Or people simply who believe in the Putin-Trump world in their hate of modern democracies and liberalism. It's not about having access to unfettered news outlets, it's what you pick yourself you want to believe in. And you can do it, when you just repeat to yourself that everything is just propaganda.

Thus there's a huge amount of people that want to believe in that the US is responsible for this war. Or that Ukraine is an artificial country and ought to be part of Russia...

Something like the truth / actual reality isn't a problem for them.

Ukraine is getting a $90bn euro loan. That will fund their war effort for the next 18 months.
https://www.ft.com/content/e5691048-696b-44cd-8a0a-50b917e3d62a

Some Russopeople dressed up as Ukrainian Nazis in Austria:

Chats: Wie Putin seinen Krieg der Desinformation auf Wiens Straßen führt
Chats: How Putin is waging his war of disinformation on Vienna's streets
^{— Max Miller · Profil · Dec 12, 2025}

Similar stuff has been reported before in other countries.
Some subsequent reports:

Austria Exposes Russian FSB Network Posing as “Ukrainian Nazis” to Sway Public Opinion Against Ukraine
^{— Roman Kohanets · UNITED24 · Dec 14, 2025}
In Austria, an FSB network disguised as "Ukrainian Nazis" was exposed
^{— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre · Dec 14, 2025}
Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation Network Posing as ‘Ukrainian Nazis’ Exposed in Austria
^{— Roman Pryhodko · Militarnyi · Dec 14, 2025}

There are a number of other reports on related topics.
The FSB cosplays as evil people and works to sow unrest wherever.
The Kremlin circle is a tad preoccupied with Nazism.

For me, these things are not part of the consideration. Sure, there will be rumblings, but who is going to stick their neck out when the world is headed for World War 3? — Tzeentch

The problem is the US does not have enough carrots and sticks to keep the entire world inline and Isolate China.

So you really need to war-game out your scenario to some sort of end point. For example, maybe the US could do a full blockade for a year and then come to a peace agreement with China and get some concessions, in a similar way of the tariffs negotiations. That would obviously be doable from a practical point of view, but it would obviously not really accomplish much in terms of containing China, just a negotiation tactic essentially.

Truly blockading China for years and decades would be really a huge undertaking.

However, we're only differing in projected intensity of the same structural dynamic.

Just like having a limited war in Finland (limited for Europe and Russia but obviously catastrophic for Finland) is a sort of Cold War with "enhancements", the US has already embarked on enhancements on the seas with intercepting Venezuelan and Iranian ships.

Definitely it's possible this is a practice run for a full embargo of China, but my feeling remains that would be simply too difficult and pressuring on the margins with piracy on the high seas is more cost effective: by doing a bit of something you can deploy the leverage of doing the full amount (as you demonstrate you aren't bluffing that you can and will do it) with minimal cost due only doing some demonstrations but then can demand concessions relative the full value of the threat.

As we have establised earlier, this is where our views differ the most.

US global dominance was established as a result of WW2, and my sense is that the battle to end it will be fought with the same stakes in what in essence will be WW3.

Under such conditions a full, indefinite blockade of China would be child's play. The endgame/end state/victory conditions that would lead to America's success I have already laid out (isolation of China and implosion of its economy) so I won't repeat them again unless you have very specific questions.

You lean more towards the idea that the battle over ending US dominance will remain limited. A perfectly defensible idea also.

As long as we're taking fundamentally different starting points (limited war vs. full-scale war), we will be talking past each other, though.

As long as we're taking fundamentally different starting points (limited war vs. full-scale war), we will be talking past each other, though. — Tzeentch

I disagree.

There was never a full scale war with the Soviet Union, so we have that already as an example of an alternative geopolitical structure to WWI and WWII.

Whereas in the world wars, each side could defeat the other (especially at the start before the US entry into the war), the dynamics of the cold war was driven by an inability of either side to win, and therefore alternative competition modes had to be sought: propaganda, proxi wars, fomenting dissent, arms races, economic blocks and so on.

