But it doesn't follow that hinges are only propositions “belonging to scientific investigations.” That’s your restriction, not Witt. OC develops the same structure far beyond science under other labels, what stands fast, framework, world-picture, river-bed, and the contrast between what we test and what makes testing possible; — Sam26

Would it not be fair to point out that Witt often makes the same or similar point(s) several times in different ways. The private language argument comes to mind as an example.

Perhaps in the OC L.W. is making up the rules as he goes along... And isn't this sometimes worth doing? — Banno

I think it is probably the result of his determination not to get trapped in a set doctrine or dogma.

A paradigm is a set of commitments that hold fast so that normal science can proceed. — Sam26

It seems to me that part of the importance of Kuhn's idea is that he includes in the paradigm a social context and the associated technology. A paradigm is more than a set of commitments - it's more like a practice, part of a way of life, therefore not just linguistic or intellectual.

In one sense, the proposition “here is one hand” must be a hinge within the coherent language game of which it is a part, otherwise its language game will fall apart.

However, the proposition “here are no hands” must also be a hinge within a different coherent language game of which it is a part, otherwise its language game will fall apart.

Therefore, a proposition is a hinge within a coherent language game if without the hinge its language game will fall apart.

But there can be different coherent language games each with their own hinge propositions.

In fact, there can be innumerable different coherent language games, and innumerable hinge propositions.

But each language game is an expression of the Form of Life within which it exists.

Therefore, if there are innumerable different coherent language games there must be innumerable different Forms of Life.

Each individual has a choice as to which language game they play, which hinge propositions are for them without doubt and which Form of Life they exist within.

Should I be a theist or an atheist, a Realist or an Idealist, a democrat or an authoritarian?

For each choice, hinge propositions are available.

You are confusing facts and propositions. It is a fact that we have hands and this plays an important role in our lives. What turns on the proposition "here is a hand"? Moore's point is that we cannot doubt it, but we do not normally doubt it.

If "here is a hand" a hinge proposition then is "here is a tree"? How about "here is a blade of grass" and "here is an ant" and so on with everything in the world?

If "here is a hand" a hinge proposition then is "here is a tree"? How about "here is a blade of grass" and "here is an ant" and so on with everything in the world? — Fooloso4

Exactly. I made this point years ago.

Every proposition within a coherent language game is in a sense a hinge proposition beyond doubt.

Finally, “read him on his own terms” doesn’t mean treating “hinge” as a technical term whose meaning is exhausted by three examples. — Sam26

First, it is clear that at least some hinge propositions belong to our scientific investigations. The question is: are there other hinges that do not belong to our scientific investigations? Look and see. The examples you cited turn out not to be hinge propositions. I have taken them one by one and they are either propositions that belong to science, that is to say, the natural world or they are problematic in one way or another.

Second, it seems that you do not see this because you think that hinges are not propositional despite what Wittgenstein says. And so all kinds of innumerable things become hinges.

Exactly. I made this point years ago.

Every proposition within a coherent language game is in a sense a hinge proposition beyond doubt. — RussellA

That is the opposite of my point. Not everything we point to is a hinge proposition.

That is the opposite of my point. Not everything we point to is a hinge proposition. — Fooloso4

Maybe we agree that there is no difference between “here is one hand” and “here is one tree”.

Either i) if “here is one hand” is a hinge then why isn’t “here is one tree” also a hinge?

Or ii) if “here is one tree” is not a hinge then why should “here is one hand” be a hinge?

There is a great deal of confusion in the minds of some members here regarding what Wittgenstein means by scientific investigations. A few quotes from the Tractatus and PI might clear this up.

Tractatus

4.1
Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
4.11
The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the
natural sciences).
4.111
Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.
... Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the clarification of
propositions.

What belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations is the totality of true propositions. That is to say, the whole of natural science. Hinge propositions have a particular function but, like all other propositions, they represent states of affairs. What distinguishes them is that they regarded as true and free from doubt.

Philosophical Investigations

79 (The fluctuation of scientific definitions: what today counts as an observed concomitant of phenomenon A will tomorrow be used to define

“A”.)

Compare with OC 98:

But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience,
at another as a rule of testing.

109. It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. The feeling ‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’ a whatever that may mean a could be of no interest to us. (The pneumatic conception of thinking.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light - that is to say, its purpose - from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized a despite an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language.

The editors note the connection to the Tractatus.

