They can enjoy a particular kind of existence, as fictional characters. — Shevek
Or barring discussions on the existence of fictional entities, or modal realism — Shevek
they can still be quantified as negative existentials that are nonetheless causally efficacious. — Shevek
I'm obviously jumping into this discussion very late, and perhaps someone brought this up before, but why should we look at suffering as something defective with the state of things? There are other ethical frames, such as Nietzsche's, that see suffering as a necessity for any meaningful form of human transcendence. Pleasure or pain might take particular values only in an instrumental sense. — Shevek
No. Unborn people are not fictional characters. — The Great Whatever
Even if one were a modal realist, unborn people would not be actual, and only actual entities can be affected by actions in the actual world. — The Great Whatever
A negative existential is a kind of statement, not a kind of person. If a negative existential is true of an unborn person, this just means, as I've said, they they don't exist. Sapientia has difficulty wrapping his head around this -- he claims to understand it, and then makes posts that are only intelligible if he does not. — The Great Whatever
What is good or bad does not depend on an impotent 'ethical frame.' It doesn't matter what ethical frame you have, suffering is still bad, precisely because it doesn't care whether anyone 'looks at it' as bad. What you think, or how you look at it, doesn't matter -- suffering is bad on its own terms, and no alternative belief system tat claims it isn't can change this, as if mere belief or framing could stop reality.
Pleasure and pain are intrinsically good and bad, while everything else can only be extrinsically so. — The Great Whatever
Why not? What would qualify an unborn person being a fictional character? Does it have to be in a published novel or short story? What about unpublished narratives? Or narratives that exist in the space of conversation? — Shevek
But it does seem like a kind of existence that has effect. — Shevek
And then we get into broader questions of ontology, when we ask "what is there?" or what it means to exist. — Shevek
Simply stating 'unborn babies don't exist' doesn't solve anything. — Shevek
You're essentially just saying your metaethical view is true by bare assertion. This is a form of argumentation that has little purchase in my mind. — Shevek
I feel like this question isn't worth answering. I don't need a complete account of fiction to know unborn people aren't fictional characters. To insist otherwise IMO is not to understand what fiction is, not even in a technical sense, but just in a vulgar sense. — The Great Whatever
I mean, I disagree, but then, I think modal realism is fundamentally confused and is not really an account of modality so much as a science fiction story. — The Great Whatever
These are not necessary to know unborn people don't exist. If your theory says otherwise, that is evidence agains your theory. — The Great Whatever
It isn't 'my metaethical view.' Again, what metaethical view you have doesn't really matter. Pain's still going to be bad on its own terms without any care for your philosophy. — The Great Whatever
I'm obviously jumping into this discussion very late, and perhaps someone brought this up before, but why should we look at suffering as something defective with the state of things? There are other ethical frames, such as Nietzsche's, that see suffering as a necessity for any meaningful form of human transcendence. Pleasure or pain might take particular values only in an instrumental sense. — Shevek
Life is mostly misery, there is little joy, for some people none. To focus on joy is cherry picking. — The Great Whatever
Pleasure also plays its part in propagating misery, of course, and is in the end a servant to it. — The Great Whatever
Also, there is no baby to be thrown out.
Unborn people do not exist.
Unborn people do not exist.
Unborn people do not exist. — The Great Whatever
I'm not insisting otherwise, but just seeing why, in principle, unborn babies couldn't enjoy the kind of existence that some attribute to fictional characters. I'm asking for more nuance and sophistication in our ontology, which I see as opposite of asserting vulgar views. — Shevek
They're at least necessary to be clear on our terms and what we mean by being and existence. — Shevek
For example, you could be an eternalist who would say that unborn (presently nonexistent) babies exist. — Shevek
You can't just keep reasserting a premise that's under question. You have to make some argument. — Shevek
And yet there are all sorts of people out there that think pain is good, because it teaches them a lesson, helps them grow, or they're just good old-fashioned masochists. If you think they're mistaken somehow, you have to explain why. — Shevek
It isn't up to you or any other individual to decide the worth of the lives of everyone that lives, or has lived, or will probably live. — Sapientia
A negative existential is a kind of statement, not a kind of person. If a negative existential is true of an unborn person, this just means, as I've said, they don't exist. Sapientia has difficulty wrapping his head around this -- he claims to understand it, and then makes posts that are only intelligible if he does not. — The Great Whatever
It's only bullshit on stilts if its meaning matches a foolish misinterpretation. For the last time, I'll explain the nuance, so please pay close attention:
To state that you're robbing a possible future generation, in the way that I have done so, is to express in a figurative manner something which can be expressed in the conditional mood, which avoids the contradiction which would be implied by a literal version of the aforementioned statement.
