If you want to split hairs over "not bad" and a longer version of what you said to the effect of we place more emphasis on the absence of pain and we consider pain before we consider pleasure, then in effect, the logic is the same. — schopenhauer1
I do think he has a point though that since there is no perspective to even feel deprived, there is literally no harm done to anything by the possibility of happiness remaining not actual. However, since the possibility did not become actual, there is no perspective to even feel harm. This can be considered a good thing, as preventing actual harm from occurring is a good thing. — schopenhauer1
I don't think it is splitting hairs, though. I think it is pointing out flaws where flaws exist. — darthbarracuda
Benatar's asymmetry has been systematically misinterpreted and rejected by otherwise intelligent people, and may be because it is not entirely coherent itself. — darthbarracuda
Unfortunately, Benatar is made out to be like the Jesus of antinatalism and so to reject Benatar's asymmetry is often seen as a rejection of antinatalism, which is not the case at all. — darthbarracuda
Schop1, again, this is falling into the counterfactual abuse and assuming a kind of anti-frustrationism/negative utilitarianism beforehand. — darthbarracuda
But imagine a modal universe that is completely different from ours, in which those born don't even feel pain at all, ever. Dissatisfaction, boredom, misery, death, etc are all unheard of, it is all bliss and harmony. I would be surprised if you responded that there is no impetus to create another person. It may not be the looming feeling of guilt that is associated with creating a child that will experience pain, but ultimately I do believe that you will concede that abstaining from bringing at least one child into existence into this perfect, blissful world is kind of weird. — darthbarracuda
Ultimately the pleasure that life brings is not enough to justify the pain that life also brings, despite what the television shows tell you. — darthbarracuda
Meh. Splitting hairs i say. Not really flawed so can't agree with that. — schopenhauer1
Prevention of harm is absolutely good
- Preventing happiness is only relatively bad as you need to have an actual person for this to be realized — schopenhauer1
I certainly think people might have the assumption that life is supposed to be there to teach lessons (for what I don't know- maybe some idealized death-bed scene where one is fully self-actualized in all that they learned from life or something). That I think goes with many people's justification for suffering. Somehow, they might say it is elevating as it teaches perseverance, so should be celebrated and thus more people should be born in order to have to persevere through life. Perseverance, along with happiness, and a few other principles or qualities thrown in there are the usual mix of reasons why it is deemed acceptable or good to procreate. — schopenhauer1
It is not hair splitting because it shows that Benatar has a goal in mind (to show that birth is immoral), and then proceeds to construct an argument that argues for this (cart before the horse). — darthbarracuda
If the world was not filled with excessive suffering, I wonder if Benatar would still have written his book. — darthbarracuda
Yes, but if you are saying this as though you are agreeing with these premises, then I must only say that if the prevention of happiness is only relatively bad, then the prevention of harm is only relatively good. — darthbarracuda
Usually this is in addition to a belief in a god and an afterlife. An eternity of blissful heaven with a omnibenevolent (?) god would seem to make the petty toils here on earth seem unproblematic. — darthbarracuda
Well, welcome to philosophy. There is no a priori argument that lacks basic axioms/assumptions. No math, no dialectics on ethics, etc. — schopenhauer1
I wouldn't see how he would. You have to know something exists, or at least its hypothetical existence to write about it, I would think. — schopenhauer1
To put it another way, though happiness is good, depriving happy experiences is not ethically relevant (preventing the possible experiencer of happiness from becoming actual), but preventing harm is (preventing the possible experiencer of harm from becoming actual). — schopenhauer1
Now you're sounding like TGW. I don't get my philosophy from television shows or McDonald's ads. — Sapientia
Again, the premium is that prevention of harm is the core of the ethics. The child did not need happiness. As I have said in the past, no one needs to live life to experience "x" this or that principle, especially when we know harm is almost always a guarantee. — schopenhauer1
There's a difference between starting out with basic axioms to argue on and the manipulation of axioms to fit your needs. — darthbarracuda
If the principle of the prevention of harm is not absolute and at the core of the ethics, then necessity in that regard isn't necessary to counter the argument. It's sufficient to argue that it'd be a better alternative. This principle is the weak spot. — Sapientia
Clearly, Benatar is at least consistent. He thinks ALL harm is bad, in the most absolute terms. This, to me is not manipulation so much as it is a very particular kind of view of what is ethically bad. Therefore, he comes up with the conclusion that even a pinprick is enough to disqualify procreation. — schopenhauer1
I'd also like to broaden the discussion beyond Benatar's asymmetry. I just happened to get stuck in the weeds in terms of defending an interpretation of his asymmetry. Though it is one argument, I would also like to discuss the instrumentality of life, the circumstances of a non-ideal world, or Schopenhauer's understanding of striving. — schopenhauer1
As an aside, there have been times when I stumbled into a philosophical conclusion that changed my view on things. In the course of discussing matters of science, for example, I went from a position on the philosophy of mind, that can be characterized as emergentist of sorts in the scientific naturalist sense to at least entertaining notions of panpsychism. — schopenhauer1
But imagine a modal universe that is completely different from ours, in which those born don't even feel pain at all, ever. Dissatisfaction, boredom, misery, death, etc are all unheard of, it is all bliss and harmony. I would be surprised if you responded that there is no impetus to create another person. It may not be the looming feeling of guilt that is associated with creating a child that will experience pain, but ultimately I do believe that you will concede that abstaining from bringing at least one child into existence into this perfect, blissful world is kind of weird. — darthbarracuda
Perfect?! It would be nightmarish, for the same reason that a world of Stepford wives would be nightmarish, and for the same reason that a world in which we're all hooked up to pleasure machines would be nightmarish. — Sapientia
