And how meta of you to reply by demonstrating said special gift.

We have two opposing directions, one toward the inside, the other toward the outside. I say we proceed toward the inside. You say we proceed toward the outside. Relative to each other we are both backwards. Your backwardness is the drab, everyday backwardness of all those cave dwellers, the entire scientific community. My backwardness is a special gift.

But my position is triadic. It goes in three directions.

Bear in mind that you are taking a very partial view of current evolutionary arguments. So the idea that life has the global purpose of surviving is being replaced by the idea it serves the greater purpose of entropification or dissipation. — apokrisis

I don't recognise that as 'purpose', I think it simply reflects the emptiness of physicalism. The net sum is zero. Really the only appropriate philosophy for anyone who believes that is hedonism and consumption, as this is surely the most effective way to hasten it.

Anyway, I'm really talking only about evolution as an element in current cultural discourse, not as science per se. I'm simply arguing that, from the viewpoint of evolutionary theory, the sole criteria against which every attribute is defined, is 'that which contributes to survival'. But when it comes to 'the human condition', that doesn't amount to a philosophical answer.

There's a famous evo-biologist, by the name of Theodosius Dobzhansky, who is well-known for the saying that 'nothing in biology makes sense except for in the light of evolution'. However, he was also a devout Orthodox Christian, and published a book called The Biology of Ultimate Concern that canvasses these same ideas.

To describe man as a conglomeration of transformed groceries is valid and realistic, up to a certain point. The limit of the validity of this description is set by its reductionist character. What is needed in addition is a compositionist counterpart. Man certainly consists of molecules and atoms, but he does not arise by an accidental concourse of these molecules and atoms. — Dobzhansky

I think semiosis is certainly a step in the right direction, but mainly insofar as it understands information as fundamental to nature.

Do you see much renunciation going on in the modern consumer society? — apokrisis

No. It clearly goes against the current of consumer society (and for that matter, Buddhist monks were described as 'those who go against the current'.) But that is not the point.

Rational animal, thank you. It's a qualifier that makes a fundamental diifference.
— Wayfarer

I don't think I would call that difference "fundamental". — Metaphysician Undercover

OK then, "unique".

I fully accept the facts of evolution, but I believe that once h. sapiens crosses a certain threshold, she is able to see things in a way that are not simply 'biologically determined'. Such, indeed, is the meaning of the 'sapience' after which our kind is named.

~ Wayfarer

What is the point to assuming such a "threshold"? — Metaphysician Undercover

One of the signifiers of crossing that evolutionary threshold comes with the ability to ask the question 'who am I?'

Creativity, just like metaphysics, cannot be made sense off from an evolutionary perspective because it does not necessarily increase one's chance of survival, nor does it necessarily increase propagation. However, it is an essential part of life which cannot be overlooked. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's very similar to the point I'm trying to make.

I don't recognise that as 'purpose' — Wayfarer

What could decide whether the naturalist or the transhumanist is correct here?

Purpose is the reason why things are done. Naturalism suggests the most general reason it can. And proof would be that the reason ultimately constrains everything.

But how could transcendent purpose be validated? Is personal revelation or religious tradition enough to talk about purpose in that universalising sense?

But how could transcendent purpose be validated? Is personal revelation or religious tradition enough to talk about purpose in that universalising sense? — apokrisis

Nowadays we presume that such things as religious ideas are subjective, personal, private, or internal. Nature, studied by science, is external, shared, objective, and studied in the third person.

But this background understanding, which is widely assumed by modern secular culture, is itself a culturally- and historically-conditioned perspective. However, as Buddhist scholar David Loy points out, "the main problem with our usual understanding of secularity is that it is taken-for-granted, so we are not aware that it is a worldview. It is an ideology that pretends to be the everyday world we live in. Many assume that it is simply the way the world really is, once superstitious beliefs about it have been removed.'

