According to eternalism, every moment in the universe's history is real and as such exists simultaneously. — Alec

No, not simultaneously. Each moment is its own time (they're not simultaneous any more than each location is the same place). It's just that no particular moment is special any more than any particular location is the one correct 'here'.

No, not simultaneously. — noAxioms

According to eternalism, every moment is real in the same sense as the present is real. I don't see how else I can make sense of all moments being real or equally real other than to treat them all as I do present objects, which is to say, that they currently exist, unless you have another idea of what it means to say that they are all "real".

I have the subjective experience of this particular moment of asking this question. — Alec

Eliminativism most likely (denial of subjective experience/ appearance vs the reality), I think that's what can be interpreted the "stubbornly persistent illusion" quote.

Anyway, the B-theory of time is the modern Parimendes and so the classicial criticisms apply. Such as how it is possible to be persuaded by the result of argument if change is not possible. In order to accept B-theory, you have to accept minds can change in some way and the change must be in some way the result of the argument.

According to eternalism, every moment is real in the same sense as the present is real. I don't see how else I can make sense of all moments being real or equally real other than to say treat them all as I do present objects, which is to say, that they currently exist, unless you have a better idea of what it means to say that they are all "real". — Alec

Very well then, but use of relative terms to describe a non-relative concept is inevitably going to run into inconsistencies like that.

What do you mean by "relative terms"? And what inconsistency are you talking about? I don't understand.

I was asking if you have an idea of what all moments being equally "real" or all "existing" could possibly mean if not that they exist in the present tense. If you cannot do so for whatever reason, then I can only conclude that your disagreement is irrational and that you don't know what you're talking about.

What do you mean by "relative terms"? And what inconsistency are you talking about? I don't understand. — Alec

Let me bold some:

...every moment is real in the same sense as the present is real. ... to treat them all as I do present objects, which is to say, that they currently exist, unless you have another idea of what it means to say that they are all "real". — Alec

There is no present, no present objects, since no reference has been specified. So you can say that Napoleon presently exists at Earth, 1815, which is a redundant way of saying Napoleon exists at Earth, 1815. But there is no 'the present', and 'currently' is meaningless without a temporal reference point. Whose present? Currently with what? Begging references to these things is going to make you declare the position irrational.

I was asking if you have an idea of what all moments being equally "real" or all "existing" could possibly mean if not that they exist in the present tense. If you cannot do so for whatever reason, then I can only conclude that your disagreement is irrational and that you don't know what you're talking about.

Napoleon exists, and he also exists in 1815, but does not exist in 1915 since the two times are not simultaneous. Paris exists, and Paris exists in France, but Paris does not exist in Japan since the two locations are not the same place. But that doesn't mean Paris doesn't exist just because the speaker is in Japan. It simply doesn't exist at that speaker's 'here' any more than Napoleon exists at your 'present'.

There is no present, no present objects, since no reference has been specified. So you can say that Napoleon presently exists at Earth, 1815, which is a redundant way of saying Napoleon exists at Earth, 1815. But there is no 'the present', and 'currently' is meaningless without a temporal reference point. Whose present? Currently with what? Begging references to these things is going to make you declare the position irrational. — noAxioms

I think you're confusing a preferred time with things currently existing. The argument from relativity states that there is nothing to determine that one set of simultaneous events should be preferred to any other, leading to the conclusion that none are. There are no privileged frames; this is known as the relativity of simultaneity.

It is like saying that any one place in space is privileged. Our location is not any more special than any other in the universe. For instance, some may say that our planet is at the centre, but that is not true at all, or at least not justifiable. However, that does not prevent us from saying that all locations presently exist or are currently existing.

Napoleon exists, and he also exists in 1815, but does not exist in 1915 since the two times are not simultaneous. Paris exists, and Paris exists in France, but Paris does not exist in Japan since the two locations are not the same place. But that doesn't mean Paris doesn't exist just because the speaker is in Japan. It simply doesn't exist at that speaker's 'here' any more than Napoleon exists at your 'present'. — noAxioms

My emphasis on the word "exists". You seem to be using "exist" in the present tense. You don't say that Napoleon "did exist" or "will exist", you are saying that he currently exists.

I think you should understand that under eternalism, time as a dimension functions very much like space. One could even say that it is the fourth dimension of space. The notion of past and future are replaced with earlier and later, which designate coordinates in our universe just as spatial ones. Just as we say that Pluto exists over there, so too do we say that Napoleon exists in 1815.

