But what I am against is the idea that some interpret Wittgenstein's “meaning is use” as being that 100% of our thinking derives from language and society. — RussellA

Yes, people too often assume that language is about communication and has no other uses. That's not true.

“I am in pain” refers to being in hidden inner pain, whilst “ouch” refers to the behaviour of outward observable grimacing. In this sense, as they refer to different things, they are not synonyms. — RussellA

"Ouch!" isn't part of language, so it can't refer to anything. You should think of it alongside grimacing. Both are, one might say, expressions of pain. "
If "I am in pain" refers to hidden inner pain, then, surely, it is not hidden. "I am in pain" is like "ouch" and grimacing in many ways, which is why Wittgenstein insists that it is an expression of pain. The complication, which, I think he does not deal with because it is not relevant to his focus in that discussion, is that it is also like "S is in pain"; it plays into the standard structures that usually apply when se speak of knowledge.

You are assuming we can directly interact with outer facts. A Direct Realist would agree, but an Indirect Realist would disagree. An Indirect Realist would say that we are directly interacting with an appearance of what we assume to be outer facts. — RussellA

I am not assuming any particular theory about perception or facts. All I am assuming is that there are such things, and that, one way or another, we interact with them. I feel that direct and indirect realism might be regarded as off-topic on this thread.

So, yes, the meaning of "beetle" preceeds you, and you learn it, and then you know it, and based on that knowledge you use it. — Dawnstorm

Person A sees a beetle in the world which causes a thought in their mind of a beetle. It may be that when they see a beetle in the world they also see alongside it in the world the name “beetle”. They can then begin to associate their private thought of a beetle with the public name “beetle”.

Person B sees the same beetle in the world which causes a thought in their mind of a beetle. It may be that when they see a beetle in the world they also see alongside it in the world the name “beetle”. They can then begin to associate their private thought of a beetle with the public name “beetle”.

Person A can then say “I saw a beetle” to person B, who will then know what person A means.

It may well be that my-red-is-your-green, and the beetle in person A’s mind is different to the beetle in person B’s mind, but as regards language this doesn't matter because the common factor is the beetle in the world, which is the same for both persons A and B.

Language is not communicating the private thought of person A to person B, because their private thoughts may be different, but is communicating the knowledge to person B that person A is thinking of the same observable, empirical fact in the world.

Language can be used to communicate knowledge between people because public facts have private meanings.
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When you know that the water in this tub is 36° Celsius, then that knowledge has no influence at all on the temperature. — Dawnstorm

If there is a beetle in the world, this is a public fact, independent of private thoughts.
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When you know the word "beetle" means [beetle] (square bracket for the private meaning that - according to Wittgenstein - drops out - if I'm not mistaken), then you use the word "beetle" to mean {beetle} (squiggly brackets for a token in a language game). — Dawnstorm

On the one hand the private beetle drops out of the language game, but on the other hand the private beetle cannot drop out altogether otherwise the mind would be an empty blankness, and there would not be any language game at all.

My concept of “slab” must be similar to yours, but cannot be the same as yours, because we have experienced different Forms of Life.

Because we have learnt our concepts of “slab” through an extensive personal Form of Life, our concepts are too complex to be defined.

Our concepts of “slab” probably generally overlap, but it is unavoidable that sometimes my concept of “slab” will be different to yours. — RussellA

I would not use the word "concept" here. I think concepts are logical structures with formal rules. Instead, we both know how to use the word, though our particular instances of use will vary. Where we all overlap in usage, we have what is required to make a generalization (inductive conclusion) which may serve as a dictionary definition. What I think, is that if someone states particular criteria, or rules governing the use of the word, for the purpose of a logical procedure, then we have what is required for a "concept". Notice though, that I am stipulating such rules in this case, proposing a restriction to the way that you use the word "concept".

If "I am in pain" refers to hidden inner pain, then, surely, it is not hidden. — Ludwig V

It is possible to refer to hidden things. For example, if I see a broken window, I can say that something caused it to break. What caused the window to break may be unknown, but I can still refer to this unknown something.
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"Ouch!" isn't part of language, so it can't refer to anything. — Ludwig V

I agree that uttering ouch is not part of language, but saying “ouch!” must be part of language. As it is the nature of language that every expression must refer to something, “ouch!” must also refer to something.
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"S is in pain" — Ludwig V

As regards language, there is form and content. How does language work?

