If you want to split hairs over "not bad" and a longer version of what you said to the effect of we place more emphasis on the absence of pain and we consider pain before we consider pleasure, then in effect, the logic is the same. — schopenhauer1

I don't think it is splitting hairs, though. I think it is pointing out flaws where flaws exist. Benatar's asymmetry has been systematically misinterpreted and rejected by otherwise intelligent people, and may be because it is not entirely coherent itself. Unfortunately, Benatar is made out to be like the Jesus of antinatalism and so to reject Benatar's asymmetry is often seen as a rejection of antinatalism, which is not the case at all.

I do think he has a point though that since there is no perspective to even feel deprived, there is literally no harm done to anything by the possibility of happiness remaining not actual. However, since the possibility did not become actual, there is no perspective to even feel harm. This can be considered a good thing, as preventing actual harm from occurring is a good thing. — schopenhauer1

Schop1, again, this is falling into the counterfactual abuse and assuming a kind of anti-frustrationism/negative utilitarianism beforehand. If preventing actual harm from occurring is a good thing (for whom?), then preventing actual pleasure from occurring is a bad thing. What differs is how much emphasis we place on the duty to prevent pain compared to the duty to impose pleasure.

I'll tell you honestly that it is difficult for me to find the lack of pleasure to be a "bad" thing, because pleasure comes at such a high price (pain, etc), and the pain is more severe than the greatest of pleasures. But imagine a modal universe that is completely different from ours, in which those born don't even feel pain at all, ever. Dissatisfaction, boredom, misery, death, etc are all unheard of, it is all bliss and harmony. I would be surprised if you responded that there is no impetus to create another person. It may not be the looming feeling of guilt that is associated with creating a child that will experience pain, but ultimately I do believe that you will concede that abstaining from bringing at least one child into existence into this perfect, blissful world is kind of weird.

I don't think it is splitting hairs, though. I think it is pointing out flaws where flaws exist. — darthbarracuda

Meh. Splitting hairs, I say. Not really flawed, so can't agree with that.

Benatar's asymmetry has been systematically misinterpreted and rejected by otherwise intelligent people, and may be because it is not entirely coherent itself. — darthbarracuda

Well, I don't really care that other people think Benatar's arguments are not valid. There are things I think he can tweak to make the argument better, but the general gist of it is valid. Not to say that one shouldn't be critical of all arguments, I just don't think just because someone is critical, means they are right in their criticisms.

Unfortunately, Benatar is made out to be like the Jesus of antinatalism and so to reject Benatar's asymmetry is often seen as a rejection of antinatalism, which is not the case at all. — darthbarracuda

Correct, but I also think people have misinterpreted the argument on all sides, not just the ones that agree with him.

Schop1, again, this is falling into the counterfactual abuse and assuming a kind of anti-frustrationism/negative utilitarianism beforehand. — darthbarracuda

Again, I agree that there are always initial assumptions. Classic Utilitarianism- the assumption is happiness maximization, deontology- the assumption is duty or intent, moral sense theory- the assumption is a moral sense that most people have, etc. etc. The assumption here seems to be the following:

- Harm is bad/not desirable (and can be subjective or objective but not relevant to this point)
- Pleasure is good/ desirable (and can be subjective or objective but not relevant to this point).
- Prevention of harm is absolutely good
- Preventing happiness is only relatively bad as you need to have an actual person for this to be realized

As far as the hero-worship thing, I get it. I really do not need Benatar's asymmetry to justify antinatalism, but it certainly does not detract from it.

