I need to be blunt here because you've walked into a contradiction and you're not seeing it.

Your stance in this thread has been read Witt on his own terms, don't extend his concepts beyond how he uses them, pay attention what he says. You've held me to that standard over and over. Every time I point to the wider functional role that OC is describing, you try to pull me back to the three passages where "hinge" literally appears and say I'm overreading.

But look at what you're doing with "scientific investigations."

Witt says at OC 342, "it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted." That's a remark about the logic of investigation, the activity of testing, checking, verifying, revising. It's not a remark about culture, worldview, or the general shape of modern life.

You've taken that phrase and expanded it into our system is inextricably scientific, our framework is scientific, our world-picture is scientific, our judgments are based on science, and our community is bound by science. You've turned Witt's remark about how inquiry works into an overarching claim about the character of our entire form of life. And you did it while citing OC 298, which says we're bound together by "science and education," as if that settles the question. But 298 doesn't say our system is scientific. It says science and education bind the community. Education is right there in the sentence. Are you going to say our system is "inextricably educational" too? The sentence is describing what holds a community together, not defining the nature of every proposition in the system.

Now think about what your position. You've taken a term Witt uses in a specific context, removed it, expanded it to cover far more than the original passage warrants, and then insisted the text supports your broader reading. That's exactly what you accuse me of doing with "hinge." Exactly. The only difference is that when I do it, you call it bad method, and when you do it, you call it reading Witt on his own terms.


Let's look at your citations again.
OC 141: "When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions." Nothing about science. A system of propositions.

OC 144: "The child learns to believe a host of things… bit by bit there forms a system… some things stand unshakably fast and some are more or less liable to shift." Nothing about science. A child acquiring a system through training. The hinge structure is already there, things standing fast while others shift, before any scientific content enters the picture.

OC 279: "It is quite sure that motor cars don't grow out of the earth. We feel as sure of it as of anything that we could know. But this is 'something that a human being acquires by means of observation and instruction.' I intentionally do not say 'learns.'" Observation and instruction. Not scientific investigation. And Witt deliberately avoids the word "learns" to mark that it isn't the acquisition of knowledge through inquiry. It's something more basic.

OC 247: "What would it be like to doubt now whether I have two hands? Why can't I imagine this at all? What would I believe if I didn't believe that? So far I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist." An everyday certainty. No science. The system here is whatever makes it unintelligible to doubt that I have two hands.

These are your citations, and not one of them say what you need them to say. They describe a system that forms through training, observation, instruction, and living. Science is part of what eventually fills that system, but the system's structure, its hinge structure, isn't itself scientific.

And OC 286, which you passed by quickly, "If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer one by far." If the system just is science, then a society without science has no system. But Witt says they do have one. It's poorer, but it's a system. Which means "system" is not identical with "scientific." There are systems, and ours happens to be heavily shaped by science, and theirs by something else. The hinge structure belongs to the system as such, not to the scientific content.

Finally, you've applied a strict standard to my reading of hinges, viz., don't go beyond what Witt explicitly says. And you've applied a loose standard to your own reading of "scientific investigations" and inflated it to cover the entire framework. That's not a consistent method. If you want to hold me to the text, hold yourself to the text. And if you read the text honestly, it doesn't support the claim that hinges belong exclusively to scientific investigations. It supports the claim I've been making, hinges are what stand fast within a system so that doubt and inquiry can function, and the structure shows up everywhere, in science, in everyday certainty, in training, in the things a child absorbs before it ever hears the word "science."

You left out the italicises "I", — Banno

In the e-copy I am using it is not italicized, but even if it were what difference does it make?

and ignore that he immediately qualifies that comment. — Banno

I left it out because it is not relevant to the point that it is not a hinge.

You have been getting pushback for claiming that hinges are only about scientific investigations. — Banno

I made the connection between:

341. That is to say, the question^ that we raise and our doubt depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

and

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

How do you understanding what he means when he uses the phrase "that is to say' in both cases?

As I understand it the second statement clarifies the first. They are making the same point in different words. When he says certain propositions that are exempt from doubt are like hinges he is saying that these propositions belong to our scientific investigations.

For thinking the forest is only oaks. ↪Sam26 has explained this. — Banno

The problem is more like this: someone points to a tree and says that it is an oak and you point to some other trees and call them oak. After all they all have certain characteristics in common.

