What 'thing' is being discussed? TIme is not 'a thing'. — Wayfarer

Time is the fact of change. When you say time doesn't exist prior to consciousness, you state change didn't happen prior to consciousness. Thus, I understand why you say time starts with consciousness, as change would start with consciousness. The primacy of consciousness. But there is no evidence that change doesn't happen prior to consciousness by your points presented. Only that we are observing and measuring change. Change happens whether we observe it or label it 'time'.

My claim is that time as succession or duration does not exist independently of the awareness of it. — Wayfarer

I understand this. The problem is you have no evidence of this. You haven't presented what it would be like if time did not have succession or duration. I'm not trying to put ideas into your head as I wanted to see what you came up with first. Since you haven't, the only state I could see reality being in prior to consciousness is a state of nothingness. The logical step would be that there was a state of existence in which no change happened, then suddenly consciousness came along and changed it. Basically the God theory of universal creation. Only in this case, the "God" is consciousness as a general point.

The problem of course is that this doesn't answer Ludwig's point, it presents an alternative view point without evidence.

Presuming anything is the act of a conscious being, so it is certain that presumption of the physical world presupposes a conscious being. But we know that the physical world existed long before any conscious beings existed (at least on this planet) and, since we know of no conscious beings that exist without a physical substrate, we can be sure that the physical world can exist without any conscious beings in it. — Ludwig V

You haven't presented evidence that the world did not exist prior to consciousness. The only thing you've observed is that humans have measured change with units we call time, and you think that if there isn't a consciousness measuring change that change cannot happen. That's a big claim with nothing backed behind it.

My claim is that time as succession or duration does not exist independently of the awareness of it. What can exist without observers are physical processes and relations between states. — Wayfarer

Ok, but what would that look like coherently without the idea that change happens as succession and over duration? What does a universe without duration mean or look like? What does an idea of change without succession look like? We use succession and duration in measuring time, because these are proven concepts. I'm willing to entertain a world that does not have succession or duration, but it needs to be coherent. What does that look like to you? Again, if you accept change existing prior to humanity observing it, then 'time' exists. If you're simply stating the 'measurement of time' doesn't exist, no argument there. But the lack of an observer measuring change does not mean change does not occur apart from observation.

It’s also worth noting that contemporary physics itself no longer treats space and time as fully observer-independent in the classical sense. — Wayfarer

Yes because that is how time is measured. You need an origin, because time is the measure of relative change between two states. Again, just because someone isn't there to measure relative change between two states, doesn't mean that it does not happen.

My point is not to deny physical reality, but to note that the naive realist picture of time as an observer-free container is no longer supported — even by physics. — Wayfarer

And again, all you've demonstrated is that "The naive realist picture of measuring time as an observer-free container is no longer supported." You have that 100%. Its the leap of you removing an observer's measurement to removing change prior to the observer that is missing a logical step.

The relation we create is the thing we invent measurement for, given some difference we observe. — Mww

The relation we observe, not create. The creation of a relation is something independent of observation. I can create a related measurement of zorbools, which relates the existence of magical fluctations to farts in the wind. Does it mean I can observe zorbools? No. Magic cannot be observed, so neither can zorbools.

I will argue that time itself is inextricably bound up with observation, and that this is the seat of a genuine paradox  -  one that an appeal to the geological or evolutionary facts, taken on their own, does not resolve. — Wayfarer

This will be an interesting thread, but I doubt that it will lead to a true or false conclusion. That's because human language is intrinsically materialistic*1. I suspect that ancient philosophers, especially Plato & Aristotle, understood that physicalist prejudice, and tried to develop a special metaphorical language for exchanging knowledge obtained by inferential Reason instead of by sensory Observation. Aristotle's both/and hybrid term Hylomorph --- real material (hyle) and ideal form (morph) --- may have been intended to overcome the linguistic bias toward public objective denotation over private subjective connotation*2. Some TPF posters seem to assume that literal (physical) definitions are necessarily true, but metaphorical (metaphysical) meanings are, if not absolutely false, then somewhat ambiguous, equivocal, and vague.