Philosophical considerations must not be scientific ones. There are not philosophical propositions.

ii

Hinges are not an inventory of what we find in the world.

Finally, “read him on his own terms” doesn’t mean treating “hinge” as a technical term whose meaning is exhausted by three examples.
— Sam26

First, it is clear that at least some hinge propositions belong to our scientific investigations. The question is: are there other hinges that do not belong to our scientific investigations? Look and see. The examples you cited turn out not to be hinge propositions. I have taken them one by one and they are either propositions that belong to science, that is to say, the natural world or they are problematic in one way or another.

Second, it seems that you do not see this because you think that hinges are not propositional despite what Wittgenstein says. And so all kinds of innumerable things become hinges. — Fooloso4

I don't want to turn this thread into a referendum on hinges. The thread is much wider in its scope.

Two things:
First, you say my examples "turn out not to be hinge propositions" and that you've taken them one by one and shown they either belong to science or are problematic. But what you've actually done in each of my cases is either absorb them into your expanded sense of scientific (which, as I've argued, stretches that term well beyond what Witt means by it), or dismiss them because they don't match the mathematical case at OC 655. Neither move shows they aren't functioning as what stands fast. It just shows they don't fit your definition. And that's the disagreement. Your definition is to narrow. I'm saying the text gives us a much broader picture.

Second, you're right that I don't think hinges are propositions in the ordinary sense, and I don't think that's a weakness in my understanding of OC. I think it's Witt's point. Look at what he actually says. "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game (OC 204)." Acting isn't propositional. Next, "But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal (OC 359)." Something animal, not propositional in any standard sense. Also, "...believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not (OC 284)." Belief without expression. These are commitments revealed in what we do, in how we go on, in the trust a child shows before it can say a word.

When Witt puts these things into propositional form, he's articulating something that already operates before and beneath propositions. The propositional form is how we talk about what stands fast, it's not what makes it stand fast. A child who reaches for objects without doubting their permanence is already relying on something hinge-like, and it would be bizarre to say that doesn't count because the child hasn't formulated a proposition about object permanence.

So, when you say "all kinds of innumerable things become hinges" as if that's a reductio of my view, I'd turn this around. Yes, the structure of standing fast runs deep through human life. That's not an embarrassment for my reading. That's what OC is about. The alternative you're offering, where hinges are a small class of propositions explicitly within scientific investigations, leaves most of OC without a subject.

Hinges are not an inventory of what we find in the world. — Fooloso4

As I see it, JL Austin’s performative utterance is “I name this ship Queen Elizabeth”. Subsequently we can say “here is the ship Queen Elizabeth”, where the proposition “here is the ship Queen Elizabeth" is beyond doubt, because a performative utterance, and as such is a hinge proposition which we can find in the world.

This hinge proposition then allows us to carry on our language game by saying things like: “the ship Queen Elizabeth was built in 1938, provided a weekly transatlantic service between Southampton and New York City and was built at Clydebank”

If the proposition “here is the ship Queen Elizabeth" was in any doubt, this would throw the rest of our language game into a mess.

A coherent language game requires certain propositions to be beyond doubt in order to establish a bedrock for the language.

I want to respond to @Fooloso4 post to the audience of this thread.

There is a great deal of confusion in the minds of some members here regarding what Wittgenstein means by scientific investigations. A few quotes from the Tractatus and PI might clear this up.

Tractatus

4.1
Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
4.11
The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the
natural sciences).
4.111
Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.
... Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the clarification of
propositions.

What belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations is the totality of true propositions. That is to say, the whole of natural science. Hinge propositions have a particular function but, like all other propositions, they represent states of affairs. What distinguishes them is that they regarded as true and free from doubt.

Philosophical Investigations

79 (The fluctuation of scientific definitions: what today counts as an observed concomitant of phenomenon A will tomorrow be used to define
“A”.)

Compare with OC 98:

But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience,
at another as a rule of testing.

109. It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. The feeling ‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’ a whatever that may mean a could be of no interest to us. (The pneumatic conception of thinking.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light - that is to say, its purpose - from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized a despite an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language.

The editors note the connection to the Tractatus.

Philosophical considerations must not be scientific ones. There are not philosophical propositions. — Fooloso4

This post actually helps my case, not @Fooloso4, and I don't think he's able or willing see it.

His quote, "The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (T 4.11)." Then you say, "What belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations is the totality of true propositions. That is to say, the whole of natural science."