The "system" includes all language, the many games we play and things we do with it; from reading a train timetable to traveling to the moon in a dream, from calling for a block to multiplying 12 by 12. — Banno

When he says:

410. Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it.

He is not talking about knowledge of train schedules or dreams or calling for blocks.

Excellent.

He is not talking about knowledge of train schedules or dreams or calling for blocks. — Fooloso4

Yes, he is. Look and see.

It's not that what is being said doesn't apply to scientific investigation, but that it doesn't apply only to scientific investigation. We have to hold some things as indubitable in order to consult a train timetable, or to find our way home, or to recognise a friend, and so on. And this is also so in the laboratory.

Is it a hinge or "
hinge-like
— Sam26
? — Fooloso4

You're right that "I am called L.W." is personal. If it turns out nobody is called L.W., arithmetic still works, physics still holds. I'll drop "hinge-like" because it muddied my point.

But here's the real point again. OC isn't only about what holds fast for the system as a whole. It's also about what holds fast for each of us within a form of life. "If someone said to me that he doubted whether he had a body I should take him to be a half-wit (OC 257)." That's not a proposition belonging to scientific investigations. It's a proposition where doubt signals a breakdown in the person, not a gap in the system. And Witt treats these cases with the same seriousness as the ones you want to call hinges.

if "I am called L.W." isn't a hinge, and "I have a body" isn't a hinge, and all the cases where doubt has no foothold in ordinary life aren't hinges, then what is most of OC about? You've narrowed "hinge" to where the bulk of the book falls somewhere outside OC. I don't think that's a well thought through reading of a text whose central point is precisely the structure of what stands fast and what doesn't.

That's a remark about the logic of investigation, the activity of testing, checking, verifying, revising. It's not a remark about culture, worldview, or the general shape of modern life. — Sam26

Science is not only about certain activities such as testing. Science forms a body of knowledge. It is from within that body of knowledge that the logic of our investigations functions. It is also from within that body of knowledge that we make judgments. The judgments we make today are different from the judgments societies made in the past and judgment made by societies that are not scientifically advanced.

You've turned Witt's remark about how inquiry works into an overarching claim about the character of our entire form of life. — Sam26

I am taking what Wittgenstein said in his writings from the early Notebooks to On Certainty and others. It is not piecemeal or statements taken out of context. It is the background against which I understand what he is saying in the passages under discussions.

Education is right there in the sentence. Are you going to say our system is "inextricably educational" too? — Sam26

In so far as science is critical part of our education, yes.

Now think about what your position. You've taken a term Witt uses in a specific context, removed it, expanded it to cover far more than the original passage warrants, and then insisted the text supports your broader reading. That's exactly what you accuse me of doing with "hinge." Exactly. The only difference is that when I do it, you call it bad method, and when you do it, you call it reading Witt on his own terms. — Sam26

There is a major difference. The meaning of the term 'hinge' is contested by scholars. The same level of controversy does not occur with regard to the term science.

They describe a system that forms through training, observation, instruction, and living. Science is part of what eventually fills that system, but the system's structure, its hinge structure, isn't itself scientific. — Sam26

You beg the question. You assign a central role to hinges, but there is little or no agreement about this.

If the system just is science ... — Sam26

I have not claimed that the system is just science.

Which means "system" is not identical with "scientific." — Sam26

I agree.

And you've applied a loose standard to your own reading of "scientific investigations" — Sam26

The following might give you some idea of the scope of what Wittgenstein means by scientific investigations:

Our civilization is characterized by the word progress. Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features. Typically it constructs. It is occupied with building an ever more complicated structure. And even clarity is sought only as a means to this end, not as an end in itself. For me on the contrary clarity, perspicuity are valuable in themselves.

(Culture and Value)

It is not just that our scientific investigations make progress, but that progress is the form of our civilization. Its structure becomes more and more complicated

Another nuanced argument by Banno.

We have to hold some things as indubitable ... — Banno

One again, Wittgenstein identifies things that are indubitable but are not hinges. The importance of some things not being doubted has a long history going back at least to Plato. We find it in the divided line from the Republic. The Greek term is 'pistis'. There is no single word for word translation but trust comes close. It has both an epistemological and an ontological dimension.

