-subsisting things. — Wayfarer

I don't demand you describe alternative substance; rather, I've asked if you can propose an alternative metaphysical model of reality. It's fine if your answer is no, perhaps because you consider reality to be inscrutable. That seems justifiable. But just because (I assume) you can justify this doesn't imply there is no justifiable basis for another person to think that reality actually does consist of "self-subsisting things".

Incidentally, "justify" does not mean a sufficiently strong warrant, to qualify as knowledge. It can be weak- merely a reason to hold a provisional belief - generally treating it as true, but remaining open to being supplanted.

If you have any comment on this brief passage I included from Kant, then I will discuss it. Other than that I have no further comment at this point.

If we take away the subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B Edition, B59

I’m not trying to be uncharitable but your responses while intelligent and well articulated show some pre-commitments that need to be made explicit.

I believe that (mind-independent) objective reality exists - irrespective of whether or not any metaphysical theories are true — Relativist

OK I will enlarge a little. That is a pre-commitment. You begin with a pre-commitment to the indubitable reality of the sensible world.

Think about Descartes famous Meditation II where he resolves to doubt the existence of the world, which could, for all he knows, be the projection of an 'evil daemon'. This was not an empty gesture. It is the kind of thoroughgoing scepticism which philosophy drives us to consider. But he found that, even though the external world might be an hallucination or a delusion, that he could not doubt that he was the subject of such delusions or hallucinations. Hence the famous 'cogito ergo sum'.

In contrast metaphysical naturalism starts at the opposite end. It starts with the assumption that the sensible world is real. Basically many of your questions amount to 'prove to me that it's not'. I don't regard that question as being philosophically informed.

It has been said that ‘naturalism assumes nature’ as its task is to examine nature. It takes the sensible world to be obviously real. The kind of deep questioning that Descartes engaged in, is not characteristic of naturalism. But due to the way Descartes' philosophy unfolded, with his division of res cogitans and res extensa, and the incommensurability of the two, then res cogitans was understandably rejected as an incoherent concept (which it is). This is a fact of intellectual history of which we still experience the consequences. This is how naturalism, the 'reign of objective fact', became normalilsed in modern culture. But the philosophical underpinnings need to be understood. Kant is the one who spearheaded that understanding. (And, later, Husserl.) Hence the reference.

Where I'm coming from draws on all of that, but it's informed by cognitive science (hence the references to Pinter's book.) Cognitive science understands that what we take as the real objective world is generated in the brain. This is why, incidentally, Kant has been described as the 'godfather of cognitive science'. Cognitive science is also prepared to question our innate sense of the reality of the external world, because it understand that this sense is brain-generated. 'There is no light inside the skull'.

I don't demand you describe alternative substance; rather, I've asked if you can propose an alternative metaphysical model of reality. It's fine if your answer is no, perhaps because you consider reality to be inscrutable. That seems justifiable. But just because (I assume) you can justify this doesn't imply there is no justifiable basis for another person to think that reality actually does consist of "self-subsisting things". — Relativist

I'm indebted to Buddhism, which denies substantialist metaphysics. I won't be able to express or condense the essentials of that into a few paragraphs or even pages. But I will say, it also requires a kind of deep perspectival shift in our attitudes to what we normally take for granted as being real. Not that nothing is real, that nothing matters, or anything of the kind, but again, an awareness that the way that we construe our sense of what is real is always in accordance with our prior conditioning or metaphysical commitments. The culture we're in takes naturalism as its guiding principle. But it's not metaphysically deep, it has no particular insight into what Buddhism describes as 'the cause of suffering' (other than in the medical sense, which is hugely important in its amelioration, but doesn't necessarily address existential suffering in the way Buddhism does.)

So the reason I don't propose to answer what is fundamentally real, is because it is something each individual must discover for themselves in their own unique way. It can't be formularised or spelled out by way of propositional knowledge. But a grounding insight of non-dualism of which buddhism is a kind is the sense that reality itself is not something we're outside of, or other to. Whereas that sense of 'otherness' or apartness is deeply embedded in our cultural grammar. And that really is a cultural schism.