But that's the Tractatus. The early Witt. The later Witt explicitly rejects the idea that the totality of meaningful propositions is exhausted by natural science. That's what PI 109 is saying, the passage he quoted, "It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones." And "These are, of course, not empirical problems." Philosophy isn't in the business of producing propositions that belong to natural science. You can't import the Tractatus picture of propositions into a reading of OC as if nothing changed between 1921 and 1951.

And here's the deeper problem. He quotes OC 98, "the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing." That's Witt describing exactly the hinge structure I've been pointing to. A proposition shifts between being something we test and something we test with. That shift isn't confined to scientific investigations. It happens everywhere, in ordinary life, in training, in the child's acquisition of a system of beliefs. When a child learns that fire burns, that proposition moves from something discovered to something relied upon. It becomes part of the background. That's the hinge function, and there's nothing specifically scientific about it.

Now look at what you've done with your citations. PI 109 says philosophy is not science and doesn't produce scientific propositions. OC 98 says propositions can shift between testable claims and rules of testing. The Tractatus says the totality of true propositions is natural science, but the later Witt abandons that picture. Put them together and you get the opposite of what @Fooloso4 is arguing. The later Witt has moved away from the idea that all meaningful propositions belong to natural science, and OC is exploring what holds fast in our practices generally, not just within scientific investigation.

@Fooloso4 ends by saying "there are no philosophical propositions." Agreed. That's Witt's point. Philosophy clarifies, it doesn't add to the stock of propositions. But that has nothing to do with whether hinges are limited to scientific investigations. If anything, it reinforces the idea that what OC is doing is clarifying the structure of how propositions function in our lives, scientific or not, and showing that some of them play the role of standing fast (bedrock or some other foundational role). That role is the hinge, and it isn't owned by science.

Empirical foundation. experiments, conclusions from experiments. Sure sounds a lot like science. But Banno and Sam assure us that there is more. Except they don't seem to be able to find it. — Fooloso4

To my mind, the critical issue is not how far to employ a particular figure of speech but how to express what is wrong with Moore's argument. Wittgenstein turns to a number of different approaches and is not completely happy with them. But his opposition draws from all his work on language games.

The following series shows that not all language games are created equal:

400. Here I am inclined to fight windmills, because I cannot yet say the thing I really want to say.

401. I want to sav: propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language).--- This observation is not of the form "I know. . .". "I know. . . " states what I know, and that is not of logical interest.

402. In this remark the expression "propositions of the form of empirical propositions" is itself thoroughly bad; the statements in question are statements about material objects. And they do not serve as foundations in the same way as hypotheses which, if they turn out to be false, are replaced by others.
. . . und schreib getrost
"Im Anfang war die Tat." (and write with confidence: "In the beginning was the deed." Goethe, Faust I)

403. To say of man, in Moore's sense, that he knows something; that what he says is therefore unconditionally the truth, seems wrong to me.-- It is the truth only inasmuch as it is an unmoving foundation of his language-games.

404. I want to say: it's not that on some points men know the truth with perfect certainty. No: perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude.

405. But of course there is still a mistake even here.

406. What I am aiming at is also found in the difference between the casual observation "I know that that's a . . .", as it might be used in ordinary life, and the same utterance when a philosopher makes it.

407. For when Moore savs "I know that that's . . ." I want to reply "you don't know anything!"--and yet I would not say that to anyone who was speaking without philosophical intention. That is, I feel.(rightly?) that these two mean to say something different,

408. For if someone says he knows such-and-such, and this is part of his philosophy-then his philosophy is false if he has slipped up in this statement. — OC 400 to 408

The unmoving part of Moore's language game does not provide a foundation for hypotheses.

Your post is helpful. It's interesting to look at what Witt says in the following sequence.

OC 401, propositions of the form of empirical propositions form the foundation of "all operating with thoughts." All operating with thoughts. Not just scientific investigations.

OC 402, these propositions "do not serve as foundations in the same way as hypotheses which, if they turn out to be false, are replaced by others." They're not scientific claims waiting to be tested and replaced.

OC 403, "It is the truth only inasmuch as it is an unmoving foundation of his language-games." His language-games. Not his scientific investigations.

OC 404, "perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude." Not evidence, not verification. Attitude.