Another nuanced argument by Banno. — Fooloso4

Thank you. One responds appropriately to one's interlocutors. How one might read On Certainty and not notice Wittgenstein's quite intentionally wide ranging choice of examples, in accord with his own exhortation, is beyond my keen.

One again, Wittgenstein identifies things that are indubitable but are not hinges. — Fooloso4

Arguably, yes, and this is were I may to some degree differ in interpretation from @Sam26. The sequence for me looks something like a beginning with Moore’s claim and epistemic classification, then a consideration of hinge propositions before moving on to rules, world-picture, and animal certainty before more or less settling back to use and practice.

What I take issue with is your

There is not textual support or evidence that Wittgenstein uses the term 'hinge' to mean anything other than these incontrovertible propositions that belong to scientific investigations. — Fooloso4

Which is just plain wrong, as any who read the text will see. The use of "hinge", as Sam has so patiently been explaining, is a part of a wider discussion of various indubitable propositions in various contexts.

So sure,

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

yes; but not only to our scientific investigations, but also to our use of "This is a hand", “My name is L. W.”, “That is a tree”, “I am sitting at a table writing” and so on.

May as well let this rest.

A mathematical proposition like 12x12=144 is a hinge in the strongest sense (my bedrock sense) because its internal to the system. — Sam26

This doesn't really make sense to me. If 12x12=144 is a hinge, then isn't 10x10=100 a hinge, and 2x2=4 a hinge, and any other equation? So, wouldn't any, and every, mathematical statement internal to the system, be a hinge? And if every mathematical statement is a hinge, then "hinge" serves no purpose in this context of mathematics.

Or is it the case that mathematics itself is the hinge, in its entirety as a hinge discipline, or something like that? The problem with this perspective is that some parts actually change over time. And it's not a matter of just some fringe parts changing, the very fundamentals (what you might think would be hinges) like what qualifies as a number, change.

So in reference to the discussion on scientific investigations, I'll refer you to Kuhn's theory of paradigm shifts. If this theory is true, then the idea of hinge propositions is faulty. The entire system must be equally doubted by the skeptic, because the entire system ties together as a cohesive unit. It is not the case that some propositions of a system are doubtable and others ought not be doubted. The skeptic cannot distinguish what is doubtable from what is not doubtable, without doubting them.

The idea is that human endeavors are game-like. You embrace certain rules, certain standards, certain word usage, etc. when you embrace a game.

Yes, you can doubt that the knight really has to move in a little L shaped path. You can even throw the knight out the window, but at that point, you're no longer playing the game.

You are a little queen, looking ahead at an impending knight fork, wondering if this is all there is to you. You say:

"To be, or not to be, that is the question:
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And by opposing end them: to die, to sleep
No more; and by a sleep, to say we end
The heart-ache, and the thousand natural shocks
That Flesh is heir to? 'Tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wished. To die, to sleep,
To sleep, perchance to Dream; aye, there's the rub,
For in that sleep of death, what dreams may come,
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
Must give us pause. There's the respect
That makes Calamity of so long life:
For who would bear the Whips and Scorns of time,
The Oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely, [F: poore]
The pangs of despised Love, the law’s delay, [F: dispriz’d]
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of th'unworthy takes,
When he himself might his Quietus make
With a bare Bodkin? Who would Fardels bear, [F: these Fardels]
To grunt and sweat under a weary life,
But that the dread of something after death,
The undiscovered country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns, puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear those ills we have,
Than fly to others that we know not of?
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all,
And thus the native hue of Resolution
Is sicklied o'er, with the pale cast of Thought,
And enterprises of great pitch and moment, [F: pith]
With this regard their Currents turn awry, [F: away]
And lose the name of Action. Soft you now,
The fair Ophelia? Nymph, in thy Orisons
Be all my sins remember'd.

The idea is that human endeavors are game-like. You embrace certain rules, certain standards, certain word usage, etc. when you embrace a game.

Yes, you can doubt that the knight really has to move in a little L shaped path. You can even throw the knight out the window, but at that point, you're no longer playing the game.

