Secondly, the point originally being made about Crisp is a moral claim (hence the words "fear and resentment"), and yet the people who tend to make such claims also tend to deny moral realism, which logically takes all the sting out of their reproach. ...It's remarkable to me that on TPF moral realism is so thoroughly repelled that members regularly fail to provide any rational justification for prohibiting even the most grievous offenses, such as the slave trade, but on the other hand this has been par for the philosophical course for centuries. — Leontiskos

I’m don't know if there are moral facts or if morality is grounded in anything beyond emotional responses, perhaps emotivism is correct, of which, presumably, there are more and less defensible versions.

Interesting you see Crisp as making a moral claim. I didn’t think of it like this. I think the idea that people fear and resent 'the strange' is human nature. I know I do. I don’t consider this to be located in a specific moral framework, more a vague aesthetic/emotional one or one wherein we find ourselves unable to make sense of something. I also don't know if Crisp is right in his view. It seemed like an interesting position to raise in the context of the discussion, since it tackled tolerance differently.

:wink:

So we have the supposed paradox of tolerance; that the left, in advocating "tolerance", is hypocritical in not tolerating the right - in not tolerating intolerance.

One way to view this is as confusing tolerance with acceptance. In this usage, to tolerate is roughly to refrain from using coercion, while to accept is to place the account in the domain of public discussion.

The left can coherently tolerate the more extreme views of those on the right without accepting them.

Why not accept them? Popper's response is well-known, even if the attribution might be lost. To accept intolerance is to undermine the broader ethic of tolerance. It's not hypocrisy but consistency. On this account intolerance might be tolerated, but certainly not accepted.

I was trying to draw a broad sharp line between those who support institutions even if they often suck and those who want to shake the Etch a Sketch upside down. I am not aware of any of the former kind who subscribe to the purely emotional view you propose to be a significant factor in political discourse. — Paine

Somewhere in between we have Popper's ad hoc social engineering, piecemeal improvement. Small, testable reforms, improving society step by step while avoiding catastrophic overreach.

But is that enough?

I figure education is captured by an ongoing cultural war. From that point of view, any program put forward is not only a policy proposal but an attempt to vanquish some other view.

Noticing that development is not the same as understanding it.

It is not enough to note that some people seek their advantage.

One strategy in that culture war has been the denigration of the term "liberal". It's odd, since if we scratch most folk, outside of religious traditions, their core values will be classically liberal: Individual freedom, the rule of law, equality before that law, protection of rights and liberties and so on.

These are what lead to tolerance, and to acceptance, as much as vice versa.

So we might accept that others live lives quite divergent from our own, on the condition that they do not obligate us to do as they do. Acceptance of divergent lives does not imply agreement or obligation. This maintains moral consistency: one can uphold their own values while ethically recognising the legitimacy of other ways of living.

Will ponder. I do not have a snappy response.

I have had a different experience.

My family fought on both sides of our Civil War in the U.S. The choices between what is acceptable or not is worked out each day wherever we are. Education of children is critical to what happens next.

I don't see how your disagreements with people bear upon the matter. — Paine

I don't know how any of that pertains to the topic, or what it even means, but can you answer my question now?

I am willing to address that — Paine

Are you asking me to explain what I said without reference to what I just said?

If the context I put forward is not germane to the discussion, it is difficult for me to imagine what is.

Are you asking me to explain what I said without reference to what I just said? — Paine

You told me that you would answer my question after I answered a new question you had. I was just hoping you would follow through on that.

I’m don't know if there are moral facts or if morality is grounded in anything beyond emotional responses, perhaps emotivism is correct, of which, presumably, there are more and less defensible versions. — Tom Storm

When someone brings up tolerance there is usually an accusation at play. There is usually the premise, "One should not be intolerant." Now it surely does not make sense to say, "One should not be intolerant," while at the same time being undecided on whether there are moral "facts," no? And emotivism of whatever variety will be of no help unless one believes that emotions are sufficient grounds for binding moral norms.

But what I find more interesting is the cultural incoherence of strong moral claims in the midst of strong moral anti-realism. The cultural standard will reproach me just as forcefully if I say that binding moral norms exist, as if I fail to recognize the binding moral norm of intolerance. I find that such a deep level of incoherence is a dead end. There must be at least a minimum level of coherence and consistency before fruitful dialogue can occur.

When someone brings up tolerance there is usually an accusation at play. There is usually the premise, "One should not be intolerant." Now it surely does not make sense to say, "One should not be intolerant," while at the same time being undecided on whether there are moral "facts," no? And emotivism of whatever variety will be of no help unless one believes that emotions are sufficient grounds for binding moral norms. — Leontiskos

Thanks, I see what you’re saying, but it never occurred to me that moral positions require objective facts. This deserves its own thread. As a non-philosopher, my view has generally been that humans are social and cooperative: we seem to try to reduce suffering and promote well-being, and our moral views tend to reflect what supports those goals. Moral discussions are simply humans attempting to find the best ways to achieve this.

Thanks, I see what you’re saying, but it never occurred to me that moral positions require objective facts. — Tom Storm

I think 'fact' is a word that hinders rather than helps in these discussions. All that is required for what I've said is that someone thinks it is true that everyone should not be intolerant. Whether this is a 'fact' is not very important.

