Just to be clear, I don't think there is an answer to this "why." I think it's a pseudo-question, however lyrical. — t0m
given the particular circumstances and the laws in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected — Hempel
These top level laws are "brute fact." For you these brute facts seem to include some kind of random variation and the laws of mathematics at least. These variations are assumed to be quantifiable. So your'e not starting from nothing — t0m
Of course I don't think it's possible to start from nothing, so that's not a fault in your system. — t0m
There's also Hume's problem. Your system (I think) assumes the metaphysical necessity of scientific laws? But I don't know of any deduction of this necessity. It seems to be a hardwired prejudice. — t0m
Vagueness is more an everythingness in being unbounded possibility. — apokrisis
Either you are happy with laws as brute fact, or you feel it is reasonable to challenge that. — apokrisis
But that is just the usual habit of explaining by imagining being outside the thing to be explained. And that is precisely why attempts to account for the Cosmos and the Mind always flounder. By definition, we can't step outside existence itself to explain existence. — apokrisis
Again please respect that I am very clear that I don't start from nothing. I start from less than nothing. The fact that you try to put me back in that frame - talking about the presence or absence of particulars - shows that you are not really dealing with my actual argument. — apokrisis
The analogy with human laws sounds too much like nature might require a "law giver". Symmetries, being emergent invariances, do away with that kind of externalist metaphysics. — apokrisis
But how is this vagueness itself not your brute fact? — t0m
Brute fact is "God" without the mask. I suppose that's the aesthetic appeal. — t0m
Assuming that your or his narrative is rhetorically plausible, is this enough for its adoption? — t0m
Your theory may indeed prove to be a valuable tool within the sciences. I'm not qualified to say. But I don't see a personal use for it. — t0m
I do like the later part of the theory, where order emerges in order to speed the general dissolution. That's aesthetically dazzling. — t0m
Your argument isn't easy to follow. Some of your individual points are quite digestible. But, for instance, you now seem to be recanting the minimization of brute fact and denying it altogether. — t0m
Rhetorical? Either it is logical and worth adopting for that reason, or it is not. Either as belief it has pragmatic consequences, or it does not. — apokrisis
I said ultimately it is. But the tiniest possible scrap of a brute fact. — apokrisis
Fine. You don't. I do.
Or at least you say you don't. And then you argue that in terms of dialectical reasoning. My view may be scientifically objective, but yours is subjectively personal. My view may be rational and inductive, but yours is intuitive and aesthetic. — apokrisis
Hah. The whole discussion is just for fun. Really, having a theory about the existence of reality - even a "scientific" one - is more an aesthetic enterprise at the end of the day. It is not as if we could use the answer to do much than dazzle and entertain ourselves. — apokrisis
This spiel itself is self-referentially a tool that has worked for me. — t0m
Still, I was pointing out the degree to which any force your argument could carry would be down to its rational structure. Or are you saying that hinging your argument on metaphysical dichotomies, like aesthetic vs rational, or subjective vs objective, are merely rhetorical tropes - said for poetic effect here, and not something you believe, or that should in fact sway me other than as poetic? — apokrisis
I suggest that personalities "compute" from a basis of liquid or fuzzy re-programmable "axioms." These are dearly held, self-esteem-grounding beliefs involving virtue, especially intellectual virtue among philosophers ('intellectual conscience.') — t0m
Again, the issue is what is one to make of your language use when it employs dialectical structure as if attempting a rational argument. It could be merely just an effect chosen for it aesthetic quality, which is what you seem to be claiming. You don’t mean to be doing philosophy. It is enough to play at sounding like you are philosophising. — apokrisis
That’s fine. It’s fun. It’s an art. And you then give a metaphysical justification for it. We can’t in fact know reality. Rational explanation is always pragmatic and so always just a form of workable pretence. Because I am a pragmatist, even I would have to go along with that, is indeed the strong reply you can make. — apokrisis
So aesthetics and rationality could only be two ends of a spectrum, not two actually separated absolutes. It is not a problem that a little of each always remains part of its other. — apokrisis
So while you appear to be celebrating the possibility of confused mixes of aesthetics and rationality - philosophical discourse as a poetic chain of rhetorical flourishes - my own concern is to achieve the ability to switch crisply between one and the other as modes of discourse. I might agree they spring from the same ground - the muzziness of creative speech as social performance. But then there is a reason to be able to be switch as purely as possible into the mode required for some particular socially agreed domain. — apokrisis
Other agendas can be in play. PoMo may play at speaking metaphysics in a way designed to undermine its analytic authority. The politics of disruption are pretty transparent. But why would one grant that legitimacy?