Consequently, it is naturally assumed that 'science has shown that the Universe is devoid of purpose' and that 'man is simply another evolved species'. It is what sensible people believe, nowadays. You see that in questions on this forum, practically every day.

And I think from within such perspective, the question about 'meaning or purpose' is indeed meaningless! I remember some of my early exchanges on the old forum, with the likes of Death Monkey, with my assertion that there is an objective moral order, and he patiently assuring me that this was in fact nonsensical. And from within the kind of weltanschauung that he had adopted, indeed it was.

Go to a Zen master, and ask 'what is the meaning of it all', and he'll likely whack you with a stick and tell you to go sit, or work. 'Purpose' he might say 'is not something separate from practice'. Same with many traditional philosophies - if you asked them 'hey what is the meaning of it all?', they wouldn't have any idea what you meant. It was only when we 'became modern' that the idea that the Universe might 'exist without purpose' became clear enough to really even be thinkable. It's part of the condition of modernity, in my opinion.

So, asking the question is religious, in a way, but in the sense of a quest, I would like to think, rather than the acceptance of packaged answers.

Consequently, it is naturally assumed that 'science has shown that the Universe is devoid of purpose' and that 'man is simply another evolved species'. It is what sensible people believe, nowadays. You see that in questions on this forum, practically every day. — Wayfarer

But I have taken care to distinguish my holistic naturalism from that reductionist Scientism. So you are not dealing with purpose as a systems science perspective would understand it.

Nowadays we presume... — Wayfarer

Yes. But the question was how you could claim to know.

Naturalism has its way of supporting belief - inductive scientific reason. You seem to be saying that a religious account would be the correct one here, not the naturalistic. So what method are you using to support that belief? Let's see why it is in fact better than methodological naturalism.

@Wayfarer

One, to me glaring, metaphysical lack in Hoffman’s worldview is that he addresses evolution as a leading cause for how we are (something that I happen to agree with on multiple levels) yet does not give any attention to how evolutionary processes work on a strictly metaphysical level.

Yes, this in itself is a can of worms; e.g., which parts of our evolutionary theories are approximated maps and not the actual terrain? (lots of things—both philosophical and of the empirical sciences—could be addressed here; sorry, can’t help myself: one easy to express example: given today’s models of fitness, a bacterium which both a) has never reproduced and b) has been around since the dawn of bacteria would be denoted as holding zero fitness, this despite it having out-survived most life forms on this planet; to me, this hypothetical (it is possible in principle, and might be actual of some individual bacterium out there that, in essence, is a species onto itself) has implications regarding our models of fitness that always bothered me … but back to the main point).

Evolution—i.e., change due to natural selection—could be universally applicable, and not strictly limited to life. (You'll note how the concept of purpose is inextricable from evolutionary theory--this despite it being explained away in multiple ways by those who deny purpose to existence.) But in order for this scenario to make sense one first needs to reduce the complexities associated with biological evolution down to their bare minimums in terms of processes (thereby excluding the means via which these processes occur in physical life both genotypically and phenotypically). Nevertheless, all this would still address the physical. What Hoffman’s worldview endorses—to me, similar enough in attitude to biocentrism—is that only awareness-endowed agencies are objectively real on a metaphysical plane. I say fine, I agree, but then what form of evolutionary theory is espoused that would further simplify change via natural selection so that it may logically hold when strictly considering conscious agents (hence, that would apply to an ecosystem of aware agents/agencies even in the absence of all physicality; or, to be more precise, in the absence of all phenomenal—though not noumenal—reality)?

If this point is not resolved, then—as it currently stands for me—he is endorsing logical contradictions on a metaphysical level in justifying who we are via theories of evolution. However, I grant that I’ve only read the interview and seen the video linked to in the OP. Maybe I’m so far missing out on something? Like I said previously, I’m sympathetic to his cause.

Consciousness ends up being conscious of how it must be the product of unconscious processes. — apokrisis

A bit late in the thread with this post in relation to this and other related comments you've made.

