Nice. We can see the movement from the crystalline clarity of the tractatus, in which Wittgenstein seeks to dispose of the irregularities and ambiguities of ordinary language, to his delighting in that very irregularity and ambiguity as the very source of the power of words. Language games are here a way for him to picture the vast variety of ways in which we use words.

And we see in On certainty his wrestling with the various ways in which we are certain about our utterances. Hence the variety of expressions that he uses is indeed a feature. While the expository disposition would have us go in to minute detail as to his use of "hinge", that very act serves to reduce the diversity of his considerations. This is the reason I'm so adamant in my resistance of restricting "hinge" to scientific hypotheses alone.

But I said I'd move on.

Where did I say that a hinge proposition has the property of being indubitable rather than the role of being indubitable? — RussellA

If we agree it is a role and not a property, then all is good.

Nice. Should we take isue with each in turn? Or turn back to the tools?

The challenge I would pose is this:

Show me a philosophical problem that's resolved by Wittgenstein, and I'll show you why it's not resolved after all.

The challenge I would pose is this:

Show me a philosophical problem that's resolved by Wittgenstein, and I'll show you why it's not resolved after all. — frank

That is easy. All the problems he said he solved in the Tractatus, he showed how this was a misunderstanding of how language works. Stop looking at hidden sensations and other worldly essences, and look at how words are used in the stream of life.

Are you on the new site?

If so, then I suggest we start a new thread there to discuss a taxonomy of the indubitable. Moving on from Sam's tools, and past previous unpleasantness.

That is easy. All the problems he said he solved in the Tractatus, he showed how this was a misunderstanding of how language works. Stop looking at hidden sensations and other worldly essences, and look at how words are used in the stream of life. — Richard B

Pick a particular problem. Show how it's resolved by looking at language use.

To some extent, philosophical problems come from psychological issues that are related to culture and identity. This is true for both analytic and continental philosophy.

Solve the superficial problem and the deeper psychic war lives on.

Or maybe not.

If I found one person that his philosophy helped resolve the many philosophical problems that had tormented their soul, would that satisfy you?

Most therapies only work for some people not all.

It's interesting that Witt is held up as a fixer, but no one wants to get specific about it.

Are you on the new site? — Banno

No. I have not decided whether I will.

I suggest we start a new thread there to discuss a taxonomy of the indubitable. — Banno

Why? I don't see how it might resolve the question of whether hinges belongs to things other than the logic of our scientific investigations.for the simple reason that there is not a one to one correspondence between what is indubitable and what is a hinge.

You and Sam asked me:

Can you point to any literature that supports your specific claim concerning hinges? — Banno

I did this morning:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1041566

so far neither of you responded.

...using an AI in order to overcome Brandolini's law...

Claude:

Here are twelve philosophical problems that Wittgenstein dissolved by redirecting attention to how language actually functions:

**1. The problem of private language**
Can there be a language only one person could understand, with words referring to inner sensations? Wittgenstein argues no: meaning requires a criterion of correct use, and a purely private one collapses the distinction between "following a rule" and "thinking I'm following a rule." Without a public practice, there's no standard of correctness, so no genuine language.

**2. What is the meaning of a word?**
Traditional philosophy treated meaning as a mental object — an idea or image correlated with a word. Wittgenstein dissolves this by showing that meaning isn't a thing at all: "the meaning of a word is its use in the language." We stop looking for a hidden entity and look instead at how the word actually functions across different contexts.

**3. Rule-following skepticism**
How does any rule determine its own application? No rule seems to logically compel a particular next step, since any action could be made compatible with some interpretation of a rule. Wittgenstein dissolves this not with a theoretical solution but by pointing out that rule-following is a practice embedded in a form of life. We don't need a philosophical foundation; we act — and that's bedrock.

**4. The problem of other minds**
How can I ever know another person is conscious rather than a philosophical zombie? Wittgenstein argues the problem arises from assuming pain (or any mental state) is essentially a private inner object I know directly but can only infer in others. Once we see that mental concepts are learned through public behavioral criteria, the asymmetry that generates the problem dissolves. "The human body is the best picture of the human soul."

**5. The nature of understanding**
What happens when someone understands something — is it a mental event, a flash of insight? Wittgenstein shows there's no single thing called understanding. We say someone understands when they can go on correctly, explain, apply, and so on. We are misled by the grammar of "understanding" into looking for an inner occurrence that accompanies correct performance.

**6. What is thinking?**
Is thinking an inner mental process that accompanies speech or action? Wittgenstein shows "thinking" is not a hidden process but a family of activities: sometimes it's talking under one's breath, sometimes hesitating, sometimes working through a problem on paper. There's no one thing it names, and the pseudo-problem of its "real nature" vanishes.

**7. The problem of universals**
What do all instances of "game," "red," or "beauty" share that makes the word apply to them? The tradition demanded an essence. Wittgenstein introduces family resemblance: words like "game" apply across a network of overlapping and crisscrossing similarities, with no single feature running through all cases. We were simply misled by grammar into expecting one.

**8. The mind-body problem (as a linguistic confusion)**
Why does the mental seem irreducibly distinct from the physical? Wittgenstein doesn't solve dualism — he suspects it is generated by the misleading surface grammar of mental-state words, which look like nouns naming private inner substances. When we examine how we actually use sensation language — learned in public, tied to behavior and context — the hard metaphysical gulf starts to look like a conceptual muddle rather than a genuine mystery.

