This is why we cannot have nice discussions... :wink:

Folk which only a cursory reading of the material thinking that they have understood the whole; that they know what was said, together with the the bullshit asymmetry principle.

"Folk" was not the first word I chose.

@Banno says, "What the hell is going on!!"

Something like that. This thread is more pedagogy than philosophy.

Hinges are not solely to do with scientific language. That's evident in the text, which ranges over a large variety of examples.

Ouch!

Here is my first post on hinges:

↪Sam26

As you are probably aware, hinges are central to what some call the "third Wittgenstein". Although you do not make that claim here, I wonder whether hinges are given undue attention and importance.

I think it is given undue attention by some. — Fooloso4

How do you get from there to the accusation that I want to exclusively talk about hinges?

I have tried to correct your misunderstanding of what Wittgenstein means by 'science'.

In the Preface the editors tell us:

... his interest in Moore's defense of common sense', that is to say his claim to know a
number of propositions for sure ...

That is to say, these notes are more wide ranging than a discussion of indubitable propositions:

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)?Straight off like that, I believe not.-For otherwise the expression ''I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and
extremely important mental state seems to be revealed.

That is to say, his investigation is an epistemological one. — Fooloso4

Of course an any point you could have ended the discussion, but you kept attempting to prove me wrong. Toward that end you frequently misread and misrepresented what I said. In addition, and more importantly, you frequently misread and misrepresented Wittgenstein, and not only with regard to hinges.

Folk which only a cursory reading of the material thinking that they have understood the whole — Banno

I don't usually disclose personal information because I want the argument to stand on its own merits without undue influence one way of another. But I feel that in this case I must.

I have a PhD in philosophy. My dissertation was on Wittgenstein. My reading of him is not cursory. I successfully defended my work.

What is your terminal degree? On what subject and in which department?

Sam I'll ask you the same questions?

One benefit of an advanced education is that you have competent professors critically evaluating your work and giving you feedback, This gives you a measure of your work that you won't get sitting in front of a computer screen.


.

Okay folks time to move on to something else. Thanks for the posts.

Well, thanks. Glad to hear it. I recant.

I continue to find the apparent misreading extraordinary. I wasn't able to find anything in the literature that came near to your idea that hinges apply only to scientific propositions. I stand by what I've said.

A Masters, since you asked, in philosophical approaches to education and organisational administration. But though yours is bigger than mine, it still appears somewhat misshaped. :wink:

Can you point to any literature that supports your specific claim concerning hinges? Or will we back away from it, and return to the other tools that form the basis of this thread?

Probably. Time to move on.

Well, I just saw that last post and I'll give my response.

Oh my God, the "I have a PhD argument." This is what it's really about, you've mentioned this before (a year or two ago). You couldn't possibly admit you're wrong to someone with a lesser degree in philosophy. In another post you mention that I'm trying "to prove [you] wrong," that says it all, you've made it personal.

The fact that I've been writing (including a finished book and some papers) and studying Witt since 1979, especially in the last 20+ years means nothing, I guess. Your PhD means you're right and we're wrong. Many people with PhD's are flat out wrong about a lot of things, especially in philosophy. Besides, I can't find anything in the literature that argues for your interpretation, maybe there is, but I haven't found it.

A Masters, since you asked, in philosophical approaches to education and organisational administration — Banno

My guess would have been a BS in bluster.

But though yours is bigger than mine, it still appears somewhat misshaped. — Banno

Peyronie's disease

Can you point to any literature that supports your specific claim concerning hinges? — Banno

Since retiring I no longer have access to academic journals, but that is not to say whether I will find collaboration or not. The subject of hinges is not something that interests me very much. Besides I have been at this long enough to know that most articles are "follow the leader"and who the leader is changes.

The points I have been making about 402 come down to recognizing that not all language games accept hinges.
— Paine

I, of course, agree. — Fooloso4

With that agreement, the next question should be about the separation between "logic" and "experience" as depicted in Philosophical Investigations.

Oh my God, the "I have a PhD argument." — Sam26

You really do have a reading comprehension problem. I said that in response to the claim that my reading of Wittgenstein is cursory.

You couldn't possibly admit you're wrong to someone with a lesser degree in philosophy. — Sam26

As I said, I don't bring up degrees, I prefer to let the argument stand on its own merits.

Yes, I could possibly be wrong, but you have not given me any reason to think I am in this case.