I think you're confusing a preferred time with things currently existing. — Alec

Eternalism is not an assertion that all times 'currently exist'.

The argument from relativity states that there is nothing to determine that one set of simultaneous events should be preferred to any other, leading to the conclusion that none are.

No, events are still ordered if within each others' light cones. My parents were born before me, in any relativistic reference frame.

There are no privileged frames; this is known as the relativity of simultaneity.

Eternalism is not an assertion about simultaneity or preferred frames or the lack of them.

My emphasis on the word "exists". You seem to be using "exist" in the present tense.

Both are tenseless.

You don't say that Napoleon "did exist" or "will exist", you are saying that he currently exists.

No, I say he exists. There is no current time.

Eliminativism most likely (denial of subjective experience/ appearance vs the reality), I think that's what can be interpreted the "stubbornly persistent illusion" quote. — JupiterJess

That sounds a bit too extreme to me. It seems like eternalists are willing to grant that experiences do occur, but that they are illusory in the sense that what they imply isn't real. For instance, I mentioned the problem with the experience of the passage of time in my OP, where the common position is to accept our subjective experience, but at the same time explain it away via psychological reasons.

Anyway, the B-theory of time is the modern Parimendes and so the classicial criticisms apply. Such as how it is possible to be persuaded by the result of argument if change is not possible. In order to accept B-theory, you have to accept minds can change in some way and the change must be in some way the result of the argument.

Not familiar with Parmenides, so I'll have to look into that. My main concern however is with the problems with the view from a phenomenological standpoint, so if you have any comments on that then I'd be interested to hear them.

Eternalism is not an assertion that all times 'currently exist'. — noAxioms

Sorry, but this is just false:

One version of Non-presentism is Eternalism, which says that objects from both the past and the future exist just as much as present objects. According to Eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist right now, even though they are not currently present. We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things. — Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Time (My emphasis)

Maybe you should read up on more on the view before talking about it.

No, events are still ordered if within each others' light cones. My parents were born before me, in any relativistic reference frame. — noAxioms

There is a reason why they call it "Relativity". It's because of the fact of the relativity of simultaneity. Look it up if you disagree.

Eternalism is not an assertion about simultaneity or preferred frames or the lack of them. — noAxioms

Yeah, that was my point. Eternalism doesn't say anything about simultaneity. It has probably been around before relativity was a thing but the lack of any absolute notion of simultaneity has been used to argue for the view.

No, I say he exists. There is no current time. — noAxioms

I'm sorry, but there are only three ways I could read your "exists". Either you're saying that Napoleon "did exist" or "will exist" or you're saying that he is currently existing. You somehow deny all of them, and want a fourth option, this "tenseless" form of exist, but I have no idea what that is.

It's like libertarian free will. Metaphysical libertarians want something that isn't random but also somehow not causally determined. What else is there? I dunno but apparently it isn't any of the well defined options out there.

Sorry, but this is just false:

One version of Non-presentism is Eternalism, which says that objects from both the past and the future exist just as much as present objects. According to Eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist right now, even though they are not currently present. We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things.
— Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Time (My emphasis)

Maybe you should read up on more on the view before talking about it. — Alec

It does indeed say that, with the note that Socrates is not currently present. So there's a difference, and they are apparently allowing the use of an implied reference to a present.
You cut away the distinction between temporal sense and ontological sense of the concept of 'exists right now'

It might be objected that there is something odd about attributing to a Non-presentist the claim that Socrates exists right now, since there is a sense in which that claim is clearly false. In order to forestall this objection, let us distinguish between two senses of ‘x exists now’. In one sense, which we can call the temporal location sense, this expression is synonymous with ‘x is present’. The Non-presentist will admit that, in the temporal location sense of ‘x exists now’, it is true that no non-present objects exist right now. But in the other sense of ‘x exists now’, which we can call the ontological sense, to say that x exists now is just to say that x is now in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, whether x happens to be present, like you and me, or non-present, like Socrates. When we attribute to Non-presentists the claim that non-present objects like Socrates exist right now, we commit the Non-presentist only to the claim that these non-present objects exist now in the ontological sense (the one involving the most unrestricted quantifiers). — Stanford

So in my posts, I consider references to the present ('right now', 'currently', etc.) to be temporal references, not ontological ones. There is no ontological now, nor a time that is ontologically the current one.