**9. What is a proposition? / The picture theory's own dissolution**
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein had argued propositions are logical pictures of facts. Later, he dissolved this by noting that language has enormously many uses — commanding, joking, guessing, cursing, praying — that are not descriptions of facts at all. "Language games" replaces the single picture model. The Tractarian problem of how propositions hook onto reality is itself exposed as arising from an impoverished view of language.

**10. Mathematical Platonism: where do mathematical objects live?**
Numbers and sets seem to exist necessarily, yet not in space or time. Wittgenstein dissolves this by looking at mathematical practice: mathematical statements are not descriptions of abstract objects but moves within rule-governed techniques. "2+2=4" is a norm of description, part of our calculating practice. The haunted realm of Platonic objects is a grammatical illusion.

**11. The problem of certainty / skepticism about the external world**
Can I really know there is a table here, or that I have two hands? Wittgenstein's response in *On Certainty* is to deny that such "hinge" propositions are knowledge claims at all — they form the framework within which knowing and doubting take place. Doubting them is not more rigorous; it is unintelligible, because doubt itself requires a stable background of accepted certainties. The skeptic isn't raising a coherent question.

**12. What is time? / Augustine's puzzle**
"What is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I try to explain, I do not." Wittgenstein treats this as a paradigm of philosophical confusion: we assume that because the word "time" is a noun it must name something, and we try to find it. But we already know perfectly well how to use temporal language. The question "what is time?" is dissolved by recognizing we don't need a theory — we need to look at how we actually talk about past, present, and future in ordinary life.

---

The common thread in all twelve is the same therapy: a problem that seemed to demand a metaphysical or scientific answer is revealed to arise from misunderstanding how language works — from taking grammar as a guide to ontology, or from assuming a word must name a single thing. The cure is not a new theory but a clearer view of what we were doing with words all along.

I can list more.

Why? — Fooloso4

...because it's a neat topic, somewhat tangential to this particular thread, and may be of interest to others.

You are not obligated to join in. I'll have a go at drafting an OP later.

I can list more. — Banno

I was kind of looking for someone who would take the challenge in good faith. I could do it myself, but then I'd just be talking to myself.

I want to start a new thread on something other than Witt but haven't decided on what yet.

You and Banno have ignored my post providing literature that supports my claims about hinges. Why is that?

You said:

I want to point out where the published scholarship actually stands, because it doesn't lean in Fooloso4 direction. I haven't found anyone who holds Fooloso4's limited hinge interpretation. — Sam26

All of this after you had decided it was time to move on.

A few hours later I provided my response. My guess is you wanted to leave things where it appeared as if there was no support for my position. Ironically, the support I provided came from two of the authors you provided.

I will leave it here, but that makes it look as if you are unable or unwilling to admit you were wrong. This is not to say that my claim is right but it does show that it does have mainstream academic support.

[It also shows that you are not interested in open and honest philosophic argument but only in presenting your own opinions.]

I've been saying I want to move on since page 8. I guess you also know my intentions too. Good God man grow up and quit stomping your feet because you want to be right.

Well, your challenge is a bit like the response to "thousands are starving in Sudan..."

Then name one.

Fine. I'll look into a new thread on the taxonomy of certainties, in the Other Place.

Hope you join.

You and Banno have ignored my post providing literature that supports my claims about hinges. Why is that? — Fooloso4

I didn't recognise it at as such, and it wasn't addressed to me. I'll look into it.

Even if not all language games accept hinges, for each language game is there something taken as indubitable, as granted in order for the game to function? — Banno

That is a good question to ask about the treatment of games in Philosophical Investigations

Whether right or wrong, the following of rules is separated from the doubts encountered in experience.

The argument militates against having confidence on the basis of "what cannot be doubted."

Well, your challenge is a bit like the response to "thousands are starving in Sudan..."

Then name one. — Banno

It's a challenge to explore whether Witt's wisdom really solves philosophical problems. I think he struggled with that question himself.

Instead of hand waving, walk through an actual problem. I feel I'm being called back to reddit. My homebase there is the Nietzsche sub. Drop by sometime.

The AI response was pretty specific, twelve times.

Instead of hand waving, walk through an actual problem. — frank

Sound advice.

If you had the courage of your convictions you might start your own thread and see what happens.

:meh: You continue to expect others to do the work.

I'm off to read Homer's Contest.

I'll leave the adolescent philosophy to you. :grin:

:meh:

Show me a philosophical problem that's resolved by Wittgenstein, and I'll show you why it's not resolved after all. — frank

Show me a philosophical problem that been solved by anyone, and .......

This is the reason I'm so adamant in my resistance of restricting "hinge" to scientific hypotheses alone. — Banno

I like the definition of science as organized common sense.

If I say “here is one hand”, how do I justify it? Moore says “I know here is one hand because I can see it". But how does he justify what he sees!

There is no alternative but to accept “here is one hand" as indubitable by making it a hinge proposition within a language game.

If “here is one hand” can be a hinge, then also “here is one tree” can be a hinge. In a language game there can be many hinges. Other hinges may be “a hand has five fingers”. This allows the logical conclusion that within this coherent language game “here are five fingers”.

Another coherent language could be created using the hinge propositions:
“Here is one Walrus”, “Here is one Carpenter”, “Here is sand”, “Here is an animal that can walk”, “Here is an animal that can talk”.

These hinge propositions can then be logically connected to create the passage
“The Walrus and the Carpenter
Were walking close at hand;
They wept like anything to see
Such quantities of sand:
‘If this were only cleared away,’
They said, ‘it would be grand!”

It is possible to create innumerable coherent language games, each with their own hinge propositions and each with their own Form of Life.

The question is, how do we know which of the innumerable language games we should be using?