I don't believe that the transcendental subject is a being in a sense other than the indexical. We can't single out the transcendental subject and say what it is. I don't think that Kant thought that the transcendental subject was something we could know. — Wayfarer

True, the transcendental subject is not itself an empirical object in Kant's system, but the structure and the function of the transcendental subject is nonetheless knowable via an inference to the conditions for the possibility empirical experience. My interpretation of what Kant is arguing in CPR is that 'something' must exist that has this structure and these functions otherwise empirical experience would be impossible. This is an ontology. Noumena exist. The transcendental subject exists. However, their existence is inferred rather than experienced. If they didn't exist, then empirical experience itself would not be possible.

The “excess” disclosed in inquiry is not an object standing outside cognition, but the open-endedness of meaning itself. And notice I'm not saying there is nothing outside of or apart from the cognized object - that would be to assert its non-existence - but that, whatever we make of the object, is through that process of assimilation, whereby it becomes incorporated into the network that comprises the world of lived meanings (the 'lebenswelt'). Were it totally outside that, then we couldn't even cognize it. — Wayfarer

You are right that the 'excess' is not to be understood in ontological terms.That's the whole point, we can't start by assuming our conclusion. The question of whether any given object exists independently of the mind should be answered at the end of inquiry into the nature of that object, not assumed at the beginning. After we've inquired into the nature of the object and have judged that the object exists independently of the mind, that's it. That is just what it means to make an ontological commitment. Whereas what you are doing is defining 'object' as 'mind-dependent' from the outset, so that no matter what we learn about the object through the process of inquiry this knowledge always only applies to a mind-dependent object by definition. You are deciding the ontological status of the object in advance of the inquiry, which just begs the question.

@Gnomon I'm in agreement with your 'both-and' type of attitude. The 'either-or' dilemma is something stamped firmly into [Rational] consciousness. — Wayfarer

Having an affinity for "modern Aristotleanism" (e.g. hylomorphism), as you have said you do, Wayf, I'm sure, for consistency's sake, you agree with this venerable (pre-modern, non-Western) Aristotlean's bivalence:

Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned. — Ibn Sina, d. 1037 CE

:smirk:

What the mind already knows about the object is the object as it is for-consciousness. — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, in that the object in its entirety is the experience. When the perception is already determined as, e.g., basketball, as far as the human intellect is concerned, the totality of conceptions subsumed under the general are included in the experience whether or not consciousness registers them. Such being the case, what is not known about the thing is not in-itself, but can be nonetheless cognized as an inference to a possible experience, insofar as the logical object of those inferences is necessarily contained in the thing experienced.

What the mind doesn't know about the object is the object as it is in-itself. — Esse Quam Videri

Given the above, it is clear this is not the case, under the assumption the object the mind knows of, is the same object the mind may not know all of. It is absurd to suppose the dark side of the moon, at those times in which there was no experience of it, there was only the dark-side-of-the-moon-in-itself.

What the mind doesn’t know about a thing doesn’t necessarily indicate a thing-in-itself. It is entirely possible the mind doesn’t know about a thing because there’s no thing to know about.

THAT the mind doesn’t know OF the object, is just what it means for the object to be as it is in itself.

Therefore, the object as it is in-itself is in excess of the object as it is for-consciousness. — Esse Quam Videri

In a sense, yes. But these merely represent time differentials between the thing in itself and the same thing for-consciousness. Wordplay: in-itself vs in-us; in-itself vs for-consciousness. In-itself as a thing vs thing given to us as appearance vs thing represented in us as phenomenon.

Furthermore, the act of asking a question presupposes that what the mind doesn't yet know about the object (the in-itself) is knowable because, again, otherwise it wouldn't ask the question. — Esse Quam Videri

Agreed, in principle, with the caveat that part of the thing the mind asks about is not any part of the thing in itself. By definition, the mind cannot even ask about the thing-in-itself, but is perfectly within its cognitive purview to ask about things merely possible for-consciousness, to use your term.

Still, there are myriad instances of asking questions even about things the mind thinks, but for which the mind already knows the experience is impossible. One of the more familiar instances being….what is it like to be a bat. Again, in your terms, what is known is a bat; what is asked is what it is like to be a bat-in-itself, from which what is proposed as being knowable, is actually not.

Therefore, the act of asking a question about an object presupposes that the object as it is in-itself is knowable. — Esse Quam Videri

The act of asking a question about an object presupposes the possibility of an answer relative to the object asked about. The object asked about is the object or possible object for-consciousness, not the object as it is in itself.

If it is the case the perception of a thing is the perception of a whole, it makes sense that the thing-in-itself of which there is no perception includes the whole of that thing-in-itself. From which follows the possibility of knowing all of the one, but the impossibility of knowing anything at all in part or in whole about the other, while at the same time granting necessary existence relative to a perceiver, of both.
—————-

On the other hand…..

There is a kind of in-itself-ness of things for which there is experience. It is not irrational to allow knowledge of the basketball itself to not include knowledge of the air contained inside its spatial boundaries. Or that the knowledge of the exterior spherical surface material does not grant knowledge of the interior spherical surface material. But it is understood a priori, first, that there must be those, and, second, there is no need, and indeed it would be superfluous, to cognize such distinction necessarily, in order for the experience of the thing as a whole to reside in consciousness without self-contradiction.

But it doesn’t serve any useful purpose to suppose the air in the basketball is some thing in itself. Or even the microscopic things of which there isn’t any direct experience at all. Which makes sense, because all that stuff each has its own name, whether directly experienced or not, which presupposes it is some thing already known or inferred logically by the same mind that comprehends the necessity of all the constituency of the thing as a whole experience.
—————-

Noumena exist. The transcendental subject exists. However, their existence is inferred rather than experienced. — Esse Quam Videri

That which is inferred is a strictly logical construct. Existence is a category, and all categories and their subsumed conceptions have reference only to things of experience, and never to merely logical inferences. An existence is empirically given, an inference is only logically valid. Under these conditions, it cannot be said noumena exist, but it can be said it is impossible to know they do not.