Even Time's Arrow*3 is an interpretation, not an observation. We see multiple instances and infer post hoc, ergo propter hoc. From observations of Quantum Physics, scientists have found that mental & mathematical measurements of time are ambiguous, even though our human stories of Time & Change tend to be unidirectional. For example, I have no personal experience of time prior to my birth, but society views birth as the first step toward death. And modern science typically portrays cosmic time as a near-infinite thermodynamic downhill run from low Entropy (order) to high Entropy (disorder) in terms of Energy digression. On the other hand, traditional historians have usually described the passage of time in terms of Hegelian dialectic, with an overall direction of progression. Even our word for ongoing Change, Time, is typically defined as irreversible succession of events from past to future.

For most practical scientific applications, the conventional progressive meaning of Time is useful. But for theoretical philosophical purposes, the meaning of Change is debatable. :nerd:



*1. The phrase "language is materialistic" suggests language isn't just abstract but deeply tied to physical reality, social structures, and material practices, moving beyond simple representation to actively shaping and being shaped by the world, seen in how words become physical (writing) and how language use reflects/reinforces economic systems, bodies, and cultural values. It's a concept explored in theories like new materialism, viewing language as an embodied activity embedded in concrete social situations, not an isolated system
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=language+is+materialistic

*2. Denotation : the literal or primary meaning of a word, in contrast to the feelings or ideas that the word suggests.
Connotation : an idea or feeling that a word invokes in addition to its literal or primary meaning.

*3. The arrow of time in physics refers to the unidirectional flow of time from past to future, a concept coined by Arthur Eddington. While fundamental physical laws are time-symmetric, our experience shows time's irreversible march, primarily explained by the second law of thermodynamics, which states that the entropy (disorder) of an isolated system always increases, defining the thermodynamic arrow of time (e.g., an egg breaking, not unbreaking). Other arrows include the cosmological arrow (universe expansion) and quantum arrow (wave function collapse).

Time is the fact of change. When you say time doesn't exist prior to consciousness, you state change didn't happen prior to consciousness. Thus, I understand why you say time starts with consciousness, as change would start with consciousness. The primacy of consciousness. But there is no evidence that change doesn't happen prior to consciousness by your points presented. — Philosophim

Change — understood as physical variation or state transition — can perfectly well occur without observers. I explicitly acknowledge that in the original post:

I am entirely confident that the broad outlines of cosmological, geological, and biological evolution developed by current science are correct, even if many of the details remain open to revision. — Wayfarer

If you think that is being denied, then you’re not engaging the point of the argument.

What I am questioning is whether physical change, by itself, amounts to time in the absence of an observer. Time provides the framework within which facts are ordered and rendered intelligible as a sequence — as earlier, later, before, after, duration. As soon as one considers those facts, that temporal ordering is already being brought to bear by a standpoint capable of making sense of them. That is what the observer brings to the picture. But the observer is never a part of the picture.

The period prior to the evolution of h.sapiens can indeed be estimated and stated, but that estimation is performed by an observer using conceptual units of time that are meaningful to human cognition.

It’s therefore important to see that this is not an empirical argument about what we observe, and hence not a question of empirical evidence as such. A useful parallel is the long-standing problem of interpretations of quantum mechanics: all interpretations start from the same empirical evidence, yet they diverge radically in what that evidence is taken to mean. The disagreement is not evidential, but conceptual. None of your objections really come to terms with this if you continue to see it as an empirical argument.

Ultimately, the passage of time ought to be considered as an immaterial activity, which all material activities may be compared with (measured by). However, this presents us with the problem of determining exactly what this immaterial activity is, so that we might figure out a way to measure it. We actually already have a good idea about what it is, it is a wave activity, the vibration of the cosmos. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nothing like that is required. What appears mysterious is not some hidden feature of the world, but the fact that the conditions which make the world intelligible are not themselves part of what appears, but are provided by the observer. That is exactly what “transcendental” means: essential to experience, but not visible within it.

Change — understood as physical variation or state transition — can perfectly well occur without observers.

If you think that is being denied, then you’re not engaging the point of the argument. — Wayfarer

I did note that you claimed you weren't denying science, and it seemed to me that you weren't denying change. My point as been that this means you also cannot deny succession and duration, at least with how I've understood your argument so far. Change implies an origin state then a successive state. Duration is the note that one thing remains in a particular state while other things around it change. We can measure this quantitatively with time, but the qualitative concepts still exist without our measurement or observation.

What I am questioning is whether physical change, by itself, amounts to time in the absence of an observer. — Wayfarer

If you are talking about the underlying qualitative concepts of what we are measuring with 'time', then yes. Succession and duration as unmeasured concepts would continue. I'll ask again, what would the world look like without succession and duration prior to consciousness existing?

