No, that's not me, nor a great number of other critical-thinkers — Questioner

Clearest? How can a "great number" all have the clearest vision? Won't some have clearer vision than others?

Clearest? How can a "great number" all have the clearest vision? Won't some have clearer vision than others? — Ecurb

Lol, I'm not sure if you are playing with me.

Yep. Some definitely have clearer vision than others.

Education is a big factor. So is the propensity to "question everything." Also, propaganda works best on those who feel "left behind" - as we see currently in the USA. Those with grievance. They are looking for the scapegoat on whom they can blame their problems, and their narrow worldview makes them susceptible to a "strongman" who inflames their hatred of the supposed scapegoat. The situation in the States really brought home to me how powerful an all-consuming hate can be.

There's a cut missing in these considerations. One that has been known to philosophers for a centuries, but hasn't transferred to the general consciousness.

We can look around the world and see how things are. And broadly, we find ourselves in agreement that there are purses and puppies and clouds. We agree as to how things are.

We can also look around the world and think about how things ought be. Again, broadly, we find ourselves in agreement that it's best not to steal stuff or kick puppies.

Now what we want is dependent on what is the case. One can't steal a purse if there are no purses, nor kick the pup if there are no pups.

But that things are indeed arranged in a certain way says nothing about how they ought be arranged. That there are purses tells us nothing about how those purses ought be distributed. That there are puppies tells us nothing about how we ought treat them.

And generally, that the world is arranged in a certain way does not tell us about how it ought be arranged.

Two aspects of this are salient to this thread.

That we have evolved in a certain way tells us nothing about how we ought behave. Even supposing we are disposed to act in a certain way by evolution, it does not follow that we ought act in that way. It remains open that we ought act in a way contrary to evolution.

The second is the more general point that while we can find out how things are by looking around at the world, we can't use that method to find out how things ought to be. More generally, while science tells us how things are, it cannot tell us how things ought be.

The area that examines how things ought be is ethics. And it's worth reading a bit bout it, especially in regard to the logic of ought sentences.

That we have evolved in a certain way tells us nothing about how we ought behave. Even supposing we are disposed to act in a certain way by evolution, it does not follow that we ought act in that way. It remains open that we ought act in a way contrary to evolution.

The second is the more general point that while we can find out how things are by looking around at the world, we can't use that method to find out how things ought to be. More generally, while science tells us how things are, it cannot tell us how things ought be. — Banno

Interesting this hasn't come up.

Can we say the same about God?

Even if we could demonstrate that God exists, it does not follow that we ought to act in any particular way. Is God moral? If we judge by the Bible, that God often behaves monstrously. If we rely on abstract philosophical reasoning, God can be made into almost anything; a benevolent source of all consciousness, or something more ambiguous.

Unless we assume that God will punish or reward us for following divine instructions; a kind of autocrat there is no clear reason to act according to God’s will. In short, the mere fact that God exists does not tell us what we ought to do.

Thoughts?

Pure science does not enter the realm of ethics. That is not part of its mandate. — Questioner

So how can it be, then, that

all morality comes from our evolution. — Questioner

?

But that things are indeed arranged in a certain way says nothing about how they ought be arranged. That there are purses tells us nothing about how those purses ought be distributed. That there are puppies tells us nothing about how we ought treat them. — Banno

Isn't this just Hume's is/ought in a nutshell? Descriptive facts about what exists or how things are arranged don’t, by themselves, entail any normative claims about how things ought to be treated or distributed. If you accept that picture of cognition — a value-neutral world first described, and values added later by way of judgement — the gap follows pretty much automatically. Indeed that was a major animating factor of Enlightenment philosophy.

But that framing has been challenged in cognitive science. John Vervaeke, for example, argues that cognition is fundamentally a process of relevance realisation: creatures don’t encounter a neutral inventory of facts and then evaluate them afterwards; the world shows up already structured in terms of salience, affordances, risk, care, and action. Even a germ knows what's bad for it. What counts as “real” for an agent is inseparable from what matters for coping and flourishing.

On that view, there isn’t a clean separation between an “is” that is purely descriptive and an “ought” that is added later. Normativity is already built into how the world is disclosed to living agents. A puppy is not first encountered as a value-free object and only later assigned significance — its vulnerability, responsiveness, and social meaning are part of how it is perceived in the first place. We're hard wired to think baby animals are cute and warrant protection, never mind that there will always be those whose empathy has been short-circuited.

