How would rules conjure a concept? It's probably that both rules and concepts are elements of post hoc analysis of language. — frank

The difference between prescriptive rules (how one ought to behave), and descriptive rules (post hoc inductive statements about behaviour) is very important. I understand a dictionary definition as principally a post hoc inductive statement. However, in educational institutions we are taught to use certain words according to strict rules of application, like my example of "triangle". In this case the rules are prescriptive, and this is what I've argued is constitutive of "concepts".

Both use in practice and formulation of a rule are aspects of concepts. — Ludwig V

I agree that both are aspects of concepts, but I also argue that what you call use of words in practice extends far beyond the use concepts. So "use in practice" is a very large category, and the majority of it does not involve concepts. And, I argue that this is a very important point to understand if we want a proper representation of "use in practice". If we assume that all "use in practice" involves concepts, then we'll end up saying that all communication, even that done by other animals involves concepts. Therefore I think we need some rules as to what exactly "a concept" is, and we need to adhere to those rules in discussions like this.

You could say that there are two different, but related, concepts here, or you could say that there are sufficient similarities between the two to justify calling them one. — Ludwig V

The point is that you cannot call two distinct sets of rules for using a specific word "one concept", without allowing for the possibility of contradiction inhering within that concept. So in your example of distinct uses of "game", things which one person would qualify as "a game" would be disallowed by the other, so you'd end up having contradictory uses of "game" being allowed for by "the same concept". This means that your proposition for "concept" allows for a violation of the law of noncontradiction.

Again, there are several varieties of football - different concepts of it if you like, since there are formal books of rules. It isn't a usually a problem. I don't see the point of arguing about it. — Ludwig V

It is a problem for anyone who claims that the different varieties are "the same game", though having different sets of rules. if two different teams want to play the same game, "football" and they each have different sets of rules, that's a very real problem. They have to hammer out their differences and decide on one game to play. They can't each be playing a different game, and insist that it is the same because they both have the same name. Likewise with concepts, if we want to have a logical discussion, we can't each be proceeding with different rules of usage for the same word, and insist that it is the same concept. That's a fallacy known as equivocation.

So, in my view, the use of the word in practice is more important that whether an explicitly formulated rule is being followed. — Ludwig V

For logical procedures following explicitly formulated rules is of primary importance. I agree that use of the word in practice may sometimes serve as a guideline for creation of those rules, especially if common practice already follows from a field of discipline (rule guided). But in many cases, the principle of "use of the word in practice", just serves to deliver equivocation, therefore it must be curbed for philosophy and logical procedures.

I agree that we have the concept of “freedom” and there are rules as to how the word “freedom” is correctly used in language (rules as to what the concept does).

But there are no rules as to why we have the concept “freedom” in the first place (rules as to what the concept is) — RussellA

I don't agree with any of this. I don't believe we have a concept of "freedom". It's just a word that's used commonly, and in a vast variety of different ways, without any real restrictions on usage. One could not locate, or isolate a commonly accepted "concept of freedom".

How could you use the word “freedom” in a sentence if you did not know what freedom meant, did not know the concept of freedom. — RussellA

That's simple, you just follow the examples set by others. It's a form of copying, mimicking. This provides one with the basis for acceptable usage without learning any concepts.

I don't agree with any of this. I don't believe we have a concept of "freedom". It's just a word that's used commonly, and in a vast variety of different ways, without any real restrictions on usage. One could not locate, or isolate a commonly accepted "concept of freedom".....................you just follow the examples set by others. It's a form of copying, mimicking. This provides one with the basis for acceptable usage without learning any concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

In language there is the word “freedom”, and although it is commonly used, I agree that it has no publicly accepted meaning, concept or definition.

As regards copying, person A sees person B say “freedom” and be given a sailing boat. Person A wants a sailing boat and therefore also says “freedom” on the expectation that they are given a sailing boat.

Person A copies person B’s behaviour saying “freedom” because they have the prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A would remain motionless if they had no prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A only speaks because they have a prior concept.

Person A may want the sailing boat in order to sail across the Atlantic, and person B may want the sailing boat in order to sail at the weekends. It could be that every member of the linguistic community has a different meaning or concept of “freedom”.

I agree that “freedom” is a word commonly used in a vast variety of different ways.

The expression “freedom” has a meaning in language because it is associated with observable, empirical behaviour, even if everyone’s meaning or concept of “freedom” is different.