This whole sequence shows Witt describing propositions that look empirical but function as what stands fast, as the unmoving foundation of language-games generally, not as hypotheses within scientific investigation. That's the structure I've been pointing to throughout this thread, and it's difficult to square with the claim that hinges belong exclusively to science.

I do not hear the sequence to be saying that the propositions in question only "look" empirical. The objection to Moore in 402 is directed toward using "material objects" without recourse to the hypothetical.

How would you characterize Wittgenstein's objection to Moore's argument?

I do not hear the sequence to be saying that the propositions in question only "look" empirical. The objection to Moore in 402 is directed toward using "material objects" without recourse to the hypothetical.

How would you characterize Wittgenstein's objection to Moore's argument? — Paine

I think of it this way. Moore says, "I know I have two hands" and treats it as an empirical knowledge claim, as if he's reporting a finding that proves the external world exists. Witt's objection is that Moore has misidentified what kind of proposition "I know I have two hands" is. The proposition is empirical in form; it looks like any ordinary statement about a material object. But it isn't functioning as a hypothesis or a discovery. It's functioning as part of the framework against which claims, evidence, and hypotheses operate. Moore thinks he's proving something. Witt is saying there's nothing to prove here because the proposition was never in doubt in any way that a proof could address.

That's the force of OC 403, viz., it's the truth "only inasmuch as it is an unmoving foundation of his language-games." Moore's mistake isn't getting the facts wrong. His mistake is treating a foundation as a finding. He takes something that holds fast in the background and drags it into the epistemic foreground as if it were a piece of evidence, and the moment he does that, the words stop doing what he thinks they're doing. That's why Witt says at 407 that he wants to reply, "you don't know anything!" Not because Moore is wrong about having hands, but because "know" doesn't do what Moore needs it to do in that context. You can't know what was never in question.

So, on the "look empirical" point, I'll concede the phrasing was loose. They are empirical in content. They are about material objects. But they don't function the way ordinary empirical claims function. That's the whole problem Witt is wrestling with in this sequence, and why at 402 he says his own expression is "thoroughly bad." He's struggling to name what these propositions are, because they don't fit neatly into the categories we have. They're empirical in content but foundational in role, and that combination is exactly what makes them hard to talk about and easy to mishandle, which is what Moore does. And frankly it's what people keep trying to do.

The later Witt explicitly rejects the idea that the totality of meaningful propositions is exhausted by natural science. That's what PI 109 is saying, the passage he quoted, "It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. — Sam26

This in consistent with the Tractatus. He is maintaining the distinction between philosophical and scientific investigations. The PI is about philosophical investigations not scientific investigations.

Philosophy isn't in the business of producing propositions that belong to natural science. — Sam26

I agree. Hinge propositions are not philosophical propositions. That is why he says that it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted. Our scientific investigations not our philosophical investigations.

He quotes OC 98, "the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing." — Sam26

He is talking about empirical propositions :

94.

my picture of the world

95 .

The propositions describing this world-picture m

96.

some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions

When a child learns that fire burns, that proposition moves from something discovered to something relied upon. — Sam26

And if the child does not belief what she is told she reaches for the flame.

The Tractatus says the totality of true propositions is natural science, but the later Witt abandons that picture. — Sam26

He makes significant changes to his understanding of language but he maintains the distinction between the propositions of science and the activity of philosophy.

@Fooloso4 ends by saying "there are no philosophical propositions." Agreed.

If there are no philosophical propositions then how are we to understand these statements:

OC 341

... somepropositions ... are as it were like hinges

OC 655

The mathematical proposition ... is a hinge ...

That role is the hinge, and it isn't owned by science. — Sam26

That is a gross misrepresentation of what I have said. I have no idea what it might mean for "the hinge" to be owned by science.

If there are no philosophical propositions then how are we to understand these statements:

OC 341
... somepropositions ... are as it were like hinges

OC 655
The mathematical proposition ... is a hinge ...

That role is the hinge, and it isn't owned by science.
— Sam26

That is a gross misrepresentation of what I have said. I have no idea what it might mean for "the hinge" to be owned by science. — Fooloso4

Witt said, "some propositions are as it were like hinges" and "the mathematical proposition is a hinge" aren't philosophical propositions in the sense he's rejecting. They're clarifications of how propositions function. That's exactly what PI 109 says philosophy does, i.e., it doesn't produce propositions of its own (his view), it clarifies how existing propositions work. When Witt calls something a hinge, he's describing the role a proposition plays within a practice, not advancing a thesis about the world. That's the difference between a philosophical proposition and a philosophical clarification.