The form of language, the symbols used, is as much a physical thing in the world as grimacing, and both are empirically observable. The form of language is as empirically observable in the world as a person’s behaviour, such as grimacing. It is the form that gives clues to the content, in that observing someone grimace gives clues to their being in pain. If, when I feel pain, I instinctively grimace, then when I observe someone also grimacing, it is a reasonable assumption that they also are in pain.

As the form of grimacing gives clues to the inner feeling of being in pain, the form of the linguistic statement “I am in pain” must also gives clues to the inner feeling of being in pain.

This suggests that is the form of the linguistic expression “I am in pain” that gives us clues about the speaker’s inner feelings rather than the content of the linguistic expression “I am in pain”.

I would not use the word "concept" here. I think concepts are logical structures with formal rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

From Wikipedia - Concept

A concept is an abstract idea that serves as a foundation for more concrete principles, thoughts, and beliefs. For example, a basic-level concept would be "chair". A concept is instantiated (reified) by all of its actual or potential instances, whether these are things in the real world or other ideas.

I have never thought of a concept as a logical structure with formal rules. For example, if I think of the concept of a slab, there is no logical structure to my thoughts of slabs and there are no rules limiting my thoughts of slabs.

I was going to say that as well. But you already knew that.

Probably the most over looked conclusion of PI, PI 307 “‘Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction?’-If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction. — Richard B

Returning to this after last nights technical difficulties.

Ordinarily when we see pain behavior we do not question whether the person is in pain. We do not regard the pain as fictional because we cannot observe the pain itself. What we say and do in response to pain behavior is treat the pain as real. It may turn out in some cases that the person is faking, but the term 'pain' becomes meaningless if the pain is regarded as a fiction because we can't observe it.

What I meant by “the problem” is the temptation Wittgenstein keeps referring to, the urge to treat understanding as a hidden inner process, that which occurs behind the scenes, and then demand an explanation of how that inner thing manages to determine what counts as going on correctly.

Once it's pictured this way, you generate a slew of puzzles. For e.g., how does an inner process connect to the rule rather than merely accompany it, how does it work in future applications, how could it ever be more than some private experience, how could it carry normativity? Wittgenstein’s point is that these puzzles are not solved by discovering the inner mechanism, they are produced by a misuse of our concepts.

Your quotation makes exactly that point:

“Just for once, don’t think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all! … Instead, ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say ‘Now I know how to go on’?” (PI 154)

He is not denying that there are mental processes (like some people think in this thread), images, feelings, neural activity, whatever you like. He concedes the ordinary point that there are processes “characteristic of understanding.” But then he adds the grammatical correction: in that sense, understanding is not itself a mental process. That is, understanding is not the name of an inner item whose occurrence constitutes correctness. It's a word whose use is anchored in criteria in our practices, in being able to go on correctly.

So, I suspect Witt would say, cognitive science is entitled to investigate the causal and psychological things that typically accompany, enable, or disrupt our ability to go on. What it can't do, by its own methods, is answer what's grammatical, namely, what makes a move count as following the rule rather than merely seeming to. What it means to count as is not an extra inner process waiting to be found, it is part of our public grammar.

That's why I resist the phrasing “simply accept mental processes as given,” especially if it mean, “leave the topic untouched and let science do the work.” Wittgenstein’s move is not to abandon the mental, it is to stop trying to make words like understanding function as names for occult inner objects. He untangles the knot so we stop demanding the wrong explanation, and then both philosophy and science can do their work without talking past each other.

Not sure, but maybe this helps to explain what I was referring to.

Tool 11: Hinges, what stands fast.

Witt’s point is that doubt only works against a background (the background is layered) of things you don’t doubt. If you try to doubt everything, you wouldn't get a more rigorous inquiry, you'd lose the very standards that make inquiry possible. In any real investigation there are propositions that function like hinges on a door, they aren’t usually the result of inquiry, they’re part of what makes inquiry and checking possible.

