Coming in late to the discussion, but just adding one key note… the fact we only experience reality in the way we do is not evidence there’s something more beyond our reality.

Define "our reality." Who is us and how is "real" defined?

H'm. Did he, by any chance, suggest a better term? — Ludwig V

Yes, Kripke suggested "possible states (or histories) of the world" or "possible situations." The latter may seem most vague, but that's for the better, in my opinion. In a model, we consider only relevant possibilities, whereas a metaphysical world is intractably rich in possibilities. A model does not aspire to completeness - only to pragmatic relevance. We stipulate what the model-theoretical "worlds" should be, based on what we expect from the model.

Consider dice, for example. In a 2d6 dice game, there are 11 possible scores in any round (2 - 12). So, if we only care about the score, then there are 11 possible worlds to consider. (Of course, these scores are not all equally likely. One shortcoming of modal logic is that it has nothing to say about probabilities.) If, in addition, we care about combinations, but consider individual dies to be indistinguishable for practical purposes, then the number of possible worlds increases to 18 (36 / 2). If we want to know the outcome on each individual die, then we are stipulating 36 distinct worlds.

But what if the die throw never occurs? Or a die is lost? Or it balances on its corner instead of landing on a side? And what of all the "extraneous" possibilities - the weather conditions, the configurations of air molecules in the room, the possible ways the Battle of Waterloo could have played out, the possible alternative endings to the Game of Thrones series? None of these real (or imaginary) world possibilities need be taken into account. We stipulate what goes into the model and what stays out. And although we cannot effectively control the outcome of a die throw, it will be up to us to translate it into the "actual world" in our model - and that is not always as straightforward as in this toy example.

Yes, Kripke suggested "possible states (or histories) of the world" or "possible situations." — SophistiCat

Either would be much better. The possible worlds model seems far too elaborate to me and quite implausible as a description of what's going on.

A model does not aspire to completeness - only to pragmatic relevance. — SophistiCat

Well, completeness is unobtainable, IMO. So why not settle for something we can do?

One shortcoming of modal logic is that it has nothing to say about probabilities. — SophistiCat

I've often wondered how possibilities and probabilities fit together. No-one seems to be interested. But here's an analysis of the possibilities of a dice game when we already have an analysis of the same game in terms of probabilities.

But what if the die throw never occurs? Or a die is lost? Or it balances on its corner instead of landing on a side? And what of all the "extraneous" possibilities - the weather conditions, the configurations of air molecules in the room, the possible ways the Battle of Waterloo could have played out, the possible alternative endings to the Game of Thrones series? — SophistiCat

Quite so. But can't we just lump all these together as "no throws", which is what would happen in real life. Not that we can ever know all the possible outlandish outcomes that might possibly occur.

It all seems perfectly clear. — Ludwig V

Good. Following your analogy, one of the books in your encyclopaedia is about the actual world. You might take it out and read it. In another possible world, another possible you can take out a different book about their world, treating it as their actual world, and read, it perhaps with as much satisfaction as you derive from reading yours.

Indeed.

An example of Modal realism, David Lewis' ideas were quite sophisticated, and far from Meta's misunderstandings. In brief, Lewis held that since someone in another possible world would consider their world to be the actual world, we should treat it as an actual world; that it was as real as our own. Such a view is annoyingly coherent, leading to a large literature.

Most philosophers will differentiate between treating a possible world as if it were real, and treating it as real.

Meta's idea, so far as I can make out, is that the node in a model (w₀, the designated “actual world”) though it is claimed to be the metaphysical actual world rather than one of many semantic artefacts, w₁, w₂ and so on. He takes these model-theoretic objects as claims about reality then accuses the logician of contradiction because the formal “actual world” differs from the metaphysical actual world.

If you continue to insist that you can use the same term to refer to different things, within the same argument (to equivocate), and to insist that there is no logical inconsistency in doing this, and also assert that the person who points out this equivocation to you, is the one making the error, then I think there is not much point in proceeding. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no such equivocation. The problem is your inability to differentiate between a model-theoretic object and a metaphysical one.

