No, not simultaneously. Each moment is its own time (they're not simultaneous any more than each location is the same place). It's just that no particular moment is special any more than any particular location is the one correct 'here'.According to eternalism, every moment in the universe's history is real and as such exists simultaneously. — Alec
No, not simultaneously. — noAxioms
I have the subjective experience of this particular moment of asking this question. — Alec
Very well then, but use of relative terms to describe a non-relative concept is inevitably going to run into inconsistencies like that.According to eternalism, every moment is real in the same sense as the present is real. I don't see how else I can make sense of all moments being real or equally real other than to say treat them all as I do present objects, which is to say, that they currently exist, unless you have a better idea of what it means to say that they are all "real". — Alec
Let me bold some:What do you mean by "relative terms"? And what inconsistency are you talking about? I don't understand. — Alec
There is no present, no present objects, since no reference has been specified. So you can say that Napoleon presently exists at Earth, 1815, which is a redundant way of saying Napoleon exists at Earth, 1815. But there is no 'the present', and 'currently' is meaningless without a temporal reference point. Whose present? Currently with what? Begging references to these things is going to make you declare the position irrational....every moment is real in the same sense as the present is real. ... to treat them all as I do present objects, which is to say, that they currently exist, unless you have another idea of what it means to say that they are all "real". — Alec
Napoleon exists, and he also exists in 1815, but does not exist in 1915 since the two times are not simultaneous. Paris exists, and Paris exists in France, but Paris does not exist in Japan since the two locations are not the same place. But that doesn't mean Paris doesn't exist just because the speaker is in Japan. It simply doesn't exist at that speaker's 'here' any more than Napoleon exists at your 'present'.I was asking if you have an idea of what all moments being equally "real" or all "existing" could possibly mean if not that they exist in the present tense. If you cannot do so for whatever reason, then I can only conclude that your disagreement is irrational and that you don't know what you're talking about.
There is no present, no present objects, since no reference has been specified. So you can say that Napoleon presently exists at Earth, 1815, which is a redundant way of saying Napoleon exists at Earth, 1815. But there is no 'the present', and 'currently' is meaningless without a temporal reference point. Whose present? Currently with what? Begging references to these things is going to make you declare the position irrational. — noAxioms
Napoleon exists, and he also exists in 1815, but does not exist in 1915 since the two times are not simultaneous. Paris exists, and Paris exists in France, but Paris does not exist in Japan since the two locations are not the same place. But that doesn't mean Paris doesn't exist just because the speaker is in Japan. It simply doesn't exist at that speaker's 'here' any more than Napoleon exists at your 'present'. — noAxioms
Eternalism is not an assertion that all times 'currently exist'.I think you're confusing a preferred time with things currently existing. — Alec
No, events are still ordered if within each others' light cones. My parents were born before me, in any relativistic reference frame.The argument from relativity states that there is nothing to determine that one set of simultaneous events should be preferred to any other, leading to the conclusion that none are.
Eternalism is not an assertion about simultaneity or preferred frames or the lack of them.There are no privileged frames; this is known as the relativity of simultaneity.
Both are tenseless.My emphasis on the word "exists". You seem to be using "exist" in the present tense.
No, I say he exists. There is no current time.You don't say that Napoleon "did exist" or "will exist", you are saying that he currently exists.
Eliminativism most likely (denial of subjective experience/ appearance vs the reality), I think that's what can be interpreted the "stubbornly persistent illusion" quote. — JupiterJess
Anyway, the B-theory of time is the modern Parimendes and so the classicial criticisms apply. Such as how it is possible to be persuaded by the result of argument if change is not possible. In order to accept B-theory, you have to accept minds can change in some way and the change must be in some way the result of the argument.
Eternalism is not an assertion that all times 'currently exist'. — noAxioms
One version of Non-presentism is Eternalism, which says that objects from both the past and the future exist just as much as present objects. According to Eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist right now, even though they are not currently present. We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things. — Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Time (My emphasis)
No, events are still ordered if within each others' light cones. My parents were born before me, in any relativistic reference frame. — noAxioms
Eternalism is not an assertion about simultaneity or preferred frames or the lack of them. — noAxioms
No, I say he exists. There is no current time. — noAxioms
It does indeed say that, with the note that Socrates is not currently present. So there's a difference, and they are apparently allowing the use of an implied reference to a present.Sorry, but this is just false:
One version of Non-presentism is Eternalism, which says that objects from both the past and the future exist just as much as present objects. According to Eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist right now, even though they are not currently present. We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things.
— Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Time (My emphasis)
Maybe you should read up on more on the view before talking about it. — Alec
It might be objected that there is something odd about attributing to a Non-presentist the claim that Socrates exists right now, since there is a sense in which that claim is clearly false. In order to forestall this objection, let us distinguish between two senses of ‘x exists now’. In one sense, which we can call the temporal location sense, this expression is synonymous with ‘x is present’. The Non-presentist will admit that, in the temporal location sense of ‘x exists now’, it is true that no non-present objects exist right now. But in the other sense of ‘x exists now’, which we can call the ontological sense, to say that x exists now is just to say that x is now in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, whether x happens to be present, like you and me, or non-present, like Socrates. When we attribute to Non-presentists the claim that non-present objects like Socrates exist right now, we commit the Non-presentist only to the claim that these non-present objects exist now in the ontological sense (the one involving the most unrestricted quantifiers). — Stanford
Are you saying that relativity does not order my parents' birth before my own? The ordering is ambiguous or nonexistent?No, events are still ordered if within each others' light cones. My parents were born before me, in any relativistic reference frame.
— noAxioms
There is a reason why they call it "Relativity". It's because of the fact of the relativity of simultaneity. Look it up if you disagree.
Yes, the lack of absolute simultaneity is seriously suggestive, but not proof of any sort.Yeah, that was my point. Eternalism doesn't say anything about simultaneity. It has probably been around before relativity was a thing but the lack of any absolute notion of simultaneity has been used to argue for the view.
Yes, all three reference the present. I mean exists ontologically, and eternalism does not give any ontological status to a present, so there is no present to reference.No, I say he exists. There is no current time.
— noAxioms
I'm sorry, but there are only three ways I could read your "exists". Either you're saying that Napoleon "did exist" or "will exist" or you're saying that he is currently existing. You somehow deny all of them, and want a fourth option, this "tenseless" form of exist, but I have no idea what that is.
My current experience is of only this one moment, and that cannot be reconciled with the view that I am currently experiencing my entire life. — Alec
It does indeed say that, with the note that Socrates is not currently present. So there's a difference, and they are apparently allowing the use of an implied reference to a present. — noAxioms
So in my posts, I consider references to the present ('right now', 'currently', etc.) to be temporal references, not ontological ones. There is no ontological now, nor a time that is ontologically the current one. — noAxioms
Are you saying that relativity does not order my parents' birth before my own? The ordering is ambiguous or nonexistent? — noAxioms
Right. It appears that one's identity is a series of experiences along the time dimension that are connected in an intimate way by laws of nature but each experience excludes the others. Earlier experiences may affect later experiences as memories built in the structure of your brain but at each moment there is an experience that excludes both earlier and later experiences. This exclusion seems to be due to the fact that consciousness exists only on certain time scales, which is about tens of milliseconds. There is no experience on shorter or longer time intervals. And so you cannot have an experience that spans an hour or your whole life. At this moment you have an experience that spans say 50 milliseconds. Over the next 50 milliseconds you have a different experience and not the one that you have over the previous 50 milliseconds. And you have no experience that spans 100 milliseconds. — litewave
They are existing in an ontological sense, but not a temporal sense. I don't like to reference the present when speaking of ontological sense since it has no ontological existence. But the temporal present can still be referenced and that is what the Stanford post is doing. Such mixing of senses only serves to confuse.But they are all currently existing. Again, I must emphasize that part of your post. You keep saying that that they aren't. Unless you want to backtrack on that. — Alec
Sure there is. Temporal now is today, the day this forum post is submitted.Perhaps you meant to say that there is no temporal now?
Good example of mixing senses, leading to confusion. Everything exists (ontological, italics) right now (temporal, bold). Eternalism does not give temporal existence to Socrates, nor give any ontological status to 'right now'.If you're saying that there is no sense of an ontological now, then you're contradicting what you just quoted. Everything exists right now under eternalism, in the ontological sense.
I cannot agree to a statement with mixed senses like that. Be explicit. Every event (there is no 'every time' since something like '1945' is ambiguous outside the context of Earth) currently (temporal sense) exists (ontological sense).But if you agree that every time in the universe's history currently exists in the ontological sense, then we can move on to the bigger problem in the OP, which is how, if all times of our life currently exist, and that we are currently a 4D object that extends throughout our life, can be reconciled to our current experience of only one of those times.
No, I don't disagree with relativity of simultaneity, but my parents are still born before I was.I would ask if you're disagreeing with the relativity of simultaneity.
They are existing in an ontological sense, but not a temporal sense. — noAxioms
I don't like to reference the present when speaking of ontological sense since it has no ontological existence. But the temporal present can still be referenced and that is what the Stanford post is doing. Such mixing of senses only serves to confuse. — noAxioms
Good example of mixing senses, leading to confusion. Everything exists (ontological, italics) right now (temporal, bold). Eternalism does not give temporal existence to Socrates, nor give any ontological status to 'right now'. — noAxioms
I cannot agree to a statement with mixed senses like that. Be explicit. Every event (there is no 'every time' since something like '1945' is ambiguous outside the context of Earth) currently (temporal sense) exists (ontological sense). — noAxioms
I didn't say that, unqualified like that.And so they currently exist which I have quoted you as saying. — Alec
Stanford qualifies the difference. If it states that there is an ontological present, then it is not any form of eternalism that I'll agree with.This is a good example of misrepresenting what I said. Did I bring in anything temporal? I was speaking strictly and purely from an ontological standpoint, and all uses of the word "now" and its synonyms are in the ontological sense.
