"Jones owns a Ford" is true. "Jones owns a Ford" entails "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona". Therefore, "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true.
Is that an accurate rendition of what you're claiming Smith's 'argument' is? — creativesoul
One of the two statements is believed. To state that one or the other is true is to believe that they both could be. It shows uncertainty where none exists. One of the two is believed. — creativesoul
There had been, a long time ago, a study linking coffee consumption to increased risk of cancer. But coffee drinkers are more likely to be smokers. Controlling for smoking, coffee's risk was downgraded. Then it went back up. The latest I think is that there's a risk associated with very hot drinks, not coffee per se.
Tests produce results, but they don't tell you why they produce the result they do. That's why justification can point away from the truth instead of toward it. — Srap Tasmaner
...I believe that the statement "London is the capital city of England or pigs can fly" is true because I believe that London is the capital city of England...
Because p3 and C1 cannot be further reduced/simplified without losing the because p part. That is true belief on your part here and now. Smith has false belief. — creativesoul
He also has a true belief. "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Brown is in Barcelona. Brown is in Barcelona, therefore "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true.
Smith believes that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true because he believes that Jones owns a Ford and knows that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Jones owns a Ford.
Again, you're setting up the untenable situation where:
1. I know that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Jones owns a Ford,
2. I believe that Jones owns a Ford, and
3. I don't believe that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true.
It's nonsense.
That's a very poor reading of what I've set out here. — creativesoul
Michael wrote:
It's a simple fact that:
1. Smith knows that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Jones owns a Ford,
2. Smith believes that Jones owns a Ford, and so
3. Smith believes that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true.
Michael just wrote:
Smith believes that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true because he believes that Jones owns a Ford...
I wrote:
"Jones owns a Ford" is true. "Jones owns a Ford" entails "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona". Therefore, "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true.
Is that an accurate rendition of what you're claiming Smith's 'argument' is?
Michael answered:
Yes. Except I wouldn't use the "either ... or ..." terminology as that implies an exclusive or, which isn't actually entailed by Jones owning a Ford. Gettier clearly meant for it to be an inclusive or, and so "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is the better wording. Charitable readings and all.
Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:
(f) Jones owns a Ford. Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's
memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a
ride while driving a Ford.
Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place names quite at random and constructs the following three propositions:
(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). — creativesoul
I see nothing especially troubling in this way of speaking. — Cabbage Farmer
To believe them, to have beliefs consistent with them, or to be disposed to assent to them, is merely to be a rational person who believes that one term in the disjunction is true.
I see nothing especially troubling in this way of speaking.
I predict great success for the hypothesis that it was either coffee or something else. But the issue is getting past tautology and giving some substance to the something else. — Srap Tasmaner
Smith believes that he will receive payment because Jones owns a Ford. His belief is false. — creativesoul
...for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.
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