What complicates the situation even further is the economic integration with China, producing about a third of global industrial goods, in addition to the rest of East-Asia that maybe also effectively blockaded in the event of a state of war. between the US and China.

Now, if your hypothesis is that a full scale blockade, and thus state of war, between the US and China may occur essentially by accident or miscalculation and then things would get messy from there and the eventual resolution would not be clear and who would ultimately benefit, we agree.

Where I am in a position of criticism is if your hypothesis is that such an act pursues some rational plan with likely net-benefit outcomes for the United States.

You can't just hand wave away the long term strategy China would pursue in inflicting costs on the US for maintaining the blockade as well as alternative trade routes, in addition to the industrial disentanglement problems. Russia prepared intensively for 8 years to cut industrial ties with the rest of Europe and it had the backing of China to accomplish that.

So, is your hypothesis that the US could just flip a switch and not only stop trading with China but potentially the whole of East-Asia? Or then that the US is now pursuing creating full redundancy and that will be ready in X amount of time and then the blockade will occur.

Now, if you don't want to war-game our your own hypothesis, obviously nothing is forcing you, but I can't see good answers to these questions so if you want to fully develop your theory you would need to propose them.

Russia prepared intensively for 8 years to cut industrial ties with the rest of Europe and it had the backing of China to accomplish that. — boethius

Do you references to this?

So, is your hypothesis that the US could just flip a switch and not only stop trading with China but potentially the whole of East-Asia? Or then that the US is now pursuing creating full redundancy and that will be ready in X amount of time and then the blockade will occur. — boethius

One sunk US aircraft carrier, or an other major surface combatant sunk, would be enough to give the US a "Pearl Harbour"-moment, and then any economic ties to China are totally irrelevant.

Oh, you don't have the low price gadgets from China? You don't have the latest chips from Taiwan? You have a recession and supply difficulties as international trade shuts down? Big deal. Increased arms manufacturing takes care of the recession. That ordinary people have to tighten their bealts? People have seen and done that, when it's wartime.

Russia gives a great example of this. If a state commits to war, economic hardships don't matter. They start only to matter when there literally isn't enough food around and people starve. The fallacy here is that Americans can get bored about war in Vietnam or in Afghanistan. Yet that's not the same as if they feel that they are attacked by a true rival like China.

Do you references to this? — ssu

Between 2014 and 2022 Russia accumulated more gold (increased reserves over 4 fold), created alternative payment systems, started replacing Western software with open source / domestic in critical systems, even passed the "Sovereign Internet Law" in 2019 (to ensure Russias internet could be disconnected from the global internet), and to cite that example as it's literally a law designed to prepare for war:

The Sovereign Internet Law (Russian: Закон о «суверенном интернете») is the informal name for a set of 2019 amendments to existing Russian legislation that mandate Internet surveillance and grants the Russian government powers to partition Russia from the rest of the Internet, including the creation of a national fork of the Domain Name System. — Sovereign Internet Law, wikipedia

To cite one more material necessities example:

The 2014 devaluation of the rouble and imposition of sanctions spurred domestic production; in 2016, Russia exceeded Soviet Russia's grain production levels, and in that year became the world's largest exporter of wheat.[3] In recent years, Russia once again emerged as a big agricultural power,[3][4] despite also facing various challenges. — Agriculture in Russia, Wikipedia

So there's clearly a intensive effort to prepare for a larger war and break with the West.

One sunk US aircraft carrier, or an other major surface combatant sunk, would be enough to give the US a "Pearl Harbour"-moment, and then any economic ties to China are totally irrelevant. — ssu

Doubtful that China would just go randomly sink a carrier.

If the US imposes a blockade that is a clear act of war and if then China retaliates that would be unlikely to be a "Pearl Harbour" moment but opinion would be mixed, even if a carrier got sunk.

