That isn't all you are saying. You philosophers don't seem to realize the implications of what you are saying. There is always more to what you are saying. It's just that you don't tend to think about the implications of what you are saying on the rest of your beliefs and world-view.One says that things are physical, the other that things are mental. It's a disagreement on the nature of the fundamental substance. It's not a disagreement on whether or not there are parts of the world that are not me. That would be solipsism vs non-solipsism.
All I'm saying is that idealism doesn't entail solipsism. There can be mental phenomena that isn't me. The Cartesian dualist says as much. — Michael
Something is required to explain the separation of minds. Are mental bodies required to maintain the separation of minds? How are mental bodies different than physical bodies?There's no reason to believe that the existence of physical bodies is required to maintain this separation of minds. — Michael
Then idealism/materialism (or any idea that says that there is substance) is an idea that is based on a vacuous concept?Pretty much. As Hempel's dilemma shows, there's hardly even a coherent understanding of what it even means be a physical thing. And I think the same dilemma can be used to question the notion of the mental, too (and any other monism).
Substance is a vacuous concept. — Michael
What do you mean it's "the best solution" to the mind-body problem? And what does that have to do with the becoming/being dichotomy (flux)?I voted idealism because I think it's the best solution to the mind-body problem. Also it's a super sexy position. The metaphysical weak are those who depend on an unchanging reality to cope with the flux of existence. — darthbarracuda
Something is required to explain the separation of minds. — Harry Hindu
Then idealism/materialism (or any idea that says that there is substance) is an idea that is based on a vacuous concept? — Harry Hindu
I would say that, for an idealist, an event is imaginary if it was invented and narrated by somebody that had no good reason to suppose that it ever happened.
A materialist can use the same definition. — andrewk
I am under the impression that realists interpret imagined counterfactual possibilities of perception as being *evidence for* the existence of mind independent objects.
Conversely i understand idealists as interpreting imagined counterfactual possibilities of perception as being *the definition of* "mind-independent" objects. — sime
In a sense, there's a lot more to the story of imaginary and real. E.g. are you’re perceptions, emotions, etc. imaginary or real? — javra
I can't see the "lot more", I think it is fairly simple: if I imagine something, my imagining it is real, but what is imagined may be merely imaginary, obviously.
If I experience an emotion, the emotion is real, and so is the experiencing of it. If I perceive something the perception of it is real, and so is the perceived object, at least in cases where the perception is veridical. — Janus
Sort of self-contradictory reasoning given that this affirmation is made via means devoid of matter: e.g., thoughts, percepts, and that skeleton-in-the-closet sometimes termed one’s choice, or will, or intention (such as regarding what is in fact real). — javra
I think you are taking for granted what you need to demonstrate: that reasoning is "made via means devoid of matter". — Janus
We look at a particular concrete object over there to understand if it’s actually made up of matter or mind … and then it seems the next question is always “whose?”— but this is misplaced. The materialism/idealism debate is not one of physics. It is one of metaphysics.
I’ll try to justify “that which I need to demonstrate” more, however, only if you are polite enough to first try justify that which I previously asked you to justify regarding what is real. — javra
Objects are "made of matter" by definition. Just as thoughts and experiences "happen to minds' by definition. We know what we mean (not in the sense of being able to offer exhaustive explanations, obviously) when we say an object is made of matter, just as we do when we say that a thought occurs in a mind. — Janus
Do we know what we mean when we say that objects are made of mind, or ideas occur to matter? I don't think so. — Janus
On the other hand, I believe we do have a more or less intuitively coherent notion of God (an infinite mind), and of the idea that objects might be ideas in His mind. — Janus
The latter position, to be coherent, must posit God or some kind of universal or collective mind. That is just the point I have been making. — Janus
What do you mean it's "the best solution" to the mind-body problem? — Agustino
And what does that have to do with the becoming/being dichotomy (flux)? — Agustino
Yeah, what makes it the best? Materialism for that matter is also a "satisfying" solution because it denies that the mind exists in any way transcendental to the body. And of course, then we have positions like substance dualism, or neutral monism.It's a satisfying solution to the mind-body problem because it denies the body exists in any way transcendental to the mind. — darthbarracuda
This psychological reading of philosophy is in the final analysis pathetic. The reason is that both poles of the dichotomy can be conceived as the cause of fear. Let me give the clearest example. Atheists frequently pull out the trope that the theist believes in God because they are afraid of death and non-being. The theist, can of course, always retort that the atheist doesn't believe in God because he's afraid of having to bear eternal responsibility and accountability for his actions.Nietzsche's position is that people cling to metaphysics, especially metaphysics of eternal, unchanging, present substance, as a psychological defense mechanism against the flux of existence. — darthbarracuda
Yes.Why? Do we require something to explain the separation of physical stuff? — Michael
Time and space.What separates this photon from that electron? — Michael
I don't understand the question. I understand physicalism as the claim that mental processes are brain processes and they exist, but are not the only kind of processes to exist, and idealism as the claim that only mental phenomenon exist.