You’ve affirmed that consciousness is there due to unconscious process of mind. On its own terms, I agree 100%. However, if this is intended to dissuade one from granting consciousness its own agency, it then does away with all possibilities of top-down causation as it would apply to consciousness. It seems to me you either a) ascribe to the unconscious mind awareness-endowed agency (i.e., top-down causal processes) or b) deny agency (i.e., top-down causal processes) to the unconscious mind.

If (a), what coherent rationale would there then be to deny agency to consciousness on its own right? If (b), how would this not be a variant of epiphenomenalism?

[Haven't read you posts in a while. Needless to say, feel free to correct any unintended misrepresentation of your stance.]

You’ve affirmed that consciousness is there due to unconscious process of mind. — javra

Or rather I have repeated back the terms in which the discussion was being framed. I hope I have made it clear enough how I object to the presuppositions with which those terms are loaded. But just for the sake of conversation, I'm also trying to use the preferred jargon of those I might argue against.

In another thread i argued at length why I would instead prefer the terms attentional level and habit level processing. And one of the reasons was that that allows top-down causality to be a part of both. The difference between the two levels then becomes one of spatiotemporal scale.

I can’t help drawing a parallel between the non-biological sterility of the renunciate and the Australian jewel beetle that Hoffman mentioins in his TED Talk, and imagining a more evolved being considering which is sillier, the beetle dry humping a beer bottle or a renunciate trying to transcend an imagined disparity between appearance and reality in an effort to cure their existential anxiety.

But I have taken care to distinguish my holistic naturalism from that reductionist Scientism. So you are not dealing with purpose as a systems science perspective would understand it. — apokrisis

I understand that your approach is not materialistic, but you still say that 'the idea that life has the global purpose of surviving is being replaced by the idea it serves the greater purpose of entropification or dissipation.' So how is that not reductionist?

Remember 180 Proof?

'life' is a specific emergent level of molecular-structured thermodynamic complexity that "happened" insofar as -- "because" -- there weren't conditions which prevented it. Same reason snowflakes "happen". In other words, the universe consists in entropy-driven transformations wherein complex phenomena like (terrestrial) "life" arises & goes extinct along a segment of the slope down from minimal entropy (order) to maximal entropy (disorder); the universe is always-already "dead" but becomes a little less-so ever-so-momentarily at different stages of its (cosmic) decomposition. — 180 Proof

So what method are you using to support that belief? — apokrisis

First person.

the beetle dry humping a beer bottle — praxis

Well, it just goes to show that some discussions are pointless.

Hoffman’s worldview is that he addresses evolution as a leading cause for how we are (something that I happen to agree with on multiple levels) yet does not give any attention to how evolutionary processes work on a strictly metaphysical level. — javra

As soon as you combine 'metaphysics' and 'evolution' you're going to end up with something like Bergson, or Tieldhard du Chardin, who are generally ridiculed in the secular academy (if anyone bothers to mention them). The explicit aim of nearly all evolutionary biology qua philosophy, is positivist, insofar as its aim is to banish anything metaphysical from consideration.

Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world. Instead they become epiphenomena, generated incidentally by a process that can be entirely explained by the operation of the non-teleological laws of physics on the material of which we and our environments are all composed. — Thomas Nagel

Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion

Like you, I'm sympathetic to his case, but I'm dubiuos about appealing to evolutionary theory to justify it; seems self-defeating to me.

There is an entire alternative cultural movement dedicated to 'evolutionary enlightenment' but again, has very little to do with evolutionary biology as it is understood in mainstream culture.

In another thread i argued at length why I would instead prefer the terms attentional level and habit level processing. And one of the reasons was that that allows top-down causality to be a part of both. The difference between the two levels then becomes one of spatiotemporal scale. — apokrisis

I glanced that thread over, portions of it at any rate. As its theme relates to this thread’s: Attention is not merely conscious; e.g., the generalized conscience is also attentive to what’s going on (otherwise it couldn’t inform of alternatives to what one desires), though it is not the first person point of view we term consciousness. Habit, on the other hand, can pertain to both the unconscious and to consciousness. A murky, and altogether different topic though.