…..an awareness that the way that we construe our sense of what is real is always in accordance with our prior conditioning or metaphysical commitments. — Wayfarer

I might be inclined to suggest the way we construe….interpret….our sense of what is real, is always in accordance with the sensation the real provides, which in turn is always mandated by the physiology of the sensory apparatuses. This is sensibility writ large.

The relation to prior conditioning or metaphysical commitments, of immediate sensation of the real, is construed post hoc ergo propter hoc as new or old in the subject interpreting, insofar as “prior conditioning” equates to, or represents, experience. This is understanding writ large, and within it judgement specifically.

But I understand you to have a broader view of the real than the above permits; a sympathetic metaphysical commitment, then, which favors less stringent judgements for those conceptions subsumed under the general “real” in compliance with the LNC, becomes nonetheless viable.

Metaphysical commitments. Like anyone could get along without one, huh???

If we take away the subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B Edition, B59

It depends on the premise that the "nature and relations of objects" lack objective existence- they depend on "the subject".

Similarly, it also depends on the assumption that space and time have some dependency on "the subject".

While our concepts of space, time, and objects reflect a human perspective, I believe they are metaphysically grounded and thus true statements can be made about all of them.

I’m not trying to be uncharitable but your responses while intelligent and well articulated show some pre-commitments that need to be made explicit. — Wayfarer

No world view can avoid an epistemological foundation, so of course I have pre-commitments: properly basic beliefs that include the innate trust that our senses deliver a functionally accurate reflection of the reality in which we live. I believe that earlier in life, you shared this innate trust, and wonder why you would abandon it. The mere possibility that we're wrong is not a rational reason to drop a belief. My suspicion is that you abandoned your innate belief because you could think of no rational basis to believe it in the first place. I'll come back to this, below.

I believe that (mind-independent) objective reality exists - irrespective of whether or not any metaphysical theories are true
— Relativist

OK I will enlarge a little. That is a pre-commitment. You begin with a pre-commitment to the indubitable reality of the sensible world. — Wayfarer

Yes- and as I said, it seems to be an innate belief- more specifically, a properly basic belief (PBB). A PBB innate is possibly false, but rational to maintain in the absence of a defeater. I'll elaborate.

My epistemological theory is a variation of Alvan Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology. He addresses a flaw in epistemological foundationalism (EF). EF necessarily entails basic beliefs that are not derived from prior beliefs- they are foundational. The problem is that this would imply the foundational (basic) beliefs are irrational. He addresses this by suggesting that a basic belief would be rational if it was caused by forces that would be expected to produce them. Such beliefs are "properly" basic. Plantinga suggests God would be expected to produce a sensus divinitatus - innate knowledge of God. He acknowledges this is not an argument for God's existence. Rather, it's a demonstration that belief in God is rational - if God exists.

I'm an atheist, but the concept of properly basic beliefs seems sound. If the world would produce living beings that were to survive in that world, those beings would need to be able to successfully interact with that world - so functionally accurate access to that world would be expected - and therefore consistent with the realty we experience. No, this doesn't prove anything about the world- but it demonstrates rationality - if it's true that there is such a world.

What if there's not such a world? Then I'm wrong. But on what basis could one decide such a world does not exist? Not a rational one, because the only basis for abandoning our PBBs is because they are possibly false. Possibility is not a defeater: it is irrational to abandon a belief solely on the basis that it is possibly false.

My suspicion is that you pondered your properly basic beliefs about the world, correctly noticed they were not based on other beliefs, and this led you to abandon them- because they seemed arbitrary and irrational. This left you with no epistemological ground - no precommitments, and this led you to idealism - a framework that focuses on the impossibility of a rational epistemological foundation. This strikes me as an epistemological dead-end; if it's true, then no beliefs are rational - because there is no rational foundation. Even your belief about where your keys are is unjustified, because there's ultimately a dependency on certain basic beliefs that you reject.

I see you've given a second reply, but I don't have time to read and reply (we're decorating our xmas tree, then I'm driving out of town). I'll try to get to it later.