Noumena are no more than that which understanding thinks, understanding thinks only in concepts, therefore noumena are no more than concepts. Concepts do not exist, they are no more than valid thoughts, valid meaning they do not contradict anything in the thinking of them. They would certainly contradict experience if it were possible for that which is no more than a mere thought, to be an experience. I mean…if that were the case, everybody could buy a unicorn.

The transcendental subject is not even a concept or a thought of understanding. It belongs to pure reason alone, as an apodeitic principle thus is even further from existence than a mere thought.

In Kantian dualism is the irreducible necessity that if this is this, it cannot ever be that. If existence is this, nothing that does not have this can exist. If inference is that, nothing that does not have that can be an inference. Existence is not inference; inference is not existence. Irreducible necessity meaning one can’t be a dualist for one thing but not another. If he is a dualist he is so in toto and cannot rationally oscillate between being one for this and not one for that.

Of course, if one doesn’t consider himself a proper Kantian dualist, he’s at liberty to mess it up any way he sees fit (grin)

Yours are interesting arguments; I only comment in reference to the claimed source material, your interpretations of it, or conjunction with it, be what they may.

As regards Faggin - I sense that the One resonates with the One of Plotinus' philosophy. He has taken ideas from a variety of sources, and also developed his own using metaphors from quantum physics and computing. But still see him as rather idiosyncratic. He's not going to get noticed much in the 'consciousness studies' ecosystem for that reason. — Wayfarer

Faggin is indeed idiosyncratic compared to eclectic New-Age-type religious philosophy. But his empirical & rational approach may be acceptable to some strands of Consciousness Studies*1. So far, his book is mostly about a scientific worldview, not a religious belief system. The word "god" does not appear in his glossary, but the term "panpsychism" does. Consequently, I get the impression that his worldview is Philosophical & Scientific, not Religious ; intellectual & practical, not emotional.

His chapter 2 is about The Nature of Quantum Reality, and his "creator" is abstract & impersonal. Speaking of universal quantum fields, he says : "These fields have space & time in common and are the fundamental entities that, interacting with each other, create everything that exists physically". The fields themselves may be construed as Metaphysical, but it remains to be seen if Faggin views them as created by some higher power, or are self-existent : i.e. god-like.

In discussing quantum particles, he describes them, not as Lucretius' tiny hard balls of stuff, but as foggy "clouds" of mathematical probability. To me, that sounds more like Platonic Ideality (shadows in he cave) than Aristotle's Physics. Personally, for all pragmatic purposes, I act as-if my world-model is Aristotelian (practical) Reality, but for theoretical exploration I can also imagine a Platonic metaphysical Ideality. Not Either/Or, but BothAnd.

As I read chapter 2, a thought occurred to me : Classical Newtonian physics was compatible with the Bible God, who creates a world, like a wind-up toy, and sets it on a straight & narrow path in a specific direction. But non-linear & probabilistic Quantum physics is more like the erratic & random ancient religions based on natural cycles. Their polytheistic gods (e.g. Olympian) were not all-powerful, and argued amongst themselves. Which left their worshipers grappling with mysteries beyond comprehension, wandering guided only by faith. On the other hand, non-religious Philosophy can deal with Quantum Mysticism, not by Faith, but by Reason. :nerd:

*1. Consciousness Studies is an interdisciplinary field exploring the nature of subjective experience, blending neuroscience, philosophy, psychology, physics, and more, to understand how the brain creates self-awareness and reality, focusing on identifying neural correlates, developing theories like Global Workspace Theory or Integrated Information Theory, and investigating altered states like meditation, aiming to bridge the gap between physical brain processes and phenomenal experience.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=consciousness+studies

Whereas what you are doing is defining 'object' as 'mind-dependent' from the outset, so that no matter what we learn about the object through the process of inquiry this knowledge always only applies to a mind-dependent object by definition. You are deciding the ontological status of the object in advance of the inquiry, which just begs the question. — Esse Quam Videri

I don’t think I’m assigning an ontological status to objects. I’m not saying that objects depend for their existence on minds. I’m saying that objecthood — identity, determinacy, intelligibility — is a cognitive status, not an ontological primitive. That’s a claim about the conditions under which inquiry is possible, not a stipulation about what exists prior to inquiry. It is an epistemological rather than ontological argument.

From the mind-created world op:

I will concentrate less on arguments about the nature of the constituents of objective reality, and focus instead on understanding the mental processes that shape our judgment of what they comprise.

... there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind. Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis ¹. Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object.

So I'm not saying that objects don't exist in the absence of the observer, but that their ontological status is indeterminate.

This is an ontology. Noumena exist. The transcendental subject exists. However, their existence is inferred rather than experienced. If they didn't exist, then empirical experience itself would not be possible. — Esse Quam Videri

But what kind of existence do they have? You can't show them to me, only explain them to me. Anything that has to be explained is conceptual, not phenomenal.

In a previous exchange, I mentioned this passage from a review of a book on Husserl:

We can maintain that mathematical objects are mind-independent, self-subsistent and in every sense real, and we can also explain how we are cognitively related to them: they are invariants in our experience, given fulfillments of mathematical intentions. ...

We can evidently say, for example, that mathematical objects are mind-independent and unchanging, but now we always add that they are constituted in consciousness in this manner, or that they are constituted by consciousness as having this sense … . They are constituted in consciousness, nonarbitrarily, in such a way that it is unnecessary to their existence that there be expressions for them or that there ever be awareness of them.[/i[ (p. 13).
— — Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics (review)

The reason I mention this again, is that it says, on the one hand, that mathematical objects are "mind-independent", but, on the other, that they are "constituted in consciousness, nonarbitrarily."