What I’m here addressing is the agency—or non-agency—of consciousness, i.e. of the first person point of view.

To keep things simple: in your worldview, does consciousness hold its own top-down causal ability?

Like you, I'm sympathetic to his case, but I'm dubiuos about appealing to evolutionary theory to justify it; seems self-defeating to me. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree. If I didn’t specify my position well enough previously, his methodology contradicts the conclusions he draws from it. More concretely, he’s using physical models of evolution to explain conscious agents’ abilities while, in the same breadth, claiming that the physical is an illusion. This leads to a chicken and egg dichotomy in which he wants to support the illusion of physicality via arguments reliant upon physicality not being an illusion. At least as I so far interpret his worldview. So, yes, to me his stance appears to be logically contradictory. Wanted to double-check, though.

Just because you don't think that dissipation is a good purpose doesn't negate it being a purpose. A purpose is the reason why things happen.

So it might be consistent with your faith based understanding that the ultimate purpose is the Good. But again, naturalism says look the world in the face and describe it as it actually is.

And 180 was wrong on a key technical detail. Life and mind arise to accelerate enropification over and above the rate being achieved by "dead matter". That is what intelligence is for. To improve on what dumbness can achieve.

To keep things simple: in your worldview, does consciousness hold its own top-down causal ability? — javra

I just don't see consciousness in this kind of entitified terminology. There is no agent, just a process exhibiting what we choose to describe as agency.

So "consciousness" is just a loose word that covers everything in most discussions. In my view, most people are talking about attention when they say it. But they also mean self consciousness or the linguistically structured skill of introspection. As a word, it just overclaims and doesn't carve the phenomenon at its structural joints.

OK, I agree, it’s a loaded term whose referent is often ambiguous. And worse, it often addresses different referents (albeit loosely associated) to different individuals.

Nevertheless, I’ve clearly specified what I meant by it in my last post to you: the first person point of view. And, if it must be repeated by me, I do not entify the first person point of view (to use your slang); consciousness is not a homunculus; nevertheless, I uphold that it is, exists, holds presence, etc. while the first person point of view holds awareness. BTW, I’m pretty certain of this one.

My question to you is then not yet answered: in your worldview, does the first person point of view (more concretely, you, me, and many, many others) hold top-down causal abilities of its own?

Tangentially, as to the agency/agent linguistic issue: a bundle of coherently functioning processes is conceived of as a unitary, holistic identity; an identity that may be in the process of becoming, but an identity nonetheless. I say “look: a rock is over there” and not “look; a bundle of coherently functioning processes that, as bundle, takes on the attributes X, Y, and Z—all of which, however, are perfectly devoid of identity—is over there”. Hence, were we to be brief in our statements, that which holds agency is addressed by the identity of “an agent”. This, then, results in the terminology of “conscious agents”.

If you disagree with these comments, on what non-contradictory grounds do you do so?

Thanks for clarifying. If I understand you correctly then, yes, the first person point of view is indeed a thing. It is the embodiment of a purpose, an intentionality.

And it arises as "consciousness" is not a passive display but an intentional view, as talking about it as a modelling relation is meant to emphasise. In every moment of comprehending the world, the brain is having to dynamically form the sense of self that is then standing in opposition to the world that is to be mastered. Perception is not merely about constructing a view of the world, it is about creating that intentional distinction which is the self experienced as that which is apart from the world with some agential purpose.

Even to eat my dinner, I have to be able to distinguish what is food, what is tongue, in my mouth. So there is agency, a point of view just in understanding the world as that which is not my "self".

The connection to top down causality is then that an organism has a point of view from which it can impose "its" wishes and designs - final and formal cause.