No, events are still ordered if within each others' light cones. My parents were born before me, in any relativistic reference frame.
— noAxioms

There is a reason why they call it "Relativity". It's because of the fact of the relativity of simultaneity. Look it up if you disagree.

Are you saying that relativity does not order my parents' birth before my own? The ordering is ambiguous or nonexistent?

Yeah, that was my point. Eternalism doesn't say anything about simultaneity. It has probably been around before relativity was a thing but the lack of any absolute notion of simultaneity has been used to argue for the view.

Yes, the lack of absolute simultaneity is seriously suggestive, but not proof of any sort.

No, I say he exists. There is no current time.
— noAxioms

I'm sorry, but there are only three ways I could read your "exists". Either you're saying that Napoleon "did exist" or "will exist" or you're saying that he is currently existing. You somehow deny all of them, and want a fourth option, this "tenseless" form of exist, but I have no idea what that is.

Yes, all three reference the present. I mean exists ontologically, and eternalism does not give any ontological status to a present, so there is no present to reference.

I guess I should have referenced Socrates, not Napoleon.

I think

Eternalists are temporal realists who believe that our physical notion of time is fundamental and represents mind-independent and psychologically timeless entities that in some metaphysically independent way gives rise to our psychological notion of time.

Presentists are temporal idealists who see our psychological notion of time as fundamental and consisting of private definitions of temporal signification which relate directly to first-person experience, and believe that physical time is conceptually reducible to talk of psychological time.

'Simultaneous' is a temporal term, not an ontological one. So Earth, 2045 and 1945 both exist (exist now in an ontological sense), but there is no simultaneity to that. Temporally, the two years are 100 years apart and hardly simultaneous.

Relativity I suppose says that the temporal distance between the two events is frame dependent, but the ordering is not. Relativity is not a statement of ontology (despite being suggestive of it), so it is pretty mute about the ontological sense of the two events.

Agree with the post. I've said elsewhere that it reduces to temporal realism vs. idealism.

My current experience is of only this one moment, and that cannot be reconciled with the view that I am currently experiencing my entire life. — Alec

Right. It appears that one's identity is a series of experiences along the time dimension that are connected in an intimate way by laws of nature but each experience excludes the others. Earlier experiences may affect later experiences as memories built in the structure of your brain but at each moment there is an experience that excludes both earlier and later experiences. This exclusion seems to be due to the fact that consciousness exists only on certain time scales, which is about tens of milliseconds. There is no experience on shorter or longer time intervals. And so you cannot have an experience that spans an hour or your whole life. At this moment you have an experience that spans say 50 milliseconds. Over the next 50 milliseconds you have a different experience and not the one that you have over the previous 50 milliseconds. And you have no experience that spans 100 milliseconds.

Why consciousness is constituted this way is an open question. There are many questions about why consciousness is the way it is, for example why a particular pattern of firing neurons feels like experience of red color or why another pattern feels like experience of sweet taste.

It does indeed say that, with the note that Socrates is not currently present. So there's a difference, and they are apparently allowing the use of an implied reference to a present. — noAxioms

But they are all currently existing. Again, I must emphasize that part of your post. You keep saying that that they aren't. Unless you want to backtrack on that.

So in my posts, I consider references to the present ('right now', 'currently', etc.) to be temporal references, not ontological ones. There is no ontological now, nor a time that is ontologically the current one. — noAxioms

Perhaps you meant to say that there is no temporal now? If you're saying that there is no sense of an ontological now, then you're contradicting what you just quoted. Everything exists right now under eternalism, in the ontological sense. This sense of now is just the sense of now that we have when we speak in the present tense.

But if you agree that every time in the universe's history currently exists in the ontological sense, then we can move on to the bigger problem in the OP, which is how, if all times of our life currently exist, and that we are currently a 4D object that extends throughout our life, can be reconciled to our current experience of only one of those times.

Are you saying that relativity does not order my parents' birth before my own? The ordering is ambiguous or nonexistent? — noAxioms

I would ask if you're disagreeing with the relativity of simultaneity. If you are then you'll have more help reading up the literature on it. If not, then I have no idea what your disagreement is on about.