But imagine a modal universe that is completely different from ours, in which those born don't even feel pain at all, ever. Dissatisfaction, boredom, misery, death, etc are all unheard of, it is all bliss and harmony. I would be surprised if you responded that there is no impetus to create another person. It may not be the looming feeling of guilt that is associated with creating a child that will experience pain, but ultimately I do believe that you will concede that abstaining from bringing at least one child into existence into this perfect, blissful world is kind of weird. — darthbarracuda

I do think most antinatalists would agree with this. If the world was ideal and blissful, there would be no reason to prevent birth. Obviously that is not the actual world, and a world that was built in an ideal way would be foreign to us. Even the notion of a world without suffering or pain is odd. It is something you can make a rough idea about, but cannot completely understand unless one was living in it, I would suspect. Of course, I doubt these types of debates would even be happening in that kind of world. But then again, I do not know. Ideal is a very broad term and can be used in many ways.

Ideal could be living in a world perfectly attuned to the individual's notion of what is good or pleasurable.

I certainly think people might have the assumption that life is supposed to be there to teach lessons (for what I don't know- maybe some idealized death-bed scene where one is fully self-actualized in all that they learned from life or something). That I think goes with many people's justification for suffering. Somehow, they might say it is elevating as it teaches perseverance, so should be celebrated and thus more people should be born in order to have to persevere through life. Perseverance, along with happiness, and a few other principles or qualities thrown in there are the usual mix of reasons why it is deemed acceptable or good to procreate.

Ultimately the pleasure that life brings is not enough to justify the pain that life also brings, despite what the television shows tell you. — darthbarracuda

Now you're sounding like TGW. I don't get my philosophy from television shows or McDonald's ads.

Meh. Splitting hairs i say. Not really flawed so can't agree with that. — schopenhauer1

It is not hair splitting because it shows that Benatar has a goal in mind (to show that birth is immoral), and then proceeds to construct an argument that argues for this (cart before the horse).

If the world was not filled with excessive suffering, I wonder if Benatar would still have written his book.

Prevention of harm is absolutely good
- Preventing happiness is only relatively bad as you need to have an actual person for this to be realized — schopenhauer1

Yes, but if you are saying this as though you are agreeing with these premises, then I must only say that if the prevention of happiness is only relatively bad, then the prevention of harm is only relatively good.

I certainly think people might have the assumption that life is supposed to be there to teach lessons (for what I don't know- maybe some idealized death-bed scene where one is fully self-actualized in all that they learned from life or something). That I think goes with many people's justification for suffering. Somehow, they might say it is elevating as it teaches perseverance, so should be celebrated and thus more people should be born in order to have to persevere through life. Perseverance, along with happiness, and a few other principles or qualities thrown in there are the usual mix of reasons why it is deemed acceptable or good to procreate. — schopenhauer1

Usually this is in addition to a belief in a god and an afterlife. An eternity of blissful heaven with a omnibenevolent (?) god would seem to make the petty toils here on earth seem unproblematic.

Really it's the depressive that gets their sentiments from cliche. The notions that happiness and stupidity are correlated, and intelligence, or artistic ability are correlated with misery. Even that mental illness is correlated with artistic skill/genius, or that truth is a terrible downer, and fiction is always pleasant. Most of that is demonstrably untrue, and that truth is always terrible, and fiction always good seems obviously wrong to me. Paranoia, and fear cause more damage than truth ever has. The cognitive evaluation, and belief that there is a nobility in feeling awful about the state of the world and life, I can't see doing anyone any good.

One is apparently super opposed to suffering, but if you're not miserable then you're ignoble, or delusional... which is bad...

It is not hair splitting because it shows that Benatar has a goal in mind (to show that birth is immoral), and then proceeds to construct an argument that argues for this (cart before the horse). — darthbarracuda

Well, welcome to philosophy. There is no a priori argument that lacks basic axioms/assumptions. No math, no dialectics on ethics, etc.

If the world was not filled with excessive suffering, I wonder if Benatar would still have written his book. — darthbarracuda

I wouldn't see how he would. You have to know something exists, or at least its hypothetical existence to write about it, I would think.