So it is not consciousness, nor even attention, which is the locus of top-down causation. It is the very thing of being in a modelling relation with the world where the other aspect that must be constructed is a running sense of selfhood, or autonomy and will.

Hi Wayfarer,
I watched the video and found it very interesting. It seems like what Hoffman is asserting is a simple derivation from Quantum Mechanics. That there is a superposition of all information and that the job of the brain is decohesion of that information. In fact the Copenhagen interpretation that when observed an object is force to take one state or another fits right in. There is, after all, something there that our senses are picking up on, or else I would be able to walk through walls if only I closed my eyes.

That is what intelligence is for. To improve on what dumbness can achieve. — apokrisis

By finding the fastest route to maximum entropy? That's intelligent?

It might be consistent with your faith based understanding that the ultimate purpose is the Good. — apokrisis

I don't want my understanding to be 'faith-based' but it is instructive that it must appear that way.

But again, naturalism says look the world in the face and describe it as it actually is — apokrisis

But how is it, actually? That's what the whole thread is about. That's what philosophy is about.

There is no agent, just a process exhibiting what we choose to describe as agency. — apokrisis

Oh come now. Who is it that is designating consciousness in such and such a way? That's you, and it's an intentional action on your part. That makes you 'an agent'.

Naturalism has its way of supporting belief - inductive scientific reason. You seem to be saying that a religious account would be the correct one here, not the naturalistic. So what method are you using to support that belief? Let's see why it is in fact better than methodological naturalism. — apokrisis

I should expand on my answer to this. There is actually a venerable notion of 'scientia sacra', the sacred science. That conveys the understanding that the philosophical and spiritual traditions are engaged in disclosing matters of fact. But they were generally not engaged in 'modern science', of course, but matters that were, so to speak, concerning the 'domain of values'. Nevertheless, there are ways of validating knowledge within those domains, albeit of a different kind to today's scientific methodology. Mind you that certainly doesn't rule out, or even contradict, natural science, in respect of the kinds of questions which it is suited for. But questions of the kind I am endeavouring to raise, may not be among them.

But regardless, there are schools, methods, and ways of validating such 'first-person' understanding, that is still scientific in the sense of laying out a way of proceeding and a way of validation as you go along. That is the whole idea of a spiritual discipline.

I watched the video and found it very interesting. It seems like what Hoffman is asserting is a simple derivation from Quantum Mechanics. — MikeL

Thanks Mike. That's very imaginative, especially since Hoffman only mentions quantum mechanics in passing, when he says 'we don't expect monkeys to solve problems in quantum mechanics'. So I'd be careful about mixing scientific metaphors, when the topic is daunting enough as it is. Besides, nothing about quantum mechanics is simple!

Your welcome Wayfarer. It's not surprising he only mentions QM in passing, I think he might want to downplay the link. I don't think I'm the one mixing my scientific metaphors, I think he is. But you are right about QM, there's been no mention in my readings of monkeys that can do it.

But regardless, there are schools, methods, and ways of validating such 'first-person' understanding, that is still scientific in the sense of laying out a way of proceeding and a way of validation as you go along. That is the whole idea of a spiritual discipline. — Wayfarer

That is the question I asked. So more detail please. How does this validation work and how is it demonstrably better when it comes to talking about nature's purpose.

I will try and answer, but first it might be useful to consider it from a meta-philosophical perspective i.e. what draws us to philosophy. My motivation was search for a creed, for some truth I could live by. Whereas I feel your motivation is more practical, and that has an influence on what kind of answers you're looking for. I was perusing the SEP article on Peirce recently and I noted the section on the application of Peirce's ideas, which says:

Currently, considerable interest is being taken in Peirce's ideas by researchers wholly outside the arena of academic philosophy. The interest comes from industry, business, technology, intelligence organizations, and the military; and it has resulted in the existence of a substantial number of agencies, institutes, businesses, and laboratories in which ongoing research into and development of Peircean concepts are being vigorously undertaken.

as no doubt you know. So in that arena, I would expect the scientific method to be the natural modus operandi. But the questions that drew me to philosophy were of a different kind.