If you're a physicalist and believe that the mind is just brain processes (for example), do you understand idealism to be the claim that only brain processes exist? Or do you understand the claim "only mental phenomena exist" to be something else? — Michael
But then the idealist has to explain how it is that the universal perceiver doesn't need a perceiver themselves in order to exist. It really is no different than the problem of explaining how God doesn't need a designer for itself. Idealism is really religion in different wrapping paper.And without some kind of universal perceiver, the idealist has no way to justify the existence of other minds. The universal perceiver plays the role of spacetime for idealists. — Marchesk
What separates this mental phenomenon from that mental phenomenon? — Harry Hindu
I don't understand the question. I understand physicalism as the claim that only brain processes exist and idealism as the claim that only mental phenomenon exist.
You haven't done anything to clarify how mental substances are different from physical substances. — Harry Hindu
Going by idealism, and keeping it consistent, there’s no difference among you and my experiences of you. (On a non-idealist account it’s impossible for me to experience your self-awareness, since then I’d be you instead.) You = my experiences of you. But I’m not omniscient, since otherwise I’d know that I were. I don’t have to experience someone else’s self-awareness to take it’s independent existence for granted, I don’t have to become the Moon to take it’s independent existence for granted — and I learn of both much the same way, by interaction, observation, coherence, whatever. Attempting to escape solipsism by declaring that others also are selves would be textbook special pleading. There’s no more experiencing some supposed “transcendent reality” of others’ self-awarenesses than of the Moon. (For that matter, you experience someone else’s body/actions, not their mind.) The non-solipsist may have no choice but to accept others’ self-awarenesses as examples of a kind of noumena or ding-an-sich (in a very broad sense), always just over the horizon. Fortunately we have language to share our poetry. — Jorndoe
I know. I explicitly said (twice, I think) that the very notion of "substance" is vacuous.
But that's besides the point I'm making, — Michael
So what are mental phenomena? If you're a physicalist then you think that mental phenomena are brain processes. So you must understand the claim "only mental phenomena exist" as the claim "only brain processes exist". Does that seem right? — Michael
But that's the thing - If the notion of "substance" is vacuous, then any point you attempt to make about a particular substance is vacuous (my vs. other). The claim that you are seperate from any thing is a claim about how your substance differs from other things. If it isn't then what are you actually saying? How is it that your mind isn't other minds, or how is it that other minds aren't your mind? — Harry Hindu
So when a doctor opens your skull and looks at your brain, then why does he only see a brain and not your mind? Why does his mind experience a brain instead of another mind? How would he get at looking at your mind? — Harry Hindu
I don't think this is right; I think the distinction is closely related to the question of idealism vs realism. The imaginary is understood by realists to be something mental (ideal) whereas the real is considered to be something material (which is to say extra-mental).
The imaginary is understood as something perceivable only by the mind imagining it, whereas the real is something perceivable by multiple minds or even something not perceivable by any mind. The real is thus understood to be materially so.
How would you say idealists make sense of the distinction between real and imaginary? — Janus
Then why do you keep making claims about how there is a distinction between my mind and other minds (more than one mind)? You keep veering off in different directions. I wonder if you really understand what it is that you are talking about.What I'm taking issue with is the claim "everything is physical" or "everything is mental". The point is that it isn't even clear what it means to be physical or mental, as per Hempel's dilemma.
I'm not taking issue with the claim that there exists more than one thing. — Michael
Then why do you keep making claims about how there is a distinction between my mind and other minds (more than one mind)? You keep veering off in different directions. I wonder if you really understand what it is that you are talking about. — Harry Hindu
My point has been that if different things interact with each other, then it is pointless to call these things "physical" or "mental". They are the same "substance" if they can interact. Period. That's all we need to know. What we label the primary "substance" is irrelevant - especially if there is no difference in how it interacts, or how it behaves. We can both dispense with the terms, "physical" and "mental". They aren't necessary to make yours, or my, points. — Harry Hindu
Now that you understand that it isn't necessary to use these terms, now explain to me how minds interact.
So materialists and idealists are one and the same and have no idea that they have been arguing for the same thing all of these centuries?Then physicalism and idealism are identical. They both just assert "all things interact with each other". — Michael
And that needs to be explained - why some things can interact and some things can't - again without using terms like "substance" (because, according to you, it is a vacuous term), or "physical" or "mental".They'd also be false, given that some things can't interact with other things (e.g. light and dark matter). — Michael
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