Yes, but if you are saying this as though you are agreeing with these premises, then I must only say that if the prevention of happiness is only relatively bad, then the prevention of harm is only relatively good. — darthbarracuda

You mustn't do anything. I do happen to agree that preventing harm is absolutely good and preventing good is only relatively good. That is the axiom which this particular argument rests. To put it another way, though happiness is good, depriving happy experiences is not ethically relevant (preventing the possible experiencer of happiness from becoming actual), but preventing harm is (preventing the possible experiencer of harm from becoming actual).

Usually this is in addition to a belief in a god and an afterlife. An eternity of blissful heaven with a omnibenevolent (?) god would seem to make the petty toils here on earth seem unproblematic. — darthbarracuda

I suspect that is a view many people hold or have held in past generations.

Well, welcome to philosophy. There is no a priori argument that lacks basic axioms/assumptions. No math, no dialectics on ethics, etc. — schopenhauer1

There's a difference between starting out with basic axioms to argue on and the manipulation of axioms to fit your needs.

I wouldn't see how he would. You have to know something exists, or at least its hypothetical existence to write about it, I would think. — schopenhauer1

What I meant was if the only pain that we knew of were little toe stubs and a headache every now and then, I wonder if he would have constructed his asymmetry. The asymmetry largely becomes rather absurd if there isn't an overwhelming amount of suffering that effectively cancels out the pleasure in life.

To put it another way, though happiness is good, depriving happy experiences is not ethically relevant (preventing the possible experiencer of happiness from becoming actual), but preventing harm is (preventing the possible experiencer of harm from becoming actual). — schopenhauer1

I would argue that if there is a potential for sufficient suffering, this cancels out the opportunity for pleasure. Pleasure, in both our views, is supererogatory. It is only when the risk (of suffering) becomes sufficient that it is not ethically justified to partake in a certain action.

Now you're sounding like TGW. I don't get my philosophy from television shows or McDonald's ads. — Sapientia

Where do you (think you) get your philosophy from?

I got plenty of mine from television shows. What's wrong with that? Don't be so stuck up.

Again, the premium is that prevention of harm is the core of the ethics. The child did not need happiness. As I have said in the past, no one needs to live life to experience "x" this or that principle, especially when we know harm is almost always a guarantee. — schopenhauer1

If the principle of the prevention of harm is not absolute and at the core of the ethics, then necessity in that regard isn't necessary to counter the argument. It's sufficient to argue that it'd be a better alternative. This principle is the weak spot.

I get it my way, like Burger King tells me.

There's a difference between starting out with basic axioms to argue on and the manipulation of axioms to fit your needs. — darthbarracuda

Do you think people get their axioms from divine on high? Whether people are influenced by other philosophers, their own inclinations, life experiences, anecdotes from others, their family, or otherwise, the axioms will come from somewhere. No axioms on ethics, however, are going to come from some purely logical goddess of logic whispering sweet formulations of pure truth. Even starting as an extreme skeptic on all matters of truth, any time you start a positive argument (that is, one that is not wholly there to find a contradiction in the original argument), starts from some axiom. I'm willing to bet most philosophers' axioms are biased towards the author's initial inclination, hopefully after being exposed to many other arguments. This is all the more so when value judgements in ethical matters are discussed. Benatar may have originally thought life was not so good before he formulated his asymmetry, but giving a "charitable" understanding of the argument itself, the argument, in my view, is valid. Now, whether the premises in which it lies are sound, that can be a different matter.

Clearly, Benatar is at least consistent. He thinks ALL harm is bad, in the most absolute terms. This, to me is not manipulation so much as it is a very particular kind of view of what is ethically bad. Therefore, he comes up with the conclusion that even a pinprick is enough to disqualify procreation. However, he does recognize that this is a view that most people will not hold, thus he seems to indicate that even if one is not an absolutist, but more lenient in the threshold of pain that is permissible to procreate, empirical studies demonstrate how humans tend to make excuses or discount harms that exist when reporting on the overall evaluation of life.