So I am claiming that there is a right way to do metaphysics. The fact that it underwrites good science is no surprise. And also it is not unreasonable to suspect ulterior motives in those who seek to undermine the possibility of rational certainties.
My pragmatic approach already accepts that no truths are certain. So that isn’t even the point. However it also says that knowing how not to let aesthetics or other modes of discourse get mixed up in the discussion is crucial for making metaphysical speech anything much at all. — apokrisis
...thinking is purpose driven. Roughly speaking, truth is a means. We act on a map of the world. — t0m
When you say that I'm not doing philosophy, this is an implicit definition of philosophy that excludes the dissonance that might otherwise be said to constitute philosophy. — t0m
But this is a map of mapping itself within the map and itself subject to the dialectic. — t0m
I include the deep and important matters of "spirituality" and a basic sense of sanity and self-esteem in this. In fact I think they are the center. — t0m
We agree on workable pretense. — t0m
So even the most objective system is arguably just a tool of maximum durability. — t0m
But philosophy is, among other things, a criterion of criteria.The fantasy or hope is that some eternal meta-criterion can ground itself presuppositionlessly. But it would have to be self-justifying or circular. — t0m
We don't stop seeing the table at a place where we eat with our family, even if we "know" that it's "really" particles, etc. — t0m
Switching domains is part of the charm of my theory for me. — t0m
Respectfully, I think you are being willfully "blind" in this collapsing of many thinkers into a single "PoMo." Your criticism of PoMo is itself along PoMo lines. You look into politics, legitimacy, ulterior motives. But what of your own ulterior motives? — t0m
Creativity is the source, including the source of the criteria for evaluating this creativity. There is a world out there that constrains our creativity, but we are seemingly never finished creatively mapping this constraint. — t0m
Yep. So we agree on pragmatism and its approach to rationalism?
What is distinctive is that purpose is included in epistemology. The map is not claimed to be a map of the world, but a map of a self in relation with a world. The ontological assumption here is that even "the self" is a modelled construction.
And so pragmatism simply takes for granted the socially constructed nature or truth, incorporating it into its very epistemology. It is upfront that every act of modelling has an agenda. And this is not a problem, given that the forming of "selfhood" - both personally and collectively - is how purposes or agendas could even arise.
So analytic philosophy is characterised by its desire for objective truth - truth without messy observers projecting their wishes and prejudices on to the reality being mapped. But pragmatism is quite different on that score. — apokrisis
I did more that assert that. I'm arguing it.
If you want to narrow "philosophy" to "metaphysics", that's cool. But metaphysics grounds "proper philosophy" anyway. Or that is the position I will argue. — apokrisis
So what I reject is that subjectivity is to be found "within oneself" - the Romantic story. But one wants to be fully part of the social world which is where one finds one's "true self" as a social animal. — apokrisis
Yes. But "just"?
It is significant that a social animal equipped with a habit of speech could even work out what the heck was going on in the Universe in any fashion at all, let alone down to a story with mathematically logical necessity, like the Standard Model of particle physics. — apokrisis
OK. You want to argue for infinite regress. — apokrisis
Of course. That is all part of what I've argued. The rational objective view stands in sharp contrast to the everyday business of living authentically in some actual physical and social milieu. It would be insane to mix up these modes of discourse.
You don't want to treat your family and living room as abstract metaphysical constructs. But by the same token, you don't want to claim commonsense, traditional belief, or folk wisdom, as the better base for metaphysical insight. — apokrisis
Sure. I am arguing for that too. But I am saying that metaphysics is the ur-rational discourse. It has to be to ground maths and science. Dialectical categories like discrete~continuous, matter~form, chance~necessity, one~many, and scores more, were how the whole rational/objective view of existence got started. — apokrisis
But "philosophy" is big enough to accept both modes of discourse. Well, in the end, I don't think it does. I think people who argue that always have a hidden pragmatic agenda - social goals in mind. — apokrisis
But PoMo especially is a political movement. It's purpose is social change. Well, in France especially, it is a route to being a public person, with all the personal advantages that can bring. C'mon. We can all see the game going on! — apokrisis
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