I'll rephrase. When I said, "the hinge isn't owned by science," I wasn't attributing a claim to you that science literally possesses hinges. I was summarizing the disagreement. You've argued that hinges have their place within our scientific investigations and that our system is inextricably scientific. I've been arguing that the hinge function, what stands fast so that inquiry can proceed, shows up across our practices, not just within science. That's all I meant. If the phrasing was clumsy, fair enough, but the substance of the disagreement is the same.

But what you've actually done in each of my cases is either absorb them into your expanded sense of scientific ... — Sam26

This is why I cited his use of the term science in the Tractatus, PI., and OC. He uses it consistently. They are statements about the natural world and things in it.

Neither move shows they aren't functioning as what stands fast — Sam26

Of course not! Part of what it means to be a hinge is to stand fast. I have said this and have not said anything to the contrary.

Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end — Sam26

Right. It is not about giving grounds or justification. Those are things that the troubled philosopher introduces.

But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal (OC 359) — Sam26

"It" refers to certainty.

360. I KNOW that this is my foot. I could not accept any experience as proof to the contrary.-That may be an exclamation; but what follows from it? At least that I shall act with a certainty that knows no doubt, in accordance with my belief.

If this foot is my foot is a hinge, then so is my other foot, and my nose, and every other part of my body that involves my acting in one way or another. That is a lot of hinges! Rather than introducing the concept of hinges here, it is simply pointing out that we act without first questioning it. I walk or kick someone in their hinge, I mean ass.

Something animal, not propositional in any standard sense. — Sam26

I agree that animal behavior is not based on propositions. What I am claiming is that you are introducing the concept of hinges where it has no role.

When Witt puts these things into propositional form, he's articulating something that already operates before and beneath propositions. The propositional form is how we talk about what stands fast, it's not what makes it stand fast. — Sam26

Here is where it is important to attend to what Wittgenstein says and not try to wave it away by claiming scientific investigations are a only part of what is at issue or are not really propositions. A scientific investigation involves propositions. The propositional form is not how we talk about what stands fast. The proposition is what is talked about - the earth or moon or foot. What he is pointing to is how certain propositions, namely hinge propositions, function. Not something that lies hidden beyond them that Wittgenstein discloses.

Second, you're right that I don't think hinges are propositions in the ordinary sense, and I don't think that's a weakness in my understanding of OC. — Sam26

Then why does he call them propositions? He is, after all, usually careful with what he says. You make us into inarticulate beasts who somewhere along the way have managed to pick up language.

(OC 284)." Belief without expression. — Sam26

As he says, beliefs based on experience.

The alternative you're offering, where hinges are a small class of propositions explicitly within scientific investigations, leaves most of OC without a subject. — Sam26

As I pointed out to Banno:

In the Preface the editors tell us:

... his interest in Moore's defense of common sense', that is to say his claim to know a
number of propositions for sure ...

That is to say, these notes are more wide ranging than a discussion of indubitable propositions:

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)?Straight off like that, I believe not.-For otherwise the expression ''I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and
extremely important mental state seems to be revealed.

That is to say, his investigation is an epistemological one. — Fooloso4

Acting isn't propositional. — Sam26

I have not said it is. We act on a hinge proposition without question or doubt. This leaves open the question of what those propositions are.

Second, you're right that I don't think hinges are propositions in the ordinary sense, and I don't think that's a weakness in my understanding of OC. — Sam26

Then why does he call the propositions? He is, after all, usually careful with what he says.

To my mind, the critical issue is not how far to employ a particular figure of speech but how to express what is wrong with Moore's argument. — Paine

I agree that Wittgenstein is attempting to express what is wrong with Moore's argument.

401. I want to sav: propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language).--- This observation is not of the form "I know. . .". "I know. . . " states what I know, and that is not of logical interest. — OC 400 to 408

Thanks That supports my interpretation. Although some might erroneously claim empirical propositions do not belong to science.

When Witt calls something a hinge, he's describing the role a proposition plays within a practice, not advancing a thesis about the world. — Sam26

Yes, he is describing the role a proposition plays. That is why we need to attend to which propositions function as hinges.

Right, he is not advancing a thesis about the world, but that might be what the proposition is doing.

