Saith he, quoting scripture! As it happens this is a philosophy forum, the subject of the discussion is the incorporeal nature of ideas in the Platonic tradition. — Wayfarer
Anyway, I'm happy enough to leave it at that. It was probably a mistake to attempt to engage you in discussion, since you don't seem to be open to alternative ways of looking at things at all and it always seems to end up this way. No need to worry; I won't ever trouble you again. — Janus
You don't have to agree with that of course; but I have offered my reasons for thinking that; and if really wanted to engage in open discussion, then you should proffer you reasons for disagreeing with it. It is your apparent unwillingness to do that which "dismisses any possibility of discussion" as I see it. — Janus
Alas, a concept is a peculiar thing, which by definition is composed only of essential properties, and contains no accidental properties. Using again the triangle example: A particular triangle may have accidental properties such as a size, colour, and location. But the concept "triangle-ness" may not have any accidental properties, or else it is not a concept, by definition. Consequently, the accidental property of 'being in my mind' or 'being in your mind' cannot be attributed to concepts. Instead, when we say "the concept in my mind is the same as the concept in your mind", this is just an informal way of saying "The concept I speak of is the same concept you speak of".OK, so your principle of identity involves "exact same properties". How does the concept of "five-ness" which is in my mind, qualify as the same concept of "fiveness" which is in your mind, when they are described by these different properties ("in my mind" and "in your mind"). Clearly they don't have the exact same properties, and are therefore not the same concept. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think that quoting Biblical scripture in support of an argument kicks the ball into the long grass. (I will sometimes refer to a Christian aphorism, as there is a lot of wisdom in them, but scripture is another matter,) — Wayfarer
I have noticed that you tend to draw a pretty sharp boundary when it comes to what you regard as the subject of mystical experience. Anything beyond that boundary - can't say anything about it. There's the quotidian, and the mystical. — Wayfarer
often rely on reasoned argument - indeed often to point towards something which is beyond reasoned argument. — Wayfarer
the epistemological issue is that the modern mind, modern naturalism, is characterised by a fundamental orientation, that of being separate from the Universe. Man, the scientist, the observer, there, nature before his gaze. — Wayfarer
I don't think that's correct. I think his view was that forms could only be known through the form of concrete particulars, or that the universals could only be known in the form in which they took. But he was no nominalist, in fact nominalism wasn't thought of for millennia afterwards. So I don't think you can say that the form depends on the particular, it is surely the reverse - in hylomorphic dualism, things consist of form and matter. But still reading up on this. — Wayfarer
Further, that which is one cannot be in many places at the same time, but that which is common is present in many places at the same time; so that clearly no universal exists apart from its individuals. — Metaphysics Book VII Part 16
Alas, a concept is a peculiar thing, which by definition is composed only of essential properties, and contains no accidental properties. Using again the triangle example: A particular triangle may have accidental properties such as a size, colour, and location. But the concept "triangle-ness" may not have any accidental properties, or else it is not a concept, by definition. Consequently, the accidental property of 'being in my mind' or 'being in your mind' cannot be attributed to concepts. Instead, when we say "the concept in my mind is the same as the concept in your mind", this is just an informal way of saying "The concept I speak of is the same concept you speak of". — Samuel Lacrampe
All this is is more naive realism, Apo (you refering to some real thing that is happening with scribbles on a screen, as if you have a clear, unimpeded view of what is really happening in reality). Its what everyone in this thread is doing, everytime they post anything.I only have to find that my states of belief are reliable in minimising the surprises I encounter in the world. — apokrisis
I can't help it if you don't get my point in questioning the distinction when it comes to causation and information flow.I can't help it if you don't get the difference between direct and indirect. — apokrisis
a machine could clearly perform these translations and send these signals. — Srap Tasmaner
these functions are mental, therefore they are not physical. — Srap Tasmaner
If programmed to do so by humans.
'Machine - an apparatus using mechanical power and having several parts, each with a definite function and together performing a particular task.' — Wayfarer
We use shovels to move physical dirt, physically, don't we? — Srap Tasmaner
But what the machine actually does is physical, right? Just because a human designs a machine to serve a human purpose, doesn't mean the machine itself is doing something non-physical, does it? We use shovels to move physical dirt, physically, don't we? — Srap Tasmaner
But what the machine actually does is physical, right? Just because a human designs a machine to serve a human purpose, doesn't mean the machine itself is doing something non-physical, does it? — Srap Tasmaner
Is there mind involved in some of these but not others? Do some of these hominin sounds carry meaning or information but not others? — Srap Tasmaner
human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. A more interesting example given in the book is the sentence “Birds that fly instinctively swim.” The adverb “instinctively” can modify either “fly” or “swim.” But there is no ambiguity in the sentence “Instinctively birds that fly swim.” Here “instinctively” must modify “swim,” despite its greater linear distance.
Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.
The question is whether language has a monopoly on meaning or on information or both. — Srap Tasmaner
Is there mind involved in some of these but not others? Do some of these hominin sounds carry meaning or information but not others? — Srap Tasmaner
What do you mean by "mind"? Is there a useful distinction in operation here? — apokrisis
I hope you don't think I was claiming there's no difference between animal signaling and human language. — Srap Tasmaner
That question wasn't for you. — Srap Tasmaner
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