In another post you mention that I'm trying "to prove [you] wrong," that says it all, you've made it personal. — Sam26

It is not personal. The point was made in response to the ongoing discussion of hinges. You have played a central role in that.

The fact that I've been writing (including a finished book and some papers) and studying Witt since 1979, especially in the last 20+ years means nothing, I guess. — Sam26

The problem is that the practice is insular.

Your PhD means you're right and we're wrong. — Sam26

Nope. It means that, as I said:

One benefit of an advanced education is that you have competent professors critically evaluating your work and giving you feedback,

Many people with PhD's are flat out wrong about a lot of things, especially in philosophy. — Sam26

That is true. I have encountered my share of them over the years. Another reason why I don't usually bring up my degree.

I am sorry my friend. My recent return to the forum reminded me of why I left in the first place. Too many dogs pissing on everything to mark their territory. I might feel different tomorrow but I am probably done.

We will keep in touch.

Peyronie's disease — Fooloso4

Ah, that explains it. My own ailments tend to respond to Proctosydl.

So a few points on which we might find agreement. Being indubitable is a role taken on by a proposition in a language game, and not a property of that proposition. (Hence we can set aside 's muddle). Hinges are one of several guises for the indubitable that Wittgenstein considers over the course of the document. Some of these are hinges, held firm so that other things may be questioned. The proposition that "I am called L.W." is not fossilised in the way mathematical propositions are (§657); despite that, it may form "a buttress similar to the one that makes the propositions of mathematics incontrovertible." The sorts of objections one can throw at "I am called L.W." are not so far from those we might throw at "12 x 12 = 144" (§657 &c. )

669. The sentence "I can't be making a mistake" is certainly used in practice. But we may question whether it is then to be taken in a perfectly rigorous sense, or is rather a kind of exaggeration which perhaps is used only with a view to persuasion.

I'm going to presume that your "There is not textual support or evidence that Wittgenstein uses the term 'hinge' to mean anything other than these incontrovertible propositions that belong to scientific investigations" was, after consideration, stronger than you intended.

The place will be less from your absence.

Perhaps by way of a reset...

Here are summaries by author across pages 10–12 of the discussion:

---

**Sam26** — The thread's host and primary defender of a broad reading of *On Certainty* (OC). Sam argues that hinges — propositions that "stand fast" — are not confined to scientific investigations but run through all of human practice: child development, ordinary certainty, and training. He draws on OC 141, 144, 204, 247, 279, and 359 to show that what stands fast forms through living, instruction, and habit, not science specifically. He accuses Fooloso4 of a double standard: demanding strict textual fidelity from Sam while himself inflating "scientific investigations" far beyond what OC 342 warrants. He reads OC as exploring the structure of what makes doubt possible at all, which is a structure that pervades life generally. By page 12 he ends the hinge debate and invites the thread to move on, calling Fooloso4's PhD-argument irrelevant.

---

**Fooloso4** — A retired philosophy PhD whose dissertation was on Wittgenstein. He holds the narrower position: hinges are specifically propositions that belong to the logic of our scientific investigations (OC 341–342). He distinguishes between things we merely do not doubt and genuine hinges, which must also play a *pivotal* role in our system of knowledge. He argues that everyday propositions like "here is a hand" or "I am called L.W." don't meet that bar — they're simply undoubted, not load-bearing pivots. He supports his reading by tracing Wittgenstein's consistent use of "science" from the Tractatus through PI and OC. He grows increasingly frustrated with what he sees as misreadings by Banno and Sam, reveals his PhD in defense against a charge of cursory reading, and by page 12 announces he is probably done with the forum.

---

**Banno** — The thread's moderator-figure and blunt critic of Fooloso4. Banno insists that while OC 342 does connect hinges to scientific investigations, this is not an exclusive connection — Wittgenstein's wide-ranging examples throughout OC (trees, hands, names, dreams, train timetables) show hinges operating across all language games. He endorses Sam's broader reading while noting a slight difference of emphasis: he takes hinges as one among several forms of indubitable propositions, with the real resolution lying in practice and use (PI §201). He invokes Brandolini's Law to explain why he stops fully rebutting Fooloso4, and describes his own terminal degree (a master's in philosophy of education) when Fooloso4 raises credentials.