I'd also like to broaden the discussion beyond Benatar's asymmetry. I just happened to get stuck in the weeds in terms of defending an interpretation of his asymmetry. Though it is one argument, I would also like to discuss the instrumentality of life, the circumstances of a non-ideal world, or Schopenhauer's understanding of striving.

As an aside, there have been times when I stumbled into a philosophical conclusion that changed my view on things. In the course of discussing matters of science, for example, I went from a position on the philosophy of mind, that can be characterized as emergentist of sorts in the scientific naturalist sense to at least entertaining notions of panpsychism. So, I am not discounting that people will change their minds when presented with compelling arguments or with certain self-generated thesis' that come from a newly realized way of looking at the subject.

If the principle of the prevention of harm is not absolute and at the core of the ethics, then necessity in that regard isn't necessary to counter the argument. It's sufficient to argue that it'd be a better alternative. This principle is the weak spot. — Sapientia

One can still apply the asymmetry in non-absolutist terms, so I don't see how this really matters.

Clearly, Benatar is at least consistent. He thinks ALL harm is bad, in the most absolute terms. This, to me is not manipulation so much as it is a very particular kind of view of what is ethically bad. Therefore, he comes up with the conclusion that even a pinprick is enough to disqualify procreation. — schopenhauer1

I am apt to agree with him that all harm is bad, but to say that the lack of bad is good and the lack of good is not-bad is question begging. Benatar claims his asymmetry is independent of the pain/pleasure calculus of the world, but this is plainly false; a world where there was an overwhelming amount of pleasure compared to pain would obviously be worth being born into.

Benatar has a position: antinatalism, and uses a nifty tool, the asymmetry, as a heuristic to claim that all birth no matter what is always immoral. To a person such as myself and to assumingly you as well who see the world as filled with suffering and the potential thereof, the asymmetry is merely icing on the cake. (Actually the asymmetry was my first introduction to antinatalism and originally convinced me). But for others, the works of Schopenhauer and co. are not going to convince many people because most people don't have the time, patience, nor do they give a damn to read them. So Benatar comes up with a heuristic that starts out from a pessimistic axiom and creates an argument that can supposedly be used universally.

And I applaud his work (it initially convinced me and led me to antinatalism), but a flawed argument is a flawed argument. In the end, it comes back to a subjective calculus of life, the same subjectivity that Benatar was attempting to avoid via his asymmetry.

I'd also like to broaden the discussion beyond Benatar's asymmetry. I just happened to get stuck in the weeds in terms of defending an interpretation of his asymmetry. Though it is one argument, I would also like to discuss the instrumentality of life, the circumstances of a non-ideal world, or Schopenhauer's understanding of striving. — schopenhauer1

I'm not sure what you mean by the instrumentality of life. Can you elaborate please? Do you mean that life has no cosmic purpose?

I agree with the non-ideal world idea: the world is inadequate the human psyche's needs.

I tend to like to use the concept of tanha rather than the Will.

As an aside, there have been times when I stumbled into a philosophical conclusion that changed my view on things. In the course of discussing matters of science, for example, I went from a position on the philosophy of mind, that can be characterized as emergentist of sorts in the scientific naturalist sense to at least entertaining notions of panpsychism. — schopenhauer1

It's all about property dualism bruh.

Perhaps "absolute" was the wrong word to use, but what I said matters because your comment that I was replying to assumes - mistakenly, I'd argue - that the principle of preventing suffering is of such moral import that in order for it to be overturned, it would have to be necessary for people to live and be happy and have positive experiences. That isn't necessary. It's sufficient to counter-argue on the basis that people do and probably will have such experiences. The argument that you've presented wouldn't refute anti-antinatalism merely by demonstrating an absence of necessity or duty in that regard.

The argument, as presented, assumes a deontological ethics. Wosret has also criticised this view, at least regarding the prevention of suffering.