Think about Descartes famous Meditation II where he resolves to doubt the existence of the world, which could, for all he knows, be the projection of an 'evil daemon'. This was not an empty gesture. It is the kind of thoroughgoing scepticism which philosophy drives us to consider. But he found that, even though the external world might be an hallucination or a delusion, that he could not doubt that he was the subject of such delusions or hallucinations. Hence the famous 'cogito ergo sum'. — Wayfarer

Where does this "thoroughgoning skepticism" lead to? It seems to me that if skepticism (of even your innate beliefs) is your starting point you have no rational basis for any claims you might make. You think you know where your keys are, but this means trusting your memories and your senses - that these were not deceptions by an "evil daemon", or part of an imaginary world your mind conjured. And yet, you are indeed confident of the whereabouts of your keys. This is in conflict with extreme skepticism, and is suggestive of self-deception: you indeed know where your keys are, but fail to accept the broad implication that knowing this implies your "mind created world(model) is consistent with the actual world.

I begin with this "common sense" notion: we DO trust our memory and senses (despite no rationally derived basis), so let's accept that it's true. It's innate: no one has to teach us these things. I also question whether it's even possible to fully divest of this belief. If you only do it part-way, you're being inconsistent- which seems less virtuous ( in terms of deontology) than fully embracing the common view.

In contrast metaphysical naturalism starts at the opposite end. It starts with the assumption that the sensible world is real. Basically many of your questions amount to 'prove to me that it's not'. I don't regard that question as being philosophically informed.

I haven't asked you to prove to me it's not; I've asked you to identify a flaw in my reasoning - explain why I shouldn't maintain this belief that you once had. I took a guess at why you changed your mind: that it was because you could find no rational reason to believe it in the first place. But if we're the product of either nature, or design, in a world we must interact with to survive, then we would be likely to have a natural sense that the world we perceive is real, at least to the extent to allow successful interaction with it. The belief would not be rationally derived, but it also wasn't derived IRrationally. So I suggest that inertia wins, because the mere possibility we're wrong is not a defeater. There has to be a compelling reason to change a belief; mere possibility is not compelling.

Where I'm coming from draws on all of that, but it's informed by cognitive science (hence the references to Pinter's book.) Cognitive science understands that what we take as the real objective world is generated in the brain. — Wayfarer

Two issues:

1) cognitive science assumes the world exists and can be understood through empirical analysis. How can you justify believing it, given it's supposedly questionable basis?

2) It's not in dispute that the brain generates the world-model. The question is: is this world-model (essentially) accurate? There are good reasons to think it is: it's critical to survival. Why would a false image be generated?

Not that nothing is real, that nothing matters, or anything of the kind, but again, an awareness that the way that we construe our sense of what is real is always in accordance with our prior conditioning or metaphysical commitments... — Wayfarer

Yes, but also the way we're wired. You have challenged, what I argue to be, an innate belief - not one developed by reasoning from prior assumptions.

So the reason I don't propose to answer what is fundamentally real, is because it is something each individual must discover for themselves in their own unique way. — Wayfarer

That pertains to question 2:

You're blending 2 questions:
1) does there exist a mind-independent objective reality?
2) what is the nature of this mind-independent objective reality? — Relativist

I had asked you to answer question 1. You identified my affirmative answer as a pre-commitment, from which I infer that your answer is either "no" or "I don't know". And yet, you make use of knowledge you obtained in the world- which seems contradictory. So...what is your answer?

Where does this "thoroughgoning skepticism" lead to? — Relativist

In Descartes example, to the apodictic truth of his own existence - cogito ergo sum - which then served as the foundation-stone for his philosophy. But notice that the unassailable confidence that one has to exist, in order to even be decieved, is of a different kind or order to knowledge of external objects.

1) cognitive science assumes the world exists and can be understood through empirical analysis. How can you justify believing it, given it's supposedly questionable basis? — Relativist

It is true that cognitive scientists would generally assume a naturalistic outlook. But I anticipated this fact: 'It might be thought that a neuroscientific approach to the nature of the mind will be inclined towards just the kind of physicalist naturalism that this essay has set out to criticize.'

But, I then say 'perhaps ironically, that is not necessarily so. Many neuroscientists stress that the world we perceive is not an exact replication of external stimuli, but rather is actively constructed by the brain in a dynamic and interleaved process from one moment to the next. Every act of perception involves the processes of filtering, amplifying, and interpretation of sensory data — physical, environmental, somatic — and in the case of h. sapiens, refracted through language and reason. These are the constituents of our mental life which constitute our world. The world is, as phenomenologists like to put it, a lebenswelt, a world of lived meaning."