For e.g., “There’s an external world,” “Other people exist,” “I have a body,” “The world didn’t begin five minutes ago,” “My memory is generally reliable,” “This is how counting works.” In ordinary life, we don’t treat these as hypotheses we keep retesting, we treat them as what stands fast while we test other things. That’s what Witt calls a kind of certainty, but it’s hinge certainty, not epistemic certainty. It isn’t a conclusion from evidence, and it isn’t subjective certainty either, a feeling of conviction. It’s the background role the claim plays in our practices.

This also explains why prove it can be misplaced. If someone demands evidence for the hinges themselves, they’re asking for the justification that only makes sense within a system of checking that presupposes those hinges. The result isn’t a refutation, it’s a diagnosis, i.e., the request pulls the words like doubt, know, or evidence out of the language game where they do their work.

You’re asking, “How can meaning be use if I can’t use a sentence I don’t understand?” But that just shows that understanding is a skill, not that meaning is something you possess before use. If I don’t know Swahili, I can’t respond in Swahili to “niletee ubamba.” That’s exactly what it means to lack the skill. It doesn’t follow that the meaning must be an extra item hidden behind the words.

Think of it like chess. If you don’t know chess, you can’t use the move castling. You can treat it as something happening in the game, ask what it is, watch, imitate, get corrected, and finely learn. The meaning of castling just is its role in the game, but you only grasp that role by learning the game.

Same with “niletee ubamba.” At first it’s just a sound. Then you learn what to do with it by examples, context, and correction. The fact that you can’t act on it before you learn it doesn’t refute meaning as use, it’s exactly what meaning as use predicts.

Do you accept the possibility that shared meaning might be an illusion, such that meaning is bound to perspective and actual usage, in a way that cannot be represented in terms of social conventions?

Secondly, how can meaning-as-actual-use be anything other than as described in the former paragraph?

If we also allow meaning to refer to potential uses and to a normative ideal standard, then aren't we reintroducing something speculative that is hidden from view?

That is, understanding is not the name of an inner item whose occurrence constitutes correctness. It's a word whose use is anchored in criteria in our practices, in being able to go on correctly. — Sam26

From the quote from the Blue Book I gave above, the difference between science and the investigation Wittgenstein is doing involves the use of models. To see the contrast, we can look at those who study linguistics as a science. Consider a remark by Noam Chomsky on behaviorism:

Many people tend to think of psychology in terms of its tests and experimental methods. But one should not define a discipline by its procedures. It should be defined, in the first place, by the object of its investigation. Experimental or analytic procedures must be devised in order to shed light on this object. Behaviorist psychology, for example, excels in its experimental techniques, but it has not properly defined its object of inquiry, in my opinion. Thus it has excellent tools, very good tools . . . but nothing very much to study with them. — Chomsky, Noam. On Language: Chomsky's Classic Works: Language and Responsibility and Reflections on Language (p. 53).

The matter of causes is directly addressed by Wittgenstein:

Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us. And when we are worried about the nature of thinking, the puzzlement which we wrongly interpret to be one about the nature of a medium is a puzzlement caused by the mystifying use of our language. — ibid. page 10

This why the comparison of language games is not an explanation to replace another explanation.

Do you accept the possibility that shared meaning might be an illusion, such that meaning is bound to perspective and actual usage, in a way that cannot be represented in terms of social conventions?

Secondly, how can meaning-as-actual-use be anything other than as described in the former paragraph?

If we also allow meaning to refer to potential uses and to a normative ideal standard, then aren't we reintroducing something speculative that is hidden from view? — sime

I definitely don’t believe shared meaning is an illusion, at least not globally. The fact that we successfully correct each other, teach children, translate, argue, etc, shows that there’s something real here. It’s not perfect uniformity, and it’s not a hidden essence, but it’s also not merely “my perspective.” If it were, the distinction between misunderstanding and mere difference would collapse, and it obviously doesn’t.