Right. It appears that one's identity is a series of experiences along the time dimension that are connected in an intimate way by laws of nature but each experience excludes the others. Earlier experiences may affect later experiences as memories built in the structure of your brain but at each moment there is an experience that excludes both earlier and later experiences. This exclusion seems to be due to the fact that consciousness exists only on certain time scales, which is about tens of milliseconds. There is no experience on shorter or longer time intervals. And so you cannot have an experience that spans an hour or your whole life. At this moment you have an experience that spans say 50 milliseconds. Over the next 50 milliseconds you have a different experience and not the one that you have over the previous 50 milliseconds. And you have no experience that spans 100 milliseconds. — litewave

Interesting. It could be that we do not either exist as complete 4D entities extended throughout our entire lives, nor instantaneous entities in the block universe, but are actually somewhere in between, mini 4D entities who exist for only a mere few milliseconds, but certainly more than an instant. However, that does raise a number of problematic questions, such as how arbitrary processes within our brain during our lives can determine how we are extended through time. In a sense, such a process seems to be meta-temporal, where events within time can affect the way time is divided, which is somewhat strange to me. In addition, even if our brains are at every moment, processing events of an extended interval of time, this process (at least to my mind) is continuous. Our brains seemingly just process information in discrete chunks of 50 milliseconds, but our experiences are constantly flowing in and out (presumably staying within our brain for that particular interval of time), so which parts of our lives these our mini 4D entities do occupy and experience is unclear which raises the question of why our lives were "cut" up in a particular manner.

Personally, I think that the fact that our brains process information at a certain time scale has no ontological implications. It just means that at every moment we are aware of events occurring within a period of time but that does not mean that our conscious mind need be extended.

But they are all currently existing. Again, I must emphasize that part of your post. You keep saying that that they aren't. Unless you want to backtrack on that. — Alec

They are existing in an ontological sense, but not a temporal sense. I don't like to reference the present when speaking of ontological sense since it has no ontological existence. But the temporal present can still be referenced and that is what the Stanford post is doing. Such mixing of senses only serves to confuse.

Perhaps you meant to say that there is no temporal now?

Sure there is. Temporal now is today, the day this forum post is submitted.

If you're saying that there is no sense of an ontological now, then you're contradicting what you just quoted. Everything exists right now under eternalism, in the ontological sense.

Good example of mixing senses, leading to confusion. Everything exists (ontological, italics) right now (temporal, bold). Eternalism does not give temporal existence to Socrates, nor give any ontological status to 'right now'.

But if you agree that every time in the universe's history currently exists in the ontological sense, then we can move on to the bigger problem in the OP, which is how, if all times of our life currently exist, and that we are currently a 4D object that extends throughout our life, can be reconciled to our current experience of only one of those times.

I cannot agree to a statement with mixed senses like that. Be explicit. Every event (there is no 'every time' since something like '1945' is ambiguous outside the context of Earth) currently (temporal sense) exists (ontological sense).
That's utterly confusing, but at least spelled out.

Are you saying that relativity does not order my parents' birth before my own? The ordering is ambiguous or nonexistent?
— noAxioms

I would ask if you're disagreeing with the relativity of simultaneity.

No, I don't disagree with relativity of simultaneity, but my parents are still born before I was.



Going offline for quite some

They are existing in an ontological sense, but not a temporal sense. — noAxioms

And so they currently exist which I have quoted you as saying.

I don't like to reference the present when speaking of ontological sense since it has no ontological existence. But the temporal present can still be referenced and that is what the Stanford post is doing. Such mixing of senses only serves to confuse. — noAxioms

Look, the Stanford author was clearly outlining a sense of "now" that is ontological, which for some reason you want to deny. If you disagree with him in any way, then just say it. If you're more interested in muddling things, then I don't see how this discussion can go forward.

Good example of mixing senses, leading to confusion. Everything exists (ontological, italics) right now (temporal, bold). Eternalism does not give temporal existence to Socrates, nor give any ontological status to 'right now'. — noAxioms

This is a good example of misrepresenting what I said. Did I bring in anything temporal? I was speaking strictly and purely from an ontological standpoint, and all uses of the word "now" and its synonyms are in the ontological sense.

I cannot agree to a statement with mixed senses like that. Be explicit. Every event (there is no 'every time' since something like '1945' is ambiguous outside the context of Earth) currently (temporal sense) exists (ontological sense). — noAxioms

Like I said, everything is strictly ontological, so you can't dodge the problem like before.

.