But imagine a modal universe that is completely different from ours, in which those born don't even feel pain at all, ever. Dissatisfaction, boredom, misery, death, etc are all unheard of, it is all bliss and harmony. I would be surprised if you responded that there is no impetus to create another person. It may not be the looming feeling of guilt that is associated with creating a child that will experience pain, but ultimately I do believe that you will concede that abstaining from bringing at least one child into existence into this perfect, blissful world is kind of weird. — darthbarracuda

Perfect?! It would be nightmarish, for the same reason that a world of Stepford wives would be nightmarish, and for the same reason that a world in which we're all hooked up to pleasure machines would be nightmarish.

Perfect?! It would be nightmarish, for the same reason that a world of Stepford wives would be nightmarish, and for the same reason that a world in which we're all hooked up to pleasure machines would be nightmarish. — Sapientia

You are bringing in ideas of discord. There would be no discord. An ideal world would indeed be alien to us. You could not even characterize it, because it is so foreign to our perspective of our world, so descriptions like "Stepford Wives" would not even be fair to apply. We can only get at it through veiled notions of what a perfectly ideal world would be.

No, that there would be no discord is what would make it not only imperfect, but nightmarish.

I am apt to agree with him that all harm is bad, but to say that the lack of bad is good and the lack of good is not-bad is question begging. Benatar claims his asymmetry is independent of the pain/pleasure calculus of the world, but this is plainly false; a world where there was an overwhelming amount of pleasure compared to pain would obviously be worth being born into. — darthbarracuda

Clearly his intuition does not think this is plain or obvious. What this gets at again is that people have axioms. The axioms may lead to some jarring conclusions, but apparently, he thinks harm is never good in any circumstance, even one where there is a world with much less harm than is possible in our current one. What I really do not want to do is pretend to speak for Benatar, as right now it is a mix of his stuff and mine. I do not even have the book with me, so I really think it would be a discredit for me to attempt to defend his reasoning for his axioms. I can only give you my interpretations thereof.

And I applaud his work (it initially convinced me and led me to antinatalism), but a flawed argument is a flawed argument. In the end, it comes back to a subjective calculus of life, the same subjectivity that Benatar was attempting to avoid via his asymmetry. — darthbarracuda

We have a slightly different interpretation of how it is flawed. I do not think the logic is flawed, but the premises may be flawed. The logic can be tweaked with less absolute interpretations. I also think you may not give him credit for anticipating this when he goes on regarding empirical evidence why indeed the amount of suffering is much more than pinpricks and trivial harms. So, to use a phrase you like, "don't necessarily throw the baby out with the bath water". Certainly, I think there can be additions to his formulation that make it more accurate as to the premise. Even better, some people have done better reformulations, expanded the argument etc. As I think you have acknowledged here, his heuristic was innovative and has started other, possibly more detailed and accurate ones that reflect a similarity to his original, but with a bit different axioms than his absolutist premise of harm.

I'm not sure what you mean by the instrumentality of life. Can you elaborate please? Do you mean that life has no cosmic purpose? — darthbarracuda

Yes, this is my phrase for the emptiness of our pursuits. Here are some earlier quotes I said about it:

I use the word instrumentality because that captures the idea that there is some sort of emptiness/incompleteness at the end of all endeavors. We are doing to do to do to do. But this ceaseless flux and feeling of emptiness is itself a form of suffering. Now, again, we can argue that this is temperament, but certainly, at least some individuals see this throughout the history of civilizations and seem to not be contingent only on a few specific people, but is a relatively common viewpoint. — schopenhauer1

When we get our goals, we quickly succumb to a sort of existential angst that reflects the instrumentality of existence in terms of the constant need to keep ourselves alive, comfortable, and entertained. Time presses on us and we feel its affects in our need for need and our existential angst when reflected on life itself without anything in particular to strive for. Schopenhauer's understanding is closer to home, it is the life we actually live, not a philosopher's dream of pure intellectual devotion. Schopenhauer's vision is closer to the reality of the human condition which takes into account the restless nature of the human psyche, the deprivation of contentment that motivates us all, and the contingent nature of existence impinging upon us. The contingent nature of reality along with our own inner restless nature is closer to what is going on. — schopenhauer1