You can't know what was never in question. — Sam26

402 says that you cannot have questions without the hypothetical:

And they do not serve as foundations in the same way as hypotheses which, if they turn out to be false, are replaced by others. — OC 400 to 408

Having questions and doubts takes place in the context of acceptance:

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

344. My life consists in my being content to accept many things. — OC 341 to 344

The acceptance is different from "resting content with assumptions" because proceeding with assumptions is done in the context of doubts. What does not move in Moore's language game does not provide a pivot for other propositions to move around. Or, to repeat myself:

The unmoving part of Moore's language game does not provide a foundation for hypotheses. — Paine

But certainty and doubt do not only happen on the basis of this kind of acceptance:

657. The propositions of mathematics might be said to be fossilized. -- The proposition "I am called . . ." is not. But it too is regarded as incontrovertible by those who, like myself, have overwhelming evidence for it. And this not out of thoughtlessness. For, the evidence's being overwhelming consists precisely in the fact that we do not need to give way before any contrary evidence. And so we have here a buttress similar to the one that makes the propositions of mathematics incontrovertible. — OC 657

The selectivity of your reading is astonishing.

See §402.

And §409.

Yes, he is describing the role a proposition plays. That is why we need to attend to which propositions function as hinges. — Fooloso4

From what I have gleaned from the text, the plural of propositions is the essential ingredient here. The analogy requires a collection of propositions.

The points I have been making about 402 come down to recognizing that not all language games accept hinges.

For this reason, it would be a mistake to apply acceptance of such collections as a component in all language games.

~~

Once again, fevered accusations without substantive support.

402. In this remark the expression "propositions of the form of empirical propositions" is itself thoroughly bad ...

In this remark refers to a particular expression. I would ask what remark he is referring but it is likely you will provide a condescending response and delude yourself in thinking you are engaging in philosophical argument.

He does not say the expression "propositions of the form of empirical propositions" is itself thoroughly bad ...

In fact he repeats the expression "propositions of the form of empirical propositions" several times:
[/quote]

At 83 he said:

The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference.

.

At 96:

96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions,

and at 167, 213, 273, 308, 319, and 651.

Now you might think he changed his mind but 651 occurs after 402. He is still using the expression.

He goes on to explain why the remark is thoroughly bad:

402 ... the statements in question are statements about material objects. And they do not serve as foundations in the same way as hypotheses which, if they turn out to be false, are replaced by others.

The statements in question, statements about material objects, are not the expression: "propositions of the form of empirical propositions".

83. The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference.

that is, not to the objects

And:

403. To say of man, in Moore's sense, that he knows something; that what he says is therefore unconditionally the truth, seems wrong to me.-It is the truth only inasmuch as it is an unmoving foundation of his language-games.

If it turns out that what we say about a material object is false, we replace claim with some other. They are not foundations. We determine whether they are false from within the frame of reference, that is, from within the form of empirical propositions.

[Added: I think I have to revise this last part. It is the hypotheses that must be replaced.

The points I have been making about 402 come down to recognizing that not all language games accept hinges. — Paine

I, of course, agree.

You've demonstrated the uncontested point that he does talk about scientific investigation. It remains that he also talks about other things.

Again, this is wrong:

At the risk of repeating myself I will repeat what Wittgenstein actually says about hinges: They are propositions that belong to our scientific investigations. — Fooloso4

There is not textual support or evidence that Wittgenstein uses the term 'hinge' to mean anything other than these incontrovertible propositions that belong to scientific investigations. — Fooloso4

(The conclusion of this post disappeared in editing. I'll not rewrite it. Brandolini's Law applies here; Sam has made a valiant effort to explain some of the complexities here to you, but you will have to work through this stuff yourself. You are probably honest enough to eventually see what's going on...)

He clearly states that propositions belong to our scientific investigations. — Fooloso4

Read OC again. And then look to his other works, and to the secondary material. This is not how he treats propositions.

You seem to see what you want rather than what he says. He clearly states that propositions belong to our scientific investigations. The question then is whether they also belong to anything else. That is a good question. It has guided what I have been saying from the beginning. You think the do but like Sam, any example you give turns out to be wrong, Rather than respond the problems I raise you move on or simply say I'm wrong.

Perhaps I am, but you have not given a substantive argument to back up the claim. As you are probably aware, examples are of central importance to Wittgenstein. Again, I am still waiting.

If you want to exclusively talk about hinges, then start a thread. This thread is broader than that.