It's hard work knowing what's real. Just a thought - I have heard one realist philosopher say pretty much that. — Marchesk
4. 'Objects' of physiological sensory perception are external to thought/belief. — creativesoul
10. All philosophical positions presuppose the existence of an external world.
It effectively refutes solipsism as well — creativesoul
4. 'Objects' of physiological sensory perception are external to thought/belief.
5. All thought/belief presupposes the existence of an external world.(from3,4) — creativesoul
So true premisses beg the question? — creativesoul
that does not help you since (1) the beach, the footprints and the person can only be objects of your perception, and (2) can only be known through the concepts and impressions that they give you. — charleton
4 doesn't say that — creativesoul
3. Thought/belief presupposes the existence of it's own content.(from1,2)
4. 'Objects' of physiological sensory perception are external to thought/belief.
5. All thought/belief presupposes the existence of an external world.(from3,4)
Oh, I see. If I say something about an external world in any of my premisses, then I beg the question, but if I don't than I cannot derive anything about an external world from them...
Clear as mud. Makes perfect sense...
What are you denying Michael? — creativesoul
The poll result shows the naiveté, of those voting. — charleton
You cannot know existence except through the senses and this is an ideal reality. It is unavoidable. — charleton
I don't get paid enough for this... — creativesoul
According to this theory (correspondence), truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view ... seems to conform rather closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by "agreement" or "correspondence" [or 'correlation'] of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense.
1- In order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison?
2- The making of the comparison is itself a fact about which we have a belief. We have to believe that the belief about the comparison is true. How do we know that our belief in this agreement is "true"? This leads to an infinite regress, leaving us with no assurance of true belief.
Although it seems ... obvious to say, "Truth is correspondence of thought (belief, proposition) to what is actually the case", such an assertion nevertheless involves a metaphysical assumption - that there is a fact, object, or state of affairs, independent of our knowledge to which our knowledge corresponds.
"How, on your principles, could you know you have a true proposition?" ... or ... "How can you use your definition of truth, it being the correspondence between a judgment and its object, as a criterion of truth? How can you know when such correspondence actually holds?"
I cannot step outside my mind to compare a thought in it with something outside it.
(...) Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognising it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object.
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