And here is an oldy but goody in my more grandiose days (but still pretty accurate I think):

Even if some fulfillment of the initial state of lack leads to some positive outcomes, these are usually temporary. Besides, even if there is happy moments, the basic lack of something should make you wonder if there is something suspect about the whole enterprise. There is simply a movement forward, what Schopenhauer would call "Will". The ceaseless striving of things has no overall purpose except perhaps to survive or continue to move forward, which begs the question (we survive to survive to survive, endlessly striving for nothing, but to keep it going). Look at ennui- boredom. This is a state of our striving having no particular aim. You can see it turn in on itself right before your very eyes. It is the weariness of the striving brought to the foreground- not distracted from any particular pursuit. This is the time for real reflection- not when one is occupied by this or that, but when one has run out of goals and simply stares at the void head-on. If happiness is coming from a state of dissatisfaction and lack of something, what is that telling you about the true nature of happiness? If we strip off our human emotions, we can see the inner-workings of pure Will or striving. — schopenhauer1

No, that there would be no discord is what would make it not only imperfect, but nightmarish. — Sapientia

Only from the perspective of this world we know. Also, perhaps your version of reality would have discord to make it less nightmarish. If you are a subjectivist in terms of ideality- than the condition of the world would be set up such that you would have whatever discord, perseverance, and the like you wanted and could be turned off at any instance as well. If you are a Schopenhaurian, then ideality would be a state of no lack of anything and no flux. Again, all these ideas (it could be many different versions) are foreign to us, and from a perspective of someone who has only experienced non-ideal situations would be understandably strange and even hostile to what we have grown accustomed to. But the very notion of a perfectly ideal world would make it a world in which whatever negative label you have for it would not even be a part of its reality because it is so perfect.

You do seem to have the assumption of a sort of telos. What I mean by this can be summed up in a recent quote:

I certainly think people might have the assumption that life is supposed to be there to teach lessons (for what I don't know- maybe some idealized death-bed scene where one is fully self-actualized in all that they learned from life or something). That I think goes with many people's justification for suffering. Somehow, they might say it is elevating as it teaches perseverance, so should be celebrated and thus more people should be born in order to have to persevere through life. Perseverance, along with happiness, and a few other principles or qualities thrown in there are the usual mix of reasons why it is deemed acceptable or good to procreate. — schopenhauer1

If you have not already read Cabrera's paper, I would recommend you do so.

Benatar is attempting to avoid the subjective calculus of life that his pessimistic predecessors advocated. This is why he made the asymmetry; it is a universal heuristic. Additionally, he recently was chief editor of a book on "analytic existentialism" which, interestingly enough, fails to include any pessimistic continental philosophers.

You do seem to have the assumption of a sort of telos. What I mean by this can be summed up in a recent quote: — schopenhauer1

I certainly think people might have the assumption that life is supposed to be there to teach lessons (for what I don't know- maybe some idealized death-bed scene where one is fully self-actualized in all that they learned from life or something). That I think goes with many people's justification for suffering. Somehow, they might say it is elevating as it teaches perseverance, so should be celebrated and thus more people should be born in order to have to persevere through life. Perseverance, along with happiness, and a few other principles or qualities thrown in there are the usual mix of reasons why it is deemed acceptable or good to procreate. — schopenhauer1

No, actually, I'm not assuming any sort of telos. I'm an existential nihilist. We can learn from life experience, but life isn't there to do the teaching. There's no purpose to be discovered, but we can create our own. Life is just life, it's just there, and is indifferent to whether or not we prosper or suffer. But I think that a life without any suffering wouldn't be as fulfilling as one with a proportionate amount. I do think that there is some truth to what you say about elevation and perseverance in the face of suffering. Nietzsche had some interesting things to say about that. But that isn't the line that I take. I don't think that it's necessary to try to turn the tables and claim that suffering is a good thing. It isn't so black and white. I think that it's sufficient to point out those cases in which the suffering doesn't render life not worth living or reproducing. I think that some amount of suffering is essential to life. A life without suffering would be unnatural, and isn't a realistic possibility in any case.