You are a little queen, looking ahead at an impending knight fork, wondering if this is all there is to you. — frank

Yes, "you're no longer playing the game". That's the point. At this point, your humanly endeavour (throwing the knight out the window) is not game-like at all, it's anti-game-like. Then the proposition "human endeavors are game-like" is not a valid inductive generalization, because some people are always throwing the knight out the window. Such is the skeptic. But Wittgenstein tries to squeeze the square peg into the round hole, and portray the anti-gamer as a gamer, maybe just playing a different game.

because some people are always throwing the knight out the window. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't you get cold living under that bridge?

This doesn't really make sense to me. If 12x12=144 is a hinge, then isn't 10x10=100 a hinge, and 2x2=4 a hinge, and any other equation? So, wouldn't any, and every, mathematical statement internal to the system, be a hinge? And if every mathematical statement is a hinge, then "hinge" serves no purpose in this context of mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a good question, but at any given moment, the proposition 12x12=144 is either functioning as a hinge or it's not. When we're checking a calculation and we rely on 12x12=144 without questioning it, then it's functioning as a hinge. When no one's relying on it as such, then it's not a hinge, it's just another mathematical proposition. Could many mathematical propositions serve that role? Sure. But that doesn't make the term useless.

Or is it the case that mathematics itself is the hinge, in its entirety as a hinge discipline, or something like that? The problem with this perspective is that some parts actually change over time. And it's not a matter of just some fringe parts changing, the very fundamentals (what you might think would be hinges) like what qualifies as a number, change.

So in reference to the discussion on scientific investigations, I'll refer you to Kuhn's theory of paradigm shifts. If this theory is true, then the idea of hinge propositions is faulty. The entire system must be equally doubted by the skeptic, because the entire system ties together as a cohesive unit. It is not the case that some propositions of a system are doubtable and others ought not be doubted. The skeptic cannot distinguish what is doubtable from what is not doubtable, without doubting them. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, mathematics as a whole isn't "a hinge." A hinge is a proposition holding fast so that some inquiry can proceed. The fact that mathematics changes over time doesn't undermine the idea. Witt's river-bed image (OC 96-97) says that what stands fast can harden and later shift. That's not a flaw in the concept; it's just the nature of some hinges.

Second, Kuhn doesn't defeat hinges, he illustrates them. A paradigm is a set of commitments that hold fast so that normal science can proceed. When a shift happens, some of what stood fast gives way and new things take its place. Witt practically describes this at OC 96: "fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid."

Third, the skeptic point gets Witt backwards. The whole thrust of OC is that you can't doubt everything at once. Doubt requires a foundational background (a hinge background) in order to function. The skeptic who says "I must doubt everything equally" hasn't achieved some deep point of inquiry, they've destroyed the conditions that make doubting intelligible. It's my understanding that Kuhn confirms this, but I'm definitely not a Kuhn expert, that's for sure.

For Wittgenstein, as regarding hinges:

Mathematical propositions are hinges.

The personal propositions “I am here” (OC 10) and “the existence of the external world” (OC 20) are hinges, because they are exempt from doubt.

The personal proposition “I am called……….” plays the role of a hinge because of overwhelming evidence and is regarded as incontrovertible.

OC 314 - That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, and are as it were hinges on which these turn
OC 655 - The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e: “Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn”
OC 657 - The propositions of mathematics might be said to be fossilized. - The proposition "I am called...." is not. But it too is regarded as incontrovertible by those who, like myself, have overwhelming evidence for it.

Ultimately, logically and grammatically, something that plays the role of a hinge cannot be a hinge.

Don't you get cold living under that bridge? — frank

It's not being under the bridge that's cold, it's the truth that's cold and hard.

When we're checking a calculation and we rely on 12x12=144 without questioning it, then it's functioning as a hinge. — Sam26

Well then anything which one learns, and employs in an habitual way would be functioning as a hinge. Anything we've come to rely on we use without questioning it. Once we learn how to use something, we employ it without questioning it, it becomes a part of the toolbox. We generally don't question the tool when we pull it out, unless we're thinking of using it in an unorthodox way. This would mean that the vast majority of common language use would consist of hinges, words spoken without deliberation. We rely on them without questioning them.

We could portray anything reliable as a "hinge", but this does not support the claim that it would be unreasonable to doubt hinges. Surely, even after we've come to rely on a specific process it makes sense to question whether there might be a more efficient way, or even a better end.

So this points to an important distinction, the difference between things which we do not doubt, and things which we ought not doubt. If hinges simply consist of things which we do not doubt, they cannot serve as the basis for what the skeptic ought not doubt.

