The anti-natalist position is about birth. — The Great Whatever
You cannot decide that you know better than a non-existent person. — The Great Whatever
I am not talking about a hypothetical person. — The Great Whatever
And it's still nonsense -- but at least you're admitting what you're doing now? — The Great Whatever
A most salient admission. I'll take it as proof that my objection to you was correct after all. — Thorongil
is waking up from sleep or being resuscitated while unconscious undesirable? — darthbarracuda
You said: "Being non-existent, strictly speaking, they don't get a say in the matter, nor are they entitled to one, nor are they missing out or being done an injustice." They're not missing out, eh? So why are you in favor of bringing them into the world so that they don't in fact miss out on art and whatever else? This is manifestly contradictory and shows you're trying to have your cake and eat it too. You either stick to the quoted statement and find a better argument or admit that the argument you presented several pages ago is faulty. — Thorongil
Nope. If no one were born, nobody would miss out, either. — The Great Whatever
Yes, but that's obviously not the condition I had in mind — Sapientia
To state that they DO not miss out doesn't contradict the claim that they WOULD miss out IF such-and-such bla-de-bla. — Sapientia
It's consistently painful and tedious. — The Great Whatever
Then why did you say it? — The Great Whatever
This is irrelevant, isn't it? They neither DO nor WOULD miss out. — The Great Whatever
It's quite simple, really. In a hypothetical future scenario, someone is born and experiences valuable things out of life. This scenario can become an actuality, unless we go extinct. In a figurative sense, therefore, we can say that this someone would be missing out if they were never born and didn't subsequently experience those valuable things in life. Would they actually be missing out? No, because they were never born. Did I ever state or imply that they would actually be missing out? No. That's a straw man. — Sapientia
This is the use of counterfactuals to describe a potential, possible world, which is plausibly at least a component of our ability to conduct debates about modality.
Anyhoo, it's pretty easy to see, at least to myself (and others here as well) that the valuable things "missed" are not as important as the terrible things "avoided".
And we can further use counterfactuals by arguing that a potential person "has" the right to consent to exist. Since they cannot consent, do not give birth. — darthbarracuda
In a figurative sense, therefore, we can say that this someone would be missing out if they were never born and didn't subsequently experience those valuable things in life. — Sapientia
Did I ever state or imply that they would actually be missing out? No. That's a straw man. — Sapientia
In the end I believe it comes down to a subjective introspective appropriation of the value of existence. — darthbarracuda
Can a life be made to be valuable? Possibly. Can a life be miserable and worthless? Possibly. Is an actualized valuable life worth more than an avoided miserable life? — darthbarracuda
That is really what I perceive to be the underlying sentiment here: that there is a disproportionate amount of misery compared to fulfillment, and that no amount of pleasure will be able to compensate for the amount of pain, or the potential thereof, that a life will contain. — darthbarracuda
I'm glad that you acknowledge the subjectivity of it, but I suspect that you go further than I would with the appropriation part. I would say that some cases are more clearcut than others. If taken to extremes, we can more easily judge the value of a certain life - whether that be the life of an actual person or a hypothetical life. We can imagine a life of extreme misery, and in contrast, we can imagine a much better life. But there is a large grey area in between, and of course, although we can take certain factors into consideration, we don't have a crystal ball with which we can rightly appropriate the value of the lives of all of those within that grey area. — Sapientia
The part in bold is what I think really matters. The former part could be conceded. It may well be the case that there is, in a certain sense, a greater and disproportionate amount of misery compared to fulfilment. But what matters is the effect that this has on the value of life. If the misery to fulfilment ratio was, say, 2:1, it doesn't follow that the detrimental effect that the former has on the value of life outweighs the beneficial effect of the latter. I don't think that you can successfully argue that that is true of every case, so I think that your position is untenable. — Sapientia
The fact that we don't have a crystal ball means that we probably shouldn't be messing around with stuff that affects other people. — darthbarracuda
Regardless of the misery/value distinction, there is a threshold that once stepped over, the value of life drops significantly. — darthbarracuda
In fact I would be willing to bet (based off of psychological and anthropological findings) that the value people derive from their lives is post hoc at best, that is, a derivation of relief that allows them to comfort themselves. — darthbarracuda
Again, since there is no way to predict how a person will end up, we probably shouldn't be experimenting. — darthbarracuda
Instrumentality means nothing other than a means to an end. Anything other than that is what you're reading into it. — Sapientia
You can use that same reasoning to argue that we should let other people have children, and let those children live their lives unaffected by the actions of present-day antinatalists. (Of course, you and I both understand that they wouldn't technically be affected if they never exist, but I think that you catch my drift, bearing in mind what could be and what could cease to be a possibility). I also get that you don't argue in favor of enforced antinatalism, but the point still stands when you once again consider what could be if we were all antinatalists. It's hard to overstate just how catastrophic the consequences would be if you're not correct: we're talking about the extinction of humankind here. And what would otherwise happen? We'd continue to live on, through the good and the bad. Most people would affirm that they'd rather it be that way than not at all, and we should give them some credit. — Sapientia
The ends never end though. It is always a means to another end, and another end, and another end. — schopenhauer1
If you do not get the sentiment of it, it's like not getting what someone means when they say existential angst vs. test anxiety, or situational depression vs. severe depression, or any other such situational usage vs. global usage. — schopenhauer1
It conveys well, I think, the understanding that we are striving creatures that work as if there is an end, but there is no end. — schopenhauer1
I find it hard to believe you would not get that concept. — schopenhauer1
To parse the term to try to make it its common usage when it was meant in its global usage would be an obvious misuse of what I am trying to connote. To say, for example, "But look.. I just accomplished and END, therefore everything is not instrumental!" would be misleading, and if you knew the global understanding of the way I am using this, it would be purposely misleading, and therefore a strawman. I am not saying you were going to do that, but just anticipating the possible strawman. — schopenhauer1
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