---

**Paine** — A careful, constructive contributor. He focuses on OC 400–408 to argue that the "unmoving" propositions in Moore's language game don't function as foundations for hypotheses in the scientific sense — they're a different kind of bedrock entirely. He draws attention to OC 341–344 and 657 to show that certainty and acceptance come in different forms, and that not all language games involve hinges. His question to Sam — "How would you characterize Wittgenstein's objection to Moore's argument?" — produces one of the thread's clearest exchanges. He expresses regret at Fooloso4's departure.

---

**Fooloso4 and Paine** agree, notably, that not all language games accept hinges — a point that cuts against both the narrowest and broadest readings of OC.

---

**Ludwig V** — Brief but thoughtful. Notes that Wittgenstein often makes the same point multiple ways (the private language argument being a parallel case), and adds that Kuhn's paradigm concept involves more than just commitments — it includes a social context and technology, making it closer to a form of life than a set of propositions. — Claude...

**Fooloso4 and Paine** agree, notably, that not all language games accept hinges--- a point that cuts against both the narrowest and broadest readings of OC. — Claude...

What are these narrowest and broadest readings?

Presumably, "broad" is @Sam26 and I, who take hinges to apply widely, and "narrow" is @Fooloso4's view that hinges are specifically propositions that belong to the logic of our scientific investigations...?

Even if not all language games accept hinges, for each language game is there something taken as indubitable, as granted in order for the game to function?

I'm incline to cite the Principle of Charity here, that we make maximal sense of the words or actions of others if we presume that we overwhelmingly agree as to what is the case...

**Fooloso4 and Paine** agree, notably, that not all language games accept hinges — Claude...

I've long believed these two are the same person. There are too many similarities that are unique and eccentric.

Sorry - fat thumb syndrome.

Even if not all language games accept hinges, for each language game is there something taken as indubitable, as granted in order for the game to function? — Banno

You put this is a question, I'm sure that any language game will rely on presuppositions at different levels, so there is unlikely to be just one thing that any of them presuppose. On the contrary, I assume that there are many varieties of language game and the variety of presuppositions will match that - they are games, after all. But I doubt if Wittgenstein would be much interested in such general remarks. It may be unfair, to you and others, but I want to insert here a comment on the general conception of language games as they appear (to me, at least) in philosophical discussion.

Two selected quotations.

Philosophy was a method of investigation, for Wittgenstein, but his conception of the method was changing. We can see this in the way he uses the notion of "language games", for instance. He used to introduce them in order to shake off the idea of a necessary form of language. At least that was one use he made of them, and one of the earliest. It is often useful to imagine different language games. At first he would sometimes write "different forms of language"--as though that were the same thing; though he corrected it in later versions, sometimes. In the Blue Book he speaks sometimes of imagining different language games, and sometimes of imagining different notations--as though that were what it amounted to. And it looks as though he had not distinguished clearly between being able to speak and understanding a notation. — BB 1958. Preface p.vi

Language games, it would seem, are not, or not necessarily, actual structures in language. We can, we are expected to, make them up to suit the investigation we are conducting - specifically, to break loose from the forms of language that seem inevitable to us. It seems plausible to suppose that he would not want to replace those with a different inevitable form of language.

. We see that what we call “proposition”, “language”, has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is a family of structures more or less akin to one another. —– But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here. But in that case doesn’t logic altogether disappear? For how can logic lose its rigour? Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigour out of it. The preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole inquiry around. (One might say: the inquiry must be turned around, but on the pivot of our real need. — PI 108

Here, it seems clear to me that the hinge (here "pivot") is an entirely pragmatic concept, "rooted in our real needs" at the time, designed to break up the vision of "crystalline purity". "Hinge" is a role, not a classification.

On the annoying variety of expression that Wittgenstein almost invariably uses, which causes so much difficulty for orthodox philosophical discussion, it is a maxim of traditional rhetoric to employ variety of expression. So this tendency is not a mark of intellectual confusion, but of a decision not to follow the precepts of orthodox philosophical analysis. I would love to insert a quotation here from Quintilian or some similar author, but I don't know enough to do that. But I can offer the following from, I think, ChatGPT.

Importance of Rhetorical Variety
Engagement: Different expressions capture attention and keep the audience engaged.
Clarity: Diverse expressions can clarify complex ideas through relatable imagery.
Emotional Appeal: Varying expression techniques can elicit specific emotions, enhancing the impact of the message.
Memorability: Unique and creative language makes messages more memorable.
By employing a variety of rhetorical expressions, communicators can enhance their effectiveness and resonate more deeply with their audience.