The period prior to the evolution of h.sapiens can indeed be estimated and stated, but that estimation is performed by an observer using conceptual units of time that are meaningful to human cognition. — Wayfarer

They are more than meaningful to cognition, they produce accurate predicted results about the past and present. Again, time isn't just an invented concept, its applied with success. Just like length still exists if we don't use an inch to measure it.

The quantitative count of time could not exist without consciousness, true, and it shouldn't just apply to people. Bugs and animals have consciousness to an extent as well. They observe the world without a measure of their existence. I'm going even beyond this and removing consciousness entirely. Rocks in space still had change relative to themselves and other rocks in space. Its just unmeasured and unobserved.

It’s therefore important to see that this is not an empirical argument about what we observe, and hence not a question of empirical evidence as such. — Wayfarer

But it does require us to consider the empirical if we are going to include science. When you say, "Time does not exist without observers," you are making a claim about existence. So at the least, it can't contradict what we know about existence now without a good argument. My point is that our measurement of time, and the underlying concepts of succession and duration are proven in the very measurement tools we use. 1 second is both a sustained amount of measured change, and succession is the start of the second vs the end. There is no reason that if we simply stopped measuring or 'observing' time, that the qualitative concepts would suddenly stopped. You keep avoiding this portion, so I'll ask again. If succession and duration do not exist, how does change work intelligibly? This is conceptual, and not empirical.

A useful parallel is the long-standing problem of interpretations of quantum mechanics: all interpretations start from the same empirical evidence, yet they diverge radically in what that evidence is taken to mean. The disagreement is not evidential, but conceptual. — Wayfarer

The differences in concepts only has value in its clarity of understanding the evidence as is, and helpful in discovering new evidence going forward. There is a concept of quantum mechanics that our literal eyeballs looking at something change the outcome of what we're observing. This is factually incorrect. A misconception holds no value. My point is that your viewpoint seems to hold the misconception that the absence of an observer means the absence of the qualitative aspect of time. At most, it just means the absence of someone measuring it.

I did note that you claimed you weren't denying science, and it seemed to me that you weren't denying change. My point as been that this means you also cannot deny succession and duration, at least with how I've understood your argument so far. — Philosophim

But I respectfully suggest that you haven't. You will invariably view it through the frame of scientific realism, and the only kind of arguments you would consider, would be scientific arguments. Let's leave it at that, and thanks for your comments.

Excellent job on the OP, as usual.

I think your critique of the “pre-history” objection is largely successful. In particular, I agree that appeals to cosmology often assume, without argument, that temporal succession is simply given as a fully determinate framework, independently of the conditions under which “before” and “after” have any sense. Your insistence that physics presupposes, rather than explains, temporal passage seems exactly right.

That said, I wonder whether the antinomy you describe really forces us to treat temporal succession as dependent on an actual standpoint or observer. There may be a middle position here, one that avoids both brute temporal realism and observer-dependence.

In a broadly Aristotelian tradition, the world is understood to be intrinsically intelligible. That is, it need not be thought of as intelligible because it is taken up by a mind; rather, minds are possible because the world is already ordered and determinate. On that view, structure and sequence are not imposed by understanding, but are what make understanding possible in the first place. This does not reduce order to mere physics, but neither does it make order depend on experience.

If something like this is right, then it seems important to distinguish physical change, lived temporality, and temporal order as such. Your argument shows convincingly that lived duration - in the Bergsonian sense - cannot be reduced to physical change, and that clocks and equations do not by themselves yield passage or continuity. But I would argue that it does not follow that temporal order itself requires an experienced point of view in order to be real.

One might say instead that the world prior to observers was not timeless, but unexperienced. The sequence of events was ordered and determinate, even though that order was not taken up or reflected upon by any subject. What emerges with consciousness is not temporal order itself, but the explicit presence of that order as order.

Framed this way, the tension you identify remains genuine, but it may not mark a final antinomy. Scientific accounts of a long pre-history and phenomenological accounts of temporality would then be addressing different aspects of the same reality: one describing ordered succession, the other describing how that succession comes to be experienced as passage.

Nothing like that is required. What appears mysterious is not some hidden feature of the world, but the fact that the conditions which make the world intelligible are not themselves part of what appears, but are provided by the observer. That is exactly what “transcendental” means: essential to experience, but not visible within it. — Wayfarer

That is exactly what I am disagreeing with. That feature of the world, which we know and measure as the passing of time, is a real, independent, and very mysterious feature of the world. We know that the passage of time is independent from observers from the evidence derived from studies like geology and geomorphology. We know there is activity independent from the observer, and any activity requires the passage of time. Therefore we can conclude deductively that this mysterious aspect of reality, which we know as the passing of time, is independent from the observer.