The problem with using your own private language is that there wouldn't be a way to confirm rules. That same issue shows up if you ask yourself what rules you've been following up till now. There's no fact of the matter. — frank

Can you not make up your own rules for own private language, confirm and agree with the other member who uses the private language too?

Yes, it is a point to mull over as you indicated. Will get back for further thoughts on the point, if crops up.

The rule of random determination? Can't randomness be considered as a rule? — Corvus


Not as a rule. — RussellA

There seem many things operating under the rule of random selection or random events. Consider the lottery jackpot numbers drawn from 50 numbers plus 12 lucky star numbers. The winning jackpot numbers consists of 5 numbers and 2 lucky star numbers randomly chosen. No one can predict or say why those numbers came out. But they do.

Another example, consider your own birth. Was there a rule for you having been born as yourself?
Can you explain why you were born as RussellA? Nope. I guess not. It was a pure random event. But there you are.

Many things happen and exist without explanation why. That is the truth of reality. Is it not?

There seem many things operating under the rule of random selection or random events. — Corvus

Chess has rules and society has laws that are consciously made by humans

They say that we are living in a rule-governed universe that operates according to the laws of nature, meaning that there are rules and laws operating independently of humans.

Because humans are a part of the Universe, and our concepts are part of us, it may well be that our concepts are rule-governed operating according to the laws of nature. I don’t know.

Because humans are a part of the Universe, and our concepts are part of us, it may well be that our concepts are rule-governed operating according to the laws of nature. I don’t know. — RussellA

Chess has rules and society has laws that are consciously made by humans — RussellA

Not sure about the universe - how large it is and how it began. One thing seems to be clear is that concepts are made by man. Western chess has its rules, but the Chinese chess has it own rules, and Japanese chess called "Go" has its own rules too, which are all different and specific on how they work.

On the concept of freedom, you could write a dissertation on its origin of the word, analysis of the meaning and uses of the concept, if needed.

We can make up any rules on anything, and as long as we agree to follow, that would be the rule. And in some cases, there is no rule for something such as random events and operations, and that is a rule too.

We can make up any rules on anything, and as long as we agree to follow, that would be the rule. — Corvus

Suppose we make any rule, which we agree to follow. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rules. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rule that we agree to follow the rules.

Ultimately, rules are no more than social agreements.

We can make up any rules on anything, and as long as we agree to follow, that would be the rule.
— Corvus

Suppose we make any rule, which we agree to follow. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rules. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rule that we agree to follow the rules.

Ultimately, rules are no more than social agreements. — RussellA

I don’t think that’s right, and the regress you set up is a good way to see why.

If rules were “nothing but social agreements,” then you really would need an extra rule that says “now follow the rules,” and then another, and so on. But in real life we don’t add an continuous stack of meta-rules. We get trained into a practice where “following the rule” is already part of the technique, shown in what counts as going on correctly, what's a correction, what's a mistake. It's not a separate agreement; it’s built into what we do.

Also, agreement isn’t enough. A group can agree on a rule and still misunderstand it, misapply it, or disagree in cases about what counts as following it. That’s why rule following isn’t just a vote, it’s a practice with standards that show themselves in use, training, and correction.

I’d say it like this, rules aren’t private rails, but they also aren’t social contracts. They’re norms embodied in shared practices, and that’s why the regress stops in “this is how we go on,” not in a further agreement to agree.

As you are probably aware, hinges are central to what some call the "third Wittgenstein". Although you do not make that claim here, I wonder whether hinges are given undue attention and importance.

If hinges are a tool then what is their function beyond being a corrective to radical skepticism? Surely even a philosopher can see that there are many things what we accept without question. But it is questionable whether everything we accept without question is a hinge. What turns on the claims that there’s an external world,” that “Other people exist,” that “I have a body,” and “The world didn’t begin five minutes ago”?

On the other hand the fact that we do not question some things is not in itself a good reason not to question them.

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein does not tell us what does or does not count as a hinge. The only example he gives us is the mathematical proposition (655).

It is not clear whether Wittgenstein intended to restrict the use of the term hinge so as to exclude pre-linguistic practices and activities, but it is questionable whether everything that is not doubted is a hinge. The term hinge is used three times. The first is explicitly about propositions (OC 341). The second refers to investigations and assumptions. (OC 343)

Between these two statements about hinges and connecting them he says:

... it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

( OC 342)

The third, as already mentioned is about mathematical propositions. (655)

It may be that his use of the term 'hinge' does not refer to human forms of life but rather to specific forms of life shaped and informed by science.