In other words, it is not a bug, but a feature.
In addition, I've already remarked that it also helps to evade the pressure to over-specify one's ideas. Orthodox philosophy thinks that this helps clarity, but one might argue that it does not. All it does is set up a target for endless analysis and confusion.

So a few points on which we might find agreement. Being indubitable is a role taken on by a proposition in a language game, and not a property of that proposition. (Hence we can set aside ↪RussellA's muddle). — Banno

Where did I say that a hinge proposition has the property of being indubitable rather than the role of being indubitable?

In one sense, the proposition “here is one hand” must be a hinge within the coherent language game of which it is a part, otherwise its language game will fall apart. — RussellA

Where did I say that “here is one hand” is truth-apt?

Where is the muddle in the following:

Hinge propositions are interesting as part of the framework of our language and as such are beyond doubt. A framework cannot doubt itself. — RussellA

Maybe we agree that there is no difference between “here is one hand” and “here is one tree”. Either i) if “here is one hand” is a hinge then why isn’t “here is one tree” also a hinge? Or ii) if “here is one tree” is not a hinge then why should “here is one hand” be a hinge? — RussellA

I want to point out where the published scholarship actually stands, because it doesn't lean in @Fooloso4 direction. I haven't found anyone who holds Fooloso4's limited hinge interpretation.

Duncan Pritchard, probably the most prominent figure in hinge epistemology today, treats hinge commitments as arational (something I also say) commitments underlying all rational evaluation, not just scientific investigation. In Epistemic Angst (2016) his examples include everyday commitments like having parents, one's name being such-and-such, speaking English, having hands. He calls these terms an "über hinge commitment," a fundamental arational certainty that we are not radically in error. None of this is restricted to science. Moreover, I've actually talked with Duncan Pritchard about my interpretation, and it generally lines up with how many philosophers look at hinges. I say this because Fooloso4 made a comment about my research being done in isolation.

Danièle Moyal-Sharrock has also arrived at the same general conclusion I have. In Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty (2004) and in other papers, she argues hinges are nonpropositional, nonepistemic, and animal. Her examples include "I exist," "there exist people other than myself," "the world has existed for a very long time," "human beings have bodies and need nourishment." She provides a large example of hinges covering linguistic, personal, local, and universal varieties. She calls OC Wittgenstein's "third masterpiece" precisely because of how radically it reconceives foundational certainty as enacted and animal rather than propositional and scientific. This is also my reading too.

Annalisa Coliva takes a different approach from both Pritchard and Moyal-Sharrock on whether hinges are rational or arational, but she also reads them more broadly. On her framework reading, hinges are conditions of possibility for meaningful epistemic practice. She doesn't restrict them to scientific investigations. I can't find anyone who takes Fooloso4 side of the issue.

Crispin Wright uses the term "cornerstone propositions" for essentially the same concept and treats them as heavyweight assumptions like "there is an external world" that underwrite whole domains of discourse, not just science.

Michael Williams reads OC as showing that propositions have no fixed epistemic status independent of context, which again implies hinges operate across all practices.

The claim that hinges are limited to propositions belonging to scientific investigations and that the term should be restricted to Foolsos4 interpretation in OC is not, as far as I can tell, a position held by any philosopher in the field. Every serious reading of OC treats the hinge concept as applying broadly across human practices.

I mention this not to settle the argument by authority. The text should do that, and I think it does. But since credentials and scholarly standing have been raised in this thread, it's worth knowing that the broad reading of hinges isn't some amateur overreach. It's the mainstream of the field.

So a few points on which we might find agreement. — Banno

I appreciate the effort to find agreement

Hinges are one of several guises for the indubitable that Wittgenstein considers over the course of the document. — Banno

I hope we can find a way to disagree without being disagreeable. As I see it, not everything that is indubitable are a Hinge, but every hinge is indubitable.

I'm going to presume that your "There is not textual support or evidence that Wittgenstein uses the term 'hinge' to mean anything other than these incontrovertible propositions that belong to scientific investigations" was, after consideration, stronger than you intended. — Banno

My attitude is skeptical in the sense of remaining open to evidence and argument. I think that Wittgenstein uses the term scientific in a broad sense that distinguishes it from his use of the term philosophical investigations. I do not think that facts are hinges since the question of doubt and justification d not arise. The same goes for instinct or "animal behavior". As far as human behavior, we too often act without doubt or question. In these cases the question why finds no rational answer. "This is just what I do" is not a hinge. Hinges involve not just a system in which we think and act, but a conceptually constructed system.