And so they currently exist which I have quoted you as saying. — Alec

I didn't say that, unqualified like that.

This is a good example of misrepresenting what I said. Did I bring in anything temporal? I was speaking strictly and purely from an ontological standpoint, and all uses of the word "now" and its synonyms are in the ontological sense.

Stanford qualifies the difference. If it states that there is an ontological present, then it is not any form of eternalism that I'll agree with.

Like I said, everything is strictly ontological, so you can't dodge the problem like before.

In a strictly ontological sense (there is also a temporal sense), there is no 'currently'. Current with what? Eternalism is not a statement of the simultaneity of all events. Time is a dimension, not a point.

If it states that there is an ontological present, then it is not any form of eternalism that I'll agree with. — noAxioms

Okay, then you disagree with the article. I don't really have much else to say then :-} .
I can only conclude that your version of eternalism is, like libertarian free will, irrational and ill defined.

It could be that we do not either exist as complete 4D entities extended throughout our entire lives, nor instantaneous entities in the block universe, but are actually somewhere in between, mini 4D entities who exist for only a mere few milliseconds, but certainly more than an instant. — Alec

But there must also be a kind of connectedness between these mini 4D entities that enables accumulation and integration of memories that enable our experience of personal identity that evolves in time.

Our brains seemingly just process information in discrete chunks of 50 milliseconds, but our experiences are constantly flowing in and out (presumably staying within our brain for that particular interval of time), so which parts of our lives these our mini 4D entities do occupy and experience is unclear which raises the question of why our lives were "cut" up in a particular manner. — Alec

These chunks of experiences may actually overlap, but since we cannot experience time intervals under the scale of tens of milliseconds the transitions between experiences may feel fuzzy and continuous.

Personally, I think that the fact that our brains process information at a certain time scale has no ontological implications. It just means that at every moment we are aware of events occurring within a period of time but that does not mean that our conscious mind need be extended. — Alec

Our experiences are obviously associated with spatiotemporally extended objects like brains but the experiences themselves seem to be indivisible and unanalyzable. They seem to have an intrinsic, unstructured, monadic identity as well as a relational identity that is constituted by the relations of the intrinsic identity to other intrinsic identities. This metaphysical view is also known as Russellian monism.

If i say "now and here" for no apparent reason while pointing at a tree, what information have i conveyed?

Haven't I at best, merely named the tree "now and here"?

But there must also be a kind of connectedness between these mini 4D entities that enables accumulation and integration of memories that enable our experience of personal identity that evolves in time. — litewave

Yes. They are all different versions of the same entity that exists over its entire lifetime, different clones of the same person.

These chunks of experiences may actually overlap, but since we cannot experience time intervals under the scale of tens of milliseconds the transitions between experiences may feel fuzzy and continuous. — litewave

That could be the case, but then that would sound a bit too extravagant and excessive. Instead of having multiple 4D entities that uniquely experiences and represents a portion of a person's life, every moment is represented by a multiple (perhaps infinite) entities that each have very slight differences in regions they occupy. Personally, I think that sounds even more strange.

Our experiences are obviously associated with spatiotemporally extended objects like brains but the experiences themselves seem to be indivisible and unanalyzable. They seem to have an intrinsic, unstructured, monadic identity as well as a relational identity that is constituted by the relations of the intrinsic identity to other intrinsic identities. This metaphysical view is also known as Russellian monism. — litewave

Not entirely familiar with that view, so I'll have to look into that. I do think that this particular issue is related to the debate between what people call Extensionalism and Retentionalism. There are those (the extensionalists) who have argued that the specious present requires our minds to be actually extended and those (the retentionalists) who claim that it doesn't. This partially extended view seems to involve some form of the former view. I, however, happen to find the latter more preferable since it seems to reduce our specious present into something purely psychological instead of metaphysical.

The only other option that I see is that there would have to be infinite versions of me (or an incredibly large amount) which exist corresponding to every moment of my life. That is, there is a version of me that only experiences a moment when I am a toddler, one experiencing a moment where I am an old man, and of course one where I am asking this question. — Alec

I actually argued for something similar to this in a thread a few months back. I think your conclusion refers to the stage view of persistence, which states that you are one of the multiple (though not numerically identical) instantaneous counterparts of you in the block universe.

If you're willing to do some extra reading, there have been other authors who have discussed this topic. Off the top of my head, there is Experience and the Passage of Time by Bradford Skow (which I think can be found on the author's page) and A phenomenological argument for stage theory by Josh Parsons (I'm not sure if this can be found online as easily though).