First, mathematics as a whole isn't "a hinge." A hinge is a proposition holding fast so that some inquiry can proceed. The fact that mathematics changes over time doesn't undermine the idea. Witt's river-bed image (OC 96-97) says that what stands fast can harden and later shift. That's not a flaw in the concept; it's just the nature of some hinges.

Second, Kuhn doesn't defeat hinges, he illustrates them. A paradigm is a set of commitments that hold fast so that normal science can proceed. When a shift happens, some of what stood fast gives way and new things take its place. Witt practically describes this at OC 96: "fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid." — Sam26

You are clearly reducing "hinges" to propositions which we do not doubt in practise. That's fine to portray hinges in this way, but then the hinge provides no defense against skepticism, of any sort. If the river-bed, or paradigm will shift, and the shift will likely lead to a better system, then the skeptic ought to doubt the hinges and work toward producing that shift. If "hinges" are portrayed in this way, then it is unreasonable for anyone to say that it is unreasonable for a skeptic to doubt the hinges.

Third, the skeptic point gets Witt backwards. The whole thrust of OC is that you can't doubt everything at once. Doubt requires a foundational background (a hinge background) in order to function. The skeptic who says "I must doubt everything equally" hasn't achieved some deep point of inquiry, they've destroyed the conditions that make doubting intelligible. — Sam26

This is what I assert is the false representation of doubt. "Doubt", skepticism, is to refuse judgement, suspend judgement. Judgement is what requires a foundational, hinge background. But doubt is to oppose judgement, altogether, and this enables opposition to any hinge background which supports any judgement, and the activity associated with that judgement. In meditation, contemplation, and similar practises we can doubt anything and everything which comes to mind. Doubt itself, is just a matter of refusing judgement so it doesn't require any supporting hinges. As soon as it's time to act though, we must make judgements and put an end to any radical skepticism.

So if we portray "doubt" as opposing a particular judgement, then doubt is understood as a contrary judgement. The contrary judgement of course, requires a hinge background. But if we portray doubt as it truly is, the refusal to make any judgement, this frees us from the necessity of a hinge background. Being freed from the necessity of a hinge background is what allows the skeptic to choose principles. To employ the game analogy, consider that the doubter, while doubting, is refusing to play any game. This allows the doubter to select the game of choice.

There is an argument which can be made against radical skepticism, which claims that thinking itself is an activity. This activity itself must be derived from some sort of prior judgement, requiring some sort of hinges. The problem with this approach is that it puts judgement as prior to thinking, and this would reduce the capacity of thinking to guide our judgements, producing the conclusion that we couldn't prevent activities which we were inclined to make, but thought to be wrong. So it's better to allow that judgement is the product of thinking, and skepticism can extend to all thought.

Which is just plain wrong ... — Banno

I suggest you take a look at the scholarly literature. The claims made about hinges are varied and interpretations mutually exclusive. What your regard as:

Wittgenstein's quite intentionally wide ranging choice of examples — Banno

begs the question. Are they examples of hinges? You have a picture in mind of what a hinge is and see his wide ranging discussion of various things as examples of hinges. It is as if your toolbox only contains a hammer and so everything is seen as a nail.

It is like the religious person who looks around and proclaims that everything she sees is evidence of God.

The use of "hinge", as Sam has so patiently been explaining, is a part of a wider discussion of various indubitable propositions in various contexts. — Banno

In the Preface the editors tell us:

... his interest in Moore's defense of common sense', that is to say his claim to know a
number of propositions for sure ...

That is to say, these notes are more wide ranging than a discussion of indubitable propositions:

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)?Straight off like that, I believe not.-For otherwise the expression ''I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and
extremely important mental state seems to be revealed.

That is to say, his investigation is an epistemological one.

The fact that certain propositions stand fast is a condition for knowledge but that does not mean that they function as hinges. In order to be hinges they not only have to stand fast, other things must pivot around them, Moore's propositions do not play a pivotal role in our system of knowledge. They are simply things that we have no reason to doubt.

Hinge propositions are interesting as part of the framework of our language and as such are beyond doubt. A framework cannot doubt itself.

However, some propositions which exist within this framework are more open to doubt than others, but all can be doubted.