So when you ask for something 'demonstrably better', then the question becomes, what kind of purpose do you have in mind? If the criteria are those of science and engineering, then that requires a certain method. But if the criterion is, the attempt to understand an existentially meaningful truth, then the method may be different. Although they may something in common, too.

You keep changing the subject so I'll just repeat the question...

I don't recognise that as 'purpose'
— Wayfarer

What could decide whether the naturalist or the transhumanist is correct here?

I'm not changing the subject.

But how could transcendent purpose be validated? Is personal revelation or religious tradition enough to talk about purpose in that universalising sense? — apokrisis

Here's another example of why I say your ontology is backward. You look outward for purpose. But clearly we must look inward to find purpose, and purpose is something which comes from within us. If you derive purpose from outside of yourself, you are taking someone else's purpose, working for someone else's intentions instead of your own. The only way to have true purpose is to be true to yourself, and this purpose comes from within, or else it is not your purpose.

When we go deep deep within ourselves, we find the uniting principle at the deepest internal level, not being imposed on us from the outside. And this is why Rich, with a very odd sort of ontology is on the right track. We may look outward, at a vast external world but there is only separation out there. Any appearance of unity in the external world is just that, an appearance. When we turn inward, we find the true principles of unity, and unity is the basis of all mathematics and logic.

So the puzzle which we find here is how is the unity of objects which appear to our senses as being at great distances from each other, achieved through the inside. When we look to a smaller and smaller point of space, artificially, or theoretically, dividing space to a smaller and smaller point, we approach the issue of infinite divisibility. So we assume that somehow this divisibility has to stop. We can go in two directions. We can take an infinitesimally small point of space as our limit, or we can jump to the non-spatial, dimensionless point. Those who do not make the dualist inspired jump to non-spatial existence, and assume an infinitesimal point as the limits to reality, are locked into a physicalist system which does not recognize the reality of non-spatial existence.

But if, in the platonic tradition, we recognize non-spatial existence as the true basis of reality itself, we open up an entire realm of non-spatial existence to our inquiring minds. It lies within, or underneath all of physical existence, which, being non-physical, cannot be perceived by the senses, but only apprehended directly by the mind. From this perspective we can apprehend the existence of information at non-spatial, dimensionless points, and the unity of those points through the means of that information.

(Y)

I don't recognise that as 'purpose'
— Wayfarer

What could decide whether the naturalist or the transhumanist is correct here? — Apokrisis

Actually I'll have another stab at this question because my previous response was about the notion of 'purpose' generally, whereas here you're asking about a very specific issue, namely, the sense in which entropification constitutes a purpose. I guess, as we're talking about 'the heat death of the universe', a sense of the vastness of the time involved should be retained. We're talking about something that is predicted to happen billions of years in the future. So to be honest, I really couldn't say which out of the two given options is the correct one, or if it even matters. My point is simply that as a kind of symbolic or metaphorical 'reason for it all', the notion that life is really just the most efficient route to the heat death of the universe seems at the very least nihilistic.

Well what is the bleeding method then? You've only assured me that there is one.

Where evolutionary theory misleads us is with the idea that the special traits of the different species are created by the survival process. It is a fact, that the special traits which we can observe today, are the ones which have survived, but this does not lead to the conclusion that these traits were caused by survival. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good point.

The traits must have been produced by the creativity of the living creatures in the first place. This creativity, which is the actual cause of variations and species is completely neglected by evolutionary theory, which dismisses it as randomness. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quite plausible.

I agree with Hoffman to this extent: conscious agency is a creative power and fact of human nature.

Creativity, just like metaphysics, cannot be made sense off from an evolutionary perspective because it does not necessarily increase one's chance of survival, nor does it necessarily increase propagation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. To address human creativity requires different toolsets (i.e., social sciences, humanities, philosophy).