As a non-philosopher, my view has generally been that humans are social and cooperative: we seem to try to reduce suffering and promote well-being, and our moral views tend to reflect what supports those goals. Moral discussions are simply humans attempting to find the best ways to achieve this. — Tom Storm

But is it valid to say, "Humans generally try to reduce suffering, therefore it is true that everyone should try to reduce suffering"?

My point about "fruitful dialogue" has to do with reason-giving in moral contexts. So if someone thinks their moral utterances are true, require reasons, and can be rationally engaged, then the problem I've pointed out dissipates. But at the prevailing meta-ethical level this simply isn't true on a cultural level.

All that is required for what I've said is that someone thinks it is true that everyone should not be intolerant. Whether this is a 'fact' is not very important. — Leontiskos

That's helpful.

But is it valid to say, "Humans generally try to reduce suffering, therefore it is true that everyone should try to reduce suffering?" — Leontiskos

I’m not sure. I’d say humans generally find suffering unpleasant and therefore try to avoid it. And because we’re social animals, we also often try to reduce suffering for members of our own tribe, community, or culture. I’m not convinced many of us care much about the welfare of strangers or the suffering of people we don’t like. Personally, I have a strong dislike of suffering and wouldn’t want even my enemies (not that I really have any) to suffer, but that’s just my own emotional preference. I suppose I’d like others to try to reduce suffering as well, but I have a mental block when it comes to calling it “true” that we should all reduce suffering. I’m not sure in what sense I can say it is true.

My point about "fruitful dialogue" has to do with reason-giving in moral contexts. So if someone thinks their moral utterances are true, require reasons, and can be rationally engaged, then the problem I've pointed out dissipates. But at the prevailing meta-ethical level this simply isn't true on a cultural level. — Leontiskos

:up:

If you don't think that conservative politics struggle not to appear heartless, you're probably in an ever-shrinking minority. — Pantagruel

Exactly what I was getting at in my OP.

The Right try and claim the Left are just as/more intolerant which I don't think is true from an unbiased point of view. Of course they would say I am biased, being on the Left, so I could never give a fair appraisal and they will say 'we are just as tolerant or even more because of xyz', Usually the xyz is that they are anti-woke and bastions for free-speech.

Overton Window — Leontiskos

Lol any time I have read that phrase it has been in some Right wing conspiracy article. Similar to 'cultural marxism' and 'Great Replacement' and talk of 'European stock'.

The left can coherently tolerate the more extreme views of those on the right without accepting them. — Banno

I am not sure this has to be about tolerating extreme views?

Also the term tolerance seems to be a sticking point which lends itself to the interpretation it must tolerate extremism.

I would say that the positive ideals of the Left are that they welcome diversity and difference as diversity is healthy just like sexual diversity in dna and such.

So on this interpretation it is not inconsistent to welcome diversity but be intolerant of those who don't welcome it. Then the Right might say 'but why don't you welcome our views equally?' then I would say because they don't encourage inclusiveness.

As I wrote that it reminded me of where I got that from recently. David Pakman made a good point that the Left welcome diversity but the Right in general see difference as a threat and want to protect against it. Tighter immigration laws, more guns to protect your stuff and so on.

He put it much better but that is the gist I recall.

Although the names of political parties can be meaningless, in this case it seems to ring true that Conservative is in line with their values to want to conserve existing values and resist change.

That's pretty much in agreement with my view, I think.

Where you talk of welcoming, I used acceptance.

So we both differentiate mere toleration, in which something is thought unacceptable but we put up with it, from welcoming and accepting different ways of living that do not infringe on our own, and a willingness to negotiate when they do.

And both are contrary to the view that one's own way of living is obligatory for others. Such a view cannot be accepted, and ought not be tolerated.

Okay, I will give it a go.

From my experience, the views of 'moral realism' you brought up do not reflect how education works in families and institutions. How sharply one differentiates those from each other is a source of conflict in communities and political structures. Sometimes that adds up to one policy being advanced over another. Other times, that is an underlying feature of life in a particular place that does not get formulated in that way. From that perspective, I don't view any theory of connecting or disconnecting those aspects as important as people looking for what benefits or harms the chances of their hopes and fears.

Consider the habit of adversarial discourse in families. I was raised in one of those as was my son. I have known and worked with people who did not. That difference is a genuine cultural divide that is not simply a product of different opinions. On the other hand, it is obvious that it does influence opinion. What we all choose to do in such divergences is a personal matter of choice that theory cannot relieve us from. Tolerance is easy until it is in your face.

The left wing is not intolerant. They are not telling anyone how to live their lives. Only the right wing does that. They have the more rigid ideology, which expects everyone to conform to their beliefs. Any dissent from that is seen as moral failure.