Hence, I am not guilty of implying that nonexistent people are being robbed, which is obviously a contradiction, because nonexistent people cannot be robbed. Rather, I am expressing a point that I've already made, namely that if we purposefully brought about the early extinction of humanity after the current generation had died, then we would, as a consequence, be removing the possibility of future generations. I am further saying that this would, as a consequence, also remove the possibility of said future generations experiencing a worthwhile life or even anything worthwhile at all, which, in my judgement, would be unfortunate.
Note my use of "if... then..." and "would" which are key indications of a statement in the conditional mood. I'm certainly not implying that future generations are missing out, or that they do object.
I'm not speaking on their behalf; I'm pointing out that we can obtain some knowledge about what their life would probably be like if they were to exist, and that we can use that knowledge to make a judgement. The funny thing is, you're doing exactly the same thing. The only difference is that we reach different conclusions. — Sapientia
Okay, so why then is natalism, which makes precisely such a decision, justified?
Notice the absurdity of your position: to not have a child because you fear the child's life might not be worth living is to decide for a nonexistent person unjustly; yet to actually have a child and so decide for a real person this same thing, but in the opposite (your favored) direction is fine because...?
I mean, what the hell are you even talking about? Insofar as your argument works, it shoots you in the foot, and insofar as it doesn't, you should stop bothering with it. — The Great Whatever
The answer to your question, to reiterate an earlier point, is that it's better, in my view, to give them the opportunity to decide for themselves, once they're able to do so, than to take away the opportunity altogether. — Sapientia
Given that there's no other realistic alternative for the living, since we cannot consult non-existent people or babies, that's the best option. — Sapientia
You cannot simply claim over and over that you understand that unborn people don't exist, and then go on to make claims that can only be sensibly interpreted if you do believe this. My guess is that you want to make such claims, but have been beaten back by obvious and appropriate objections, and are now scrambling for a way to say the same thing without claiming that you're saying it.
If not, please inform me in what way not robbing anyone of anything can possibly be 'unfortunate.' — The Great Whatever
It is not possible to give someone the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they want to be born. — The Great Whatever
The other option is not to procreate, which is also the best option. — The Great Whatever
Obviously. I said as much myself in the next part of what you quoted. — Sapientia
The answer to your question, to reiterate an earlier point, is that it's better, in my view, to give them the opportunity to decide for themselves, once they're able to do so, than to take away the opportunity altogether. — Sapientia
And that is where we disagree. This is where the disagreement is substantial, and can't be resolved merely by correcting a trivial misunderstanding, unlike the other issue, although apparently I haven't been able to get through to you on that one, and it has grown tiresome. — Sapientia
It's unfortunate that no one else would get the opportunity to live a worthwhile life. To say that it's unfortunate is not to suggest that there are disappointed non-existent people or anything like that. That would be an idiotic interpretation. — Sapientia
than to take away the opportunity altogether. — Sapientia
That is not what you say. What you say is:
— The Great Whatever
The answer to your question, to reiterate an earlier point, is that it's better, in my view, to give them the opportunity to decide for themselves, once they're able to do so, than to take away the opportunity altogether. — Sapientia
If the issue is that of being born (and what else could it be, given that we are discussing anti-natalism), there is no way to give such an opportunity, since there is no one to give such an opportunity to. In other words, the qualification 'once they're able to do so' does not make any sense. — The Great Whatever
Hopefully you can see from this what I mean by your numerous confusions. — The Great Whatever
You claimed, falsely, that the only option was... (well, what Im not sure, since as I just pointed out, your suggestion is literally incoherent). You are simply wrong that there is no other option, since there is one, viz. not procreating. Perhaps you think such an option is not 'reasonable?' But okay, why? And why should I care? — The Great Whatever
No opportunities are being taken away by not procreating. There is nobody to take such opportunities away from. Get it? — The Great Whatever
You want to eradicate suffering, despite the great cost of doing so. — Sapientia
I do admit that the lack of pleasure is an unfortunate thing. — darthbarracuda
What I meant was that it is unfortunate that pleasure only exists when in couple with suffering. I didn't actually mean that lack of pleasure is an unfortunate thing for an unborn person, as I actually said later on in my post. — darthbarracuda
I didn't say that the opportunity is being taken away from anyone, let alone anyone that doesn't exist. The opportunity, or at least it's possibility, would simply be taken away: post-extinction, it would no longer be a possibility for anyone to live a worthwhile life. — Sapientia
And just to clarify, in that quote, I was talking about the opportunity for people to judge the worth of their lives and whether or not to continue to live, not the opportunity to decide whether or not they want to be born. — Sapientia
You cannot take away an opportunity to live, without taking it away from someone. It makes no sense to say it is just 'taken away.' What does that even mean? — The Great Whatever
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