The passage of time turns out to be "transcendental" in a much more significant and absolute way. Not only does time transcend all experience, but it also transcends all physical existence. This is why modern cosmological theories break down at the so-called "Big Bang". They have not been able to separate the immaterial, nonphysical passage of time from the physical existence of the universe. The former is necessary for, and demonstrably prior to, the latter.

Hey, thanks! Most appreciated. There’s nothing I really differ with there. Again, I’m not saying that ‘nothing exists’ sans observers. What this, and most of my arguments, are against, is the elimination of the observer - the pretence that through the perspective of science, we see the world as it truly is. And the almost invariable implication, we’re a ‘mere blip’ in the vastness of cosmic space and time. That is viewing ourselves “from the outside”, so to speak - treating the observer as another phenomenon. When in reality the observer is that to whom or to which phenomena appear. That, I take to be the lesson of phenomenology and its forbears.

Again, I’ve also been most impressed with a book I’ve mentioned before Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles Pinter (Routledge 2021.) Pinter was a maths professor emeritus whose last book (and swansong) was about the intersection of philosophy and cognitive science. It was not much noticed in the philosophy profession as he had been a maths professor - which is a shame, because it’s a genuinely insightful book. His big idea is the way cognition (not only human cognition) organises experience by way of meaningful gestalts.

I’m also influenced by Aristotle - not by having studied him at length, because I wasn’t educated in ‘the Classics’. But I’ve absorbed it by cultural osmosis, so to speak, and also through my pursuit of comparative religion and philosophy. In the time I’ve been posting to forums, since around 2010, I’ve developed respect for Aristotelian Thomism, although without necessarily buying into the devotional commitments. But I’m very much in the overall mold of Platonism, again I think through cultural osmosis.

We know there is activity independent from the observer, and any activity requires the passage of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

“The observer knows there is activity independent from the observer”. He does indeed.

But I respectfully suggest that you haven't. You will invariably view it through the frame of scientific realism, and the only kind of arguments you would consider, would be scientific arguments. Let's leave it at that, and thanks for your comments. — Wayfarer

All good, appreciate the discussion Wayfarer!

The observer knows there is activity independent from the observer”. He does indeed. — Wayfarer

So the passage of time itself is independent. Right? Therefore before and after are also independent.

What is subjective (dependent on an observer) is the measurement of the passage of time. Therefore any specific unit, or period of time is subjective (dependent on an observer). Examples of these are a specific minute, a specific hour, today, yesterday, 2021, 1940, etc.

The problem is that most people do not distinguish between the measurement of the passing of time, and the passing of time itself. Then the measurement, which is subjective, is taken to be "time". And so most do not distinguish between physical change (the common means of measuring time), and the thing measured, the non-physical passage of time.

If you take a ruler and measure a blade of grass at one foot long, one foot long is the measurement, it is not the thing measured, being the blade of grass. Likewise, if we measure that it has been 24 hours since this time yesterday, 24 hours is the measurement. It is not the thing measured, which is the passage of time itself. The passage of time is that mysterious immaterial aspect of the independent world, which we do not understand.

Then the measurement, which is subjective, is taken to be "time". — Metaphysician Undercover

Isn't the measurement objective? The feel, knowing and perception of time is subjective, but any measurements are objective i.e. by watch or clock, isn't it? Your 1 hour must be same as my 1 hour, and for the folks in the down under, and the folks in the whole world.

The distinction made between a realm of becoming and the realm of eternity in early Greek thought is an interesting frame to consider.

Change becomes the most difficult thing to talk about.

Isn't the measurement objective? The feel, knowing and perception of time is subjective, but any measurements are objective i.e. by watch or clock, isn't it? Your 1 hour must be same as my 1 hour, and for the folks in the down under, and the folks in the whole world. — Corvus

Well, "objective" has many meanings. Here, you imply that if two people agree, then it is "objective". That would imply a meaning of "objective" which is based in intersubjectivity. So, when I said the measurement is "subjective", this is not inconsistent, or contrary to your use of "objective" here.