On “meaning as actual use,” yes, meaning is bound up with how expressions are used. But actual use isn’t just each person’s private usage. It includes consistency across speakers and time, and it includes the practice’s standards of correction. That’s what makes it shared.

And no, talking about potential uses or normative standards doesn’t reintroduce something hidden. “Potential use” just means competence, viz, what a trained speaker does with the expression in new cases. That’s not hidden, it’s displayed in the ability to go on, and to correct. Likewise, the norm isn’t a speculative thing hovering behind our practices, it’s the publicly observable difference between using a word correctly and using it incorrectly within our lives. You can call that “normative,” but it’s not metaphysical. It’s built into what it is to have a learnable practice at all.

Wittgenstein's written philosophy is imitative of dialogue — Fooloso4

That underscores for me the stated goal of Wittgenstein to distance himself from the generality of the Tractatus.

That is, understanding is not the name of an inner item whose occurrence constitutes correctness. It's a word whose use is anchored in criteria in our practices, in being able to go on correctly.
— Sam26

From the quote from the Blue Book I gave above, the difference between science and the investigation Wittgenstein is doing involves the use of models. To see the contrast, we can look at those who study linguistics as a science. Consider a remark by Noam Chomsky on behaviorism:

Many people tend to think of psychology in terms of its tests and experimental methods. But one should not define a discipline by its procedures. It should be defined, in the first place, by the object of its investigation. Experimental or analytic procedures must be devised in order to shed light on this object. Behaviorist psychology, for example, excels in its experimental techniques, but it has not properly defined its object of inquiry, in my opinion. Thus it has excellent tools, very good tools . . . but nothing very much to study with them.
— Chomsky, Noam. On Language: Chomsky's Classic Works: Language and Responsibility and Reflections on Language (p. 53).

The matter of causes is directly addressed by Wittgenstein:

Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us. And when we are worried about the nature of thinking, the puzzlement which we wrongly interpret to be one about the nature of a medium is a puzzlement caused by the mystifying use of our language.
— ibid. page 10

This why the comparison of language games is not an explanation to replace another explanation. — Paine

I mostly agree, but I’d clarify couple of points. I think Chomsky’s critique is about what an empirical science should count as its object, whereas Wittgenstein isn’t offering a rival scientific model of language or mind at all. What he’s doing is conceptual therapy, clearing up the temptations that make us demand a model in the first place.

And yes, comparing language games isn’t a replacement explanation, it’s a grammatical clarification. The point is to show when we’ve slid into some false explanation, treating thinking as a medium or mechanism. Once the grammar is understood, the urge for this kind of explanation seems to disappear.

it is to stop trying to make words like understanding function as names for occult inner objects. — Sam26

The question is prejudiced by framing it in terms of occult inner objects. Rather than objects in the brain it is the development of neural pathways. They are not occult in the sense of supernatural. Advances in brain imaging render whatever is going on less hidden and better understood.

how does an inner process connect to the rule rather than merely accompany it, — Sam26

Without the establishment of neural connections understanding would not occur. The inner process is what makes the connection between the rule and how to follow it. This may involve training or trial and error. But all the training in the world may not enable a particular person to understand if those neural connections are not made.

That underscores for me the stated goal of Wittgenstein to distance himself from the generality of the Tractatus. — Paine

Yes, and the generality of modern practice of philosophy as well.

Ordinarily when we see pain behavior we do not question whether the person is in pain. We do not regard the pain as fictional because we cannot observe the pain itself. What we say and do in response to pain behavior is treat the pain as real. It may turn out in some cases that the person is faking, but the term 'pain' becomes meaningless if the pain is regarded as a fiction because we can't observe it. — Fooloso4

Wittgenstein is not questioning whether someone is in pain if they are were just hit by a car and displaying typical pain behavior. What is a grammatical fiction is our understanding the sensation of pain divorce of expression, behavior, and context. When little Johnny bumps his head and starts crying, we don't expect him to attach a name to private sensation to later identify if experienced. He is consoled and possibly taught another form of expression like “Ouch that hurt!” When Johnny learns the difference between using the concept “tickle” and an “itch”, he is not applying identity criteria that differentiates the sensation of an itch and a sensation of a tickle. But learning a tickle is associated with laughter, location of the body, others demeanor while an itch is associated with scratching and possible skin changes.