I think that some amount of suffering is essential to life. — Sapientia

You have to qualify "essential". That seems to have some baggage which you claim to reject. However, you can try to prove me wrong. If you mean that suffering goes along with survival, then I guess I agree. However, this does not really prove a point for why life is worth starting or even continuing. No, rather, the perseverance principle seems to be some sort of transcendental elevating which I find unjustified. As you say about suffering, we just suffer, it just is. Same with perseverance. Yes, it is necessary to not go crazy, suicidal, or to not give up on any task or life in general. This is simply begging the question that we need life to life to life to life. This actually goes back to the instrumentality of things. We do need to persevere for life to persevere to life..etc. just because that is what we do. That amounts (if we strip all the verbiage) to "We do to do". This is not saying much.

A life without suffering would be unnatural, and isn't a realistic possibility in any case. — Sapientia

I am not sure about your usage of "natural". One can say that anything that happens is natural because is what exists. As for being a realistic possibility, I agree that an ideal existence is not reality, hence why it may not be worth starting a life.

You have to qualify "essential". That seems to have some baggage which you claim to reject. — schopenhauer1

It's essential to live a healthy, fully functioning, and more fulfilling life. I reject only the metaphysical associations. I do, however, think that suffering serves an important purpose or function or role in terms of biology and psychology. But, just like an autoimmune disease, it can turn on the very organism that it's supposed to serve, as it does in cases of clinical depression.

If you mean that suffering goes along with survival, then I guess I agree. However, this does not really prove a point for why life is worth starting or even continuing. — schopenhauer1

It wasn't supposed to. Not in and of itself. I originally brought it up in response to the purely hypothetical scenario of a life without any suffering.

No, rather, the perseverance principle seems to be some sort of transcendental elevating which I find unjustified. — schopenhauer1

Transcendental elevating?

As you say about suffering, we just suffer, it just is. Same with perseverance. Yes, it is necessary to not go crazy, suicidal, or to not give up on any task or life in general. — schopenhauer1

Well, yes, but that doesn't say much. It's also necessary to get the most out of life. Imagine if we all gave up after encountering the first hurdle. Think of all of the valuable things in life that we'd miss out on. And yes, there would of course be more hurdles, some of them seemingly insurmountable. I'm not denying that. I for one do not regret ultimately deciding not to throw in the towel after going through some particularly hard times.

This is simply begging the question that we need life to life to life to life. This actually goes back to the instrumentality of things. We do need to persevere for life to persevere to life..etc. just because that is what we do. That amounts (if we strip all the verbiage) to "We do to do". This is not saying much. — schopenhauer1

Instrumentality isn't inherently bad, you know. I don't even think that it's all that relevant. I don't get your bizarre attempt to make out that there's some sort of devastating infinite regress at play. We persevere in the hope that things will get better. We persevere because we think that no matter how bad it presently is or seems, it's not worth giving up. We don't persevere for nothing or for the sake of it. We don't just go on living because it's what we do. Like I said, we create our own purpose in life, and sadly, some people choose not to go on living.

So, no, it's not like we're robots stuck on autopilot, or like we're some trivial commodity on a production line in the factory of life, being spurned out and disposed of after we expire, our only function being to live meaninglessly until we die. The opportunities in life are great and plentiful.

I am not sure about your usage of "natural". One can say that anything that happens is natural because it is what exists. — schopenhauer1

Well, yes, there is a variety of legitimate ways in which the word can be used - some relatively narrow, others more broad. But one thing's for sure, if it hasn't ever occurred in nature, and is unlikely to do so for the foreseeable future, then it ain't natural. Hence, human life without any suffering whatsoever is indeed unnatural.