They are "mind independent" in that mathematical proofs are not dependent on any particular mind. But they are "constituted in consciousness" in that they can only be known by a rational intelligence. So here, I'm advocating a form of logical realism: that numbers, scientific laws, and logical principles are real in this same sense. They're not existent as phenomena, but are inherent in the way consciousness constitutes meaning, through rational inference and the like.

I don’t deny that noumena or transcendental conditions exist, (or rather: are real) but existence is not a single category. What exists phenomenally can be shown; what exists formally or logically can only be explained. Mathematical objects, logical laws, and transcendental conditions are real without being phenomenal — objective without being mind-independent in the sense of existing as items in the empirical world. That is the sense in which reality has an inherently mental aspect, without collapsing into subjectivism.

Classical Newtonian physics was compatible with the Bible God, who creates a world, like a wind-up toy, and sets it on a straight & narrow path in a specific direction. But non-linear & probabilistic Quantum physics is more like the erratic & random ancient religions based on natural cycles. — Gnomon

Well, Tao of Physics (1974) is a cultural landmark, notwithstanding that it is written around many weak analogies. But it is a matter of fact that Neils Bohr, on being awarded Imperial Honors by the Danish Crown for his discoveries, had a familial coat-of-arms designed which had the Taost Ying-Yang symbol at its centre. He regarded the 'complementarity principle' as the most important philosophical discovery of his life.

I think the more salient point is the emergence of the 'division of mind and matter' that originates with Descartes and Galileo. The objective world comprising measurable properties (the 'primary qualities') is said to be the ground of reality as far as science is concerned, while how things appear is relegated to the mind of the observer. That is the 'cartesian division' which is still very influential in life and culture. Hence the belief that the Universe is devoid of meaning, as meaning has been subjectivised. So whatever meaning there is, is a matter for the individual. Faggin says in his introduction:

If we start from consciousness, free will, and creativity as irreducible properties of nature, the whole scientific conception of reality is overturned. In this new vision, the emotional and intuitive parts of life—ignored by materialism—return to play a central role. Aristotle said: “To educate the mind without educating the heart means not educating at all.” We cannot let physicalism and reductionism define human nature and leave consciousness out from the description of the universe. The physicalist and reductionist premises are perfect for describing the mechanical and symbolic-informational aspects of reality, but they are inadequate to explain its semantic aspects. If we insist that these assumptions describe all of reality, we eliminate a priori what distinguishes us from our machines and we erase our consciousness, our freedom and, above all, our humanity from the face of the universe. — Faggin, Federico. Irreducible: Consciousness, Life, Computers, and Human Nature (p. 14) Kindle Edition.

But I know from experience, many will respond, 'OK if consciousness is so important, where is it! Show it to me!'

Yājñavalkya says: "You tell me that I have to point out the Self (i.e. 'consciousness') as if it is a cow or a horse. Not possible! It is not an object like a horse or a cow. I cannot say, 'here is the Ātman; here is the Self'. It is not possible because you cannot see the seer of seeing. The seer can see that which is other than the Seer, or the act of seeing. An object outside the seer can be beheld by the seer. How can the seer see himself? How is it possible? You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the Thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the Understander of understanding. That is Ātman." — Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad

He regarded the 'complementarity principle' as the most important philosophical discovery of his life. — Wayfarer

Ironically, would troll Neils Bohr as a wishy-washy woo-purveyor, if he had the audacity to post his on this forum. I just realized the significance of the alcohol-purity screenname : A> it may symbolize the ideal of a trump-like "perfect" worldview : Black vs White & True vs False & Immanent vs Transcendent*1 with no watered-down adulterants. Or B> it dumbs-down philosophical complexities to Either/Or dualities that a simple mind can handle.

The "logical fallacy" of a two-value (right/wrong) posturing is the arrogant presumption of absolute knowledge. Which often causes imbalance & disharmony among imperfect humans. I suppose 180's "ideal" of perfect omniscience is admirable in a way, but it's not Plato's way.

For the rest of the story : Rutherford-Bohr's original classical planetary model of an atom was later invalidated by Heisenberg's statistical Uncertainty Principle. But, as you noted, Bohr --- with intellectual modesty --- later came to accept the Yin-and-Yang Complementary Principle illustrated in the Taoism symbol. Note, I also use that Holistic image as a bullet in my blog posts.

For most philosophers and scientists, the search-for-truth is motivated by the lack of omniscience. But 180, on his pure-white perch above us mortals, can despise any signs of ignorance and intellectual modesty. :joke:




*1. "Either/or black vs white" refers to the logical fallacy of a false dilemma (or false dichotomy), where only two extreme options (black or white, good or bad, for or against) are presented, ignoring the vast spectrum of possibilities, nuances, and "shades of gray" that actually exist, often used to oversimplify complex issues or force a choice. It's a way of thinking that reduces complex realities to simple, opposing choices, hindering deeper understanding and compromise.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=either+or+black+vs+white&zx=1765662725371&no_sw_cr=1

*2. In philosophy, the search for truth is the fundamental, ongoing quest to understand reality, knowledge, and existence, using reason, logic, and critical inquiry to answer big questions, even without definitive answers, with various methods like correspondence, coherence, and pragmatism offering different paths to what is real or useful. It's seen as a core activity, even if philosophers often debate what truth is, with some defining it as what works (Pragmatism), what matches reality (Correspondence), or a coherent system of ideas.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=philosophy+search+for+truth