I agree that it is sometimes possible to know the cause of a broken window, in that someone may have filmed it, but it is impossible to know the inner cause of someone grimacing. — RussellA

It's difficult to express the point clearly. "the inner cause of someone grimacing" could be taken to refer to the sensation of pain. But the private language argument shows that there's no such thing. So we need to explain that if we are to be quite clear.

For example, the fact that I may not know what “Je veux deux pommes” means does not mean that it is not part of a language. — RussellA

True. But lots of people do know what it means. No-one knows what "slithy" means, because it doesn't mean anything. It is just a noise. Lewis Carroll was having fun writing something that sounded like language but wasn't.

For example, the fact that I may not know what “Je veux deux pommes” means does not mean that it is not part of a language — RussellA

But it is part of a language. So lots of people know what it means.

In the world, there are a total of four things if two things are alongside another two things. — RussellA

Yes but the sign "+" does not refer to that fact. It is, in effect an instruction to do something, so it can't refer to anything.

There are no unicorns, but the word “unicorn” still refers to something. — RussellA

But it does not refer to some thing. Unicorns are mythical creatures, so they do not exist, so "unicorn" cannot refer to them. You could, I suppose say that "unicorn" refers to the myths in which the stories occur, but that is a very different kind of reference from the one you seemed to have in mind.

Betrand Russell distinguished between phrases that refer to non-existent entities and those that refer to actual objects. For instance, "the present King of France" refers to a non-existent entity, while "the present King of England" refers to a specific, existing individual. (Wikipedia) So we can refer to both existent and non-existent things. — RussellA

No, Russell's point, as I understood it that propositions that appear to refer to non-existent entities can be assigned a truth value by interpreting "The present king of France is bald" by analysing it as consisting of two claims - 1) that there is a king of France and 2) that he is bald. A conjunction of two sentences is true iff both conjuncts are true. In this case one of the conjuncts is false, because the reference fails, so the entire sentence is false. No non-existent entities required.

You seem to have a generous soul. Your concept of language is generous. So is your concept of reference.

One of Wittgenstein’s most useful tools is noticing when a word has stepped out of its ordinary work. We're using the word, but it’s no longer doing the job it normally does, and this is when language goes on holiday to Bermuda. — Sam26

Sometimes we stretch meanings or apply them in new ways, but it is not always going on holiday. Sometimes it is putting words to work in new ways. Perhaps I'm being picky, but I think it would be wrong to think that a new use is always, as one might say, the engine idling.

But it’s false if you hear “everyday use” as “the average person’s current opinions or sloppy speech is the standard.” Witt isn’t taking a poll. Use includes the practice’s norms, how words are taught, corrected, and applied. Ordinary use includes skilled and technical language games too, medicine, law, mathematics, because those are also ordinary human practices with standards. — Sam26

There are different registers of language, appropriate to specific kinds of occasion. Informal usage is one thing, formal usage somewhat different. One register for the law courts, another for a late night in the pub, and so on. Yet it is true that our approach in philosophy does assume a common understanding of correctness in language which might not always be appropriate. This was more or less taken for granted until somewhere in the 'sixties. Less so now. It could be very difficult, but seems to work well enough on the whole.

I understand a dictionary definition as principally a post hoc inductive statement. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not unjustified. The only enforcement pressure for the "rules" of language is not being understood or being misunderstood. But that is seriously undermined by our ability to understand what people mean to say even if they say it in a way that breaks the rules.

If we assume that all "use in practice" involves concepts, then we'll end up saying that all communication, even that done by other animals involves concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see why we should not allow that animals have concepts. It would be hard to understand them if we did not.

Therefore I think we need some rules as to what exactly "a concept" is, and we need to adhere to those rules in discussions like this. — Metaphysician Undercover

The trouble is that you and I can recommend, but we have absolutely no power to enforce anything.

if two different teams want to play the same game, "football" and they each have different sets of rules, that's a very real problem. They have to hammer out their differences and decide on one game to play. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right. But they can decide to play either game, or play one the first week, the other the second and so on. It's only a problem if they try to play both games at the same time.

As you are probably aware, hinges are central to what some call the "third Wittgenstein". Although you do not make that claim here, I wonder whether hinges are given undue attention and importance.

If hinges are a tool then what is their function beyond being a corrective to radical skepticism? Surely even a philosopher can see that there are many things what we accept without question. But it is questionable whether everything we accept without question is a hinge. What turns on the claims that there’s an external world,” that “Other people exist,” that “I have a body,” and “The world didn’t begin five minutes ago”?

On the other hand the fact that we do not question some things is not in itself a good reason not to question them.