Look at it this way. Let's say that ideas and concepts are property of the subject. These things are dependent on the minds of subjects, therefore in a sense, "subjective". Also, we assume physical objects, like the cups I mentioned earlier, which are supposed to be independent. When we talk about these things, their properties etc., we are talking about the objects, hence what is said may be "objective", in the sense of 'of the object'.

Measurement is a very difficult concept because we take ideas and concepts, which are subjective, in the sense described above, completely universal and removed from the objects, and attempt to apply them to objects. The measurement is never objective, because it is always entirely conceptual, property of the subject. Nor is the measurement something we say about the object itself, because measurement is applied to a specific parameter (property) of the object. Notice, a property is said to be "of the object", objective in the sense of something we say about the object. But the measurement is not something we say about the object itself, it is something we say about the specific property. So measurement is twice removed from the object. It is not a property of the object, but a property of the property. It is an idea applied to an idea, therefore subjective.

The measurement is never objective, because it is always entirely conceptual, property of the subject. Nor is the measurement something we say about the object itself, because measurement is applied to a specific parameter (property) of the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Measurement is agreed way of setting and counting the figures of objects, be it size, weight or time. If it is not objective, then everyone will have different way of measurement on days, hours, minutes, distance, size, weight etc, which will make Science and daily life chaotic?

Isn't the measurement (of time) objective? — Corvus

It is. If you read the OP as saying it isn’t, then you’re not reading it right.

Measurement is agreed way of setting and counting the figures of objects, be it size, weight or time. — Corvus

You ignored the point I made. "Size", "weight", etc., are not "the object", those terms refer to a specific feature, a property of the supposed object, and strictly speaking it is that specific property which is measured, not the object.

If it is not objective, then everyone will have different way of measurement on days, hours, minutes, distance, size, weight etc, which will make Science and daily life chaotic? — Corvus

That is the definition of "objective" which I tried to steer you away from, so that you could understand the point I wanted to make. If you just want to claim that this definition of "objective" (based in an agreement between subjects) is the only meaningful definition of that term, then I can't make the point, and discussion is useless.

But let me ask you one question. If we define "objective" in the way that you propose, how would you differentiate between "justified" and "true"?

It is. If you read the OP as saying it isn’t, then you’re not reading it right. — Wayfarer

The point I made is that if we adhere to a strict definition of "objective", meaning of the object, then measurement is not objective. This is because measurement assigns a value to a specified property, it does not say anything about the object itself. Assigning the property to the object says something about the object, but assigning a value to the property says something about the property.

The problem with the loose definition of "objective" (agreement amongst subjects) which Corvus is proposing, is that it blurs the distinction between justified and true. If we maintain that objective knowledge requires both, justified and true, and "true" requires correspondence with the object, then simple agreement amongst subjects does not meet the criteria for "objective knowledge".

Isn't the measurement objective? — Corvus

Try this explanation.

To claim that the measurement of time is objective requires that we have an object to refer to, to meet the criteria for "true", by correspondence. "True" is a common condition for "objective" knowledge. Without this object, which would be pointed to as the one with the property of "time" which is being measured, there is no possibility of truth by correspondence. Then all we are left with is agreement amongst subjects, and this only means that the measurement has been justified. But there is no way to determine truth without the required object. Therefore such a measurement cannot be "objective".

This is a consequence of special and general relativity. Since the measurement of time is made to be reference frame dependent, there is no single object which the passage of time is a property of. Therefore it is impossible that the measurement of time could be objective.

So it makes no sense to look for an empirical cause of Kant’s categories. — Joshs

I see this assertion repeated by Kantians but to be honest this seems to be a distraction. The point isn't finding empirical causes of the categories. The assumption that they might have a cause arises from the fact that our existence seems contingent. If it is contingent, our existence should have a cause.

But Kant considers transcendental subjectivity to be an atemporal condition of possibility of time. — Joshs

To me this would only make sense if our mind was also atemporal. Indeed, if 'transcendental subjectivity' is not 'nothing' or a mere illusion, it seems to me that the logical conclusion is to say that 'transcendental subjectivity' is atemporal. This almost sounds like what the Indian Samkyas ("there are a plurality of eternal minds") or the Advaita Vedanta ("there is only one eternal mind") would say. Of course, Kant would disagree with this characterization but I find interesting that Schopenhauer almost made those moves.