*3. The Yin Yang principle is a foundational concept in Chinese philosophy describing the belief that opposing forces are interconnected, complementary, and interdependent. Represented by the Taijitu symbol, yin (the dark, passive, feminine force) and yang (the light, active, masculine force) are not static but are in a dynamic, ever-changing balance, where each contains a seed of the other. The principle emphasizes that harmony is achieved through the balance of these two forces, not through extremes.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=yin+yang+principle


COMPLEMENTARY YIN-YANG PRINCIPLE OF HOLISM

"You cannot think the Thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the Understander of understanding. That is Ātman." ___Upanishad — Wayfarer

The title of this thread was intentionally chosen to evoke some relationship between the Universe, as a whole system, and human consciousness as a part (and maybe participant) in that system. In Federico Faggin's book Irreducible, he tends to use Plotinus' notion of The One (ultimate source of reality) instead of the Platonic notion of Cosmos (the universe conceived as a beautiful, harmonious, and well-ordered system). But some people prefer the religious term “God” in their discussions of Ontology (what we can know about our existence). The question here is about the ultimate source of human Being, and specifically the self-conscious Mind that is supposed to be our primary distinction from biological plants & sentient animals. Faggin defines The One as “the totality of what exists”, and makes the questionable assertion that “One wants to know Itself and self-actualize”.

Ancient people didn't understand some frightening features of Nature : how can it be blue sky one day and dark & stormy the next? Thunderstorms, volcanoes, and earthquakes are just a few of the scary deviations from the warm & cozy character of Mother Nature (Cosmos personified). So, they must have imagined that there is some invisible deeper or higher level of SuperNature, which some pictured as humanoid gods above the clouds. Faggin is a modern scientist though, with a much more detailed understanding of how Nature works, including the invisible realm of Quantum physics.

Now even a sober secular scientist has come to believe in unseen aspects of the world, that our physical senses are not innately tuned to detect. Yet, he knows about the hidden Quantum dimension of total Reality only by mathematical reasoning, supported by mystifying experiments. Instead of postulating anthro-morphic gods though, he uses more abstract, operational, and relational terminology. He also refers to our commonsense knowledge of the world as “the illusory model of reality created by our senses”*1. Quantum scientists now describe the mysteries of the unseen reality by less anthro-morphic, but oddly weird language. Instead of super-human gods, he refers to the Ideality behind Reality as “Fields”. But it's still spooky, and probably offensive to philosophical Realists.

Like Einstein, is a Realist, and seems to be spooked by any idealistic reference to super-nature or deeper-reality or transcendent realms or quantum infinity, that are insensible to our physical senses. So, he lashes-out at those infidels, who dare to speak of a non-classical model of reality. Isaac Newton was realistic, except for his assumption of a personal God in his eternal immeasurable heaven, somewhere above our 3-dimensional physical world. Einstein's secular notion of God was more like an impersonal Cosmos, as described by Spinoza in 1677. And in 1935, Einstein published a paper (EPR paradox) arguing that quantum physics was “incomplete” because it violated the “locality principle”, implying that our finite reality was actually infinite. Despite Einstein's skepticism, Faggin reports that the Bell “experiment and all subsequent ones have shown that quantum physics is correct and that Einstein's objections were not valid".

Nevertheless, I have to take Faggin's interpretations as hearsay, because I have no personal experience of such immaterial non-things as mathematical Fields, and Holistic entanglement of statistical particles. So, I can understand why 180proof would be freaked-out by such ghostly non-sense. I guess it comes down to what are you going to believe, your own senses, or the mystical myths of science-priests? Who do you trust, your own eyes, or the tea-leaf readings of atom-smashing scientists? When I see the world with my built-in ocular instruments, I see a continuous reality, not a discrete quantum ideality. So, is quantum science, and it's implicit transcendent belief system, a perversion of the world as it really is?

180's Either/Or worldview, like Spinoza's 17th century unified monistic system, and like Newton's 17th century mechanical deterministic divine system, is pure & perfect. So 21st century scientists and metaphysicians, like you and me, seem to be shitting on his pristine porcelain. For years, I thought he was just a disgruntled troll. But now I see that there is a logical philosophical viewpoint underlying his Good versus Evil worldview, unsullied by the uncertainties, indeterminism, unpredictability and general fuzziness of Quantum philosophy. By contrast, my world seems to be imperfect, incomplete, and still evolving toward some unknowable future state, that may or may not include flawed flesh & blood humans like me. If we can't believe our personal concrete senses, can we rely on abstract reasoning to reveal the true nature of the world around us? :chin:


*1. Late Lament
song by Moody Blues
. . . . . . .
But we decide which is right
And which is an illusion

The title of this thread was intentionally chosen to evoke some relationship between the Universe, as a whole system, and human consciousness as a part (and maybe participant) in that system. In Federico Faggin's book Irreducible, he tends to use Plotinus' notion of The One (ultimate source of reality) instead of the Platonic notion of Cosmos (the universe conceived as a beautiful, harmonious, and well-ordered system). But some people prefer the religious term “God” in their discussions of Ontology (what we can know about our existence). — Gnomon

I appreciate the careful thought you've put into this post. But it has to be acknowledged that in these discussions, we're touching on deep questions of philosophy which have occupied great minds for millenia. And also we're in an unprecedented cultural situation where knowledge of these ideas has been widely (almost indiscriminately!) circulated first through mass media and now through interactive media. So it is possible for us all to pick up fragments of these ideas and combine them in various ways. It's a complete melting-pot. But then there's also the element of crisis, a civillisational, environment and political.

So there's a lot going on here.

Federico Fagin

Fagin, as I said, I respect. Actually I saw him speak at the last Science and Nonduality conference I went to, in 2013, in San Jose. (I did know the way there, fortunately.) He's an open sort of fellow, doesn't come across at all pretentious. This book of his, I'm sure, has been many decades in incubation, he too has gathered all these bits and pieces from world wisdom literature, and combined them with his particular philosophical outlook. That is informed both by his background as a phycisist, inventor and technologist, and also by the overwhelming spiritual awakening he had at Lake Tahoe many years ago.