Moore's propositions do not play a pivotal role in our system of knowledge. They are simply things that we have no reason to doubt. — Fooloso4

I just finished re-reading the book and found out how much is based upon the "reasonable" person. This person inherits a system of facts:

But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. — OC 94

Much of the book is devoted to how a child learns language games. Doubting happens afterwards:

This game proves its worth. That may be the cause of its being played, but it is not the ground. — OC, 474

The pursuit of the ground seems to be the sense given by many in this discussion to the use of "hinge." But finding what is "reasonable" is finding what stands fast:

I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not 'fixed' in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility. — OC 152

This is the inverse of building up from an unmoving ground. We do, however, justify our beliefs through arguments:

All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life. — OC, 105

It is when we attempt to assemble proof that the arrangement of propositions come to the fore:

295. So hasn't one, in this sense, a proof of the proposition? But that the same thing has happened again is not a proof of it; though we do say that it gives us a right to assume it.

296. This is what we call an "empirical foundation" for our assumptions.

297. For we learn, not just that such and such experiments had those and those results, but also the conclusion which is drawn. And of course there is nothing wrong in our doing so. For this inferred proposition is an instrument for a definite use.

298. We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education. — OC 295 to 297

I suggest you take a look at the scholarly literature. — Fooloso4

I have some familiarity. I did indeed do a search for any support there might be for your contention that hinges are restricted only to scientific investigation. Michael Williams and Crispin Wright came up, but that's a stretch. The view is too narrow to be much countenanced. Apart from your posts here, there is no serious, textually grounded reading restricts hinges to scientific investigation only.

Yes, he is considering more than just hinge propositions. And again, §341 does say that “They are propositions which belong to our scientific investigations”, and indeed they are, but this does not restrict them to scientific investigation alone. In the surrounding text he examines hinges in various other examples.

Cheers.

The reading that hinges are restricted to scientific investigations is obviously incorrect to anyone who spends some time reading OC. I wouldn't care how many scholars say otherwise. I've given my arguments and so have others. You can spin this or that quote however you like, but it won't change anything. I'm pointing this at @Fooloso4

I did indeed do a search for any support there might be for your contention that hinges are restricted only to scientific investigation. — Banno

The point of the search was to show that there is no consensus as to what a hinge is.

Where did I say that hinges are restricted only to scientific investigations? If there are hinges that do not belong to the logic of our scientific investigations we must examine them in order to determine whether they are in fact hinges or just have one or more of the features of a hinge but not all of them.

Yes, he is considering more than just hinge propositions. — Banno

You cited several examples of what you claimed hinges - from animal instinct to “My name is L. W.”. As I have pointed out to you more than once, he explicitly denies that propositions such as “My name is L. W.” is a hinge. You conflate what is not doubted with hinges.Although some scholars, perhaps most notably Danièle Moyal-Sharrock do claim that animal instinct is a hinge, this is problematic.

That an animal does this or that has nothing to do with that behavior being exempt from doubt or the animal concluding that it is. Doubt does not enter the picture. Neither is 475 an example of a hinge. It is about the origins of language.

You give the following examples of other things that you regard as hinges: “that is a tree”, “I am sitting at a table writing”. If they are hinges they must play a pivotal role in our system of knowledge. What is their the pivotal role? That tree may serve as an example of a tree but an example is not pivotal. And what role does the information that you are sitting a writing table play in our system?

So what are the criteria for something to be a hinge?: It must have the following distinguishing characteristics:

It are exempt from doubt

It stand fast while other things turn around them

It is part of our system of knowledge

It makes no sense to claim that something is a hinge if it does not meet this criteria.

Where did I say that hinges are restricted only to scientific investigations? — Fooloso4

Here:

At the risk of repeating myself I will repeat what Wittgenstein actually says about hinges: They are propositions that belong to our scientific investigations. — Fooloso4

and here:

There is not textual support or evidence that Wittgenstein uses the term 'hinge' to mean anything other than these incontrovertible propositions that belong to scientific investigations. — Fooloso4

and, if you were repeating yourself, elsewhere as well. And also in the various replies to Sam and I.

This conversation is very odd. But if you now wish to say that hinges are not restricted to scientific investigations, we'll just leave it at that.

The reading that hinges are restricted to scientific investigations is obviously incorrect to anyone who spends some time reading OC. — Sam26

Yep. He's just plain wrong.