But it is possible that he is not doing that. I may have misunderstood, but I think the idea is that the actual world is regarded as a possible world, which does not imply that there are two worlds here. — Ludwig V

You have not misunderstood.

, , For better or worse, the term is now embedded in the literature. One needs must learn instead to use it correctly.

This got complicated. For the non-philosophers, is there a 2 or 3 sentence answer to the OP from your perspective? From my perspective we can’t ‘know’ but I guess it depends upon what’s meant by know… or ‘beyond’.

This got complicated. — Tom Storm

Yes, indeed. I'll stand by what I said in my first post:

How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality?

Because reality is what there is.

To posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is. It is to extend reality.

This is why the extent of our language is the extent of our world.

Hopefully, replacing "limit" with "extent" will head off some of the misplaced criticism of that phrase.

The other mistake here is to equate what we experience with what is real, and so to conflate "How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our experience" with "How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality".

"Beyond reality" is not a region; it is a grammatical error. — Banno

How's that sit with you?

I may have misunderstood, but I think the idea is that the actual world is regarded as a possible world, which does not imply that there are two worlds here. — Ludwig V

In our discussion, Banno more than once explicitly said that the actual world is the world that we live in. This is completely different from any representation of the world we live in. And, numerous times it is implied that he is referring to what he now calls the "metaphysical actual world" with "the actual world", yet other times he insists that "the actual world refers to a representation..

The reason why the argument which Banno presented from Fitch fails, is that it requires this conflating of the independent world, and the "actual world" of the modal model. It can only succeed through that fallacy of equivocation. I proposed to Banno that we revisit this argument and analyze it while maintaining the appropriate separation separation. Banno so far has refused, simply asserting that his error is mine.

We're getting sucked in to all-or-nothing positions. Ordinary language sometimes misleads and sometimes doesn't. One of the tasks for philosophy is to sort out the misleading bits and those that are not. I notice, however, that many major issues in philosophy are precisely based on misleading features of ordinary language - such as the pursuit of "Reality" and "Existence".
I don't think of language as a sort of bolt-on extra that human beings possess and other creatures don't (on the whole). In the first place, many animals have communication systems that are recognizably language-like and look very like precursors of language. In the second place, language is something that humans developed under evolutionary pressure, and hence no different from any other feature developed in the same way by other creatures. In the third place, you seem to think that our "inner intuitions" are not as liable to mislead us as language is; I see no ground for supposing that. — Ludwig V

My point was simply that when ordinary language contradicts good philosophy, we ought to accept this as a flaw in ordinary language, rather than rejecting the philosophy because it contradicts ordinary language.

There is no such equivocation. The problem is your inability to differentiate between a model-theoretic object and a metaphysical one. — Banno

That's so wrong. You, in the very same argument use "the actual world" to refer to a model-theoretic object, and also to a metaphysical object. When a person demonstrates to you that this is the fallacy of equivocation, you claim that it is that person's error for not distinguishing the two.

As I told, the argument from Fitch which you provided, fails if we maintain that separation. Are you ready to look over your argument, and see how it depends on equivocation?

You, in the very same argument use "the actual world" to refer to a model-theoretic object, and also to a metaphysical object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where?

Might be best to quote me. Be precise.

How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality?

Because reality is what there is.

To posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is. It is to extend reality.

This is why the extent of our language is the extent of our world. — Banno

This makes sense. But from my perspective reality is a vexed term to begin with. What exactly do we mean by this word - the totality of facts, not things?

In a not untrivial way, some people's reality (on account of language acuity and education) is definitely larger than others who have more limited capabilities. I don't think this is an equivocation on the word, but you may think so?

Is it not the case that what we call reality today is "beyond" what we called reality 500 years ago?

At the risk of being overly formal, have a think about the difference between what is true and what is known to be true.

To explain the idea, lets' suppose we can list all the facts, every true statement: {f1, f2, f3...} Those facts, taken together, list everything that is the case.

But while you and I know maybe the first few thousand facts, little Jimmy over there only knows the first few hundred.