That would explain why my experience is of one moment only but now we face the question of why I only experience this particular view. Out of all the different versions of me that exist, why am I the person who experiences life in October of 2017? — Alec

This is like asking why you are you and not somebody else. It's not like there was a roulette wheel that was spun prior to your birth to determine who you are. If you were somebody else you would probably ask the same question, and similarly, the same would apply if you weren't the you who experiences life on October 20 of 2017.

To be clear though, I am not referring to an experience of time as passing in a world that isn't; that is another issue for another topic. Instead, I am talking about the fact that currently, I have the subjective experience of this particular moment of asking this question. — Alec

I don't think that you can separate these two. The particular experience of asking the question, takes time, it has temporal extension. So it is impossible to separate the experience of this particular moment, from the experience of time passing, because the experience of this particular moment is an experience of time passing. By the time you say "now", time has passed, so even the moment of now involves an experience of time passing.

If we assume a block universe, then the subject must be somehow propelled through this block to create the feeling of time passing. The propellant must be something external to the universe, but within the subject, to create the subjective experience. So there must be something within the subject, which is external to the universe, causing the subject to experience a procession of time. This suggests dualism.

The only other option that I see is that there would have to be infinite versions of me (or an incredibly large amount) which exist corresponding to every moment of my life. — Alec

The problem with this perspective is to account for the connection between the different versions of you, and the relationship of order, between them. If there are different versions of you, then how can you have memories from different versions of you. This requires that you assume a relationship between the different versions of you. What is this relation, and why is there a particular order to the memories of the occurrence of different versions of you? So you end up having to assume something else, to account for these relationships. What is that something else? Is it time passing? If it is, then we have two "times", one in the eternalist block, the other to account for the ordered relations, the passing of time..

So we can't call this "time", because it would create contradiction, two distinct definitions of "time". What is it then, other than that special feature of the subject, which I've already spoken about, that causes an ordered relationship of memories? Either way, if we assume the eternalist block, dualism is unavoidable.

If it is, then we have two "times", one in the eternalist block, the other to account for the ordered relations, the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

This idea just occurred to me a while ago but it seems that the second timeline, which would be a series of my passing "now" experiences of the eternalist block, would constitute another eternalist block. It would be a series of my brain states or mind states, each state being an experience. And since my subjective experiential timeline is bound up with the objective world timeline we might fuse these two timelines into one timeline of a world that includes both the objective world and our brain or mind states.

Funnily, it also occurred to me that the "passage" of time may be a phenomenon that is not only our subjective experience but in some weird sense also a property of the objective world. Let me explain. What we experience is, strictly speaking, not the external world but the representations of the external world in our minds. But since these representations are particular mappings, via causal relations involving the senses, of the external world onto our minds, there is some significant similarity between the external world and our representations of it. For example, when we see a triangular traffic sign in the street, the triangle of the traffic sign in the external world is similar to the triangle experienced in our mind. Also presumably, when we experience the red color of a tomato, there is some similarity between our experience of red color and a property of the tomato that is represented by our experience of red color. And so, when we experience the passage of time of the external world there seems to be a property of the external world that is somehow similar to its representation, that is, to our experience of the passage of time. That property would be an objective "passage" of time. It would be like an "experience" of the eternalist external world block itself, associated with structural properties of the world (the relativistic structure of spacetime, the laws of physics, the second law of thermodynamics...).

This idea just occurred to me a while ago but it seems that the second timeline, which would be a series of my passing "now" experiences of the eternalist block, would constitute another eternalist block. It would be a series of my brain states or mind states, each state being an experience. And since my subjective experiential timeline is bound up with the objective world timeline we might fuse these two timelines into one timeline of a world that includes both the objective world and our brain or mind states. — litewave

I follow, except there is a lot more than two timelines, because every subject has one's own timeline. Then the "objective timeline" is assumed to have real existence because we can find consistency between the different subjective lines. The real issue though, is the experience of time passing. I don't believe it is possible to disassociate the "now" experience from the experience of time passing, so we have to work this "time passing" into the objective timeline.