I am apt to agree with him that all harm is bad, but to say that the lack of bad is good and the lack of good is not-bad is question begging. Benatar claims his asymmetry is independent of the pain/pleasure calculus of the world, but this is plainly false; a world where there was an overwhelming amount of pleasure compared to pain would obviously be worth being born into. — darthbarracuda
And I applaud his work (it initially convinced me and led me to antinatalism), but a flawed argument is a flawed argument. In the end, it comes back to a subjective calculus of life, the same subjectivity that Benatar was attempting to avoid via his asymmetry. — darthbarracuda
I'm not sure what you mean by the instrumentality of life. Can you elaborate please? Do you mean that life has no cosmic purpose? — darthbarracuda
I use the word instrumentality because that captures the idea that there is some sort of emptiness/incompleteness at the end of all endeavors. We are doing to do to do to do. But this ceaseless flux and feeling of emptiness is itself a form of suffering. Now, again, we can argue that this is temperament, but certainly, at least some individuals see this throughout the history of civilizations and seem to not be contingent only on a few specific people, but is a relatively common viewpoint. — schopenhauer1
When we get our goals, we quickly succumb to a sort of existential angst that reflects the instrumentality of existence in terms of the constant need to keep ourselves alive, comfortable, and entertained. Time presses on us and we feel its affects in our need for need and our existential angst when reflected on life itself without anything in particular to strive for. Schopenhauer's understanding is closer to home, it is the life we actually live, not a philosopher's dream of pure intellectual devotion. Schopenhauer's vision is closer to the reality of the human condition which takes into account the restless nature of the human psyche, the deprivation of contentment that motivates us all, and the contingent nature of existence impinging upon us. The contingent nature of reality along with our own inner restless nature is closer to what is going on. — schopenhauer1
Even if some fulfillment of the initial state of lack leads to some positive outcomes, these are usually temporary. Besides, even if there is happy moments, the basic lack of something should make you wonder if there is something suspect about the whole enterprise. There is simply a movement forward, what Schopenhauer would call "Will". The ceaseless striving of things has no overall purpose except perhaps to survive or continue to move forward, which begs the question (we survive to survive to survive, endlessly striving for nothing, but to keep it going). Look at ennui- boredom. This is a state of our striving having no particular aim. You can see it turn in on itself right before your very eyes. It is the weariness of the striving brought to the foreground- not distracted from any particular pursuit. This is the time for real reflection- not when one is occupied by this or that, but when one has run out of goals and simply stares at the void head-on. If happiness is coming from a state of dissatisfaction and lack of something, what is that telling you about the true nature of happiness? If we strip off our human emotions, we can see the inner-workings of pure Will or striving. — schopenhauer1
No, that there would be no discord is what would make it not only imperfect, but nightmarish. — Sapientia
I certainly think people might have the assumption that life is supposed to be there to teach lessons (for what I don't know- maybe some idealized death-bed scene where one is fully self-actualized in all that they learned from life or something). That I think goes with many people's justification for suffering. Somehow, they might say it is elevating as it teaches perseverance, so should be celebrated and thus more people should be born in order to have to persevere through life. Perseverance, along with happiness, and a few other principles or qualities thrown in there are the usual mix of reasons why it is deemed acceptable or good to procreate. — schopenhauer1
You do seem to have the assumption of a sort of telos. What I mean by this can be summed up in a recent quote: — schopenhauer1
I certainly think people might have the assumption that life is supposed to be there to teach lessons (for what I don't know- maybe some idealized death-bed scene where one is fully self-actualized in all that they learned from life or something). That I think goes with many people's justification for suffering. Somehow, they might say it is elevating as it teaches perseverance, so should be celebrated and thus more people should be born in order to have to persevere through life. Perseverance, along with happiness, and a few other principles or qualities thrown in there are the usual mix of reasons why it is deemed acceptable or good to procreate. — schopenhauer1
I think that some amount of suffering is essential to life. — Sapientia
A life without suffering would be unnatural, and isn't a realistic possibility in any case. — Sapientia
You have to qualify "essential". That seems to have some baggage which you claim to reject. — schopenhauer1
If you mean that suffering goes along with survival, then I guess I agree. However, this does not really prove a point for why life is worth starting or even continuing. — schopenhauer1
No, rather, the perseverance principle seems to be some sort of transcendental elevating which I find unjustified. — schopenhauer1
As you say about suffering, we just suffer, it just is. Same with perseverance. Yes, it is necessary to not go crazy, suicidal, or to not give up on any task or life in general. — schopenhauer1
This is simply begging the question that we need life to life to life to life. This actually goes back to the instrumentality of things. We do need to persevere for life to persevere to life..etc. just because that is what we do. That amounts (if we strip all the verbiage) to "We do to do". This is not saying much. — schopenhauer1
I am not sure about your usage of "natural". One can say that anything that happens is natural because it is what exists. — schopenhauer1
As for being a realistic possibility, I agree that an ideal existence is not reality, hence why it may not be worth starting a life. — schopenhauer1
One way of putting the anti-natalist sentiment is that having been through life and knowing what it's like, it's not something I would ever want to put someone else through. — The Great Whatever
Those who disagree perhaps are underestimating what they're actually doing. — The Great Whatever
See? This is why it's not all about birth, and why your earlier dismissal of my comment on that basis was unjustified. — Sapientia
the decision to prevent human life from occurring* because you know better than they ever would that life - their life - wouldn't even be worth starting, let alone living through — Sapientia
Also, note how we can both talk about a hypothetical someone without talking nonsense. Remarkable, eh? — Sapientia
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