In Husserl, transcendental subjectivty is nothing but the structure of time itself. It is not contingent; it is contingency itself. — Joshs

Contingency means "the possibility of not be", i.e. X is contingent if it is possible for X to not be. If (1) 'X exists' and (2) 'X is contingent' this would suggest that there is a 'reason' (in a general sense of the word 'reason') that 'X' exists. So, I'm not sure of what Husserl means here.

There is no pre-given temporal form that consciousness then inhabits; temporality is inseparable from the flow of conscious life itself. Transcendental subjectivity is therefore not “before” time, nor “outside” time, nor a condition of possibility in the Kantian sense of a formal constraint. It is a self-temporalizing process. — Joshs

Is this 'transcendental subjectivity' inter-subjective? That is, is it shared between subjects?

Interesting. I had never heard of Nagarjuna. So, what is left after objectification? The Tao is also known as non-being and is often not considered a thing at all. — T Clark

Yes, Taoism IMO is the closest view to Buddhism non-dualism. As @Wayfarer however correctly pointed out there is controversy about how to interpret Nagarjuna's thought (for instance, this SEP article elucidates how various Tibetan exegitical school understood the difference between the 'two truths' of Nagarjuna). Still, I can't help but seeing similarities here.

Still, this "So, what is left after objectification?" is a very IMO deep problem. I came to the view that intelligibility is in fact essential to being. So, perhaps my own answer would be 'nothing' (if objectification is understood as intelligibility).

I don't think what the Taoists call "the 10,000 things," i.e. the multiplicity of the world, arise only from rational thought. Our minds are doing a lot we are not fully aware of. I am strongly drawn to the idea we are all subject to human nature--both ours as human beings and our own as individuals. Taoists call this "Te." As I understand it, our human nature includes a structured mind that limits and directs us to a particular relationship with, particular knowledge of, the world, including a particular division of the Unity, whatever you call it, into the vast universe of things we find ourselves in. — T Clark

I agree with that but not that 'rationality' isn't limited to what we are aware. Regardless of that, however, the point I am making is that if there wasn't a 'structured reality' before the arising of 'human nature', I'm not sure how could the latter arise in the first place. The only answer that might make sense in this view is that multiplicity is, in fact, illusory and reality is still that 'unstructured unity' or 'unstructured reality that is neither one nor many'. In other words, the 'change' is merely apparent. Indeed, as I read it, Laozi seems to suggest just that in ch1 of the Tao Te Ching. It seems to me that, in fact, he's saying that multiplicity is superimposed by 'desire':

Ever desireless, one can see the mystery.
Ever desiring, one can see the manifestations.
These two spring from the same source but differ in name;
this appears as darkness.
Darkness within darkness.
The gate to all mystery. — Tao Te Ching, ch.1

Intelligibility is not something the world produces, but something that arises in the relation between a world and a mind capable of making sense of it. For a contemporary cognitive-science way of expressing this without metaphysical commitments, John Vervaeke’s notion of “relevance realisation” points in a similar direction: intelligibility emerges as an ongoing activity of sense-making enacted by cognitive agents in their engagement with the world. — Wayfarer

If intelligibility arises from the relation between the world and a certain kind of mind, such a relation is the ground of intelligibility. This, indeed, is like saying that there is no intelligible explanation of how such a relation can exist. However, the very fact that one says that "intelligibility emerges in this way" presupposes intelligibility.

I was only voicing concern for attributing to time plausible explanatory ground for the existence of sentient beings. It’s like…seeking an answer the truth of which is impossible to prove, given from something the truth of which is impossible to know. — Mww

I might agree with that. But an impossibility to know an explanation isn't a conclusive evidence of an absence of an explanation.

Passage. Movement. Passage of time, movement of time, movement of an infinite immaterial. Irrational.
Passage. Change. Change of time. Change of a motionless, infinite immaterial. Irrational.
—————-

There is measure of duration or succession of things in relation to each other, in units of time.
There is measure of change of place, the motion of a thing in relation to itself or something else over a series of units of time. These empirical measurements are physical activities in the use of instruments, therefore objective, but they are measures of duration or succession/coexistence, which all relate to determinable empirical change, not to time itself.

There is a change in the condition of a subject, e.g., from aesthetic measure of having no fear to the fear of, having no hope for, etc, the object for which there is possibly no experience, hence this determinable change is entirely subjective.

There is a change in the condition of a subject, from having no knowledge of the duration of a thing, or the succession of a thing in relation to another thing, to knowledge of these insofar as he has accomplished a relevant measurement, such change precisely as subjective as his fear or hope, albeit with an object of experience related to it.