In a strictly ontological sense (there is also a temporal sense), there is no 'currently'. Current with what? Eternalism is not a statement of the simultaneity of all events. Time is a dimension, not a point.Like I said, everything is strictly ontological, so you can't dodge the problem like before.
If it states that there is an ontological present, then it is not any form of eternalism that I'll agree with. — noAxioms
It could be that we do not either exist as complete 4D entities extended throughout our entire lives, nor instantaneous entities in the block universe, but are actually somewhere in between, mini 4D entities who exist for only a mere few milliseconds, but certainly more than an instant. — Alec
Our brains seemingly just process information in discrete chunks of 50 milliseconds, but our experiences are constantly flowing in and out (presumably staying within our brain for that particular interval of time), so which parts of our lives these our mini 4D entities do occupy and experience is unclear which raises the question of why our lives were "cut" up in a particular manner. — Alec
Personally, I think that the fact that our brains process information at a certain time scale has no ontological implications. It just means that at every moment we are aware of events occurring within a period of time but that does not mean that our conscious mind need be extended. — Alec
But there must also be a kind of connectedness between these mini 4D entities that enables accumulation and integration of memories that enable our experience of personal identity that evolves in time. — litewave
These chunks of experiences may actually overlap, but since we cannot experience time intervals under the scale of tens of milliseconds the transitions between experiences may feel fuzzy and continuous. — litewave
Our experiences are obviously associated with spatiotemporally extended objects like brains but the experiences themselves seem to be indivisible and unanalyzable. They seem to have an intrinsic, unstructured, monadic identity as well as a relational identity that is constituted by the relations of the intrinsic identity to other intrinsic identities. This metaphysical view is also known as Russellian monism. — litewave
The only other option that I see is that there would have to be infinite versions of me (or an incredibly large amount) which exist corresponding to every moment of my life. That is, there is a version of me that only experiences a moment when I am a toddler, one experiencing a moment where I am an old man, and of course one where I am asking this question. — Alec
That would explain why my experience is of one moment only but now we face the question of why I only experience this particular view. Out of all the different versions of me that exist, why am I the person who experiences life in October of 2017? — Alec
To be clear though, I am not referring to an experience of time as passing in a world that isn't; that is another issue for another topic. Instead, I am talking about the fact that currently, I have the subjective experience of this particular moment of asking this question. — Alec
The only other option that I see is that there would have to be infinite versions of me (or an incredibly large amount) which exist corresponding to every moment of my life. — Alec
If it is, then we have two "times", one in the eternalist block, the other to account for the ordered relations, the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
This idea just occurred to me a while ago but it seems that the second timeline, which would be a series of my passing "now" experiences of the eternalist block, would constitute another eternalist block. It would be a series of my brain states or mind states, each state being an experience. And since my subjective experiential timeline is bound up with the objective world timeline we might fuse these two timelines into one timeline of a world that includes both the objective world and our brain or mind states. — litewave
Funnily, it also occurred to me that the "passage" of time may be a phenomenon that is not only our subjective experience but in some weird sense also a property of the objective world. Let me explain. What we experience is, strictly speaking, not the external world but the representations of the external world in our minds. But since these representations are particular mappings, via causal relations involving the senses, of the external world onto our minds, there is some significant similarity between the external world and our representations of it. For example, when we see a triangular traffic sign in the street, the triangle of the traffic sign in the external world is similar to the triangle experienced in our mind. Also presumably, when we experience the red color of a tomato, there is some similarity between our experience of red color and a property of the tomato that is represented by our experience of red color. And so, when we experience the passage of time of the external world there seems to be a property of the external world that is somehow similar to its representation, that is, to our experience of the passage of time. That property would be an objective "passage" of time. It would be like an "experience" of the eternalist external world block itself, associated with structural properties of the world (the relativistic structure of spacetime, the laws of physics, the second law of thermodynamics...). — litewave
Exactly. We conclude that there is an objective timeline from the fact that there is consistency in our experience, so from the consistency in this aspect of our experience, time passing, we can conclude that there is an objective aspect of reality which corresponds to this experience the passage of time. So the question is, how do we reconcile this with the eternalist block time. I don't think it is possible, and that's why I don't think that the block time is an acceptable representation of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
Eternalism is not an assertion that all times 'currently exist'. — noAxioms
According to Eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist right now, even though they are not currently present. — Alec
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