But a problem I detect with it is that he hasn't been obliged to defend his thesis, which he would have done, had he come up through higher education. I've discussing the book with ChatGPT, who observed that, had his work been presented as a thesis, he would have had to have fielded questions such as:

“This is no longer physics but philosophy — please indicate the grounds for the shift.”
“You are making an ontological claim here. On what basis?”
“Is this inference licensed by the formalism, or is it a metaphysical choice?”

All these questions would oblige Fagin to justify some of the assertions he makes. And he well might be able to answer them - but they have never been asked. So he comes across as something of a maveric or a dark horse. So though he draws on many sources, it is difficult to map his ideas against those of his possible peers in consciousness studies. I don't think his writing is in the least harmful or pernicious, and I overwhelmingly agree with at least the aim of his project, but I don't think it's going to get a lot of traction for these reasons. The fact that it was published by Kastrup's Essential Foundation is not also necessarily a point in its favour. But all that said, I still think Irreducible is an important and serious book, and it's not my aim to dissuade you or anyone from reading it.


Non-dualism in Culture and Society

Getting back to that point about the 'melting pot' - one of Kastrup's frequent interlocutors is Swami Sarvapriyananda of the New York Vedanta Society. That organisation was founded by Swami Vivekananda in the 19th century, as part of Vivekananda's whistle-stop tour of the USA after the World Parliament of Religions (1889 from memory). So it's a venerable institution, and the Swami is an erudite and learned speaker (indeed I recommend his online lectures.)

But notice the context of Advaita Vedanta: it is an orthodox school of Hinduism, which observes the strict and traditional code of ethics (not that the Swami exaggerates that in his talks). These are the 'restraints and observances' common to yogic schools:

• Yama (moral discipline)
• Niyama (observances)
• Asana (physical postures)
• Pranayama (breathing techniques)
• Pratyahara (sense withdrawal)
• Dharana (concentration)
• Dhyana (absorption or meditation)
  Samadhi (enlightenment or bliss)

That is "cultural context" (although Advaita, in particular, tends to be among the more radical of the orthodox Hindu schools). It is in that context that the principles of Advaita (non-dualism) are conveyed to students (chela). The meaning of Upaniṣads, the core texts of Vedanta, is 'sitting closely' - the idea being that these teachings are conveyed teacher-to-student in a religious context around a strick ethical discipline. Which is why I suspect much of the popular literature on nondualism fails as it doesn't embody the existential transformation which the genuine teaching entails (there's a British Vedanta teacher who has written extensively on this, see https://www.advaita-vision.org/traditional-versus-neo-advaita/)

I'm not trying to be moralistic in saying this, as I myself am not a celibate vegetarian yogi. But I mention it, because this background is often not conveyed in philosophical discussions of non-dualism. (I think Bernardo Kastrup would probably appreciate that point, but again, it doesn't necessarily come across in his dialogues with the Swami.)

Metaphysical Realism

Another difficult subject. Suffice to say, I think it's the understanding, taken as obvious by a lot of our contemporaries, that science is the arbiter of what is truly the case. But scientific method embodies certain characteristic attitudes and procedures which are problematic in a philosophical context. First and foremost is the implicit acceptance of empirical experience or sense-data, subjected to mathematical analysis and extrapolation, as the sole source of valid insight. There's an implicit acceptance that the sensory experience of the world conveys what is truly the case, so long as it is interpreted correctly in light of scientific standards of evidence. But as I often say, I think the discovery of the uncertainty principle by Werner Heisenberg 100 years ago, holes that kind of scientific realism below the waterline. Learning how to think about and cope with that is one of the chalenges we face.

Quantum scientists now describe the mysteries of the unseen reality by less anthro-morphic, but oddly weird language. Instead of super-human gods, he refers to the Ideality behind Reality as “Fields”. But it's still spooky, and probably offensive to philosophical Realists. — Gnomon

Except that a lucky guess modeled the quantum fields as harmonic oscillators by performing a Fourier transform on all sorts of waves to be as sinusoidal, and, lo, the quantum model of rungs of quanta falling out matched the reality of experiments and made for quantum field theory to be the most successful in the history of science.

The "logical fallacy" of a two-value (right/wrong) posturing is ... — Gnomon

False. Bivalence, or law of the excluded middle, is an axiom of classical logic (indispensable for determining many formal and informal fallacies) as well as Boolean logic (the basis of computational and information sciences).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_bivalence

... the arrogant presumption of absolute knowledge.

Strawman.

Niels Bohr ... regarded the 'complementarity principle' as the most important philosophical[scientific] discovery of his life. — Wayfarer

:zip:

It's one of those ideas that kind of straddles philosophy and science, that we can say.

Depending on how you look at it :rofl:

But to view ourselves against that background is implicitly to view ourselves from outside of our lives, to loose sight of the significance of the fact that as intelligent subjects, we are in some vital sense the way that whole process has come to begin to understand itself. And that is not a thought that is novel to me. To view ourselves simply as a species, or as phenomena, is really an artifice. It is not actually a philosophy. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I get it, and I can relate. And while I personally don't subscribe to scientism by any means, I am sympathetic to metaphysical realism, which is why I am trying to explore your critique. I get that I'm probably not your primary target here, but the scope of the argument you presented does seem to include any position that claims we can have knowledge of mind-independent objects.

I don’t think I’m assigning an ontological status to objects. I’m not saying that objects depend for their existence on minds. I’m saying that objecthood — identity, determinacy, intelligibility — is a cognitive status, not an ontological primitive. — Wayfarer

But this is itself an ontological claim.