Oh, you don't have the low price gadgets from China? You don't have the latest chips from Taiwan? You have a recession and supply difficulties as international trade shuts down? Big deal. Increased arms manufacturing takes care of the recession. That ordinary people have to tighten their bealts? People have seen and done that, when it's wartime. — ssu

It's a pretty big deal if there are components that cannot be easily substituted for critical infrastructure and various critical machines.

There's a lot of components and materials out there that are produced in incredibly complicated processes that are not easy to replicate, in addition to a lot of components that are super cheap due to immense accumulated capital expenditures in China over decades that cannot so easily be conjured up from nothing.

Russia gives a great example of this. If a state commits to war, economic hardships don't matter. They start only to matter when there literally isn't enough food around and people starve. — ssu

Russia is the example of preparing for 8 years for what would otherwise be economic and industrial pandemonium.

And Russia started that preparation from a relatively easy position of being lower in the value chain of producing commodities and industrial products (including nuclear reactors), and being supported by China that can produce most things. It is actually the higher in the value chain the harder such a break would be. For example, if you're economy was mostly lawyers and tax evasion then you may make immense profits from being that high up in the value chain, but it would be the hardest position to then substitute industrial commodity inputs, as most lawyers and their various flavours of secretaries don't weld all that great. Same for brands (one step lower on the value chain) it's easier for Russia or China to rebrand a commodity they produce than for the brand to start suddenly making the commodity domestically.

Doubtful that China would just go randomly sink a carrier.

If the US imposes a blockade that is a clear act of war and if then China retaliates that would be unlikely to be a "Pearl Harbour" moment but opinion would be mixed, even if a carrier got sunk. — boethius

Doubtful that Trump would just go randomly to impose a blockade of China.

The problem is if China declares a blockade against Taiwan, which it sees as an the renegade province, and then US tries to run it. This is totally realistic, just look at the Mission statement of the US Navy:

The United States is a maritime nation, and the U.S. Navy protects America at sea. Alongside our allies and partners, we defend freedom, preserve economic prosperity, and keep the seas open and free. Our nation is engaged in long-term competition. To defend American interests around the globe, the U.S. Navy must remain prepared to execute our timeless role, as directed by Congress and the President.

The US has a dubious history of giving the wrong signals for countries (just like Saddam's Iraq before it's invasion of Iraq) and hopefully China won't fall for this, even if Trump would send the wrong signals to it (look do whatever you want with Taiwan). And anyway, any kind of blockade has the possibility of things getting out of control and warships being sunk.

This is something that now could happen in Venezuela, where after sinking "narcoterrorist" speed boats the next vessels the US Navy could be sinking are the ships of the Venezuelan Navy now escorting the oil tankers. Then we'll see if the Trump is again the TACO he has been.

Doubtful that Trump would just go randomly to impose a blockade of China. — ssu

Well I agree. I am doubting the hypothesis of full US blockade on China, proactively to maintain hegemony.

The problem is if China declares a blockade against Taiwan, which it sees as an the renegade province, and then US tries to run it. This is totally realistic, just look at the Mission statement of the US Navy: — ssu

This is a different question than the US instigating a blockade, which is @Tzeentch's view will happen (whether under Trump or the next president).

If China instigates by attacking Taiwan, that is an entirely different military and diplomatic situation.

Presumably China's plan would be to rapidly take the Island and then disengage with the US Navy and wait until some diplomatic resolution (obviously where they keep Taiwan).

Of course, could spiral into a full scale war in the Pacific,

The US has a dubious history of giving the wrong signals for countries (just like Saddam's Iraq before it's invasion of Iraq) and hopefully China won't fall for this, even if Trump would send the wrong signals to it (look do whatever you want with Taiwan). And anyway, any kind of blockade has the possibility of things getting out of control and warships being sunk. — ssu

Agreed, blockading China would unlikely to be at zero cost.