I’m not sure. I’d say humans generally find suffering unpleasant and therefore try to avoid it. And because we’re social animals, we also often try to reduce suffering for members of our own tribe, community, or culture. I’m not convinced many of us care much about the welfare of strangers or the suffering of people we don’t like. Personally, I have a strong dislike of suffering and wouldn’t want even my enemies (not that I really have any) to suffer, but that’s just my own emotional preference. I suppose I’d like others to try to reduce suffering as well, but I have a mental block when it comes to calling it “true” that we should all reduce suffering. I’m not sure in what sense I can say it is true. — Tom Storm

In my late teens I was not yet a Christian but I was reading C. S. Lewis’ Mere Christianity. His arguments made me realize that I had to choose between relativism and moral realism. I realized that if I thought there were no moral facts, then I could not in good conscience rely on moral claims, or say things that entailed moral claims. For example, I could not accuse people of being intolerant. If moral realism is false then at the end of the day there is no good reason for people not to be intolerant, and I would be highly irrational for deeming intolerance blameworthy or wrong.

You can take any moral proposition you like: “Slavery is wrong,” “Rape is wrong,” “Discrimination against gays is wrong,” etc. If you don’t hold that there are any true moral propositions, then obviously you can’t maintain that such things are true.

You make your points well and I thank you for your patience. I apologise that I seem unable to see this. I have read Lewis' book (many years ago) but I not yet convinced. I'm going to start a thread on relativism versus anti-foundationalism. I think there is a more nuanced position to take than simple relativism.

Is slavery wrong? I can definitely see how it would be wrong from a human values perspective. If you essentially accept the Western tradition, that life should be about values like flourishing and freedom and well-being and the minimisation of suffering, then slavery is not an ideal way to go about it.

Morality to me seems to be a code of conduct, and we can argue about what conduct best achieves goals like flourishing, cooperation, and the minimisation of suffering. I can't see how we can have a moral fact that floats free of human values, but that does not stop us from reasoning within the values we share.

If someone wants to claim that all morality is just an opinion and all opinions are equally valid, then they undermine their own ability to debate moral positions. But if we instead treat morality like a system with aims and constraints (something like a game with rules and goals) then we can meaningfully explore what strategies best achieve those aims.

If the main criticism is that my view has no ultimate, metaphysical foundation for right and wrong beyond human context, then yes, I agree. But I do not see why that means we should abandon having views on how to organise society. Human beings still have needs, vulnerabilities, and preferences, and these give us more than enough ground to reason about better or worse ways to live together.

I see that you have posted your thread and will follow with interest.

In the context of political divisions brought up in this thread, the lack of moral realism is being depicted by Leontiskos as the source for one side of a divide. To put it that way makes the topic political in its own right.

In the formulations of what is "natural" for humans, the debate over kinds of authority has been the central problem. For instance, is Hobbes right that only a central authority can stop the natural war between men or is Rousseau correct that we have come from a different way of life that did not require that much power?

The difference between them is not whether morality is real or not.

Cool, please have your say on that thread too. I may be more of a Hobbsian and have always disliked Rousseau, but I suspect that more than anything it's one's disposition that informs this choice.

One aspect about the difference between Hobbes and Rousseau is how their language appears in different political messaging. There is a "this arbitrary power is better than its absence" set against "there is a better way to proceed that does not require so much power."

Imagining what would happen without X does not seem to be the singular province of anyone.

Okay, I will give it a go. — Paine

Paine, here is the question I asked and you deferred, claiming that you would answer it in time:

It's this clause of your post: "[Acceptance] is actively being opposed by efforts that want to have power over the next generation."

Which side of the broad sharp line wants to have power over the next generation, and which side doesn't? — Leontiskos

Is that the question you were attempting to answer? You yourself claimed that in you were trying to draw a "broad sharp line." I am asking how what you said in that post relates to this "broad sharp line" you spoke of, specifically by asking about your claim about wanting power over the next generation.

In terms of the next generation, it is a large difference between encouraging a revolt versus some kind of accommodation. That involves the different agendas underway at the time but also how one is to live in the future. What we accept or reject personally involves who we care for, however we choose to understand that.

I apologise that I seem unable to see this. — Tom Storm

But it seems that you do see it, at least in part, with claims like these:

If someone wants to claim that all morality is just an opinion and all opinions are equally valid, then they undermine their own ability to debate moral positions. — Tom Storm

But I will merge any reply I have here into your new thread on the topic.

If someone wants to claim that all morality is just an opinion and all opinions are equally valid, then they undermine their own ability to debate moral positions. — Tom Storm

Yep.

What if they instead claim morality is just an opinion and proceed to rely on their own opinion? When we evaluate whether an opinion is “valid,” we can only do so through our own judgment; hence in that sense, yes, morality always comes back to one's own opinion.

There's no one else to blame.



the rest, deleted - I'll re-work it into your new thread.
Re-thinking my rethink, I don't think I will. I'll leave this here, as I think it sufficiently different to the issue in your other thread.

I am glad to see your rethink because I think it is important to not turn all of this into one goo.

What if they instead claim morality is just an opinion and proceed to rely on their own opinion? When we evaluate whether an opinion is “valid,” we can only do so through our own judgment; hence in that sense, yes, morality always comes back to one's own opinion.

There's no one else to blame. — Banno

Yes. As you say that's a differnce sense of subjectivity that the first account.

What interests me most in these discussions is how people believe they can ground their morality.