.

One pivotal difference in our disagreement comes down to how we are to understand Wittgenstein's use of the term 'science'. Science, as opposed to philosophy, is epistemic, theoretical, explanatory, rational, propositional, evidential.

Another difference is I understand hinge propositions to be propositional in the ordinary sense. Coliva, quoted below agrees. This rules out there being behavioral hinges.

The following is from Chispin Wright's "Hinge Propositions and the Serenity Prayer"

The peculiarity of Proper Hinges is just the point that scepticism fastens on: that they are, arguably, not merely immune to empirical disconfimation but beyond supportive evidence too. Rather than being recipients of (overwhelming) evidence, these propositions work to condition our conception of the evidential relevance of, e.g., the data of our senses and the movements of others. They channel empirical enquiry not by exemption from disconfirmation, nor by depth of evidential entrenchment, but
by determining our overall conception of the world in which we live — the whole idea that there
is matter, and other minds, and an extended past and future, for instance — and hence our very
notion, at the most general level, of the kind of thing that exists for enquiry to teach us.

(296)

Proper Hinges (“The earth exists”, “Physical objects continue to exist when unperceived”,
“The earth has existed for many years past”) to doubt which would have the effect of undermining our confi dence in a whole species of proposition, by calling into question the bearing of our most basic kinds of evidence for propositions of that kind

. (297)

"In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology"
Annalisa Coliva

It is worth stressing that even though, for Wittgenstein, the origin of hinges lies in our
shared practices, hinges do play a regulative and normative role in guiding us in the practice of acquiring and assessing evidence for or against ordinary (mostly) empirical propositions, thus rendering the latter justified, or unjustified, known or doubtful. Thus, as we might put it, they are constitutive elements of epistemic rationality. (3)

(footnore 3)Yet, they are propositions (OC 95-99, 309, 318-21 cf. PI 65)3 This point has been vigorously denied by Moyal-Sharrock 2005, but it is fair to say that her extreme view, according to which hinges are not propositions, since they aren’t bipolar, has not been met by consensus, not even among supporters of a framework reading of On Certainty

If for example we grow up from babies in a world where every aspect is theist, including language, buildings, events, organisations, then every aspect of our Form of Life will be indubitably theistic. Indubitable because that is all we know. A theist will not question their practices of prayer, worship and religious rituals. A theist will not say “I know theism is true” but rather “theism is true”. Basically , this is common sense.

A practice within a form of life may be pre-linguistic, but is more than animal instinct. Practices within a form of life may inform propositions within language.

The indubitable fact that the ground beneath a church is compressed because of the weight of the church is contingent rather than necessary, and therefore not a hinge.

That “theism is true” is indubitable for a theist, is not a fact as it is non-epistemic, and as neither contingent nor necessary, is a hinge.

Every aspect of a theistic form of life for a theist, both enacted, such as going to church, and propositional, such as “theism is true” will be indubitable, and as such hinges. Some hinge beliefs may be actions and some propositions.

In this sense, a hinge is not the role a proposition plays within a practice, but rather the role a practice and proposition play within a Form of Life.

I've long believed these two are the same person. There are too many similarities that are unique and eccentric. — frank

I don't think Paine will mind my revealing our secrets - we are Siamese twins who share one head

Seriously, I think the similarities are due in large part to having similar educations focusing on reading and struggling to interpret primary texts rather survey courses (not to be mistaken for courses on , surveying) or courses on problems in philosophy - ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, etc. I think Fooloso4, whoops I mean Paine, would agree that the result at the end of a semester would be a sense that we had just scratched the surface.

It would be dishonorable if that was the case. It would require considerable skill to hide such a deception from the site administrators. It is difficult to hear your charge as more than an ad hominem attempt to belittle us before others.

You agree with Banno frequently. I have no difficulty in separating your voices.

Over the years, Fooloso4 and I have had many disagreements. Sometimes we ended up accepting one side or the other. In other cases, the dispute ended in an unresolved standoff. According to your theory, those differences are part of the deception. For us, those differences are still alive.

As noted, we do share the experience of an education based upon careful reading of texts. But our lives have been spent very differently. I did not work in academia but in the construction trade for forty years. My writing style is built from those years of explanation. My most recent exposition uses the logic of a progress report rather than a classification between different opinions. It is my style.

The way that I can tell the difference is that I often agree with Paine but rarely agree with myself.

Sometimes I am of two minds. Does that make three of us?