But don't fret, if calling all of this grammatical fictions still does not sit well with you, John Searle attempts to clarify everything. Pain, itches, tickles are ontological subjective modes of existence, they exist when a human experiences them. But they can be investigated because they are epistemologically objective.

Think of it like chess. If you don’t know chess, you can’t use the move castling. You can treat it as something happening in the game, ask what it is, watch, imitate, get corrected, and finely learn. The meaning of castling just is its role in the game, but you only grasp that role by learning the game. — Sam26

In PI 43, Wittgenstein wrote “the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” We could apply this to chess and say “the meaning of the rule of castling is its use in the game of chess”

When playing chess, there are two stages a person goes through. First as a beginner learning castling and then as an expert using castling.

You support the idea of “meaning as use”.

To simplify matters for the moment, I will only look at a chess player who already knows the rules of chess.

One of the rules of chess is castling. There are two aspects to castling, what it does and what it is.

What something does is different to what something is. For example, a hammer does jobs such as knock nails into wood but is a mass of metal at the end of a handle. What a hammer is is prior to what a hammer does. The hammer did not become a mass of metal at the end of a handle because it was used to knock nails into wood, the hammer was a mass of metal at the end of a handle before it was used to knock nails into wood.

What something is is prior to what it does.

What castling does is external to castling. Castling has a use in the game of chess, it has a role in the game of chess and is one of the rules of the game of chess. Castling has a meaning within the game of chess because it has a use within the game of chess.

What castling is is internal to castling. Castling means moving the king two squares towards a rook and then moving that rook to the square the king crossed over. But the rule of castling exists within the game of chess even if never used within a game. The rule of castling exists prior to any use.

What castling does is different from what it is. It is true that as regards what it does, it has a meaning because of how it is used in the game of chess. But as regards what it is, castling has a meaning even if never used within a game of chess.

What I think, is that if someone states particular criteria, or rules governing the use of the word, for the purpose of a logical procedure, then we have what is required for a "concept". Notice though, that I am stipulating such rules in this case, proposing a restriction to the way that you use the word "concept". — Metaphysician Undercover

That's clear enough, I think. But I'm a bit bothered by the fact that we often don't bother to state criteria but use a term without such a framework. In those cases, we are relying on skills that we have picked up informally, perhaps by imitation, certainly by participation. If someone can use terms like "tree" or "table" without that formal framwork, it seems a bit odd to deny that they have the relevant concepts. That does not exclude the possiibility of adding the framework later - as in the case, perhaps, of "tree". But then, it might turn out to be a different, even if a clearer, concept.

It is possible to refer to hidden things. For example, if I see a broken window, I can say that something caused it to break. What caused the window to break may be unknown, but I can still refer to this unknown something. — RussellA

Yes, of course you can. But you can then discover the rock that caused the damage, show it to you, lodge it as evidence, as so forth. There is nothing that you can do with pain that is equivalent to that.

I agree that uttering ouch is not part of language, but saying “ouch!” must be part of language. As it is the nature of language that every expression must refer to something, “ouch!” must also refer to something. — RussellA

I see what you are getting at - roughly. Let's suppose someone utters "ouch" and someone asks me what he said; I might reply "ouch". I'm imitating his utterance, but that doesn't make "ouch" a part of language. I don't even agree that every expression ("part of language") must refer to something. What does "plus" as in "2+2=4" refer to? What does "the present king of France" refer to? What does "nothing" refer to?

As the form of grimacing gives clues to the inner feeling of being in pain, the form of the linguistic statement “I am in pain” must also gives clues to the inner feeling of being in pain. — RussellA

I don't see what form vs content has to do with this. Grimacing and "I am in pain" are connected to pain, and provide me with grounds for saying that "S is in pain". I wouldn't say they are clues exactly, because the connection is not empirical - can't be empirical, because we can't demonstrate the connection with pain as we can demonstrate the connection between rain and rainbows.