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein does not tell us what does or does not count as a hinge. The only example he gives us is the mathematical proposition (655).

It is not clear whether Wittgenstein intended to restrict the use of the term hinge so as to exclude pre-linguistic practices and activities, but it is questionable whether everything that is not doubted is a hinge. The term hinge is used three times. The first is explicitly about propositions (OC 341). The second refers to investigations and assumptions. (OC 343)

Between these two statements about hinges and connecting them he says:

... it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
( OC 342)

The third, as already mentioned is about mathematical propositions. (655)

It may be that his use of the term 'hinge' does not refer to human forms of life but rather to specific forms of life shaped and informed by science. — Fooloso4

I think this seriously understates what hinges are doing in OC, and it also makes two points that don’t hold up.

First, hinges aren’t just a “corrective to radical skepticism.” They’re Witt’s way of describing the grammar of doubt and inquiry. Doubt is not a free-floating attitude you can apply to anything. For doubt to be intelligible, some things have to stand fast, not because we’ve proved them, but because they are part of what makes checking, testing, and correction possible. That’s a conceptual point about how doubt, evidence, and investigation function, not a special attack against skeptics.

Second, “not questioning isn’t a good reason not to question” misses the target. Hinges aren’t defended by “we happen not to doubt them.” The point is that certain doubts don’t amount to a hill of beans, they don’t connect to any practice of checking. If you say, “Maybe I don’t have a body” or “Maybe the world began five minutes ago,” what would count as testing that? What would count as evidence either way? If there’s no answer, then the doubt isn’t courageous, it’s idle, it pulls the word doubt out of any meaningful role.

Third, you ask “what turns on” claims like “there is an external world” or “other people exist.” The answer is everything ordinary. Testimony, memory, perception, measurement, correction, surprise, learning. The whole business of “we checked,” “we found out,” “we were mistaken,” “the instrument was misreading,” already presupposes a stable background in which those activities make sense. That’s what “turns on” them.

Fourth, the “Witt doesn’t tell us what counts as a hinge” complaint sets the wrong expectation. Different propositions can function as hinges in different contexts, and many hinges are not even voiced as propositions most of the time. That’s why he talks of propositions, assumptions, and the “logic of our investigations.” He’s mapping a function, not compiling some list.

Finally, the idea that hinges might be restricted to science is too narrow. He says “it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations,” yes, but the point generalizes about inquiry of almost any kind, viz., it depends on what stands fast. Science is just an especially clear case because it makes “testing” and “error” explicit. The underlying structure is part of our broader form of life, not something created by science. Moreover, any belief system that can function as a system of assessment, correction, and inference will have something that stands fast for it. You can’t evaluate, test, or justify everything at once, because justification and testing always operate against a background. So, every workable system has hinge certainties / bedrock certainties of some kind.

Again, hinges aren’t “everything we accept without question,” and they aren’t a mere anti-skeptic patch. They show the background conditions that make doubt, evidence, and investigation intelligible.

But it’s false if you hear “everyday use” as “the average person’s current opinions or sloppy speech is the standard.” Witt isn’t taking a poll. Use includes the practice’s norms, how words are taught, corrected, and applied. Ordinary use includes skilled and technical language games too, medicine, law, mathematics, because those are also ordinary human practices with standards.
— Sam26
There are different registers of language, appropriate to specific kinds of occasion. Informal usage is one thing, formal usage somewhat different. One register for the law courts, another for a late night in the pub, and so on. Yet it is true that our approach in philosophy does assume a common understanding of correctness in language which might not always be appropriate. This was more or less taken for granted until somewhere in the 'sixties. Less so now. It could be very difficult, but seems to work well enough on the whole. — Ludwig V

I agree with most of that. Different registers, legal, technical, pub talk, all have their own standards, and Witt’s “use” point fits that well. There isn’t one absolute or global yardstick of correctness that floats above all contexts, correctness is internal to the specific language game and the context.

Where I’d adjust what you say is the following: philosophy doesn’t assume a single standard of correctness across all registers. Wit’s method is often to stop philosophers from importing the standards of one register into another, like treating everyday “know” as if it must behave like courtroom proof or treating psychological talk as if it's like physics. A lot of philosophical confusion comes from exactly that cross-register mix up.

Witt’s point isn’t “anything goes.” Even informal talk has standards, you can misuse words, you can be corrected, you can be asked “what do you mean?” The standards are just local, practical, and often implicit, which is why philosophy needs careful overviews rather than a theory of “correctness in general.”