Here: — Banno

So when Wittgenstein says:

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts
depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt,
are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
3 42. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific
investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

He doesn't mean only propositions of science, but when I say, as you quote:

They are propositions that belong to our scientific investigations. — Fooloso4

It means only the propositions of science?

and here:
There is not textual support or evidence that Wittgenstein uses the term 'hinge' to mean anything other than these incontrovertible propositions that belong to scientific investigations. — Banno

I have repeatedly asked for supporting evidence but everything you and Sam have provided falls short. If you cannot provide clear examples then what I am saying stands.

But if you now wish to say that hinges are not restricted to scientific investigations, we'll just leave it at that. — Banno

I would gladly say that they are not restricted to scientific investigations if you could provide examples that do not fall apart under examination. But Sam has given up rather than satisfactorily defending even one. I am waiting to see if you can. Until then ...

A quick rundown on my own position, which is subject to change on a whim.

OC uses the tools Sam lists here in a reflection on "Here is a hand", and is not a complete work.

OC begins with Moore's lecture, then moves on to other considerations, as it investigates various certainties, chiefly those of statements. Hinges are one of the considerations, along with rule-following, forms of life, animal certainty and use. For my money the resolution is found in PI§ 201, again, in that there are ways of following a rule that are shown, not said. It's down to our practise.

This is at variance with Danièle Moyal-Sharrock's view in not settling down to animal certainties and that we remaining certain of our beliefs. It is also somewhat different to @Sam26's emphasis on hinges; I rather take hinges as one example among others of indubitable propositions; but I think Sam and I agree that being indubitable is not a property of a proposition as much as a role it takes in some language game.

I have repeatedly asked for supporting evidence but everything you and Sam have provided falls short. — Fooloso4

We are not responsible for your lack of comprehension...

So sure,
342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
yes; and not only to our scientific investigations, but also to our use of "This is a hand", “My name is L. W.”, “That is a tree”, “I am sitting at a table writing” and so on. — Banno

See the bolded bit.

... the "reasonable" person. This person inherits a system of facts: — Paine

I am reminded of this:

457

I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again 'I know that that’s a tree', pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: 'This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing philosophy.

Right, and that system of facts does not include Sam and Banno's alleged hinges such as "Here is a hand" or "I know that I am a human being". We must ask what this system of facts consists of.

The pursuit of the ground seems to be the sense given by many in this discussion to the use of "hinge." — Paine

Yes, although Sam calls it something like groundless grounds. And won't call hinge propositions propositions. The reason is, at least in part because he maintains that instincts are hinges and instincts are not propositions.

This is the inverse of building up from an unmoving ground. — Paine

This is part of Wittgenstein's anti-foundationalism. That is to say, his rejection of the pursuit of grounds.

296. This is what we call an "empirical foundation" for our assumptions.

297. For we learn, not just that such and such experiments had those and those results, but also the conclusion which is drawn. And of course there is nothing wrong in our doing so. For this inferred proposition is an instrument for a definite use. — OC 295 to 297

Empirical foundation. experiments, conclusions from experiments. Sure sounds a lot like science.But Banno and Sam assure us that there is more. Except they don't seem to be able to find it.

We are not responsible for your lack of comprehension... — Banno

Evasiveness is not good philosophical practice. With each example you and Sam have provided I have said why it falls short. If there is a lack of comprehension it is not on my part.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
yes; but not only to our scientific investigations, but also to our use of "This is a hand", “My name is L. W.”, “That is a tree”, “I am sitting at a table writing” and so on. — Banno

You seem to have lost track. The question is whether these things - "This is a hand", “My name is L. W.”, “That is a tree”, “I am sitting at a table writing” count as hinges. I have given you reasons why they don't. And not because they do not belong to our scientific investigations, but because nothing in our system of knowledge turns on them.

Evasiveness is not good philosophical practice. — Fooloso4

I'm not being evasive. The text is there before you, but you seem to not be able to follow it. To say nothing turns on "here is a hand" in this context is extraordinary, since the whole of OC turns on it.

Fine.

nothing in our system of knowledge turns on them. — Fooloso4

Having recently read his philosophy of math, I'd say he would scoff at the notion of a "system of knowledge.". Too abstract.