You might want to read the paper that I linked in this instance.
— Philosophim
That paper relies on treating necessity as causation. — Banno

No, it notes that we can draw a necessary conclusion by examining causation. I wrote it Banno, so if you want to dispute it lets go there. Again, if you have issues with what I'm saying about the paper, lets not bog down another person's OP on it here.

However, we can conceive of the object floating upward, or vanishing when released. These conceptual possibilities are not physically possible. — Relativist

Quibble: they are physically possible, under certain conditions: you're in a simulation, you're a Boltzmann Brain, the laws of nature, for whatever reason, suddenly change, some magic-seeming alien technology is at work

Hmm.

What do I mean by 'no limitation'? Prior causality is the discovery of some other state that necessarily lead to another state. If X didn't happen, Y would not form in that way. But if Y formed in 'that way' without a prior cause of X, then it is not necessary that Y formed in that way, it 'simply did'. This also means that it could have 'simply not'. It did, but it wasn't necessary that it did. It necessarily is because it exists, but it didn't necessarily have to exist. — Philosophim

But in saying that, was he say that, of all the things that there are, none of them exist in every possible world? Or was he saying of nothing, that it exists in every possible world?

That's the trouble with continentals... so vague... — Banno

Good question. The ancient Greeks couldn't accept the idea of nothing. As a result, they didn't have the idea of zero and their math was limited because if it.

Zero was invented by the Babylonians.

↪Philosophim
Hmm. — Banno

Banno, I have an 8 year old nephew that I've helped raise. Now he's an excitable little fella and sometimes doesn't understand social graces in public. One of the things we're working on is saying please and thank you to waiters. He gets two warnings from me before I get serious with him. I've asked you two times to politely not derail this person's OP with a debate about my paper, and go to that topic to discuss. You have not.

I don't debate with rude 8 year olds. If you want to straighten up, stop being rude, and post that in the paper's thread to debate what I'm saying in the paper, I'll respond happily. But you're being rude to the OP at this point and I will not be part of it. I've given you my response as the author, and that is all I need to give in another person's thread.

I think this is where we bottom out. You’re treating metaphysical necessity as defined by invariance across admissible worlds, so that necessity is entirely a function of model-theoretic structure. I’m treating modal invariance as something that tracks deeper explanatory or grounding facts rather than constituting them. Once necessity is defined modally, your stipulation point follows; that definition is exactly what I’m not accepting. At that point the disagreement is methodological rather than technical, and I don’t think there’s much more to be gained by pressing it further here, so this where I will leave it. Thanks again for the discussion.

The critique I've offered was in good faith.

This pretence of victimhood you adopt when challenged is unbecoming.

Cheers.

Yes, of course it's a methodological difference.

Your possition is philosophically deeper than I initially recognised. You are arguing that the formal apparatus (modal logic) only works given certain unconditioned norms, and that we can't use that apparatus to demonstrate that everything is contingent, because doing so relies on non-contingent structure. But the weakness there is whether some "ground of intelligibility" constitutes a thing that exists necessarily (which is what the OP asks about) or just refers to conceptual/logical structures that don't "exist" in the relevant sense.

Cheers.

Quibble: they are physically possible, under certain conditions: you're in a simulation, you're a Boltzmann Brain, the laws of nature, for whatever reason, suddenly change, some magic-seeming alien technology is at work — RogueAI

Yes, if one of those logical possibilities is true, then it is physically possible.

However, if we're going to judge what is physically possible - we need to make some justifiable assumptions, otherwise we're only judging what is logically possible.