It may turn out in some cases that the person is faking, but the term 'pain' becomes meaningless if the pain is regarded as a fiction because we can't observe it. — Fooloso4

I agree that we can't observe pain in the way that one can observe a wound. But I would prefer to insist that observing someone who has been wounded writhing and screaming is observing pain.

This also explains why prove it can be misplaced. If someone demands evidence for the hinges themselves, they’re asking for the justification that only makes sense within a system of checking that presupposes those hinges. The result isn’t a refutation, it’s a diagnosis, i.e., the request pulls the words like doubt, know, or evidence out of the language game where they do their work. — Sam26

I am a bit confused by this. Your last sentence suggests that hinge propositions are always true, like a priori propositions. I thought being a hinge proposition was not a class or kind of proposition, but a role that could be played, from time to time, by a wide variety of propositions. Examples of hinge propositions are, I suppose, methodological decisions or heuristic principles. The point about these is that although they are held fast in debates, they can be changed, though not, of course, in the process of debate.
Your remarks that "they aren’t usually the result of inquiry" and "That’s what Witt calls a kind of certainty, but it’s hinge certainty, not epistemic certainty" deepen the mystery for me.

it is to stop trying to make words like understanding function as names for occult inner objects.
— Sam26

The question is prejudiced by framing it in terms of occult inner objects. Rather than objects in the brain it is the development of neural pathways. They are not occult in the sense of supernatural. Advances in brain imaging render whatever is going on less hidden and better understood.

how does an inner process connect to the rule rather than merely accompany it,
— Sam26

Without the establishment of neural connections understanding would not occur. The inner process is what makes the connection between the rule and how to follow it. This may involve training or trial and error. But all the training in the world may not enable a particular person to understand if those neural connections are not made. — Fooloso4

When Wittgenstein warns against “occult” or “mysterious” inner items, he’s not talking about the supernatural. He means a theoretical position that’s treated as if it explains meaning or rule-following but does no explanatory work. It’s “occult” in the sense of being hidden or idle, not supernatural. You were joking, right?

This also explains why prove it can be misplaced. If someone demands evidence for the hinges themselves, they’re asking for the justification that only makes sense within a system of checking that presupposes those hinges. The result isn’t a refutation, it’s a diagnosis, i.e., the request pulls the words like doubt, know, or evidence out of the language game where they do their work.
— Sam26
I am a bit confused by this. Your last sentence suggests that hinge propositions are always true, like a priori propositions. I thought being a hinge proposition was not a class or kind of proposition, but a role that could be played, from time to time, by a wide variety of propositions. Examples of hinge propositions are, I suppose, methodological decisions or heuristic principles. The point about these is that although they are held fast in debates, they can be changed, though not, of course, in the process of debate.
Your remarks that "they aren’t usually the result of inquiry" and "That’s what Witt calls a kind of certainty, but it’s hinge certainty, not epistemic certainty" deepen the mystery for me. — Ludwig V

You’re right to raise the question, viz., that hinges are “always true” or a priori in the traditional sense. That’s not what I meant. A hinge isn’t a special metaphysical kind of proposition (they're really not propositions in the traditional sense) with a magic truth status. It’s their role that gives them special status, and that role is quite separate from epistemology.

“Hinge certainty” also isn’t “epistemic certainty.” It doesn’t mean “proved beyond doubt.” It means that in a given practice, this is what stands fast and makes checking, doubting, and evidential talk possible at all. That’s why “prove it” can be misplaced, not because the hinge is infallible, but because the demand for proof is being made in a way that presupposes the very background it is trying to put on trial. I have no idea why people are having such a difficult time with this idea. It seems obvious that you would need bedrock certainties in order to have any certainty. Maybe I'm not seeing your point.

In your examples some hinges do look like methodological commitments or heuristics in a debate, and they can change, but typically not by the ordinary give and take of reasons inside the system. The change is more like a reorientation, a shift (the shift isn't with what's bedrock, but what's just above bedrock) in what we take for granted, often driven by new practices, or a new framework. The point isn’t “hinges are eternally true,” it’s “hinges are what make truth assessment and doubt possible in the first place, in that context.” Sorry, but I keep repeating myself to make the point.