Will we say that he is living in a different world to us? That he has a different reality? Well, we could, if we restrict facts to only those things that are known, and not toe those things that are true, whether known or not.

So in that way of talking, Little Jimmy's reality is smaller than yours and mine.

Btu notice that this is a different sense to all the facts, taken as a whole.

So we have two different things - what is known, and what is true. On the first, folk can have different realities. On the second, we all share the same reality.

Not an ambiguity, but we should take care as to which sense we are using and be consistent in that use.

Where?

Might be best to quote me. Be precise. — Banno

I just did that yesterday :

Look:

We are in the actual world.
— Banno

We are stipulating that that one world is the actual world, not deducing it. Any world can counted as w₀. It's built in, not contradictory. There is no modal difference between the actual world and other possible worlds.
— Banno — Metaphysician Undercover

the fact we only experience reality in the way we do is not evidence there’s something more beyond our reality. — Christoffer

No, but it is also not evidence that what we experience is all there is. We evolved as these creatures with a finite set of senses. Our reality consists only of what we can detect. Doesn't follow that that is all there is.

@Banno
Now, are you ready to address the so-called Fitch's paradox, and accept that it doesn't say anything about any supposed independent, metaphysical world? It says something about our representation of the actual world in the modal model. To me it says nothing other than the trivial tautology, that everything which is known is known. Where's the paradox?

Links to my posts rather than your own would be preferred, when you are trying to demonstrate a problem with something I said. The bit where I pointed out that responding to your rubbish requires more time than it is worth.

But I tracked down the originals.

We are in the actual world. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are in the actual world.

That's from this:

We are in the actual world. Metaphysics. — Banno

The whole quote makes it clear I am talking metaphysically. See the word "Metaphysics" in the very next sentence? It's kinda a giveaway.

The other is from a different post,

We are stipulating that that one world is the actual world, not deducing it. Any world can counted as w₀. It's built in, not contradictory. — Banno

See how it refers to w₀, and so is clearly modal.

SO your accusation was I

...in the very same argument use "the actual world" to refer to a model-theoretic object, and also to a metaphysical object. — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet the evidence you provide is from two quite different posts, which in context make it clear that one is about metaphysics and the other about modality.


A pathetic response, even for you. This is why, if I wasn't chasing posts, I'd have long ago gone back to ignoring you.

are you ready to address the so-called Fitch's paradox — Metaphysician Undercover

Always. Let's start by having you demonstrate that you understand the paradox by setting it out.

:lol:

Are you not entertained?! Is this not why you are here?!

:wink:

This issue may simply be to difficult for me.

Is it not the case that what we call reality today is "beyond" what we called reality 500 years ago? — Tom Storm

If the question asks is there a possibility that there is an aspect of reality beyond our known reality, how could we rule this out? I don't think this is a useful frame however since hypothetical aspects of reality are moot.

If the question asks is there a possibility that there is an aspect of reality beyond our known reality, how could we rule this out? — Tom Storm

I think we can guarantee that "there a possibility that there is an aspect of reality beyond our known reality". It seems to me that wha this says is "there are things we do not know", and I'm pretty confident that we do not know everything.

But is there something here, some other understanding of "an aspect of reality beyond our known reality" that I'm missing?

if not, then this appears to be a classic case of language leading us astray.

Thanks for getting us back on track. The digression with Meta has gone on too long. But it did spawn another thread, thanks to @Frank, which I'm enjoying. More opportunities for me to show off, of course. :halo:

And yet the evidence you provide is from two quite different posts, which in context make it clear that one is about metaphysics and the other about modality. — Banno

My entire discussion with you in this thread is "the same argument". When finally persuaded to clarify your use, you admitted to equivocation. At some times you used "actual world" to talk about the metaphysical world, at other times you used "actual world" to refer to a modal world.

Then you had the gall to insist that your equivocation was my error, of not being able to distinguish when "actual world" meant metaphysical world, and when it meant modal world.