What do the characteristics of objecthood apply to if not to an object? I think we can (probably) both agree that objecthood must apply to an object, but notice that so far we have said nothing about whether the object is or is not dependent on the mind. In my opinion, this is as it should be. The question of whether a given object is mind-independent is a question that should be asked about specific objects, it’s not something to be settled ahead of time when inquiring into the nature of objects in general. If we stipulate that the characteristics of objecthood apply only to mind-dependent objects from the outset, then we’ve simply ruled out realism by fiat. This is fine - there’s nothing wrong with building one’s philosophy on top of such assumptions, but it doesn’t constitute an argument against realism.

But what kind of existence do they have? You can't show them to me, only explain them to me. Anything that has to be explained is conceptual, not phenomenal. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree, but it is not uncommon for us to grant existence to things that can only be explained and not seen, like quarks or gravity.

Now you may argue that things like gravity and quarks aren’t the same because you can toss a bowling ball off a bridge to demonstrate gravity, or take me to the LHC at CERN to show how the mass of quarks is measured. In both cases I will see many things, but gravity and quarks will not be among them. Quarks and gravity are theoretical constructs that are posited in order to explain what we see, not unlike how the structure and functions of the transcendental subject are posited in order to explain phenomenal experience.

From a classical realist perspective this makes sense because in all cases the mind is grasping form. You’ll recall that in the Aristotelian tradition substance is interpreted as a metaphysical compound of matter, form (and later also existence). Form is subdivided into substantial and accidental. To understand what something is, the intellect must grasp the forms associated with it. Not copies of the forms, or representations of the forms, but the very same forms. Once understood, reason can then inquire into whether the thing exists independently of the mind. In the case of theoretical science, it is specifically the relations between things that are being tracked. Relations are a perfect example of something that can't be seen but only understood.

Given the above, it is clear this is not the case, under the assumption the object the mind knows of, is the same object the mind may not know all of. It is absurd to suppose the dark side of the moon, at those times in which there was no experience of it, there was only the dark-side-of-the-moon-in-itself. — Mww

The purpose of defining the in-itself in the way that I did was to avoid smuggling any ontological commitments into the definition at the outset. This is an epistemological/normative account of the in-itself, not an ontological account. Much of your response to my post amounts to a re-assertion of the dependence of the object upon the mind. You are free to set up the presuppositions of your philosophy in any way you wish, but doing so does not amount to making an argument.

That which is inferred is a strictly logical construct. Existence is a category, and all categories and their subsumed conceptions have reference only to things of experience, and never to merely logical inferences. An existence is empirically given, an inference is only logically valid. Under these conditions, it cannot be said noumena exist, but it can be said it is impossible to know they do not. — Mww

As I wrote in my recent response to Wayfarer, in classical realism form was understood to have two modes of existence - esse natruale and esse intentionale - such that the one-and-the-same form can be instantiated simultaneously both in the intellect and in the world, thereby bridging the gap between them. On this view there is no reason to presuppose that an inferred object exists only within the intellect.

Except that a lucky guess modeled the quantum fields as harmonic oscillators by performing a Fourier transform on all sorts of waves to be as sinusoidal, and, lo, the quantum model of rungs of quanta falling out matched the reality of experiments and made for quantum field theory to be the most successful in the history of science. — PoeticUniverse

The material & practical success of quantum science is undeniable : atom bombs, cell phones, etc. But what about the immaterial theoretical foundation of that pragmatic progress? Is quantum theory & philosophy compatible with your own worldview?*1

Faggin interprets quantum indeterminism in terms of philosophical Idealism. And he dismisses deterministic Realism as an illusion. He makes a rational reasonable case for his All One philosophy, but for me it still requires a heaping helping of emotional Faith to accept, as a metaphysical Fact, that The One uses the physical world as a way to "know itself and self-actualize". That sounds like an old theological rationalization for why omnipotent/omniscient/eternal/infinite Jehovah created a space-time world and populated it with imperfect & temporary worshipful beings*2. :smile:


*1. I guess it comes down to what are you going to believe, your own senses, or the mystical myths of science-priests? Who do you trust, your own eyes, or the tea-leaf readings of atom-smashing scientists? When I see the world with my built-in ocular instruments, I see a continuous reality, not a discrete digital quantum ideality. So, is quantum science, and it's implicit transcendent belief system, a perversion of the world as it really is? ___Gnomon post above

*2. The idea that "God knows self by means of humans" is a philosophical or theological concept not directly stated in mainstream religious texts but explored in various interpretations of divine self-knowledge and human purpose.
Mainstream Christian theology generally holds that God is a self-existent, omniscient being who understands Himself through Himself, independent of His creation.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=god+knows+self+by+means+of+humans

*3. Rhetorical Question :How are invisible "harmonic oscillators" different from a heavenly choir of angels continually singing praises to God? The quantum vibrations (on-off, +/-) somehow manifest as a tangible physical world, and the celestial vibrating voices support the ego of God, who in turn continually creates a reality for humans down below.

An Essay on Man
" by Alexander Pope
"Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
The proper study of mankind is Man."

Depending on how you look at it ... — Wayfarer

:roll: ... which is, in fact, science and not philosoohy.

Are you speaking strictly for yourself or intending to represent what Kant meant by these terms?

Neils Bohr as a wishy-washy woo-purveyor — Gnomon

Thats exactly what he was!

Neils Bohr as a wishy-washy woo-purveyor
— Gnomon

Thats exactly what he was! — Apustimelogist

:up:

Ok. Thanks.

woooooooooooosh.

It was intended as an alternative account, not a representation of Kant's account.