I also mention in the context the well-known 'neural binding problem'. This is, in brief, that although neuroscientists understand very well the specific brain functions and areas that correspond with particular aspects of experience, such as colour, movement, shape, and so on, no specific brain area has ever been identified which accounts for the 'subjective unity of perception'.



Concentrate on the bolded phrase: 'the world we perceive is actively constructed by the brain'. You will say, but there's a world apart from the one actively constructed by the brain.' To which the reply is: indeed there is, but you can never know what it is.

if we're the product of either nature, or design, in a world we must interact with to survive, then we would be likely to have a natural sense that the world we perceive is real, at least to the extent to allow successful interaction with it. — Relativist

Crocodiles have survived unchanged for hundreds of millions of years without having to understand anything whatever. Evolutionary biology is not an epistemological model. Besides, Plantinga, who you mention, argues on that very basis, that if beliefs are a product of evolutionary adaptation, then we have no warrant for believing them true. Donald Hoffman argues on similar grounds, to a rather different conclusion. So again here you're attempting to use naturalistic reasoning in support of a metaphysical argument.

I might be inclined to suggest the way we construe….interpret….our sense of what is real, is always in accordance with the sensation the real provides, which in turn is always mandated by the physiology of the sensory apparatuses. This is sensibility writ large. — Mww

But what it means is always subject to interpretation. Indeed, we're always interpreting - this is what normal conscious existence consists of. We go through every moment judging, evaluating, drawing conclusions, projecting, predicting. Isn't that essential to conscious life?

I think that is, perhaps, why religious contemplatives seek the stilling of thought - so as to see life in its real and raw immediacy, unintepreted by our constant inner chatter. Might also be the state that mountaineers and other extreme sports seek - the cessation of that inner chatter so as to be totally in the moment. Sportspeople talk a lot about that nowadays. 'Flow'.

Yeah, well, you know…I’m that much in agreement with your general philosophical presentation, if I didn’t pick a nit once in awhile, I wouldn’t have anything to say. And while being a yankeevirgobabyboomer makes the background a pleasurable enough position to hold, every now and then I think it’s ok to raise my hand.

Awareness that the way that we construe our sense of what is real…..

….is real presupposes some real as given;
….our sense of what is real just indicates real in this or that way, predicated on one or more of five physiologies affected by the given;
….we construe our sense of what is real, insofar as the given is real in this or that way, by intuiting the manifold inherent in the sensation given from the real;
….the way we construe our sense of what is real, then, must be found in the intuition, as a function of it alone, and that necessarily under a set of conditions entirely distinct from the mere affected physiology;
—————-

….. is always in accordance with our prior conditioning or metaphysical commitments.

Awareness that the way we construe, is always in accordance with our metaphysical commitments, or the speculative theoretical method by which consciousness of our sense of the real, or consciousness of which sense of the real becomes manifest in us, is deemed both possible and sufficient for that which follows from it.

Awareness of the way we construe our sense of the real, is understanding, which always accords with our prior conditioning, whether in affirmation or negation of some relevant aspect of it, and is reflected in judgement.

Awareness of the construal itself, our manifest sense of the real, that description of the relation between the given and the subject in which it is cognized, is that by which he himself determines what his knowledge of the given real, will be.

As my ol’ buddy Paul Harvey used to say….now you know the rrreessstttt of the story: how to put the subject back into the scientific picture, where he’s always been on the one hand, and overlooked on the other.

In Descartes example, to the apodictic truth of his own existence - cogito ergo sum - which then served as the foundation-stone for his philosophy. But notice that the unassailable confidence that one has to exist, in order to even be decieved, is of a different kind or order to knowledge of external objects. — Wayfarer

Consider this: His statement does not account for WHY we believe in our own existence. He was not solving a controversy, in which people were unsure of whether or not they existed. We confidently hold the belief (implicitly) that we exist even without Descarte's identifying a rationale for this belief. A rationale, determined post hoc, does not cause belief. My position is that the cause of our basic beliefs is critical.