That doesn’t magically solve every ethical question, but it does undermine the idea that the is/ought gap is a deep or inevitable feature of cognition. I think it's very much the product of the emerging Enlightenment mindset.

Even if we could demonstrate that God exists, it does not follow that we ought to act in any particular way. — Tom Storm

Yep.

Even if we had before us is the undoubted word of god, it does not follow that we ought do as he says.

It remains open for us to do as the book says, or not.

You presume the sequence "this is the case" is followed by a judgement "this ought be the case", then show that this is muddled.

Yep.

That sequence is added by you, not inherent in my post.

Yes, I suppose you're right. I did cherry-pick that passage, which was then subjected to the same kind of criticism that I would make of it. Still, worth emphasising in respect of @Questioners claim that

all morality comes from our evolution — Questioner

which passes for popular wisdom in today's culture.

Even if we had before us is the undoubted word of god, it does not follow that we ought do as he says.

It remains open for us to do as the book says, or not. — Banno

Can I check something with you?

Whether we ‘ought’ to obey God could be held to depend on the language game we are playing. The original claim assumes a game in which God is just an agent issuing commands, so obedience is an open quesion. But if we adopt the Christian language game in which God is the embodiment of goodness, then ‘obeying God’ is synonymous with acting morally. In this framework, to refuse God’s commands would be to act against goodness itself. The supposed gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ vanishes: the very definitions we use make obedience obligatory by definition.

Thoughts on this?

all morality comes from our evolution
— Questioner

which passes for popular wisdom in today's culture. — Wayfarer

There’s probably a more charitable way to look at this: if we read it as suggesting that the origins of moral behavior may be found in our evolving together as a social species: strength through cooperation, empathy and love.

...if we adopt the Christian language game in which God is the embodiment of goodness... — Tom Storm

Yep. It's a common Christian response to the Euthyphro.

Why ought we adopt that game?

The argument you present relocates the normative element into a definition. It, and the is/ought gap, are still there, just shuffled sideways a bit.

You've read previously about Anscombe's shopping list. This is much the same thing; the difference between a shopping list and an itemised receipt is not found in the items on the list, but the intent we attach to it - to what we do with the list.

if we read it as suggesting that the origins of moral behavior may be found in our evolving together as a social species: strength through cooperation, empathy and love. — Tom Storm

Sure, there are those that write on those themes. Ever encountered the 'Third Way' evolutionary theorists? Dennis Noble is a prominent advocate, often debates Dawkins.

in the previous post, I referred to 'relevance realisation' which is some terminology John Vervaeke has introduced into the discussions of cognitive science and ethical orientation. The definition 'is the cognitive capacity of an agent to flexibly generate and adjust representations of its environment to highlight what matters and ignore what does not. It is the core process of identifying, in real-time, which aspects of experience are significant for achieving a specific goal, thus filtering an overwhelming amount of information into a manageable, meaningful world.' I think it goes some way to bridging the is-ought gap. But not all the way.

I will add that people (as distinct from other animals) orient themselves toward truth, meaning, beauty, justice, and integrity even when these conflict with comfort or survival. So whatever 'relevance realisation' ultimately is, it can’t be reduced to biological optimisation alone. There’s a higher-order normative dimension at work in human cognition, due to the very nature of the human condition, as humans alone are able to discern meaning, assign value, and so on.

Which is exactly where philosophy and religion historically enter the frame: they address ultimate questions of meaning, value, life and death — not merely optimisation problems. I agree there’s some truth in the OP's claim that secular culture often provides an insufficient basis for moral deliberation, especially given how much modern philosophy has defined itself in opposition to religious or spiritual traditions, rather than engaging their deeper concerns. (And also that scientific rationalism, alone, is not equipped for this task.)

But that diagnosis easily turns into an evangelical dog-whistle, as we’ve already seen in this thread, and that’s no solution either. The failure of reductive secularism doesn’t license a slide into Christian apologetics or doctrinal authority. The real task is to recover depth without that kind of regression to an imagined superior past.