What do the characteristics of objecthood apply to if not to an object? I think we can (probably) both agree that objecthood must apply to an object, but notice that so far we have said nothing about whether the object is or is not dependent on the mind. In my opinion, this is as it should be. The question of whether a given object is mind-independent is a question that should be asked about specific objects, it’s not something to be settled ahead of time when inquiring into the nature of objects in general. If we stipulate that the characteristics of objecthood apply only to mind-dependent objects from the outset, then we’ve simply ruled out realism by fiat. This is fine - there’s nothing wrong with building one’s philosophy on top of such assumptions, but it doesn’t constitute an argument against realism. — Esse Quam Videri

I’m not claiming that objects are mind-dependent entities. I’m claiming that objecthood is not a property that pre-existing things have independently of cognition. The object is the result of apperceptive synthesis. Your objection presupposes that objects are already there as objects prior to that synthesis, which is exactly the assumption I’m questioning. Otherwise you'd have the absurd situation of differentiating objects from 'things which aren't objects' independently of any act of identification or synthesis. The whole point of the argument is to protest the notion that we're passive recipients of an already-existing world. In reality we are cognitive agents who's mind is always actively constructing our experienced world - the lebenswelt, the world of lived meanings.

From a classical realist perspective this makes sense because in all cases the mind is grasping form. You’ll recall that in the Aristotelian tradition substance is interpreted as a metaphysical compound of matter, form (and later also existence). — Esse Quam Videri

I agree that for Aristotle the intellect grasps form, not representations. But for Aristotle, that is precisely why the form is not mind-independent in the empiricist sense. In knowing, the intellect becomes the form; the form exists as intelligible only in being apprehended. So while the thing may exist independently as a composite of matter and form, objecthood and intelligibility are not properties it has apart from cognition. That is why Aristotle does not treat knowledge as the passive reception of a ready-made object, but as the actualisation of form in νοῦς.

The point of the 'idealism in context' argument, is that idealism arose because of the loss of the sense of 'participatory knowing' that is found in Aristotelian Thomism, which preserved the sense of the 'union of knower and known' that later empiricism replaces with a spectator theory of knowledge, the sense of being apart from or outside of reality. And that is more than just an epistemological difference, it's a profound existential re-orientation.

I'm not trying to be moralistic in saying this, as I myself am not a celibate vegetarian yogi.

These restraints and observances can be woven into a modern life, but it’s not easy to pass this skill onto a seeker, or chela due to the discipline required to observe them to the point that they become second nature, or to then convey the ideas around “non-dualism” such that it becomes woven into that second nature, in the frenetic consumerist world we live in. I have only managed it once and the degree to which it was successful is difficult to determine in the modern world. There are always a few naturals who get there on their own, but to do it wholesale requires monastic settings and is not likely to be added to the curriculum in schools anytime soon.

All we can hope for is that some of the teachings and ideas can be conveyed into the philosophical cannon, so that they are not lost to history.

Thanks for the Avaita-vision link, it was like taking a breath of fresh air.

I’m not claiming that objects are mind-dependent entities. I’m claiming that objecthood is not a property that pre-existing things have independently of cognition. The object is the result of apperceptive synthesis. Your objection presupposes that objects are already there as objects prior to that synthesis, which is exactly the assumption I’m questioning. — Wayfarer

It seems like we may be getting hung up in terminology. My proposed starting point is to ask “what is presupposed in the act of asking a question?” Well, there must be a mind/subject that asks the question and there must be something that the question is asked about. I am labeling this something with the word “object”. This is a pretty standard account of intentionality. The mind is intrinsically directed toward an “other”. This “other” is typically called an “object” in the literature going back at least to the middle ages. The object is what is known by the subject in the act of knowledge. So we have three things:

• A subject
• An object
• A relation between subject and object

This is an extremely simplified account of the structure of intentionality (or subjectivity). Perhaps it is the very minimum that can be said about it - I don’t know for sure.

It’s important to distinguish between the structure of intentionality and what is sometimes called the content of intentionality. We are not saying anything here about the content, only the structure. As such, we have not yet made any claim regarding the nature of any particular object other than that it must exist in some sense and must be distinguishable from the subject in some sense. This in no way implies that any particular object exists independently of the subject. It might turn out that all the possible particular things/contents that can play the role of “object” happen to be mind-dependent things.

There are some additional things that seem to be presupposed in the act of asking a question, including:

• The subject knows enough about the object to ask a question about it
• The subject does not know everything about the object

The first statement defines the scope of what is “for-consciousness”. The second statement defines the scope of the “in-itself”. Again, we are not here making a claim about the nature of any particular object in-itself (this follows from the fact that we’ve made no claim about the nature of the object). All we’re saying is that the act of asking a question presupposes a commitment to the knowability of the in-itself.

There is a lot more than can be said here, but this was as far as I had gotten. My point in presenting this was to show how one might define the “in-itself” in a way that makes knowledge of the in-itself possible without presupposing anything about the nature of the object. In my opinion, this is what an account of transcendental subjectivity ought to aim for. The purpose of transcendental philosophy should be to give an account of the structure of subjectivity, not the content, whereas the question of mind-dependence is a question that should be asked at the level of content, not structure. That is, it is a question that should be asked of particular objects (e.g. spoons, tables, ideas, etc.), not of objects in general. In other words, transcendental philosophy should not be in the business of determining what exists in the world, or how it exists, beyond what is minimally presupposed by the acts of subjectivity themselves.

The irony is that, whereas the account of subjectivity provided above so far does not make any upfront assumptions about the nature of the object, Kant’s account of subjectivity certainly does and, as a result, makes knowledge of the in-itself impossible. This is why building an argument against realism while presupposing Kant’s account of transcendental subjectivity amounts to begging the question against realism.

I will address your other comments in a separate post once I get some time.

One last thing I wanted to say with regard to the meaning of the word "object" in the above. The word "object" here is not being restricted to any kind of object. It is intended to range over any possible object the subject could be intentionally related to, including both concrete/empirical and inferential/abstract objects.