Let's start by having you demonstrate that you understand the paradox by setting it out. — Banno

Like I said, I don't understand the paradox as a paradox. This is because it appears to require that some conclusion about the independent metaphysical world, is derived from a modal model. If this is the case then it is very clearly the fallacy of equivocation, which I've charged.

So I suggest that you present it in a way which appears to make sense to you, while recognizing the separation between the actual world of modal logic, which is a human produced representation, and the independent metaphysical world. How do you propose to say something about the independent metaphysical world, from within the modal model? Or, does the paradox not say anything at all about the independent metaphysical world?

But is there something here, some other understanding of "an aspect of reality beyond our known reality" that I'm missing?

if not, then this appears to be a classic case of language leading us astray. — Banno

I think then, that you and I are in agreement. We certainly know that the phrase, beyond our known reality, is often code for the Platonic realm or any number of alternate worlds. Let's not go there.

No, but it is also not evidence that what we experience is all there is. We evolved as these creatures with a finite set of senses. Our reality consists only of what we can detect. Doesn't follow that that is all there is. — Questioner

Yes, but that’s not what I’m getting at. We know that reality looks and behaves vastly different than our senses and limited perspective can perceive, but the question asked is about the possibility of something beyond our reality, based on our limited perception. Such a question becomes a form of wishful thinking, utilizing the limited perception we have as an unknown factor to project a fantasy of existence beyond our reality. It’s existential comfort.

It’s more likely asked because we want it to be true. We entertain the idea as a form of science fiction. Because if we look at what we lack in perception, it’s rather about frequencies of light and sound waves, of energy levels and the ability for higher dimensional reasoning. Neither of it speaks of concepts of other realities, only elevated perceptions of the same reality we’re already in.

The right question would rather be… if we were able to perceive everything, what would we perceive?

And if we want to ask if there’s anything beyond our reality, the answer is most likely, nothing that would help us understand ourselves, this reality, or function as any comfort at all because it would probably be so dramatically different from everything we understand of our own reality that it would be a useless glimpse. There wouldn’t be anything recognizable, there wouldn’t be a perception level able to comprehend anything as it would be different from even perceiving everything in our own reality, which in itself would overload our minds.

In the end, the question becomes a cry for god, not a question of perception or understanding. We are limited to this reality, for which we still have lots more to discover and understand about. Anything beyond our reality becomes white noise to us, as our existence itself is bound to this reality, as nothing of us is proven to function outside the reality we are part of. To ask about realities beyond our own is to ask for some other plane of existence we could enter into. But we can’t, as doing so would untangle the very being of our existence. It becomes as meaningless as if there is nothing at all beyond this reality.

A good example is the holographic theory of our universe. That our reality is due to a projection from some event horizon in some elevated reality. But it’s not a projection of our existence as people seem to believe, it’s a projection of whatever is originally there that due to being projected has formed the parameters of our reality. It projects the conditions that forms everything we know and our reality becomes something else entirely because of it. The conditions of our reality change the projected original into not resembling anything of itself at all and the process itself giving rise to conditions that transforms the very nature of it.

By entertaining the though truthfully, the idea breaks, as our parameters of definition for something beyond our reality is dependent on our own reality, which differs from anything beyond.

It’s a hard limit to our existence, as any answer of the beyond becomes meaningless to any of our conditions.

We simply want it to be there because it would entertain the thought of all our religious fantasies.

At some times you used "actual world" to talk about the metaphysical world, at other times you used "actual world" to refer to a modal world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep. I can do that. The same term is used for two different things. That's not equivocation. It's your error to conflate metaphysics with modality. Think I mentioned that. A few times.

I don't understand the paradox as a paradox. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, then can you at least explain why Fitch and others think it a paradox? Why is it worthy of it's own article, in the Stanford Encyclopaedia, in Wikipedia, in Oxford Academic, and so on. What is it that the folk who wrote this stuff think is happening?

So I suggest that you present it in a way which appears to make sense to you, — Metaphysician Undercover

No. If you would proceed, set it out for us. I've set it out multiple times, and you disagree with it each time. Your turn. Set it out for us, and how it goes astray.

Ok.