When is the last time? What is there that will be the last time of? If it cannot be said what the first or last time is, how can it be said to pass? Or to change? That the last time of a house is the burning down of it, such that the passage of the house’s time is given, says nothing at all about the first or last of time.

Pretty sad and quite unphilosophical, for a guy to look at his watch and actually think he’s observing time. Or for him to ask what time it is, and actually think he’s getting an answer about time.

That same sad unphilosophical guy is perfectly aware the time he thinks he sees on a watch, or the answer he gets when asking of the time, is always and only given in numbers. He’s no more aware of the infinite, immaterial primitive condition of numbers, then he is of the necessity that time be just as infinitely and immaterially primitive as the numbers used as the units representing it. Guy might as well be doing magic.

If the units created to represent the immovable, infinite immaterial are strictly human conceptual constructs, how can that which is represented by them be any less a conceptual construct? Just as Nature has no numbers of its own, so too does it not have time and space of its own.
—————-

Everydayman doesn’t know and doesn’t care that no space is dependent on another, which is to say no one space is conditioned by any other space, but any one time absolutely presupposes that time antecedent to it, which is to say any one time is conditioned by that time antecedent to it.

Because of this, there is no conceptual conflict in a thing being in this space or in an adjacent space, whether a progressively or regressively conditioned space, and there is no conceptual conflict in a thing being in this time and a regressively conditioned time, re: the past, but there is necessarily an experiential conflict in the thing being in this time and then in a progressively conditioned time, re: the future.

Also from this, it is the case it is impossible that a thing can be in a space at one time and in an adjacent space in the same time, but a thing can be in a space at a time and in the same space in another time. No two things can be in one space, but any one thing can be in two times.

For he who proclaims all these space/time conditions are of Nature herself, cannot explain how the human intelligence grasps by itself, and that a priori, that of which only the totality of all experience can prove. To prove these all belong to Nature herself, there must be found no exception in the totality of all experiences, to which he does not have even the least access.

Where he can find no exception is only if these conditions belong to him alone, in direct correspondence to the totality of his own experiences, the rest of all possible experiences remain subject to logical inference regarding experience in general.

If the human intelligence does not permit, merely from the impossibility of its proof, that these conditions are laws of Nature with respect to its objects, they must then be no more than the rules of that intelligence with respect to the objects of its experiences.
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On time. Not this or that time, not the time in, not the time for, not time the measurement of.

On time itself, as intended by the thread title.

Me: ….impossibility to know the truth of an explanation.
You: …impossibility to know an explanation;

Me: ….proof of an explanation.
You: …absence of an explanation;

I don’t know what to do with this.
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an impossibility to know an explanation isn't a conclusive evidence of an absence of an explanation. — boundless

That’s exactly what it means. The possibility of knowing a thing, herein an explanation, presupposes that thing by its existence in some time….somebody made one up. The most conclusive evidence for the impossibility of knowing a thing is that the thing doesn’t exist in any time…no one has made one up ….which just is the absence of it.

All of which is irrelevant, insofar as I never said there wasn’t or couldn’t be an explanation, which means there always was or possibly was something to know. The justification for the explanation, on the other hand, the ground of its truth, may or may not meet the criteria for knowledge in general. It follows we may well know an explanation without granting that it is sufficient for what it seeks to explain.

To not know is very far from the impossibility of knowing.

I should have qualified the impossibility by saying "impossible to know by us" or something like that. I mean, I accept that our knowledge has limitations and something can be impossible to be known by us even if it is possible to know in principle.

was only voicing concern for attributing to time plausible explanatory ground for the existence of sentient beings. It’s like…seeking an answer the truth of which is impossible to prove, given from something the truth of which is impossible to know — Mww

The fact that it might be impossible for us to know how sentient beings came into existence doesn't exclude that an explanation is possible in principle.

I believe that the existence of sentient beings in this world is contingent. If I am right, this means that sentient beings could not exist. If so, there is perhaps an explanation for their existence even if we are not in a condition to know it and we might never truly know it.

The fact that it might be impossible for us to know how sentient beings came into existence doesn't exclude that an explanation is possible in principle. — boundless

Tautologically true; we’re here, for which some explanation is necessary.

I don’t want to give the impression that I doubt science’s capacity for extraordinary accuracy in the measurement of time (and distance). Atomic clocks measure time with astonishing precision. The philosophical point, however, is that the act of measurement itself cannot be regarded as truly independent of the observer who performs and interprets the measurement.