Funnily, it also occurred to me that the "passage" of time may be a phenomenon that is not only our subjective experience but in some weird sense also a property of the objective world. Let me explain. What we experience is, strictly speaking, not the external world but the representations of the external world in our minds. But since these representations are particular mappings, via causal relations involving the senses, of the external world onto our minds, there is some significant similarity between the external world and our representations of it. For example, when we see a triangular traffic sign in the street, the triangle of the traffic sign in the external world is similar to the triangle experienced in our mind. Also presumably, when we experience the red color of a tomato, there is some similarity between our experience of red color and a property of the tomato that is represented by our experience of red color. And so, when we experience the passage of time of the external world there seems to be a property of the external world that is somehow similar to its representation, that is, to our experience of the passage of time. That property would be an objective "passage" of time. It would be like an "experience" of the eternalist external world block itself, associated with structural properties of the world (the relativistic structure of spacetime, the laws of physics, the second law of thermodynamics...). — litewave

Exactly. We conclude that there is an objective timeline from the fact that there is consistency in our experience, so from the consistency in this aspect of our experience, time passing, we can conclude that there is an objective aspect of reality which corresponds to this experience the passage of time. So the question is, how do we reconcile this with the eternalist block time. I don't think it is possible, and that's why I don't think that the block time is an acceptable representation of reality.

Exactly. We conclude that there is an objective timeline from the fact that there is consistency in our experience, so from the consistency in this aspect of our experience, time passing, we can conclude that there is an objective aspect of reality which corresponds to this experience the passage of time. So the question is, how do we reconcile this with the eternalist block time. I don't think it is possible, and that's why I don't think that the block time is an acceptable representation of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would reconcile an objective passage of time with the eternalist block time in the following way. While the subjective passage of time is a qualitative aspect of a pattern of neuronal firings (an experience), the objective passage of time is a qualitative aspect of the pattern of the external world (which is represented in our mind by the pattern of neuronal firings). Both the external world pattern and the pattern of neuronal firings are patterns in an eternalist block spacetime, but every pattern has a qualitative aspect (in addition to its structural aspect); in the case of the neuronal firings it is a conscious quality (quale/experience) while in the case of the external world it is, presumably, an unconscious quality. These two qualities are similar because the two patterns are similar, but one quality is conscious and the other is probably unconscious. It seems impossible to imagine the unconscious quality because only conscious qualities can constitute the content of our consciousness, but we know that there is some kind of similarity of the unconscious quality to the conscious quality, and so in the external world there is some kind of counterpart of the consciously experienced passage of time. But as I said, both kinds of the passage of time are qualitative aspects of a static, eternalist pattern.

The "qualitative aspect" of a pattern may seem like a convenient concoction but I think there is a plausible metaphysical idea behind it. The idea is that every thing has an intrinsic identity, which is something that the thing is in itself, and this intrinsic identity is unstructured/monadic and therefore "qualitative" - it is the qualitative aspect of the thing. This same thing also has a structural identity, which may be a structure constituted by the relations of the thing to its parts (or generally by the relations of the thing to any other things), but since the thing (the whole) is not identical to any of its parts, the intrinsic identity of the thing is not constituted by its parts. The intrinsic identity is something indescribable because when we describe something we always present the thing in its relations to other things (by referring to its parts, properties or other things). And so it ultimately defies description what the "passage of time" is in itself. We may label it by a name or a phrase like the "passage of time", or describe it by reference to other aspects of reality like "past", "present" and "future", which however have something qualitative and therefore indescribable about them too.

The metaphysical view known as Russellian monism proposes that intrinsic identities, or at least some subset of them, are qualities of consciousness. The panpsychist version of Russellian monism regards all intrinsic identities as qualities of consciousness while other versions only some - that's why I differentiated between the conscious qualities of neuronal firing patterns and the probably unconscious qualities of the external world patterns. (in the end we might say that all qualities are conscious but differentiate the "level" or "intensity" of consciousness)

Eternalism is not an assertion that all times 'currently exist'. — noAxioms

From the Stanford entry:

According to Eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist right now, even though they are not currently present. — Alec

What is the difference between "existing right now" and being "currently present"? That is either a contradiction or conceptual confusion in the article, or else "existing right now" does not mean "existing at the present time". Perhaps 'right now" in the context of eternailsm is thought of not as the present moment, but instead the eternal present which is the totality of all present moments, but obviously not merely any one of them.

This is similar to the idea that "right here" could be anywhere is space, or in other words is applicable in general to everywhere, not merely specifically to where you or I happen to be.