As for being a realistic possibility, I agree that an ideal existence is not reality, hence why it may not be worth starting a life. — schopenhauer1

I think that that's an absurd way of looking at it. We can't obtain some false ideal, therefore it's better to just give up?!

David Benatar is credited with the origination of the term "antinatalism" as an analytic normative ethical position. As I have attempted to point out earlier, I believe this is to the fact that although there have been plenty of similar views held in the past, they are not of the "analytic" stripe; that is, they are not purely logical or analytic and require a certain pathos to reach their conclusion.

Because of this reliance on pathos, I believe Benatar knew that any kind of philosophy that advocated anti-birth would be ridiculed or simply rejected out of a sheer knee-jerk disgust or by an attempt to appeal to the positives of life. Thus, Benatar developed an all-or-nothing analytic argument to compensate for the lack of pure logical rigor in the alternative pessimistic literature, although he still appeals to the pathos, Continental-like philosophy when justifying his asymmetry.

Curiously, as I pointed out briefly earlier, Benatar hardly includes any of the European, more Continental-like (or even transcultural) philosophies when he produced his book "Life, Death, and Meaning", although he does include work by Hume and Schopenhauer.

Later in another book on antinatalism produced by Benatar and Wasserman, Benatar formulates another analytic argument, this time from the misanthropic stance: what if you give birth to Hitler?

Overall, it is admirable how dedicated Benatar seems to be regarding making antinatalism a forcible and persuasive stance, even if his argument(s) are not, under further analysis, perfect.

Instrumentality is the idea that at the end of the day, nothing is really necessary or fulfilling. Even when harms are at a minimum, we are simply striving beings, and know no rest. So, we do to do to do. Even without contingent harms, the necessary harm of being a striving being is a subtle dissatisfaction.

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Instrumentality means nothing other than a means to an end. Anything other than that is what you're reading into it.

One way of putting the anti-natalist sentiment is that having been through life and knowing what it's like, it's not something I would ever want to put someone else through. Those who disagree perhaps are underestimating what they're actually doing.

One way of putting the anti-natalist sentiment is that having been through life and knowing what it's like, it's not something I would ever want to put someone else through. — The Great Whatever

See? This is why it's not all about birth, and why your earlier dismissal of my comment on that basis was unjustified. The alternative sentiment is also based on having been through life and knowing what it's like, but the conclusion involves the rejection of taking that decision (the anti-natalist decision, that is, namely, the decision to prevent human life from occurring* because you know better than they ever would that life - their life - wouldn't even be worth starting, let alone living through) into our own hands, and opting instead to go with the alternative, which would give someone else the opportunity, at some point, to judge things for themselves and take matters into their own hands.

(*I don't necessarily mean prevent by any means or against the will of other living humans).

Also, note how we can both talk about a hypothetical someone without talking nonsense. Remarkable, eh?

Those who disagree perhaps are underestimating what they're actually doing. — The Great Whatever

Perhaps, perhaps not.

See? This is why it's not all about birth, and why your earlier dismissal of my comment on that basis was unjustified. — Sapientia

The anti-natalist position is about birth.

the decision to prevent human life from occurring* because you know better than they ever would that life - their life - wouldn't even be worth starting, let alone living through — Sapientia

You cannot decide that you know better than a non-existent person.

Also, note how we can both talk about a hypothetical someone without talking nonsense. Remarkable, eh? — Sapientia

I am not talking about a hypothetical person. And it's still nonsense -- but at least you're admitting what you're doing now?

I don't think anything you've said here, or in this thread, is intelligible unless you imagine people so to speak 'lined up' at the gates of heaven waiting to be put into physical bodies, and the anti-natalist talking them and saying 'I know better than you that life is bad, so I'm not letting you come into the world,' and so turning them down or 'preventing' them from being born. But this picture is nonsense, so what you say is not intelligible.