So what? might be the response. The point is that this quietly undermines the assumption that what is real independently of any observer can serve as the criterion for what truly exists. That move smuggles in a standpoint that no observer can actually occupy. It’s a subtle point — but also a modest one. It doesn't over-reach.

Where it does appear to be controversial is insofar as it calls into question the instinctive sense that the universe simply exists “just so,” wholly independent of — and prior to — any possible apprehension of it. But again, that is a philosophical observation, not an argument against science. It is an argument against drawing philosophical conclusions from naturalistic premises.

I'll chime in another time here as I've been following the topic still and seeing if I missed something. If you wish to discuss it, that's fine. If not, I'll bow out.

The philosophical point, however, is that the act of measurement itself cannot be regarded as truly independent of the observer who performs and interprets the measurement. — Wayfarer

I don't think this has ever been controversial. This is what we've always known.

The point is that this quietly undermines the assumption that what is real independently of any observer can serve as the criterion for what truly exists. That move smuggles in a standpoint that no observer can actually occupy. It’s a subtle point — but also a modest one. It doesn't over-reach. — Wayfarer

It is an over-reach. You have to understand that the act of measurement assumes something is there independent of the measurer. There has never been the assumption that we create what we measure, only the creation of the quantitative standard of the measurement itself. So we can create seconds, minutes, or whatz its, but they all have to measure change between two states. The act of measurement itself cannot exist without there being something independent to measure. You have to tackle that first. Use length. If we don't measure length, does the distance between objects disappear? If you can't say yes, then you can't say yes to measuring time and state changes.

Size", "weight", etc., are not "the object", those terms refer to a specific feature, a property of the supposed object, and strictly speaking it is that specific property which is measured, not the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s actually on point. It’s very close to Bergson’s argument about clock time: what gets measured is not concrete duration itself, but an abstracted, spatialized parameter extracted for practical and mathematical purposes. Precision applies to the abstraction — not to the lived or concrete whole. But then, we substitute the abstract measurement for the lived sense of time.

You have to understand that the act of measurement assumes something is there independent of the measurer — Philosophim

I don’t think any of the sources I’m drawing on dispute that there is something to be measured. Of course measurement presupposes an independent reality — otherwise measurement would be meaningless. The point is not that we create what we measure, but that the act of measurement already involves an observer-relative framework of abstraction.

Distance does not disappear if no one measures it — but “distance in meters,” embedded in a metric geometry and operationalized by instruments and conventions, does not exist independently of those frameworks. Likewise with clock time. What exists is change, passage, becoming; what we measure is an abstracted parameter extracted from it.

The philosophical claim is simply that it does not follow from the existence of something independent to be measured that reality itself can be specified in wholly observer-independent terms. That further move is a metaphysical assumption, not something licensed by the practice of measurement itself. It overlooks //or rather takes for granted// the role of the observing mind.

I think there’s a deeper issue lurking here. Absent any perspective whatever, what could it even mean to say that something “exists”? To exist is to be this rather than that — to stand apart, to have determinacy, identity, and distinction. That act of discrimination is not supplied by the world in the abstract; it is enacted by cognitive systems.

Space and time are intrinsic to that discriminative capacity. Without spatial differentiation and temporal ordering, there could be no stable objects, no persistence, no comparison, no calculation — and therefore no measurement at all. Conscious awareness and intelligibility presuppose these structuring forms.

None of this denies that there is something there independently of us. The point is that what counts as an existent — as something identifiable, measurable, and meaningful — already presupposes a standpoint capable of making distinctions. Pure “observer-free existence” is not coherent; it is an abstraction that undercuts the very conditions that make existence intelligible in the first place.

Husserl makes a related point in Philosophy as a Rigorous Science: naturalism quietly assumes “nature” as already given and self-evident, instead of asking how nature becomes constituted as an objective domain in the first place. The intelligibility and measurability of the natural world presuppose structures of cognition that naturalism itself cannot account for without circularity.

That is a cognitive process: the way the mind “brings forth” or constructs the world that naturalism treats as its starting point. This used to be the territory of philosophical idealism, but in an important sense these insights have been increasingly validated by cognitive science. Cognitive science explores how the brain and mind actively structure what we take to be external reality. That does not deny that there is an external reality — but an external reality can only be real for a mind.

This is how mind is properly re-integrated into a universe that naturalism assumes is without one.