It is true that cognitive scientists would generally assume a naturalistic outlook. But I anticipated this fact: 'It might be thought that a neuroscientific approach to the nature of the mind will be inclined towards just the kind of physicalist naturalism that this essay has set out to criticize.' — Wayfarer

You miss my point. It's not their naturalistic paradigm that matters, it's that you believe (accept as true) their results. What makes it true? Does it correspond to reality? You can't say it does. It seems to me that you can only accept it as a set of entailments of a paradigm you reject. If you reject the paradigm, you have no basis for accepting those entailments.

Concentrate on the bolded phrase: 'the world we perceive is actively constructed by the brain'. You will say, but there's a world apart from the one actively constructed by the brain.' To which the reply is: indeed there is, but you can never know what it is. — Wayfarer

You're right, but only in the strict sense of knowledge (beliefs that are true, and justified so strongly that the belief is not merely accidentally true). We could perhaps agree that the phenomenology of sensory input and the brain's creation of a world model establishes the impossibility of knowledge (in this strict sense) about the world.

But GIVEN the impossibility of knowledge, we can nevertheless develop justified beliefs - many with strong justifications, but always short of strictly defined knowledge. This is the best we can do, so embrace it CONSISTENTLY! You are inconsistent, by accepting science but rejecting the possibility of justified beliefs about the actual world.

Long ago, I mentioned that my metaphysical beliefs are entwined with my epistemology. I hope this helps you start to understand why I said that. I try to apply my epistemology consistently.

Crocodiles have survived unchanged for hundreds of millions of years without having to understand anything whatever. Evolutionary biology is not an epistemological model. — Wayfarer

Evolutionary biology, as a discipline, consists of a set of beliefs - so in that sense, it is epistemic.

Beliefs connect ourselves to the real world, when they are true. THIS is what you fail to consider in your mind created world(model). You write of it as if there is no such connection.

Re crocodiles: They still interact with the real world, they (in effect) trust their sensory input. When they see prey, they (in effect) believe it to be present and accessible (although they do not reflect on this). We could just call it stimulus-response, although clearly some mental activity is involved with deciding which prey to pursue.

We have more complex minds that are capable of thinking reflexively (we reflect on our beliefs), which adds more mental activity between stimulus and response; more complex decisions can be made. This provided a survival advantage. Crocodiles (among many other species) survived for different reasons, but always because their skills were adequate to survive in their environment.

Plantinga, who you mention, argues on that very basis, that if beliefs are a product of evolutionary adaptation, then we have no warrant for believing them true — Wayfarer

You're referring to his "Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism". It's described in this wikipedia article. I've read about it, debtated it, and debunked it elsewhere - on the basis that survival entails having a functionally accurate view of reality. All life depends on this. When we evolved the capacity for language, the usefulness of language entailed it's capacity to convey that same functionallyaccurate view of reality; had it not then it would have been detrimental to survival. So our ancestors accepted some statements (=believing them as true), without needing the abstract concept of truth.

The wikipedia article includes published criticisms of Plantinga's the flawed argument.

His statement (cogito ergo sum) does not account for WHY we believe in our own existence. — Relativist

He says: my existence is apodictic (impossible to doubt) because in order to doubt, I must first exist.

Concentrate on the bolded phrase: 'the world we perceive is actively constructed by the brain'. You will say, but there's a world apart from the one actively constructed by the brain.' To which the reply is: indeed there is, but you can never know what it is.
— Wayfarer

You're right, but only in the strict sense of knowledge (beliefs that are true, and justified so strongly that the belief is not merely accidentally true). We could perhaps agree that the phenomenology of sensory input and the brain's creation of a world model establishes the impossibility of knowledge (in this strict sense) about the world. — Relativist

You're getting close to the point now, but still brushing it aside. What do we know of 'the world' apart from or outside the mind or brain's constructive portrayal of the world?

survival entails having a functionally accurate view of reality. — Relativist

Functionally accurate in what sense? As said, non-rational animals can and have survived ever since the beginning of life without a rational grasp of truth. But evolutionary biology is not concerned with epistemology in the philosophical sense. Their behaviours need not be understood in terms of their ability to grasp or express true facts. It is only necessary that their response is adequate to their circumstances. A bacterium's response to its environment is 'functionally accurate' when described this way, but plainly has no bearing on the truth or falsity of its ideas, as presumably it operates perfectly well without them.