Otherwise you'd have the absurd situation of differentiating objects from 'things which aren't objects' independently of any act of identification or synthesis. The whole point of the argument is to protest the notion that we're passive recipients of an already-existing world. In reality we are cognitive agents who's mind is always actively constructing our experienced world - the lebenswelt, the world of lived meanings. — Wayfarer

I don’t deny that the mind has an active role to play in the construction of the lebenswelt, what I am skeptical of is the notion that the entirety of the contents of the lebenswelt exists only in the mind. This was the whole reason for introducing the notion of form, because forms can exist simultaneously both in a mind-dependent way and in a mind-independent way.

I agree that for Aristotle the intellect grasps form, not representations. But for Aristotle, that is precisely why the form is not mind-independent in the empiricist sense. In knowing, the intellect becomes the form; the form exists as intelligible only in being apprehended. So while the thing may exist independently as a composite of matter and form, objecthood and intelligibility are not properties it has apart from cognition. That is why Aristotle does not treat knowledge as the passive reception of a ready-made object, but as the actualisation of form in νοῦς. — Wayfarer

I don’t think this is quite right. A form existing in a mind-independent way (esse naturale) is always potentially intelligible. When the intellect grasps the form it becomes actually intelligible (esse intentionale). However, it is still one-and-the-same form now instantiated in two different ways.

Of course, not every form that comes to be instantiated in the intellect is also instantiated in nature. In that case the form is said to be purely a being of reason (ens rationis). The existential duality of form is what accounts for the fact that some of the contents of the lebenswelt are purely constructs of the mind. Some, but not all.

The point of the 'idealism in context' argument, is that idealism arose because of the loss of the sense of 'participatory knowing' that is found in Aristotelian Thomism, which preserved the sense of the 'union of knower and known' that later empiricism replaces with a spectator theory of knowledge, the sense of being apart from or outside of reality. And that is more than just an epistemological difference, it's a profound existential re-orientation. — Wayfarer

I totally agree, which is why I find it somewhat surprising that you look to Kant in order to re-establish the sense of participatory knowing given that his approach renders the world as it is in-itself (noumenal world) unknowable. Kant gives you the “participatory” part, but it’s at the expense of the “knowing” part.

The "logical fallacy" of a two-value (right/wrong) posturing is ... — Gnomon
False. Bivalence, or law of the excluded middle, is an axiom of classical logic (indispensable for determining many formal and informal fallacies) as well as Boolean logic (the basis of computational and information sciences). — 180 Proof

↪180 Proof
It's one of those ideas that kind of straddles philosophy and science, that we can say.
Depending on how you look at it :rofl: — Wayfarer

In Faggin's chapter on The Nature of Machines, he makes a distinction between deterministic (true/false) digital computers, and freewill analog (maybe/probability) meat brains*1. Apparently, 180 prefers cold, hard binary (true/false) computing to warm-blooded holistic human thinking*2.

Ironically, Binary Logic is Idealistic, in the sense of presuming mechanical perfection*3*4. But human Logic is Realistic, in the sense that living organisms are imperfect, yet adaptable to contingencies in the evolving real world. Binary computers are bound by their programming, and require "interrupts" to call for human help when the program encounters unexpected obstacles.

As you noted, human nature seems to straddle both sides of the imaginary True/False, Either/Or omniscience of the gods & robots, and the realistic Maybe/Truish, Both/And knowing of human animals. 180's god-like view is absolute & indisputable, but Wayfarer's mundane view depends on your personal perspective and is philosophically moot. :cool:


*1. Federico Faggin : "Note that the only recognition required of the hardware is to reliably distinguish the state "0" from the state "1". This recognition does not produce any meaning."
"The operation of the computer, however, is extremely fragile, because it would take just one wrong bit to turn a machine that seems intelligent and deliberate into a completely useless box of metal, plastic, and silicon."
"Within a deterministic machine there is no free will"
Note --- Meaning requires a Me. A digital computer has no self-concept to serve as the Subject to interpret incoming data relative to Self-interest. Does AI know itself?

*2. Boolean Logic versus Human Reasoning :
The opposite of binary thinking (black-and-white, either/or) involves embracing complexity through Spectrum Thinking, Non-Binary Thinking, or Grey Thinking, focusing on nuances, gradations, and multiple possibilities rather than rigid categories like good/bad or right/wrong. It's about recognizing the "both/and," finding common ground, exploring the space between extremes, and seeing the interconnectedness of ideas, allowing for more flexible, nuanced solutions.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=binary+antonym

*3. "Mechanical perfection" refers to the ideal, flawless operation of a machine, free from errors, wear, or friction, though it's often a theoretical concept;
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=mechanical+perfection

*4. Superiority Complex : A person who thinks they're perfect might be called a perfectionist, an elitist, or a narcissist, often displaying traits like setting unrealistic standards, being hypercritical, demanding flawlessness, and struggling with criticism, sometimes masking deep-seated insecurity or a superiority complex where they feel inherently better than others.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=person+who+thinks+he%27s+perfect

180's god-like[immanentist] view is... — Gnomon

... logic, mathematics, computation are mind-independent – subject/pov/language/gauge-invariant – algorithmic constraints on nature (i.e. the intelligible/explicable aspects of reality) with which minds – subjects – are nomologically entangled (read Q. Meillassoux & D. Deutsch ... Spinoza & Einstein ... Laozi-Zhuangzi & Democritus-Epicurus-Lucretius ...) "Human logic, analog maybe/probability", as you call it, Gnomon, merely consists of meat-adaptive heuristics (not algorithms) limited to surviving and reproducing, which does not show (e.g. Aristotlean) bivalence to be a "logical fallacy". :roll: