The behaviorist might grant that if there are mental states but we do not know anything about them. — Fooloso4

I believe this would mean they were no longer a behaviorist. Maybe we have different definitions. You said earlier that a behaviourist is an empiricist who deals (only?) with what can be observed.

When I say "I remember" that does not mean that I have a particular mental process going on. — Fooloso4

I believe it does. Otherwise, why would you say it?

That is a grammatical fiction. — Fooloso4

The grammatical fiction is the assumption that the word “remember” gets its meaning from a description of the particular mental process rather than from its expression; that the grammar of sensation language is based on a description of private mental/sensation objects instead of being based on the public expression of those sensations.

The grammar of "I remember" is not about some mental process. But that does not mean that the mental process of remembering is a fiction. — Fooloso4

Agreed.

The Moyal-Sharrock essay, Wittgenstein's Razor: The Cutting Edge of Enactivism (thanks Luke for the link) has a good quote about behaviorism:

Meaning, believing, thinking, understanding, reasoning, calculating, learning, following rules, remembering, intending, expecting, longing – there is hardly anything, traditionally thought to be emergent from, underwritten by, or reducible to, a mental process or state, that Wittgenstein has not subjected to the razor of enactivism; that is: shown to be primitively embodied or enacted rather than originating in propositions, theories of mind, or ghostly
processes.

This may sound like behaviourism, but it isn't. As Peter Hacker aptly sums up: — Wittgenstein's Razor: The Cutting Edge of Enactivism

... behaviourism was right about some matters. Logical behaviourism (e.g., Carnap and Feigl in the 1930s) was right to insist that there is an internal relation between mental attributes and behaviour. For the criteriafor ascribing mental attributes to others consist in their behaviour in the circumstances of life. Where it was wrong was to suppose that the mental is reducible to behaviour and dispositions to behave. Ontologicalbehaviourism (Watson and Skinner) was right to emphasise that language learning is based on training, and that it presupposes common behavioural reactions and responses. It was right to conceive of language learning as learning new forms of behaviour – learning how to do things with words. It was correct to conceive of understanding in terms of abilities and dispositions, rather than as a hidden mental state or process.
But the behaviourists were sorely mistaken to suppose that the mental is a fiction. One can think and feel without showing it, and one can exhibit thoughts and feelings without having them. Avowals of experience are indeed a form of behaviour, but what they avow is not behaviour — ibid. page 5

Chomsky made similar points. The reduction makes the subject disappear.

I believe this would mean they were no longer a behaviorist. — Luke

As a behaviorist they would deal only with the science of behavior. They reject talk about mental states and mental processes because these are not observable or knowable. What we say about them, including whether or not they exist is a fiction. Some behaviorists might take a hard line and deny mental processes others might dismiss the question of whether they exist.

In the context of PI 307:

“Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?”

Wittgenstein takes your “hard line” wrt behaviourists.

I believe it does. Otherwise, why would you say it? — Luke

Because I remember.

Let me phrase this more carefully:

When I say "I remember" I do not mean that I have a particular mental process going on.

The grammatical fiction is the assumption that the word “remember” gets its meaning from a description of the particular mental process rather than from its expression — Luke

Agreed.

When I say "I remember" I do not mean that I have a particular mental process going on. — Fooloso4

It sounds like you are not remembering. It’s like saying: ‘when I say “ouch” it does not mean I have a particular pain sensation.’ Then why do you say “ouch”?

Edit: maybe the word “particular” is causing confusion between us. I only mean that there is some sensation occurring (a particular one each time), not that the word describes the same particular sensation every time (e.g the same memory or the same pain)

You are right, the behaviorist would not grant that there are mental states. But it could be argued that:

To say anything about something we can know nothing about would be a fiction. — Fooloso4

306. ...“There has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering . . .” means nothing more than “I have just remembered . . .”

If you were to ask me, "Do I mean there has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering? I would say no, I mean I just remembered.

We can drop the talk of the mental processes. That is not the way we speak and talk of the mental process does not add to the meaning. I do not mean the mental process but rather that I remember.

When I say "I remember" I do not mean that I have a particular mental process going on. — Fooloso4

“To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering” - PI 306

But §308.

Since Wittgenstein does not make any distinctions between behaviorists, I thought it best to stick to what is in the text.

When I say "I remember" I do not mean that I have a particular mental process going on.
— Fooloso4

“To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering” - PI 306 — Luke

But I don't deny it. If I say I ate dinner I don't mean the process of mastication and digestion.

The grammatical fiction is the assumption that the word “remember” gets its meaning from a description of the particular mental process rather than from its expression
— Luke

Agreed. — Fooloso4

If you agree to this then it’s no longer clear to me where you think our disagreement lies.

307. “Aren’t you nevertheless a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you nevertheless basically saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?” If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.

My reading: Wittgenstein rejects the behaviourist idea that everything except human behaviour is a fiction (i.e. he does not deny that we have private experiences). He accepts the behaviourist idea only with regard to the determination of grammar and meaning. That is, he considers any account of the determination of grammar other than human behaviour to be fictional.

This seems to me the most straightforward reading of 307 and what he means by “grammatical fiction”.

Your account that the grammatical fiction refers to saying something about which we know nothing seems less straightforward and possibly wrong.

The grammatical fiction is the assumption that the word “remember” gets its meaning from a description of the particular mental process rather than from its expression — Fooloso4

Taking another look at this I must have overlooked the second part. Remembering gets its meaning from the experience of remembering.

He accepts the behaviourist idea only with regard to the determination of grammar and meaning. That is, he considers any account of the determination of grammar other than human behaviour to be fictional. — Luke

I do not think he accepts the behaviorist's idea about the determination of grammar and meaning. As I read it, the behaviorist's account is a grammatical fiction. If pain is a fiction then pain behavior is a grammatical fiction. Nothing would distinguish pain behavior from any other kind of behavior. There would only be behavior.

Your account that the grammatical fiction refers to saying something about which we know nothing seems less straightforward and possibly wrong. — Luke

It is not an account of the grammatical fiction. It is a logical argument against the claim that everything but behavior is a fiction.

Taking another look at this I must have overlooked the second part. Remembering gets its meaning from the experience of remembering. — Fooloso4

:up:

As I read it, the behaviorist's account is a grammatical fiction. If pain is a fiction then pain behavior is a grammatical fiction. Nothing would distinguish pain behavior from any other kind of behavior. There would only be behavior. — Fooloso4

It is not the behaviourist's account that Wittgenstein calls a grammatical fiction at PI 307, it is his own. Wittgenstein says that he is the one who speaks of a grammatical fiction, not the behaviourist.

Also, everything besides behaviour is a fiction for the behaviourist. However, Wittgenstein distinguishes between "a fiction" and "a grammatical fiction" at PI 307. Your view does not explain this distinction between fiction and grammatical fiction.

As I understand this, in response to the question of whether he is a behaviorist he says that, unlike that of the behaviorist, his inquiry is grammatical. If he speaks of a fiction it is a grammatical one. He leaves it to the reader to figure out what the behaviorist's grammatical error is. The claim that there is pain behavior but pain is a fiction, is a grammatical fiction.

The behaviourist believes that everything except behaviour is a fiction. yet you interpret W to say that pain behaviour is a (grammatical) fiction? I understand that Wittgenstein includes behaviour within grammar, but why would a behaviourist regard pain behaviour as a fiction (albeit a grammatical one)?

Also:

If pain is a fiction then pain behavior is a grammatical fiction. Nothing would distinguish pain behavior from any other kind of behavior. There would only be behavior. — Fooloso4

What does distinguish pain behaviour from other kinds of behaviour for the behaviourist? For the behaviourist, there is only behaviour.

you interpret W to say that pain behaviour is a (grammatical) fiction? — Luke

No. Once again, if pain is a fiction then pain behavior is a grammatical fiction. [Added -Wittgenstein does not say that pain is a fiction. The behaviorist does.]
Suppose there is an isolated tribe where no one felt pain. There would be no talk of pain behavior because pain would not exist.

What does distinguish pain behaviour from other kinds of behaviour for the behaviourist? — Luke

Nothing That is the point. If pain is denied there would be nothing to distinguish it.

No. Once again, if pain is a fiction then pain behavior is a grammatical fiction. [Added -Wittgenstein does not say that pain is a fiction. The behaviorist does.] — Fooloso4

Is it Wittgenstein or the behaviorist who says that pain behaviour is a grammatical fiction? How is behaviour a fiction for either of them?

Nothing That is the point. If pain is denied there would be nothing to distinguish it. — Fooloso4

But the behaviourist does deny pain and calls it a fiction. So there is nothing to distinguish pain behaviour anyway?

Is it Wittgenstein or the behaviorist who says that pain behaviour is a grammatical fiction? How is behaviour a fiction for either of them? — Luke

It is Wittgenstein who says this in response to the behaviorist's claim.

How is behaviour a fiction for either of them? — Luke

Behavior is not a fiction for either of them.The behaviorist's claim that there is pain behavior but not pain is a grammatical fiction. The former without the latter makes no sense.

Behavior is not a fiction for either of them.The behaviorist's claim that there is pain behavior but not pain is a grammatical fiction. — Fooloso4

If the 'grammatical fiction' is the behaviorist's error (as you say), then why does Wittgenstein use the word 'I' at 307? He says: 'If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.' He is defining his own method, not labeling the behaviourist’s mistake. He is saying: 'In my investigation, I don't call the inner 'nothing' (as the behaviourist does); I call the way we talk about the inner a 'grammatical fiction'.’

then why does Wittgenstein use the word 'I' at 307? He says: 'If I speak of a fiction ... — Luke

His interlocutor asks him if he is saying that everything but human behavior is a fiction. His response is that is he speaks of a fiction it is a grammatical fiction.

I call the way we talk about the inner a 'grammatical fiction'. — Luke

No, Why would he call the inner a grammatical fiction? Does he say anywhere else that the inner is a grammatical fiction?

He is saying: 'In my investigation, I don't call the inner 'nothing' (as the behaviourist does); I call the way we talk about the inner a 'grammatical fiction'.’ — Luke

Does that make sense to you, though? I mean, we probably wouldn't have discussions about the taste of coffee if there was no such taste. Is the taste the basis of the meaning of the word?

Meaning implies communication of some sort, so the notion of meaning without a social context is peculiar, and I think relates to previous attempts at logicism by Frege and Russell. It isn't a common sense notion that Wittgenstein is denying. It's the philosophical oddity of logicism.

Does he say anywhere else that the inner is a grammatical fiction? — Fooloso4

Yes, he rejects the 'name and object' model that he mentions at PI 293 with regard to the Beetle in the Box. Behaviourists and mentalists both make the same mistake of presupposing this 'name and object' model by treating a sensation like pain as a substantive (outer) object such as a rock or a table. Mentalists view pains as objects like rocks and tables. And, while behaviourists reject the substantive object, they still accept the 'name and object' model in order to do so.

Wittgenstein wants us to reject the 'name and object' model altogether wrt sensations. The meaning of sensation words like 'pain' are not based on a description of a private object; they are instead based on public expressions of pain. The presupposed inner object drops out of consideration in the language game as irrelevant, as Wittgenstein notes. "The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the language-game at all," It's not a something (contra the mentalist), but it's not a nothing either (contra the behaviourist).

Your claim that Wittgenstein considers pain behaviour to be a grammatical fiction is in direct opposition to Wittgenstein's view that public behaviours are the real basis of grammar, not inner objects.

His rejection of the name and object model is not a rejection of the inner. He does not think that the inner is a grammatical fiction.

The meaning of sensation words like 'pain' are not based on a description of a private object; they are instead based on public expressions of pain. — Luke

The meaning of pain is not the expression of pain. Nor is it an inner object. If no one ever felt pain the word would not exist.

Your claim that Wittgenstein considers pain behaviour to be a grammatical fiction is in direct opposition to Wittgenstein's view that public behaviours are the real basis of grammar, not inner objects. — Luke

I think we are done here. How many times must I repeat myself? I did not say that Wittgenstein considers pain behaviour to be a grammatical fiction. One last time: if pain is a fiction then pain behavior is a grammatical fiction. But unlike the behaviorist, Wittgenstein does not think that pain is a fiction.

His rejection of the name and object model is not a rejection of the inner. He does not think that the inner is a grammatical fiction. — Fooloso4

If you look back, I never said he rejected the inner. I said (new emphasis):

He is saying: 'In my investigation, I don't call the inner 'nothing' (as the behaviourist does); I call the way we talk about the inner a 'grammatical fiction'.’ — Luke

The "way we talk about the inner" is/was by presupposing the name and object model.

The meaning of pain is not the expression of pain. — Fooloso4

I didn't say it was. I said the meaning was based on the expression of pain.

I did not say that Wittgenstein considers pain behaviour to be a grammatical fiction. One last time: if pain is a fiction then pain behavior is a grammatical fiction. But unlike the behaviorist, Wittgenstein does not think that pain is a fiction. — Fooloso4

He says “If I speak of a fiction, then it is a grammatical fiction”. He does not say that if the behaviourist speaks of a fiction then pain behaviour is a grammatical fiction.

“To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering” - PI 306 — Luke

But §308. — Banno

308. How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise? —– The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states, and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we’ll know more about them — we think. But that’s just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a certain conception of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that seemed to us quite innocent.) — And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them.

Wittgenstein does not deny that we have mental processes or private experiences. His argument is that we do not have a private language to describe a private inner world of facts in the same way that we make reports about the physical world.

He offers several reasons for the lack of a private language or private inner world of facts, including:

• There can be no mistakes or "knowledge" about it (doubt is logically excluded).
• There is no standard of correctness ("whatever seems right is right").
• There are no private samples with which to make comparisons.
• Identity (e.g. "the same sensation as yesterday") cannot be established privately.

At PI 308, he alludes to the illusion of thinking we may be able to conduct science experiments within, or to explore and report on, this inner world. To presuppose that there are inner objects or processes that we can describe and report on is to mistakenly adopt the inner "name and object" model—the first step in the philosophical problem that altogether escapes notice. It is to assume that because nouns refer to objects in the physical outer world, the private inner world must work the same way.

Wittgenstein's rejection of this view raises the question (at PI 307) of whether he is a behaviorist in disguise. But a behaviorist denies we have private experiences, whereas Wittgenstein does not. Wittgenstein denies only that we have a private language that can be used to describe those experiences. This is why he speaks only of a grammatical fiction. Furthermore, he argues that all seeming "reports" about sensations made in public language are actually expressions of sensations, not descriptions of them.