Here's the "argument" from the OP:

This is simply the plain truth. For rhetorical purposes, they will try to avoid the plain truth but it is what it is and when you break down what they say when they're being honest- you will see that for all their noble-sounding talk which is meant to propound the alleged morality of their position.... they lack of a basis for morality and are moral relativists. They don't believe in morality. Morality from such a stance is whatever you think it is- if one is consistent. — Ram

It invokes an impressive number of non sequiturs. But let's set those aside and instead note that choosing to follow god's will does not absolve us from choice. That is, as they themselves will profess, it remains up to each of us to choose what to do and what not to do. Those who profess that there is an objective good decided by their god also admit that it can be chosen or rejected.

The fact of choice, and the issues of direction of fit, are ineliminable.

That is, the problem alluded to in the OP applies as much to the religious as to the secular. The religious only follow their god because they so choose.

The religious only follow their god because they so choose. — Banno

My conscience is captive to the word of God. Here I stand. I can do no other. God help me. Amen. — Martin Luther

The religious only follow their god because they so choose.
— Banno

My conscience is captive to the word of God. Here I stand. I can do no other. God help me. Amen.
— Martin Luther — Wayfarer

Yes, there is something unsettling in such certainty... the denial that one might have chosen otherwise. Luther excusing his own sins.

Eh. don't see it like that. Did you choose to be born? Do you choose to die? Not everything is of your own choosing.

Did you choose to be born? Do you choose to die? Not everything is of your own choosing. — Wayfarer

Yep.

But some things are of your own choosing. And convincing yourself that you had no choice when you plainly might have done otherwise is... unwise? A recipe for disfunction.

You made me say it.

Yep. It's a common Christian response to the Euthyphro.

Why ought we adopt that game? — Banno

Well, if for classical theism this is how God is understood then some of the traditional arguments put forward by atheists fall short.

A theist might say that god as goodness itself functions as a brute fact. You and I might consider this unconvincing. No doubt there is a vast library of scholarship affirming this concept.

You quoted me -

Pure science does not enter the realm of ethics. That is not part of its mandate.
— Questioner — Wayfarer

But neglected to include my very next sentence, which is relevant to your question -

But scientific knowledge may be applied to philosophy.

- your question, which is -

So how can it be, then, that

all morality comes from our evolution.
— Questioner — Wayfarer

I'm not quite sure how your question arises - you seem to conflating scientific enquiry with what it is investigating, I don't see the contradiction, but anyway -

yes, I could have been more precise here and said our "capacity for morality" - the capacities for love, hate, empathy, a sense of fairness, a sense of right and wrong - and the cognition to make decisions - are the drivers of morality - and these capacities evolved through brain evolution

If you had read my other posts, you may have found your answer. I also posted -

Empathy, fear, and hate are biologically imprinted. How they manifest in behavior depends on how they are stimulated...

Then, of course, environmental factors work on its development. Probably the most important is that the physical needs of the child are met, and they learn empathy and love through modeling. This strengthens the empathy circuits in our minds...

How that biological basis is manifested in behavior rests partly on external factors, resulting in diversity and variation within our species, in questions of religion, politics, philosophy, and ethics

all morality comes from our evolution
— Questioner

which passes for popular wisdom in today's culture. — Wayfarer

that the building blocks of morality come from our evolution is valid scientific knowledge, not pop culture

the capacities for love, hate, empathy, a sense of fairness, a sense of right and wrong - and the cognition to make decisions - are the drivers of morality - and these capacities evolved through brain evolution — Questioner

Thanks for the elaboration. You acknowledge the importance of factors such as upbringing and culture, which I agree are of fundamental importance. But that is a far cry from acknowleding that evolutionary biology provides the 'building blocks of morality'. And I question whether the biological theory of evolution really does account for those capacities. It is a theory about the origin and evolution of species, and of the traits of species, seen through the perspective of adaptive fitness.

I'm sceptical about the way that evolution is invoked as a kind of catch-all theory of eveything about human nature. But then, the historical circumstances of its discovery were such that it came to fill the cultural vacuum, left by the abandonment of the religious traditions. For some, then, it inherited the mantle as the source or arbiter of values, as it seemed a natural fit. But the theory was never intended as the basis for ethics (or epistemology for that matter.)